

LAND DISTRIBUTION AND THE POLITICS OF RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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Abstract

Original

The paper will examine the politics of land distribution and race relations in Southern Africa, with a particular focus on the experiences of the former settler colonial states of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia. After a brief introduction section, the paper will develop its conceptual framework, review the structure and state of relationships regarding race and land distribution, and land demands. This will be followed by a review of land policies and detailed case study evidence from the sub-region. The paper will synthesise international aid inputs to land reform and draw conclusions.

The paper will utilise a historical and political-economic framework to examine the evolution of racial inequalities, conflicts and struggles over land and policies to address these. The preferred framework is at once necessarily a conflict analysis and structuralist, materialist perspective which elucidates the evolution of conflictual race relations, in a context where social justice and equity issues have been subsumed or traded-off against neoliberal political and market based notions of governance and rule of law, as well as by trickle-down and welfarist poverty reduction perspectives. This analytic framework will be elaborated later.

Following this section the paper will examine the structure and patterns of race relations, which underlie land inequalities in Southern Africa. This will be based upon the relative distribution of broad demographic features, wealth and income status, economic control and management, formal political party and civil society participation and social relations in these societies. This section will also provide a framework for analyzing the social basis for land demand, struggles and policy making.

Thereafter, the paper will provide a detailed assessment of racially and class or size based land holdings, land use and income or welfare benefits from such holdings, and relate these to a few economic indicators. Data and indices of inequality, scarcity and landlessness will be presented and discussed.

This section will then be followed by a section portraying the various forms, types and sources of demand for land redistribution. These include formal and informal, legal and underground or illegal forms of demand for land redistribution, and historical and contemporary demands based upon different motives needs and issues. This section will elaborate upon how civil society organisations, parties, including War Vets, business representative organisations, community-based organisations and

traditional structures organize and demand land redistribution. The racial content of this will be examined.

The paper will then provide a broad scan of land policies, which have been pursued or demanded to address land inequalities. Such policies of necessity must cover land ownership issues and land redistribution policies, colonially developed discriminatory land use regulations and land tenure policies and administration systems, which deepened and institutionalised social and economic inequalities derived from resulting unequal agrarian structures. Different approaches to land redistribution followed will be examined. These will include land restitution, direct land redistribution and resettlement, tenure enhancement and reform, as well as other ancilliary corrective land use measures. The paper will survey the broad beneficiaries of such public policies and assess their general impact. In another sub-section, the paper will examine these politics and policies of land reform, with particular reference to the Zimbabwe experience and its implications for South Africa and Namibia. Details of political process, violence and conflict will be explored, as will be the manner in which international relations and aid have affected land reform in post-colonial settler Zimbabwe.

The paper will conclude by summarising the key elements from the above sections, and drawing conclusions concerning ways in which race relations in Southern Africa can be improved through land reform policies. The section will emphasise policies that ensure that historical social justice and contemporary problems of equity poverty reduction and broader economic growth are addressed directly rather than subsumed by aid preconditions for complex and hurried political and economic reforms premised upon simplistic market processes and narrowly founded approaches to good governance and the “rule of law”. The paper will conclude that social justice based upon more equitable race relations and land distribution is integral to longer-term political reform and economic development.

Table of Contents

List of Tables	v
List of Figures.....	v
List of Annexes	v
1.0 Introduction	1
1.1 The Problem	1
1.2 Background Issues.....	2
2.0 Conceptual Issues	6
2.1 Race Relations and Land Ownership	6
2.2 Destruction of Black Cultures, Nations and Systems	7
2.3 Post Colonial Forces of Land Problem and Global Dimensions..	8
2.4 The White Commercial Economy	9
2.5 Environmentalism and Tourism Control.....	11
3.0 Land Holding Patterns in the Region.....	12
3.1 Roots of Racial Land Holding Patterns.....	12
3.2 Present Regional Land Holding Patterns	14
3.3 Contested Settler Notions of land size	18
3.4 Land Tenure by Race and Gender in Zimbabwe	20
4.0 Politics and Demands for Land Redistribution.....	24
4.1 Elite Demands of the Middle Class	24
4.2 Popular Demands.....	26
4.3 Political Competition, Race and the Land Issue	28
5.0 Public Policies to Address Inequality and Race Relations	29
5.1 Deracialising Land Holdings	30
5.2 Market Orientation and its Problems.....	31
5.3 Land Restitution	32
5.4 Interactions of Policy and Social Action.....	33
6.0 Regional and International Dimension	34
6.1 International Role and Responsibility in Land Problem	34
6.2 Post Colonial and Neo-colonial Framework	35
7.0 Conclusions	35
8.0 References	36
9.0 Annexes.....	39

List of Tables

Table 1.1	Land and Population in Southern Africa	3
Table 1.2:	Structure of Population by Race in the region.....	4
Table 3.1:	Settler Alienation of Land in Southern Africa	13
Table 3.2:	Land Tenure in Southern Africa (Approximate % of national territory)	14
Table 3.3:	Agricultural Land Distribution Pattern in Zimbabwe (million hectares)	16
Table 3.4:	Large Scale Black Farm Ownership in Zimbabwe.....	17
Table 3.5:	Per Capita Arable Land in the SADC Region	18
Table 3.6:	Ownership Type by Area in Hectares.....	20
Table 3.7:	Number of Multiple by Owner Count and Total Area	20
Table 3.8:	Multiple Farm Area Class by Farm Count and Total Area ..	21

List of Figures

Figure 2.1:	Polarised Values on Land Reform and Democratisation.....	8
Figure 3.1:	Size and Structure of LSCF in 1998	19
Figure 3.2:	Nationality, farm count and area	22
Figure 4.1:	Estimated frequency of land occupations: 1980-2000	27
Figure 5.1:	Generic National Land Problems.....	30
Figure 5.2:	Land Redistribution: 1980, 2000 and Target.....	32
Figure 5.3:	Land Acquisition Framework	34

List of Annexes

Annex 9.1:	The Land Question Profiles in Southern Africa	39
Annex 9.2:	Land Tenure and Land Use Profiles in Zimbabwe.....	40
Annex 9.3:	Land Distribution by Sector in Zimbabwe	40
Annex 9.4:	Structure of Large Scale Commercial Farm Sector in Zimbabwe	41

1.0 Introduction

This paper examines the politics of land distribution and race relations in Southern Africa, with a particular focus on the experiences of the former settler colonial states of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia. In general the paper examines how the question of race and land has contributed to immense conflicts in the southern African region, including at the African Union and international level. It reviews the structure and state of relationships regarding race and land distribution, and land demands. This is followed by a review of land policies and detailed case study evidence from the sub-region. The paper synthesise international aid inputs to land reform and draw conclusions.

1.1 The Problem

Colonial land policies used the law to institutionalize racial inequity in land. The need to confront and redress the consequences of historical and colonial land expropriation, as well as to redress contemporary inequities, discriminatory legislation and institutions, has been a source of renewed racial conflict. The major sources of land conflict today arise from struggles to access land and associated natural resources by indigenous populations, insecurity of customary tenure in areas where the majority blacks reside in the rural areas, and the colonial hangover has seen continued use of discriminatory and ineffective institutions that administer land use and adjudicate over land disputes. This is the legacy that confronts mainly the former settler colonies such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa¹ as well as other countries, which experienced low intensity European settlerism such as Malawi, Swaziland and Botswana.²

A major aspect of the race and land conflict is the ideological distortions that have shrouded social, political and policy perspectives of the land question that reign in southern African debates (see box 1.1). The land reform debates in southern Africa have rekindled the question of race within the context of land and natural resource ownership, social justice,

1 In South Africa the discourses associated with apartheid were based on the notions of segregation. The group areas and the so-called Bantustans served to exclude people from living in certain places while forcing them to belong to others. It is commonly believed that 3.5 million black people were displaced as a result of racially discriminating laws and practices between 1960 and 1980 (Department of Land Affairs, 1996).

2 Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia experienced delayed independence mainly because the former colonial masters sought to protect white capital including large scale white commercial farmers holding on to the prime lands. The constitutional making process in granting independence was characterized by intense lobbying to protect private properties by the former colonial master thus sanctifying a clause on willing-seller-willing buyer on all freehold land.

reconciliation, colonial responsibility and the need for restitution or reparations for past misdeeds by white settlers.³

Box 1.1: Some Basic Myths on Land and Race in the Region

- there is a tendency to legitimize socially and politically the land rights held by white minorities over the land they expropriated;
- the freehold landholding (that in the case of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa in white hands) and the existing private land market system are effective and absolutely superior to other forms of tenure such as leasehold and customary (so-called “communal”) tenure;
- postcolonial state is irrational and undermines food security and confidence in the large scale agricultural sector through compulsory land acquisition;
- traditional land administration is archaic, autocratic and ineffective and therefore a constraint to commercialization of land;
- smallholders underutilise their land and that farms held by whites are efficiently utilised both in terms of the scale of area used and yields per unit of land;
- it is only the white farmers who can master superior technology, knowledge and information, for efficient large-scale production;
- black land husbandry is environmentally destructive;
- Smallholders (read black) farmers are merely subsistence farmers contributing little to the economy.

The indigenous black population has been victims of slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism and continue to be marginalised in global politics and economic benefits to land and natural resources. Nevertheless, it is within the context of the liberation struggles, entailing both violent and non-violent struggles that represent the real first attempts at addressing racial inequalities including lack of access to land and natural resources by the black majority in most of southern Africa. In the 1960s, both violent and non-violent confrontations were the hallmark of reclaiming political and economic sovereignty. Today the ethos of reclaiming land and natural resources has remobilised the question of race and land ownership internationally.

1.2 Background Issues

The existing structure and patterns of race relations, which underlie land inequalities in Southern Africa are based upon a relatively unique distribution of demographic features including population, wealth, income, and employment patterns which define economic control and management. Moreover, political party and civil society participation and

³ In South Africa a commission on Restitution of Land Rights as well as a Land Claims Court were established in 1994. The forms of restitution that are available include the restoration of original land and properties, possibilities of obtaining alternative land, priority access to state housing schemes and development projects as well as monetary compensation

social relations are also heavily polarized racially in these societies. This framework explains the social basis for land demand, struggles and policy making, which maintains a racial divide in spite of class and party alliances, which may transcend colour and race.

Immediately after the independence many large white farmers especially in the former settler colonies migrated to South Africa seeking sanctuaries for fear of recriminations from the new governments. In Mozambique and Angola, the white settlers were forced off the land mainly because of the euphoria over independence and the ideology that was there at that time. In line with the new paradigm shift,⁴ today there is evidence of a wave of new migration by white large farmers into Zambia and Mozambique creating new forms of land struggles in those countries. The new wave of migration has been spurred by the opportunities provided by those countries that did not have a significant settler population in the past. This has increased the foreign stake in land ownership in countries that demand freehold to guarantee their investment.⁵

Table 1.1 Land and Population in Southern Africa

Country	Land Area (000 ha)	Potential Agric. Area (000 ha)	Population Density (per 1000 ha)	Total Population (mill)
Angola	124 670	31 500	90	10.01
Botswana	60 537	5 330	26	1.3
Lesotho	3 035	861	685	1.80
Malawi	11 408	3 273	1,046	7.9
Mozambique	80 159	40 409	227	15.5
Namibia	82 429	6 570	19	1.16
South Africa	122 104	134 730	347	35.8
Swaziland	1 736	364	512	0.8
Tanzania	91 509	45 030	349	26.0
Zambia	75 261	24 998	111	7.6
Zimbabwe	39 058	3 524	296	11.4
Totals	477 121	155 289		

Source: Adapted from Cumming, (1999)⁶

4 Whilst in the 1960s and 1970s, the state was being lauded as the most viable framework of governance and economic development, in the 1980s and 1990s there was greater calls for economic development through mobilizing private sector capital. More international trade and the prominent role of lending institutions such as the World Bank and IMF meant that foreign direct investment has been seen as key to rescuing diminishing economies in Africa. It is within this framework that global and regional mainly white investors have been criss-crossing the region trying to find where they can invest. The agricultural sector has been prime target of such investment.

5 Given the lucrative incentives provided through such foreign investment especially through export processing zones this has created a contradictory path of development with major problems. Indigenous people who feel that the best land used in such transactions is being mortgaged to foreign interests at their exclusion.

6 Cumming, D. (1999) African Development Indicators 1998/99, the World Bank, Washington D C

In terms of population of structure, South Africa (14%) and Namibia (11%) have the largest number of whites and white farmer population. This means that the potential for land conflicts are much greater for these countries as compared to Zimbabwe (0.8 %). In Zimbabwe the actual number of white farmers is low, even though whites command a significant influence in the economy through the control of industry, commerce and manufacturing. There has been a significant growth of white South African, British and other external capital seeking to control these industry as well as controlling land as well. Foreign land expropriation has a historical dimension to it as indigenous black feel that they fought for the land to be reward with numerous constitutional regulations protecting private property making it difficult for the indigenous people to access land.⁷

Table 1.2: Structure of Population by Race in the region

Country	Zimbabwe	South Africa	Namibia	Zambia
	1992	1996	1991	1990
African	98.8	76.3	88.6	98.7
European	0.8	13.7	11.1	0.1
Asiatic	0.1	2.5	-	0.1
Mixed	0.29	8.5	-	-

Source: SHDR, (2000, p. 127)

The land question has now spread beyond the former settler colonies and the breath and intensity of land expropriation in the context of globalisation where wildlife and tourism are becoming more important than the livelihood of the local communities are issues that require further investigation. In the last few years there has been a noticeable demographic shift prompted by white farmer migration to non-settler countries such as Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana because of perceptions of peace.⁸ It is false to think that land can just be expropriated eternally and, therefore, the phenomenon of white settlers is a short term one.

Yet, land conflicts along racial lines in Zimbabwe have demonstrated that peace without justice and social integration of whites rests on a weak

⁷ The constraints faced by governments faced trying to address these problems are numerous and varies by country. In Zimbabwe it also include lack of resources to acquire land, unwilling land owners to offer land for state resettlement projects, prohibitant rates of compensation, litigations in court.

⁸ The number of white farmers is increasing due to proactive attractive policies in Mozambique and Zambia who feel that such outside investment is a necessary condition for growth (Mudenda, 2000; Moyo, 2000).

foundation. Mozambique and Angola are purported to have ruined their economies through violent eviction of white settlers. However, there are important lessons to be learnt from farcical political settlements that did not address the core racial problem particularly in relation to natural resources ownership as well as the down stream economic opportunities ensuing from such control.

One key problem is that most of the white landowners are not socially grounded in the land tenure value system of the region and are remote from the mainstream politics. The foreign citizenship and physical absence of many of the large white landowners and the increasing use of stock holding land tenure arrangements for the control of land, especially in the growing eco-tourist industry, has increasingly globalised the fundamental interests of region's land question.⁹

The race issue is predominant in the control of the economy including agriculture, manufacturing industry as well as commerce by multinational companies and individual whites.¹⁰ This makes the race issue much more intractable in the sense that most of the wealth is derived from such control. In South African land problem presents complexity mostly because of its deep seated manifestations in both massive urban slums and marginal rural areas under extreme population pressure, the long political struggle to regain national independence and the complexities of land expropriation and claims processes over many centuries in the context of resistance by a numerically and organized larger white minority population is at the roots of land conflicts.¹¹ The rest of the southern African countries have low white populations and fewer in farming, yet they control a large part of the land in these countries.

The income distribution reflects the demographic patterns, with whites having access to the high incomes. These high incomes in a sea of massive rural and urban poverty in black communities, creates animosity between blacks and whites. Most black have no access to a sustainable incomes base outside agriculture and the unemployment levels exacerbate the situation. In the former settler colonies racist land ownership patterns were applied in urban areas with the physical residential segregation of

9 Moyo, S. The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programme on Land Uses in Zimbabwe, 1998

10 The predominant labour force in industry and manufacturing sector are blacks, with whites dominating in the managerial positions and proprietorship of companies. Even though the number of commercial farmers in the large-scale commercial farming area is very low, they do employ a large percentage of the black labour force. Many studies have shown that countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe have a 'foreign' legion of black farm labour whose condition of living is pathetic.

11 South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe have a "well organized" farming community led by unions in conformity with their long presence in the farming sector.

blacks and whites. Moreover, whites sought to develop their own enclaves through social segregation in the form of separate schools, hospitals, country clubs, and so forth. These exclusionary benefits tends to create conflicts that has contributed to violence and criminal activities on the farms in South Africa and Zimbabwe as the blacks and whites struggle over the control of land and natural resources and the benefits derived from them.

Beyond race there are other land conflicts precipitated by ethnicity with numerous minority groups being denied access to land. In Botswana, the san land or so-called “bushmen” land has been expropriated by large mining concerns due to diamond mining with piece-meal compensation to the tribes. In Zimbabwe, whilst the ethnic dimension is clouded with the national land expropriation there are trends in the past that shows that the shona ethnic group had an upper hand over others in land allocation in the prime lands (Moyo, 1998; Moyo, 1995). The Herero, in Namibia, and the Maasai in Tanzania, have suffered the same fate as land expropriated from the white landowners was said to have been transferred to the majority tribes (Shivji, 1998). As a result the original claimants have suffered from lack of land rights.

2.0 Conceptual Issues

The section utilises a historical and political-economic framework to examine the evolution of racial inequalities, conflicts and struggles over land and policies to address these. A conflict analysis and structuralist, materialist perspective, which elucidates the evolution of conflictual race relations is used. This discussion is contextualised where social justice and equity issues have been subsumed or traded-off against neoliberal political and market based notions of governance and rule of law, as well as by trickle-down and welfarist poverty reduction perspectives.

2.1 Race Relations and Land Ownership

Settler colonialism and land expropriation is at the root of land and race problem. Conflict today results from past violence over access to land and natural resources during pre-colonial conquest that continued during the colonial period. During the colonial period there was polarisation along racial lines due to ill-treatment of blacks by whites on farms, mines and towns. Whilst the primary motive was land expropriation, proletarianisation was instituted as a means of making blacks cheap labour force on farms and mines (Arrighi, 1973). In order to develop a manufacturing base for white consumption the, white settler regime had

to expropriate land as the key means of production followed by exploitation of cheap black labour (Ibid.).

Greater national control by whites in the past of legislative control found expression in an institutional framework strongly biased in favour of the interests of the whites. (Umhlaba, 1989, p. 15) states that "...the only real edge that white farmers have over black farmers, is that they own the land. The only reason they own the land is because they are white. And by owning the land, they gain control over the black farmers in the area who must work for them on their terms, to keep a toehold on the land"

In South Africa, white farmers have always been able to rely on the implicit and explicit support of the police, the judiciary, the white parliament, the white technical experts so that their absolute power was seldomly challenged (Umhlaba, 1989). White farmers in South Africa (Zimbabwe and Namibia) often act as though they have absolute power and control over the lives of the black people who live on the land. "Assault and murder are commonplace and very few of the whites were prosecuted even when charges were laid". In the guise of protecting property, which sounds rationale on paper, the colonial state created an administrative system in the image of the white settlers that was exclusive of the indigenous blacks. In "...all institutions in the Transvaal platteland are fundamentally racist: shops, the police, the post offices and the courts. This can be related to the way in which race is functional to the balance of power in the areas..." (Umhlaba, 1989, p. 15)

2.2 Destruction of Black Cultures, Nations and Systems

The grand racist project of subjugation blacks found expression in the environmentalism discourse. Africans are seen as objects of environmental aestheticism (eco-culture, eco-tourism). Whilst little money trickle into these communities, the string of benefits of land control rests with external financiers and safari operators.¹² The root of destruction of black cultures can be traced to missionarism (Rhodes, Moffat, Livingstone) promoting the so-called 'civilisation' that labelled African religion as 'paganism'.¹³ Most of the black traditional leaders were evicted from places of their traditional rituals as the white

12 Some communities have expressed on their commercialization of their cultures through tourism for greed. This they point out that it undermines their cultures as people are conditioned not to take some of the ritual activities seriously.

13 The benefits that missionarism brought to Africa are in fact contested. Schools, mission hospitals and churches were constructed on the basis of the white image. The educational system reflected the nature of racial segregation as the blacks had a curriculum geared towards making them employees of the whites on farms and industry rather than making them employers in direct competition with white supremacist tendencies.

missionaries took over the control of land. White administrators found alliance with such missionaries in sanctifying the conquest of land.

Whilst, ethnicity¹⁴ was a longstanding problem within the diverse groups in Africa, the white missionaries and administrators promoted it as a basis for fanning divisive tendency to annihilate blacks. Subjugation of traditional leaders (chiefs, spirit mediums) including promotion of Christianity led to divide and rule tendencies. Owners of white capital, are perceived to have been responsible for fanning ethnicity as a means of taking control of the string of benefits that comes from land resources such as minerals (diamonds, gold, etc).

2.3 Post Colonial Forces of Land Problem and Global Dimensions

A wave of liberalism, which focuses on liberal political rights and market reform rather than social justice, rights and redistribution have become a key feature of structural adjustment prescription in most of the African countries. This has been based on policies and political reforms of white business, global capital and middle class and rather than the survival and economic needs of rural poor and working class. The focus has now turned to democratisation without questioning inequities over land and natural resources control. The rule of law has been used to protect that which was unjustly robbed from the indigenous people.

Figure 2.1: Polarised Values on Land Reform and Democratisation

Land Redistribution		Democratisation
• Equity	vs.	• Democracy
• Social Rights	vs.	• Liberal Political Rights
• Need/Poverty and Reparations	vs.	• Efficiency
• Historical Social Justice	vs.	• Contemporary Governance Problem
• Majority/Indigenisation Property Rights	vs.	• White minority Property Rights
• Reinvention of Law (Legal property rights regime, Popular interest)	vs.	• Received Rule of Law
• Customary Law or Indigenous/historic and legitimate	vs.	• Existing universalized system of law and property rights

There is a perception that there is a coalition of industry and agriculture to protect string of benefits for a few white minorities. Increasingly through global conventions such as WTO, UNCED, Kyoto and so forth, countries in the south are under pressure to strike a balance between environment protection and the need for land reform. Donors have also put pressure that land reform should not be at the expense of the environment, yet ignoring the historical context in which population

¹⁴ Consciousness of ones culture and identity

pressure is a contributory factor to environmental problems in the communal areas. Liberal NGOs have become embroiled in the Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) discourses without questioning land ownership patterns as the first stage in resolving the environmental problems.

Land reform models termed negotiated land reforms and market-assisted reforms have been promoted by global institutions such as the World Bank as a way of conflict resolution through provision of funding. However, the market assisted land reforms tend to tacitly protect and empower white landowners who have the power in such land transaction to or not offer land suitable for government resettlement plans (Moyo, 2000; Deininger, Biswanger etc). Yet, in the same breath the same global institutions call for export incentives and protection of private investment through national laws, global conventions such as WTO, Vienna that do not favour the smallholders who are mainly black.

2.4 The White Commercial Economy

It has become a global perspective that commercial is large scale and white based, whilst subsistence is for black peasantry. In a few instances there has been piecemeal concessions of land to 'buy-out' black elites in the form of affirmative action programmes. Yet, competition from rural elites was contained through restrictions on land sales in the communal areas during the colonial and postcolonial period. As a result rural elites have not been able to use land as a basis for attracting credit.¹⁵ Moreover, they could not consolidate land for commercial production, which could have led to competition with whites (Machingaidze, 1990; Arrighi, 1973). The protection of the white economy is also found within export agriculture, which has remained a preserve for white farmers, with the parity domestic market meant for blacks. However, even on the internal market, smallholders face many obstacles due to the location of communal areas far away from lines of communication to the market.

State subsidies have been used to support white farmers because they are considered key in exports. The food security¹⁶ concept has been used as an argument for subsidies to the large-scale commercial farming sector. In order to ensure a successful commercial sector, the colonial and

¹⁵ There is a perception that most of the financial institutions are racist in character because of the tendency to view blacks as high risk clients in the advancement of loans. Whilst, whites use land as a form of collateral, blacks have not been able to do so because they live in areas regarded as state land.

¹⁶ The large-scale farmers, who have large pieces of land, are regarded critical for food security. It is for this reason that a lot of subsidies go into large scale commercial farming at the exclusion of smallholders, who have to perpetually depend on food subsidies because the land they have cannot sustain commercial production.

postcolonial regimes have supported research stations located in white farming areas. This together with biased development of infrastructure such as public dams, roads, communications, and power etc, benefit white farmers to the exclusion of blacks. The aim was to widen the differential productivity of white agriculture to that of the black peasantry.

To date, land policy in Southern Africa has not fully taken on board mainstream agricultural economics debates. These have demonstrated through global case evidence that smaller sized farms tend to use their land more productively, in terms of higher unit yields and the use of labour.¹⁷ This has been the case because of the self-supervision of labour provided by peasant households particularly female and child labour. The recent exposure of governments and settlers to impressive small farmer performance in Malawi and Zimbabwe has only gradually changed beliefs about smallholder efficiency and competitiveness,¹⁸ and this despite the abundant historical evidence to this effect.¹⁹ The belief in the greater efficiency of large farms has also been a key constraint to progressive land policy in non-settler states before and after independence. Various governments, including Malawi, Swaziland and Botswana, developed their agricultural and land policies from the late 1960s on the basis of promoting large estates because of the need for economies of scale and the presumed superiority of large farms.

Such land policies initially encouraged land alienation in favour of foreign agribusiness and parastatal estates. Later in the 1980s, land policies in Southern Africa promoted individual indigenous capitalist farmers, drawn from senior politicians and civil servants, retirees and other formerly non-agrarian indigenous business people.²⁰ Once again macro-economic and agricultural policy regimes ensured that various resources such as credit, foreign currency and infrastructure were mainly allocated to both white and indigenous large capitalist farmers. The effects of such preferential resource allocations were wrongly taken to imply that large-scale farming was more effective than smallholder farming in Southern Africa. This had the effect of legitimising the expansion of large-scale landholdings and discouraging land reform in

17 This issue is explored in detail by the following authors: W. A. Master, *Government and Agriculture*, (Praeger, London 1994); Sam Moyo, *Land Reform Experiences in Southern Africa*, in Sam Moyo and Dan Tevera (editors), *Environmental security in Southern Africa*, (SAPES Books, Harare, 1999).

18 Daniel Weiner, Sam Moyo and B. Manslow and Phil Okeefe, "Land Use and Agricultural Productivity in Zimbabwe", (*Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 2., 1985); Sam Moyo, 'The Land Question in Zimbabwe', in Mandaza (ed.), *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition*, (Codesria, Dakar, 1987).

19 Sam Moyo, *The Land Question in Zimbabwe*.

20 Indigenous elite farmers tend to seek large farms, which promotes temporary alliances emerging between them and large-scale white farmers thereby further derailing state efforts to acquire and redistribute land.

those countries where growing land ownership imbalances were exacerbating land shortages, land degradation and rural poverty.

2.5 Environmentalism and Tourism Control

Within the environmental literature black husbandry is regarded as poor and that blacks will destroy the environment through land resettlement. The racist perception is that it is only whites who can value and nurture the environment better. Intercropping is said to be the major practice that destroys the soil. This is in contrast to 'conventional' white system of agriculture with crops in neat straight lines, using advanced technology and chemicals that blacks are said to be incapable of using or able to acquire. A lot of literature has disapproved this notion, yet ITK promoted by liberal NGOs suffers from its inherent link to global capital keen on relegating blacks to communal areas through community based natural resources projects that do not improve the standards of the living.

There is a common middle class belief that the poor degrade land and that the large-scale commercial sectors use land efficiently. This ideology underlies the excessive focus of NGO schemes to 'protect' land and to 'educate' the peasantry on sustainable land use, rather than their advocacy for land redistribution. Generally, NGOs have been and remain a reactionary force rather than an agenda setting one. NGOs can be conceived as a new mechanism for promoting the so called 'indirect rule system' wherein they increasingly substitute the local state and traditional authority in organising community in the co-management of state and donor initiated development projects.²¹ This tendency begs further questions in the debate on the nature and weakness of NGOs to champion the rights of the indigenous people to their land and better standards of living.²²

In terms of tourism, non-landlocked countries such as Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa, white large-scale commercial farmers including mega-tourism ventures have in the past and today expropriated land at the coastal zones. In the past, racial discriminations meant that blacks could not even access holiday resorts. Yet more importantly, the cost of coastal prime lands for tourism development has been made artificially high from the reach of most blacks. It is within this context that programmes such as land restitution will not solve such racist denial

²¹ Ibid.

²² Mahmood Mamdani, 1996. "Citizens and Subjects: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism" Princetown University Press. UK.

of access to these prime lands because indigenous people have never had a tradition of living on coastal zones.²³

Through tourism projects including the so-called transboundary peace parks involving two or more countries, global capital has found an avenue for land expropriation in the context of foreign direct investment. In Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa many of the black, white and foreign elites tend to allocate to themselves large tracts of land for commercial farming or tourism and in addition lobby the state for favourable policies (Moyo, 2000a). The marginalisation of the majority of the people tends to create political conflicts with those who seek to enjoy the same benefits. The political and economic consequences of these political problems in the region are broadly the same: poverty, enforced high population density in customary lands, land degradation, a lack of resources to invest in adequate land management and political uncertainty.

3.0 Land Holding Patterns in the Region

3.1 Roots of Racial Land Holding Patterns

Post apartheid idealism have ignored but not changed the fact that whites ‘conquered’ in most of the countries in the southern Africa region. The process of dislocation of indigenous blacks saw the white settlers assume the right to recreate a feudal or lord system, imposing themselves as the lords. The idea of creating commercial farms arose in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Malawi arose racist conceptions that the blacks could not fully utilise land and could not be relied on for food security in these countries.²⁴ For instance, the use of the indirect rule and apportionment of land to white settler interests orchestrated by Morris Carter in most of the British colonies in sub-Saharan Africa saw land administration being usurped from the indigenous population.

Only Botswana had no land alienation by white settlers in 1958. On the other hand Angola, Lesotho and Zambia had lower percentages of land alienated (table 3.1). In terms of settler population Namibia seem to have had a significant white settler population mainly composed of the Afrikaners, Germans and Austrians in 1960 with 19%. The greatest white

²³ Blacks have never had a tradition of privatising land nor denial of others to access land for enjoying natural resources. Fighting for access to beaches and fishing rights on oceans was central to the liberation struggles in those countries that are not landlocked.

²⁴ In Zimbabwe after the ‘First World War’ the ‘tenant-farming scheme’ was consolidated for whites and the ‘African purchase areas’ for blacks. The prescribed farm size for blacks was 150 hectares while that for whites was 2 000 hectares increasing with Agro- ecological natural region from II –IV reflecting socially preconceived ideas of what kind of land use and level of income was appropriate to each of the races.

settler land alienation occurred in South Africa with 89% with the Dutch and English jostling for the control of land since the 18th century.

Table 3.1: Settler Alienation of Land in Southern Africa

Country	% Land Alienated by Settlers	White Settler % of pop		
	1958	2000	1960	2000
Angola	6,0		1,0	
Botswana	0,0		0,3	
Lesotho	5,0		0,3	
Malawi	43,0		8,0	
Namibia	43,0		19,4	
South Africa	89,0		2,8	
Swaziland	49,0		0,2	
Zambia	3,0		3,0	
Zimbabwe	49,0	41	7,1	

Source: Hendricks (1995), page 9.

It took 40 years of apartheid and 100 years of segregation and discrimination and 300 years of colonialism and slavery to sanctify the present land ownership in South Africa.²⁵ It also took 100 years, of struggle that involved Namibia being declared a protectorate of apartheid South Africa as well as legal entrenchment of private property rights that protected the settlers, which made freehold title to land appear the accepted norm. In Zimbabwe, similar patterns of racist land ownership were created over a space of over 100 years and involved systematic dislocation of indigenous people from the most fertile land through violent eviction and enactment of racist laws.²⁶

In the 1960s, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Angola had a smaller white settler population. It was only in Botswana during this period, which did not suffer from massive land expropriation. Significantly traditional leaders in Botswana during the wars of conquest sought protectorate status from the United Kingdom. Namibia had the unfortunate experience of being declared a South African protectorate under the League of Nations, after having been a colony of German. The underlying premises of such administrative arrangements sanctioned by world bodies (League of Nations/UN?) denied independence to the indigenous people to run their own affairs, thus creating a platform for white administrators to enact racist colonial laws that protected the interest of white farmers on the form of freehold title to land.

²⁵ Andile Mgxitama (1999) Striking a balance between NGO-Government Collaboration: Is it positive Engagement or Co-optation, Windhoek, Namibia, 15-18 November.

²⁶ There is a precise need to understand the circumstances in which the past evictions took place. Racism on farms and in towns was at the roots of the grievances that propelled independence that at times had a violent dimension to it.

3.2 Present Regional Land Holding Patterns

Countries such as South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe are confronted with unequal land holdings with titled land²⁷ in the hands of a few white commercial farmers who are reluctant to part with the land. The extremely skewed land tenure are excessive in South Africa where white South Africans, who make up only 5% (60,000 white) of the population, own almost 87% (85,5 million) of the land (Moyo, 2000a). Map... show that almost the whole of South Africa is dominated by freehold title still in the hands of whites. Only 20,000 white commercial farmers produce 80% of the gross agricultural product. A further 40,000, including some 2000 black farmers, produce 15%, while 500,000 families living in the former homelands produce an estimated 5%.

Table 3.2: Land Tenure in Southern Africa (Approximate % of national territory)

Country	Private/Freehold Leasehold	Communal/Tribal/C customary	Conservation/Minerals/Water Catchments/Reserves And Other state land
Angola	5.4	88	6.6
Botswana	5	70	25
Lesotho	5 ³	90	5
Malawi	4.3	78.7	17
Mozambique	2.9	93	4.1
Namibia	44	43	13
South Africa	72	14	14
Swaziland	40	60 ²	-
Tanzania	1.5	84	14.5
Zambia	3.1	89	7.9
Zimbabwe	41 ¹	42	16

Sources: Cumming, 1999; Moyo S, *Land Reform Experiences in Southern Africa*.

Notes: 1. Includes small-scale farm leases and resettlements.

2. Includes Swazi Nation Land (SNL) held under customary tenure and the SNL land leased to companies.

3. Leases in urban areas.

However, it is only in Namibia with the highest number of white settlers with 19% of the total population.²⁸ Commercial land under freehold comprises 6,300 farms belonging to 4,200 mostly white male farmers measuring about 30 million hectares of either German, Austria and South Africa origin as well as companies closely linked to the former colonial masters. Map... shows that most of southern Namibia is dominated by freehold title with little pockets of stateland or communal areas. The

²⁷ The large-scale commercial farming sector under such freehold title is dominated by white farmers, multinational corporations, churches and so forth that have strong links to global capital that is mainly white dominated.

²⁸ Namibia has a dualistic agricultural sector comprising large-scale commercial farming sector and a communal sector where most of the black population reside.

freehold land covers 44% of available land and 70% of the most productive agricultural land covering 362,000 square kilometres. By contrast, communal lands comprise 138,000 households with an area of 335,400 square kilometres, which is only 41% of the land available. Since independence from South Africa in 1990, only about 35 000 Namibians have been resettled on commercial farmland. Some 243 000 are still waiting for land and to resettle them the government needs N\$ 900 million (US\$ 112 million) to buy 9.5 million hectares. Only 2.2 million hectares belong to black farmers.²⁹

In the case of Swaziland and Lesotho, the topography reduces the arable land area creating heavy population densities in some parts of the countries. In the same breath customary land tenure is predominant, and the countries have to struggle to meet equitable land ownership as traditional leaders squabble over land allocation and management (Motlatsi, 2000). Yet greater privatisation of state lands as part of foreign direct investment pushes the majority of the people to the worst lands creating nascent conflicts.

In Mozambique, though all land is constitutionally stateland, privatisation of land that started in 1984 through 1987 due to the implementation of IMF structural adjustment programmes creates grounds for racial animosity. The violent confrontation over the land issue in neighbouring Zimbabwe has seen the emigration of white Zimbabweans to Mozambique, with a potential to create tensions there as well.³⁰ Mozambican officials have called for greater social integration of incoming white farmers to avoid creation of “white islands” of development. Prospective farmers negotiate for access to land with the state and local communities to pre-empt future land conflicts.

In Zimbabwe the contest is on the racial distribution of the large-scale commercial farms as most of the LSCF land are located in the most fertile parts of the country.³¹ In the prime lands are the most favourable climatic

29 Financial Gazette, 5-07-01.

30 Mozambique is said to expect 100 white Zimbabweans to settle as commercial farmers. To date at least 10 white Zimbabwean farmers have been allocated 4 000 hectares in Manica province and 40 to 60 jobs are said to have been created. Furthermore a group of 63 white Zimbabweans had requested for 400,000 hectares, but the government of Mozambique has put a cut off point of 1000 hectares per individual application Daily News, 20/07/2001.

31 For agricultural purposes Zimbabwe is divided into the highveld, middleveld and lowveld. The highveld comprise the best climatic conditions of high rainfall, good soils as well as the best physical infrastructure of good roads, railway network, power and communications. The lowveld has good soils, but poor rainfall due to high temperatures and the low topography. In addition the country is also divided into natural regions I, IIa, IIb, III, V and VI. NR I –III covers most of the high and part of the middleveld where most of the white commercial farms are located. The lowveld coinciding with the NR IV and NR V is regarded as not suitable for cropping but for cattle and wildlife ranching. Most of these agricultural enterprises are in the hands of white farmers. This leaves part of NR III and IV coinciding with the present communal areas with minimal

conditions with most of the water resources.³² In Zimbabwe, approximately 4 500³³ white commercial farmers (0.03% of the population) control 31% of the country's land under freehold tenure or about 42% of the agricultural land.³⁴ On the other hand 1.2 million black families in Zimbabwe subsist on 41% of the country's area of 390 076 square kilometres (Ibid.). The highveld stretching from Matebeleland to Mashonaland and the eastern highlands of the country is dominated by freehold title and is under white ownership (see map....).

Table 3.3: Agricultural Land Distribution Pattern in Zimbabwe (million hectares)

Sector	1980	1985	1989	1995	1997	2001
LSCF	15.5	12.3	11.2	11.2	12.1	
SSCF	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	
Communal Areas	16.4	16.4	16.4	16.4	16.4	16.4
Resettlement	-	2.6	3.3	3.4	3.6	7.8
State land	0.5	0.5	0.9	0.5	0.1	
Total	33.1	33.1	33.1	32.8	33.6	

Notes:

State lands includes the CFSS, ADA, CSC, FC

Zimbabwe has 39.6 million square kms, the difference

The resettlement programme in Zimbabwe saw 3.6 million hectares of land being redistributed to 70 000 families from the mainly large-scale white owned land.³⁵ Nevertheless, Zimbabwe has seen little shift in freehold land as the white farmers hold onto the land (table 3.30). Most of the resettlement took place during the first five years of independence. This is the time when most of the white farmers migrated to South Africa and United Kingdom in fear of recrimination against past violence over the blacks. The government called for reconciliation without addressing the racial land problems that precipitated agitation for independence. The black population in most of the communal areas continue to increase

infrastructure and harsh climatic conditions of poor rainfall, poor soils and so forth where most of the black people live.

32 Access to water resources is also skewed in favour of the white large scale commercial farmers because they occupy the highveld where most of the damming of rivers occurred in the past. It is envisaged that a land reform programme that redistributes prime land will also facilitate the indigenous people to gain access to water for commercial agricultural production.

33 Significantly there are a lot of multiple farm ownership individually, jointly and through companies. This means that there are more farms than the actual 4 500 when such ownership patterns are taken into consideration.

34 The number continue to decline with the on-going land reform programme that has seen 3 800 farms that make up part of the 11.2 million hectares being gazetted for compulsory acquisition.

35 There are still contrasting figures of the actual number of farms and area listed for compulsory acquisition. The government states that to date 7.8 million hectares and 135 000 families have been settled under fast-track, but with some of the land being contested by owners and some being under illegal occupation. Yet the Commercial Farmers Union indicates that no more than 35 families have so far been settled on almost 90 % of the land under white ownership (Daily News, 09-08-01).

without a concomitant increase in land holdings to reflect the demographic changes.

However, blacks have had access to land under various government schemes such as the Commercial Farm Settlement and the tenant farming schemes. A total of 399 farms have been accessed through this route with an area of 420 000 hectares. Some blacks have used their own resources to acquire land on the open market. Close to 1000 farms estimated to be 760 000 hectares have been acquired to date. However, the contentious issue is that elite blacks tend to acquire marginal land, with the prime land still remaining in the hands of the white farmers who are not prepared to dispose it. If the farms are sold on the open market, the prices are so high to the extent that the blacks cannot acquire them.³⁶

Table 3.4: Large Scale Black Farm Ownership in Zimbabwe

Type of Farms	No. of 'Farms'		Area Controlled	
	No.	%	No.	%
Leaseholds				
Commercial Farm Settlement Scheme	93	3.6	140,268	1.3
CSFS Leases (No option to buy)	57	1.0	65,469	0.6
Tenant Farmer Scheme Leases	40	2.6	217,757	2.0
Sub-total	399	7.2	423,494	3.9
Private				
Self Purchased Large Farms	500	9.3	700,000	6.2
Peri-urban Plots	500	NA	60,000	NA
Sub-total			760,000	6.2
Totals	1399	31.1%	1,200,000	10.9

Source: Author's estimates, GoZ records, CFU reports

Notes: ¹Area and percentages of 11,2 million ha.

²No. and % of 5399 (4500+899)

The 'indigenisation' project over the land question, focused on the meaning of 'return of lost lands' on the 'blackening' of the ownership base of commercial farmland. In effect, it sought a racial substitution formula for capitalist farming, which changed the eligibility criteria for access to land from the 'landlessness' and 'insecure' to the 'capable, 'productive' and 'efficient' within the terms of the neoliberal global development paradigm.

³⁶ It has been noted that blacks who have gone into the open market to acquire land using their own resources have tended to perform badly due to high debts, incapacity to capitalize as all the resources are put into the acquisition of land.

Some of the biggest landowners in southern Africa are the multi-national companies such as Anglo-American and Lonrho who hold the biggest cattle ranches and mining concession. These companies now control wildlife and consumptive Safari lands, which have become the fastest land use growth sector in countries such as Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique. The benefit of these new land uses however have not accrued to the disadvantaged poor nor the elites indigenous black capitalists but to the multinational companies with international connections.

3.3 Contested Settler Notions of land size

In the former settler colonies per capita arable land ownership has been declining due to increase in population in the communal areas. The little gains made by piecemeal land resettlement have been severely eroded due to this population increase. However, the greatest security threats remain that a few white farmers continue to subsist on most of the best arable land much to the chagrin of the majority blacks. In the last four decades of independence for some of the countries, poverty amongst the majority has been increasing.

Table 3.5: Per Capita Arable Land in the SADC Region


Country	Per Capita Arable Land Area (Hectares)				
	1965	1980	1987	1990	2000 ^a
Angola	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.36	0.28
Botswana	1.9	1.5	1.5	1.06	0.70
Lesotho	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.18	0.12
Malawi	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.28	0.21
Mozambique	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.20	0.36
Swaziland	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.21	0.14
Tanzania	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.19	0.28
Zambia	1.3	0.9	0.7	0.62	0.21
Zimbabwe	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.29	-
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.29	0.22

Source: Cleaver K M (1993, page 134).

The criterion used to determine viable farm sizes is based on a legacy of white settler notions of the ‘small scale’ being subsistence oriented and the ‘commercial’ being large scale white farms. Although the categorisation is posited as a function of different resource levels, there is still a clear class or racial (social) element to it. Large land sizes are said to be necessary for mechanised agriculture such as use of combine harvesters, etc that blacks are said to be unable to acquire. The large sized land are said to provide leverage for multiple land uses on a single farm including leaving some of the land under furrow for sometime.

In order to conceal land underutilisation and speculative uses of land, white commercial farmers and multinational companies have tended to put their land under wildlife ranching. To invest in game ranching, tourism in the form of conservancies, it requires expropriation of large sized land that in some countries they achieve through land consolidation. Various shareholding structures that remain in the clique of white farmers are exclusionary to the blacks contesting such arrangements through land occupations. The tourism sector is regarded too technical for blacks, in terms of marketing its products. In 1995 The World Bank Agricultural sector memorandum (Zimbabwe) argued that black smallholders should concentrate on less technical crops such as maize, sunflower rather than horticulture that should be the preserve of large scale white farmers who are competent to do so.

Figure 3.1: Size and Structure of LSCF in 1998



A main racist belief is that blacks yearn for a traditional home and do not require land for commercial uses hence the small landholdings they have. However, impressive performance of some resettled black farmers and including those who have invested in peri-urban areas have demonstrated that with adequate access to land they can do well. Unfortunately in the donor circles, there is a misplaced notion that when blacks obtain large sized land through state support it is cronyism, where as when whites obtained large sized land through the same principles it is regarded as aimed at commercialisation.

3.4 Land Tenure by Race and Gender in Zimbabwe ³⁷

In Zimbabwe the land tenure and ownership patterns reflect six land ownership categories: individual or family farms; company farms; mining companies' land; church farmlands; NGO farmlands (including trusteeships, associations, etc.), and state lands (see table). Companies account for 58 per cent of the farms in number and 71 per cent of area, compared to 39 per cent individually owned (952,295 hectares or about 24 per cent of the area identified) and 0.3 per cent government parastatal farms.

Table 3.6: Ownership Type by Area in Hectares

Ownership Type	Farm Count	% of n = 1471	Area (Ha)	Total Area
Individual	572	38,89	951 175	23,86
Company	870	59,14	2 881 991	72,29
State lands	7	0,48	97 828	2,45
Church farmlands	2	0,14	2 203	0,06
NGO farmlands (Trustees)	20	1,36	53 747	1,35
Total	1 471	100,00	3 986 944	100,00

Church and NGO farms only accounted for 1.6 per cent of the farms, although some of these hold farms in company form and name. Twenty one farms are owned by multinationals, accounting for 516,000 hectares or 13 per cent of the land aread. Two government parastatals, the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) and the Cold Storage Company (CSC), had amongst them 6 farms amounting to 91,002 hectares. The nature of the multinational forms of ownership.

Fewer black women (below 4%) own land compared to their white counterparts, who were mostly registered as joint husband and wife owners. Thus, white males who almost exclusively dominate company directorships and individual titles of landholdings above 10 000 hectares in size, are the focus of the land problem.

The bulk of the multiply-owned farms are company owned farms or belong to multinational firms. For instance, at least 900 farms accounting for 2.06 million hectares belong to parastatals and individuals or families (see table). About 10 indigenous farm owners owned multiple farms, totalling 34 farms and accounting for 836,188 hectares.

Table 3.7: Number of Multiple by Owner Count and Total Area

³⁷ Case Study Evidence from a Sample of 1 471 farms listed for compulsory land acquisition in 1997 in Zimbabwe was used here.

Multiple Class	Farm Count	Owner Count	% of Total area
1	894	894	51,69
2	272	136	17,55
3	123	41	13,08
4-6	115	24	7,62
7-11	67	8	10,05
Total	1 471	1 103	100.00

The land tenure evidence shows a diverse and differentiated structure of landholding and land use among Zimbabwe's white population. The debate on racial ownership of land needs to be more nuanced, rather than simply, and referring to them as 'white farms', we have to note that few white-dominated large companies – some of which are multinational companies with strong South African connections – own the greater part of commercial farmlands in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Botswana and Swaziland. These companies also tend to under use over 50% of their land.³⁸

Table 3.8: Multiple Farm Area Class by Farm Count and Total Area

Area Class	Farm Count	Owner Count	% of n=210	Area (Ha)	% of Multiple Area
1. 1- 1 499	387	47	22,38	309 294	16,06
2. 1 500-2 999	107	67	31,90	236 355	12,27
3. 3 000-4 999	29	25	11,90	112 652	5,85
4. 5 000-14 999	39	39	18,57	300 242	15,59
5. 15 000-29 999	10	24	11,43	202 598	10,52
6. 30 000-99 999	3	5	2,38	233 674	12,13
7. 100 000+	2	2	0,95	531 271	27,58
Total	577	209	99,52	1 926 086	100,00

While the evidence on the nationality of owners of large farms in Zimbabwe is contested many of the companies' directors are registered as foreigners. Most foreign owners appeared to be British and South African. This could explain the preoccupation of these two countries with Zimbabwe's land reform programme.³⁹


Absentee land ownership often seen as a reflection of limited commitment to farming relies on farm managers supervised from afar. In Zimbabwe, absenteeism affirms the fact that a significant number of farm managers are blacks whose skills are not appropriately recognised. Black managers are often classified as 'supervisors' and 'semi-skilled' and

³⁸ On the other hand, we have a group of about 1,000 white-owned family farms and family-based companies with relatively small farms, as well as a few large companies with relatively large farms that are used relatively well in Zimbabwe.

³⁹ Indeed, through dual citizenship, it is estimated that between 15 000 to 30 000 white Zimbabweans are British (House of Lords, Hansard) as quoted in Sam Moyo, *The Land Question in Zimbabwe*.

receive lower wages than their jobs warrant.⁴⁰ But because about 40 per cent of farm management and technical skills are indigenous, according to survey evidence, it could be argued that since the LSCF sector is essentially black managed, the transfer of land ownership towards such farmers will not have negative effects. A broader application of absenteeism would thus include many of the 800 black LSCF farm holders, and therefore complicate the objectives of redressing colonial, racial and nationality imbalances which underlie the land reform policy.

Figure 3.2: Nationality, farm count and area



Indeed, through dual citizenship, it is estimated that between 15 000 to 30 000 white Zimbabweans are British.⁴¹ While the definition of who is 'indigenous' remains, some members of minority groups who are Zimbabwean citizens by birth or through naturalisation regard themselves as being indigenous in contradistinction to foreign companies. But though they are Zimbabwean citizens, the limited social and political integration of most white LSCF owners renders them relatively isolated. This isolation tends to shape perceptions of them as non-indigenous persons. The term indigenous people in Zimbabwe, generally refers to black Africans born in Zimbabwe. It is not associated with the generic use of the term such (e.g. aborigines or Khoisan). In Zimbabwe it excludes whites born in Zimbabwe as they are regarded as descendants of illegal settlers who gained land through conquest.

⁴⁰ GoZ, National Man Power Survey, (Ministry of Man Power Planning and Development, Harare, 1981).

⁴¹ Many white Zimbabweans have dual citizenship, mainly of British and Zimbabwean.

One unsubstantiated view, which seems exaggerated, is that many black-held LSCFs are underused and more of them should be availed for land reform. Indeed there are some multiple-ownership farms held by blacks which are extremely large and comprise parts of huge multiple estates. For instance, 26 farms owned by just six companies that had black directors or owners comprised about 1.3 million hectares, or 33 per cent of the land identified for acquisition. Three of these farms, amounting to 317,000 hectares, were owned in trust by DTZ that purports to promote indigenous development in general. The extent to which the majority of the Zimbabweans have benefited from such ventures has not been seen. In fact the evidence suggests that many of the black directors may in fact be minority shareholders in these companies. The transfer of such oversized estates would not be inconsistent with the indigenisation objectives of Zimbabwe's land policy.

Fewer than 20 directors associated with Anglo-American Corporation, for instance, own 25 farms under nine companies amounting to almost half a million hectares. Other key companies owning large tracts of land include ZIMASCO, Lonrho and Development Trust of Zimbabwe (DTZ). Using the cut-off point of over 10,000 hectares owned either through company or individual title and as single or multiple farms, 66 landowners occupying over two million hectares were Zimbabwe's 'landed gentry', and thus as crucial to negotiations for land transfer. These owned 158 farms. A full 38 per cent of the area of these farms is in the shape of multiply-owned company farms, while 13 per cent, 1.3 per cent and 2.5 per cent are respectively owned as single company farms, individuals' multiple farms and individuals' single farms. At least 18 directors associated with Anglo-American Corporation, for instance, own 18 farms under 4 companies, amounting to half a million hectares. Other companies which owned large tracts of land include: Zimasco, Lonrho, and the Development Trust of Zimbabwe (DTZ). Among those owning over 10 000 hectares, we found eight individuals among the targeted farms who together owned 13 farms occupying 158,531 hectares, of which 29 per cent of the area was owned as multiple farms. Multiple farm ownership is thus a decided feature of Zimbabwe's landed gentry, whether these are company or individually owned.

There were also black companies which held 5 farms of close to 17 000 hectares which featured in our area-based definition of the landed gentry. Casual observation suggests that there could be up to 10 more black owners of over 10,000 hectares among those whose land was not designated. Otherwise, the one large black-owned estate is the three farms which make up Nuanetsi Ranches, owned by the DTZ Trust formerly led

by the late Vice President Joshua Nkomo, three other living black and one white director. Many of the large company owners are in fact very long established landed owners, involved mainly in the mining sector and other non-farming activities.

Ten families - the Oppenheimers, Meikles, Shawls, Skinners, Dyers, Guthries, Therons, Styles, Wheelers and Machipisas - are the most notable of Zimbabwe's landed gentry. Only 20 wholly-owned black landholding companies were among those targeted for land acquisition, making up only about two percent of the company-owned land. More blacks own land under individual title.

4.0 Politics and Demands for Land Redistribution

This section will discuss the various forms, types and sources of demand for land redistribution. These include formal and informal, legal and underground or illegal forms of demand for land redistribution, and historical and contemporary demands based upon different motives needs and issues. This section will elaborate upon how civil society organisations, parties, including War Vets, business representative organisations, community-based organisations and traditional structures organize and demand land redistribution. The racial content of this is examined.

4.1 Elite Demands of the Middle Class

While historical grievances over land alienation are important these tend to be subordinated to the more generalized demand for the redistribution of land for productive uses by a variety of potential and actual small and large scale indigenous land users. For instance in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the black indigenous lobby has over the years demanded access to productive land when earlier attempts to break into the manufacturing and commerce have not resulted in much benefits due to the intense foreclosures of black owned companies (Moyo, 1999). Many of the black business people realise that the societies in which they do their business in the region are largely agrarian, and economic growth has to start at the agrarian level which means having access to land.

However, the demand by indigenous elite for large scale farms, whose size is not conducive to efficient land utilization, such as those of some white owners, is not a primary factor in the land policy formulation because the economic rationality of this focus is questionable. The key objective of land reform policy is to establish a more efficient and

rational structure of farming and, of land and natural resources utilisation. A rational land policy should not defend the interest of minority elite groups at the expense of optimal land utilisation, increased productivity, employment growth, improved income distribution, and environmentally sustainable use of resources. But this cannot mean that varied farm sizes including conceptually reformed notions of medium scale farms with varied efficient land uses, must be excluded from land redistribution.

The key issue facing Zimbabwe's land reform policy therefore is how to balance the control and access to land, by redistributing land from large scale landholders who underutilise their land to new small and medium scale users.⁴² Such landholders include: individual large scale farmers whether white or black, large parastatal land holdings, large multinational firm landholders, large domestic conglomerates which specialize in mainly non-agricultural activities, and large private natural resource conservancies. The challenge here is how to "peacefully transfer" land from those who have been and remain unwilling and incapable of mobilizing adequate financial and labour resources towards the optimal use of land and natural resources at their command.

The manner in which elites, such as those working in government, some ex-combatants and other key ruling party supporters will gain access to land, in what proportion and at what cost to them, is a matter of widespread public conjecture and speculation. Fear of discrimination and exclusive tendencies in land redistribution and the wider indigenisation policy process heavily shadow the decision makers in charge of land reform. Suggestions that there are corrupt practices in elite land schemes against in the past are now weighed against the land reform programme by many.

In the southern Africa region, particularly in Zimbabwe, South Africa. Namibia there seem to be a preference for large farms by both whites and blacks (Moyo 1995, 1999, 2000a). This is aptly signified by the resistance by white land-owners to subdivide their land voluntarily and passionate resistance of any form of compulsory acquisition or taxation of their produce and/or land that they own. Yet, many of the black elites seem to fall into the same trap of large farms that they want to acquire for prestige and speculative purposes. Such slow attempts at land acquisition based on the traditional arguments of fear of loss of production and its economic consequences. Even in countries such as Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland and Mozambique, they are not exonerated from this colonial

42 For a detailed discussion of this aspect see Whitlow, 1985.....; Weiner 1985; Moyo 1986; Roth 1990, , Moyo, 1995.....

hangover (Moyo, 2000c). The result is that large farms are seen as more economical and these countries still have stringent regulations that prohibit the subdivision of farms into more socially and economically viable units.

Multinational firms engaged in agriculture and tourism enclaves have their land spared from acquisition, yet local people have specific social demand to some of the lands under the so-called peace parks. Throughout colonial history local people, have been marginalized, brutalised and demeaned when they poach natural resources on those mega-farms for basic subsistence survival (Moyo, forthcoming). Given this social marginalisation, the classical indigenous black capitalist farmers from the colonial and post- colonial period have formed an alliance with local people to reclaim such land, as a process to wedge their economic exclusion from having access to such land. There is also a racist attitude that obtains amongst those opposed to land reform that assumes that peasant farmers cannot venture into tourism as a land use option. The reality is that black elites and peasants feel marginalized through these perceptions.

4.2 Popular Demands


The social and political mobilisation in the name of the unfinished struggle for land is the main cause of heightened racial and class polarisation over the underlying contradictions of implementing land reform and democratisation. Since 1997 in Zimbabwe, the war veterans have spearheaded a 'rebellion' within the ruling party combining greater utilisation of land occupations with the official compulsory land acquisition approaches, to resolve the land problem. Although various combinations of different levels of government, politicians, and traditional leaders have differences over these radical land acquisition approaches, landholding segments of the middle class in Zimbabwe are solidly against these two forms of land acquisition preferring market approaches, which they expect to enhance economic stability.

Land expropriation on a large scale during the colonial era and more recent and localised, smaller scale expropriations underlie the contradictory property relations that have produced post-colonial land movements.⁴³ Land struggles have also arisen in response to white men having inequitable control of land, and disenchantment with local land administration processes managed by the state, traditional authorities and local committee structures.

43 Sam Moyo, 2001. The Interactions.....op. cit.

There is no recognition that the circumstance where the minority white population control much of the land, in a context of growing poverty⁴⁴ amongst the blacks in the communal lands provides complex contradictions. Violence has, in any case, increased in response to economic decline and poverty.

Figure 4.1: Estimated frequency of land occupations: 1980-2000



The first phase saw **low profile high-intensity occupations** throughout the country, from 1980-1985, yet a parallel process of land resettlement funded mainly by British funds was moving in tandem with the occupancies (Moyo et. al., forthcoming). The period between 1985 and 1990 witnessed a **normal low intensity occupation**. Occupations took place in the context of dwindling resources for continued land resettlement and economic liberalisation which resulted in many people losing their jobs in urban areas and the mines. During the 1990s landless communities increased "illegal" occupations of land and poaching of natural resources in private, state, "communally" owned lands and in urban areas (Moyo, 1998). Land occupancies then slowed down slightly in the late 1980s but then expanded more and more culminating in a more intense period (**the high profile intensive occupations**) (Moyo et al., forthcoming) of land occupancies from 1997 onwards involving war veterans and rural peasants.

⁴⁴ Demands for land redistribution in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia has been growing amongst the poor due to growing poverty and the retrenchment of workers as the countries stick to neo-liberal path of economic development. Yet, the wealth mainly white farmers and international capital seek to maintain and expand access to land and natural resources and accumulate capital irrespective of the growing poverty.

In South Africa the demand for land has mainly been in the urban and peri-urban areas given that 70 % of the population is urbanised. However, there are pockets of discontent in the rural areas that has led to intense polarisation between white farmers and black demanding access to the land of their ancestors. In South Africa the National Land Committee (NLC), which is the most active NGO on land matters has been accused by the government of fomenting land occupations the “Zimbabwean – style”. Yet, opposition political parties such PAC have taken advantage of the hesitance of the ruling ANC to condone land occupations through parcelling land to those who want it.

Zimbabwe provides an interesting case of a plethora of NGOs depended on donor funding and thus are in a catch twenty-two situation of being unable to question race and natural resources questions. Moyo, (2000, 1999), argues that NGOs have not been central to land reform or to land and agrarian social movements. Whilst most of them grew out of the social welfare and emergency relief traditions and so did not address structural issues. Some human rights and advocacy NGOs have emerged but these are led by the middle class and members of racial minorities, and focus on political and civil rights, not social and economic rights and social justice based upon redistribution.

4.3 Political Competition, Race and the Land Issue

The global interest of the land issue in southern Africa has a political dimension to it. The white farmers in their individual capacity and their strong unions have sought a political path to protect their land rights. The strongest white participation in politics is found in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe in line with the numerous whites in these countries. In Zimbabwe, white farmer participation in politics to protect their land rights in Zimbabwe took the form of the support against the yes vote in the constitutional referendum in 2000. It was also alleged by the government that the farmers were responsible for financially supporting opposition political parties.

Whilst external-funding institutions argued that the land issue must not be politicized (World Bank, 1992), the large-scale farming unions have also sought a non-political path to resolve the land issue. The basic premises of such arguments are based on the unproven perceptions that tinkering with large-scale commercial production in Africa in general will lead to massive poverty and famines. Yet, the land question is largely political and its resolution will be found in political negotiation involving give and take. Opposition parties in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia have

sought to depoliticise the land issue on technical grounds for the same reasons as the external-funding institutions.

White farmers have sought political conduit through the opposition movements. The opposition movements that have emerged since the late 1980s in Zimbabwe have had very narrow political interests. All of them have made some valid demands for democratisation, within a liberal electoral and human rights framework, but no wider social democratic demands for redistribution of resources or economic restructuring.

The pressure for land reform must, as usual and of necessity given Zimbabwe's history, build up around elections, making it trite to say that the issue of land reform was being politicised. Rather, the point is that every party must look for a vantage point on land reform so that their political agenda is adequate. Given the potential for land conflicts in South Africa and Namibia, there has been some tussling over the manner in which the Zimbabwe land problem should be handled in their respective parliaments. Whilst, the black legislators deriving from the liberation movements have indicated that such conflicts are inevitable if they do not resolve the issue, the white legislators from liberal political parties have tended to put pressure on their governments to condemn land occupations and to be reassured that the Zimbabwe situation should not happen in their countries.

5.0 Public Policies to Address Inequality and Race Relations

This section provides a broad scan of land policies, which have been pursued or demanded to address land inequalities. Such policies cover land ownership issues and land redistribution policies, colonially developed discriminatory land use regulations and land tenure policies and administration systems, which deepened and institutionalised social and economic inequalities derived from resulting unequal agrarian structures. Different approaches to land redistribution are examined. These include land restitution, direct land redistribution and resettlement, tenure enhancement and reform, as well as other ancillary corrective land use measures. The section surveys the broad beneficiaries of such public policies and assess their general impact. The section also examine the politics and policies of land reform, with particular reference to the Zimbabwe experience and its implications for South Africa and Namibia. Details of political process, violence and conflict are explored, as is the manner in which international relations and aid have affected land reform in post-colonial settler Zimbabwe.

Figure 5.1: Generic National Land Problems

Issue	Problems
Distribution	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Inequitable and unjust• Limited rights/access• Costly and cumbersome transfers
Utilisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Discriminatory regulations• Speculative underutilisation• Unsustainable use• Coercive regulations
Tenure	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Insecurity of some tenures• Discriminatory system• Over-centralised regulations
Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Coercive/centralised• Dispersed institution• Poor representation• Weak transparency
Adjudication	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Bias favour market and state• No restitution/victims compensation• Merged powers• Inaccessible

5.1 Deracialising Land Holdings

One of the emerging discourses in the southern African debates is the extent to which land reform can be used as a basis for deracialising the agricultural sector. Different forms of deracialisation have emerged in the form of affirmative action and indigenisation in Zimbabwe and South Africa. In Zimbabwe, the state has deliberately used schemes such as the CFSS and the Tenant farming scheme as necessary tools in creating a black agrarian bourgeoisie. The existing land controlled by the state through parastatals have been used to facilitate access to land by blacks who have the resources to invest into agriculture.

Perhaps the first real attempt to address potential black-on-white revenge was the policies of reconciliation pursued by Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia following independence. During the first years of independence more time was spent in changing the bureaucracy so that it conformed to the needs of the black majority. The main bottleneck was that separate forms of land tenure between blacks and whites did not immediately allow for an all round system of land administration. The white owned commercial large-scale farms received minimum regulation because of the power contained in the freehold title to land that allowed them to do as they liked. However, the communal areas where declared state land with all the punitive sanctions of what the blacks on these lands could and could not do. A series of environmental laws, land use regulation followed on tight local administration including policing by state departments against forest degradation, land degradation,

restrictions on water pollution and so forth. The same standards were not applied to the large-scale commercial farms.

In debates around land reform race issues emerges because the land to be acquire will come from land largely owned by whites. The reality is that the state has had to respond to agitation by black social movements, traditional leaders, rural community leaders, and black affirmative pressure groups to facilitate land reform as a basis of healing the wounds of colonialism. In southern Africa land transfer occurs in a context where the source of land is mainly white farms and the beneficiaries are largely black peasant farmers. This creates complexities and confusion on how land reform can proceed without innuendos of racialism. Any attempt to address the land question is construed to be overt racism on those demanding land from the state, yet land shortages in the communal areas are existing and real.


5.2 Market Orientation and its Problems

Southern African debates on land reform tend to be hostile to large-scale land redistribution because of the powerful ideological and material forces and lobbies of settler colonial and racial legacy of economic power and control of media (Moyo, 2000a). In the past the former colonial master forced constitutional provisions that excessively protected white farmers on the guise of providing incentives to those who were using the land. This saw the birth of the willing-seller-willing-buyer provision with the governments forced to negotiate to acquire land with the land-owners. There was no consideration of the context in which the black people took-up violent liberation struggle to create the conditions in which the indigenous could reclaim land they deemed stolen.

Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia have used the market means of acquiring land using the willing-seller-willing-buyer principle. In the 1990s, multilateral institutions fearing the possibility of radical land seizures from white commercial farmers have come with a new version they popularly refer to as market assisted land reforms. This framework of land acquisition protects the white landowners and has several components to it. The basic concept is that adequate compensation has to be paid timoulsy to white farmers, yet indigenous black people feel that they cannot be responsible for stolen the land. It is stated that land reform has to be based on negotiations between the state and farmers, between the local communities and white landowners and between civil society organisation on behalf of communities and white farmers. Resources are

then supposed to be mobilised from both bilateral and multilateral institutions with the state giving a hand.

Figure 5.2: Land Redistribution: 1980, 2000 and Target



Zimbabwe has had a longer experience of using this principle (1980-1997). At least 3.6 million hectares were transferred to 75 000 black families on land acquired under this principle. The target of the GoZ has been to transfer 8.3 million hectares to smallholder black farmers (figure, 1.1) and to de-racialise ownership of the remaining 6 million hectares of the large-scale commercial farm sector by transferring land to blacks with the resources for commercial production. The proactive affirmative policies to promote blacks to access large-scale farming land using the same past policies of state support, have been labeled corruption by post-colonial states bent on racialising the land issue.

5.3 Land Restitution

South Africa has used the land restitution approach within its land reform programme as part of a wider policy framework of Retribution and Development plan. It aims to redress the injustices of forced removals of blacks by white settlers and the historical denial of access to land to the majority of the South African population. The programme has three components: land redistribution, land tenure reform and land restitution. Under the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights and the Land Claims Court, it aims to provide rights to land to those communities dispossessed of such rights after 19 June 1913 as a result of past

discrimination laws. The aim of the restitution policy is to “restore land and provide other restitutionary remedies to people in such a way as to provide support to the vital process of reconciliation, reconstruction and development” (Department of Land Affairs, 1996, p. 15).

As of 2001, 1203 claims had been settled representing some 162 000 beneficiaries (Department of Land Affairs, Restitution statistics). The land restitution programme deals with justice in a material, tangible sense through acknowledging the injustice of the past and addressing these through concrete action.


5.4 Interactions of Policy and Social Action

Land occupations in southern Africa are not generically new since they have consistently accompanied or influenced government efforts to acquire land in the past whether this be on the market or through compulsory procedures. There are important similarities and a few differences between various phases of land occupations, which need thorough analysis. However, there is a need to analyse them in the two other instruments of land acquisition – market acquisitions and compulsory acquisitions - which interact with occupations in a politically determined manner, which is socially grounded in a context of demand for land.

The GoZ has in the past used the market and compulsory land acquisition approaches in its land reform exercise since independence. Through these approaches the LSCF sector has been spared of substantial compulsory land acquisition. As land demanded and occupations pressures occurred periodically the GoZ had co-opted these using the ruling party, and the War Veterans Association, into a formalized land acquisition approach suitable to the changing political and economic context and pressures of the times in question.

Therefore, state power and ‘force’, as well as social pressures through land occupations tend to be critical inputs into the ‘negotiation’ of ‘orderly’ land acquisition processes. Given that the state plays a key role in both mediating conflict in general and over land in particular as well as in promoting land reform when popular demands for it are politically organized (in partisan, political or socially) market mechanisms of land acquisition are rarely undertaken in a purely liberal and democratic framework, unless the states’ fiscal capacity to co-opt radical demands for power and to buy land for redistribution are promising

Figure 5.3: Land Acquisition Framework



Experience suggests a model of land acquisition for redistribution in which the different approaches to land acquisition interact in varying degrees of complexities and changing emphasis among them. Indeed the different approaches to land acquisition yield different ‘regimes’ of land redistribution, ranging from a highly conflictual and aggressive process based upon varied forms of land seizures towards more benign regimes of superficially non-conflictual market regimes of land transfer. These ‘regimes’ are in turn grounded in specific historical experiences within the nation-state, based upon the shifting political and economic conjuncture determined by political transitions and economic performance. This model of the interaction of different forms of land acquisition is a critical conceptual framework necessary for understanding the evolution of land reforms in general and the emerging land reform experiences of Southern Africa.

6.0 Regional and International Dimension

6.1 International Role and Responsibility in Land Problem

Most of the governments (Zimbabwe, Namibia) in the region have unequivocally stated that the former colonial masters have an obligation to pay for the land that was expropriated during the colonial period. Whilst most of the countries with historic land conflicts such as Mexico, Brazil, Columbia, and South East Asian countries have received financial support for land reform, it seems that little finance have been committed for the countries in the southern African region for a variety of reason

that includes perceptions of racism and protection by the donor community of their 'kith and kin' and broader capital interests in the globalisation context.

However, there are some countries in the southern Africa such as Lesotho where the a land market has been recommended to allow foreigners to buy land. While, countries such as Zimbabwe can count on the United Kingdom government to pay for compensation, the people of Lesotho will have to rely on their own to buy their land back (Thabane, 2000).

6.2 Post Colonial and Neo-colonial Framework

The demise of apartheid in South Africa allowed many to think that the whole issue of race in the region would simply disappear. Regional integration and collaboration were envisaged and the 'peace dividend' was expected to be economic growth throughout the region with South Africa being the engine of that growth. It was hoped that this would obviate the need for radical national development strategies and addressing national historic questions in an historic context.

Redress of historical problems and social justice to memory and truth based reconciliation, without correcting the land redistribution of problem. In addition there are also conflicts related to expropriation of other resources, lost opportunities by blacks and so forth. As independence was negotiated there was no compensation for loss of land, livestock, loss of economy.....

One of the vexing questions is the extent to which land can be treated as a development project requiring external funding. Many of the countries have supported land reform as a project, yet they seek to treat it not as a political and social justice issue.

The main conflicts relate to the responsibilities of the former colonial masters for land transfer and the role of individual farmers in the negotiation processes. Whilst farmer prefer to deal with market principles of compensation, some governments have sought to develop the financing principles on the basis of bi-lateral and multi-lateral funding negotiations. In most instance, land reform becomes part of conditionality, yet overshadowing the historical responsibility of countries such as United Kingdom, Germans, Austrians and so forth.

7.0 Conclusions

The paper concludes by summarising the key elements drawing conclusions concerning ways in which race relations in Southern Africa can be improved through land reform policies. This section emphasise policies that ensure that historical social justice and contemporary problems of equity poverty reduction and broader economic growth are addressed directly rather than subsumed by aid preconditions for complex and hurried political and economic reforms premised upon simplistic market processes and narrowly founded approaches to good governance and the “rule of law”. Social justice based upon more equitable race relations and land distribution is integral to longer-term political reform and economic development.

The land occupations in Zimbabwe and threats of the same in South Africa, Namibia and Malawi have confronted bad past and present race relations by forcing intensive interaction and discussion between whites and blacks in different roles. It has also raised the issue of the different values placed on the deaths of blacks and whites and challenged the notion of reconciliation without the truth.

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9.0 Annexes

Annex 9.1: The Land Question Profiles in Southern Africa

Country	Land Distribution	Land Tenure	Land Use	Land Administration	Legal Framework
Angola		Communal lands Protected areas			
Botswana	Equitable	5 % freehold 70 % tribal lands		Land Boards	Land Control act, 1975. Constitutional protection of freehold land
Lesotho	Equitable	All communal lands		Land belongs to the Basotho nation and held in trust by the king	Customary law
Malawi		Protected land Estates Communal lands			
Mozambique	Equitable	Leaseholds (RSA and Zweans)		State	Constitutionally all land belongs to the state
Namibia	Unequal Limited access to the majority	Freehold Communal lands	Discriminatory regulations Speculative underutilisation	State is the sole owner of all communal lands	Namibian constitution enormously protects private property
South Africa	Unequal Limited access to the majority	Freehold Communal lands	Discriminatory regulations Speculative underutilisation		Land expropriation act
Swaziland	Equal	Communal Leasehold			Customary law
Tanzania				State	33 year leases for commercial land
Zambia	Equal	Leasehold Communal			
Zimbabwe	Inequitable and unjust Limited rights/access Costly and cumbersome transfers	Insecurity of some tenures Discriminatory system Over-centralised regulations	Discriminatory regulations Speculative underutilisation Unsustainable use Coercive regulations	State is the sole owner of all communal lands	Land acquisition act

Annex 9.2: Land Tenure and Land Use Profiles in Zimbabwe

Land Categories	Areas in Ha. 1980		Area in Ha. 1997		Land Tenure Profile	Land use profile
	No. Million ha	%	No. Million ha	%		
LSCF	15.5	39.10	12.1	30.60	Freeholds; leaseholds	Underutilised; largely regulated by market?
SSCF	1.4	3.50	1.4	3.50	Leases and leases W/O to purchase	Regulated through conditions and tenants in leases but lack of enforcement
RAs	-	-	3.6	9.10	Permits	Managed from top
CAs	16.4	41.40	16.4	41.40	Customary tenures; "Permits"- (Permissive rights?)	Regulated by laws and by laws enforcement doubtful perhaps selective
State farms	0.3	0.8	0.1	0.30	Freeholds, leaseholds, statutory allocation	Minimal regulation; uncoordinated
National Parks, urban settlements	6.0	15.20	6.0	15.20	Statutory allocation urban; freeholds and leaseholds	Unco-ordinated; subject to abuse, Urban;regulated
Total	39.6	100.00	39.6	100.00		

Annex 9.3: Land Distribution by Sector in Zimbabwe

Sector	Hectares	%
Large Scale Commercial Sector	11,020,000	28.2
Small Scale Commercial Sector	1,380,000	3.15
Communal Area	16,350,000	41.8
Resettlement Area	3,540,000	9.1
Parks/ Forest Land	6,339,000	16.2
ARDA (State Farming)	250,000	0.6
Urban Area	200,000	0.5
Total	39,079,000	100.0

Annex 9.4: Structure of Large Scale Commercial Farm Sector in Zimbabwe

Sector	Hectares	%
White and foreign farms		
▪ Commercial Farmers' Union Members (Family, Company and Multinational Farms)	8,975,000	78.5
▪ Non- CFU Multinational Companies	600,000	5.3
Black freehold large farms		
▪ Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union	700,000	6.2
▪ Development Trust of Zimbabwe	332,000	3.0
▪ Indigenous / Tenant Schemes / Leases	470,000	4.2
State /parastatals freeholds		
▪ Cold Storage Company	211,000	1.8
▪ Forestry Commission	112,000	1.0
Total	11,020,000	100.0