Asian Transformations in Action

The Work of the 2006/2007 API Fellows

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TRANSFORMATIONS IN AGRARIAN LIVELIHOOD AND THE SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE MOVEMENT UNDER GLOBALIZATION

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Introduction

The dynamic transformation of agriculture in many countries around the globe has been actively occurring under globalization. Globalization has created powerful economic, political, social and cultural ties across borders (Singh 2007). After the Second World War, the development of economic ties became the major theme in global integration as international trade and investment were enhanced and production technology greatly improved in line with the growth of transnational corporations (TNCs). Information technology has significantly speeded up this integration, especially in the flow of money and investment, labor, production, information and culture.

Within the context of globalization, the global economy has been accelerated by the ideology of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism, which developed from capitalism, is defined as trade liberalization in terms of goods, services and capital, allowing them to flow across borders without state control, leading to rapid economic growth (Janyapes 2000). In this context, TNCs have gained greater power in economic negotiations that have included deregulation, privatization, trade stabilization and liberalization. Meanwhile, international organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have played important roles in gearing up this economic transformation.

Consequently, agricultural transformation has inevitably moved forward under several bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. These trade agreements have been made between developed countries, in which agriculture is highly subsidized, and developing countries, which are poor. The concept of trade liberalization considers that free trade will bring about competent trade competition and efficient production. It has been implemented by many international organizations as a method of poverty reduction. As a result, farmers' ways of life have been transformed and small-scale farmers have inevitably had to adjust to the context of globalization. As an alternative to these changes, sustainable agriculture is proposed by the agricultural community. It was conceived as a response to the impact of the Green Revolution.

The objective of my study was to understand changes in the agricultural sector and the creation of farmers' alternatives in the development of sustainable agriculture in Japan and Indonesia. In Japan, this study focused on farmers' livelihoods and farmers' groups in the prefectures of Mie, Saitama, Fukuoka, Hiroshima, Hokkaido and Yamagata. These farmers are involved in the development of sustainable agriculture including the issue of farmer-consumer linkages, as well as related policy issues. In Indonesia, the study was conducted in rice-based communities in Wonogiri District, Central Java and Ngawi District, Eastern Java. The study focused on the impact of trade liberalization and the formation of the communities' alternatives based on local culture and biodiversity. The study was conducted at two levels. At the policy level, data were gathered through a literature review and interviews with local state officials. On the issue of sustainable agriculture and communities' alternatives, the study was focused at the community level. Data were gathered through interviews with family members and members of community groups, NGO staff and university academics. Participation in various activities such as meetings, seminars and on-farm visits also generated data.

Agricultural change: Political, economic and social context

Agricultural change in the two countries has been caused by changes in their political, economic and social systems. These include the change to adopt a system of capitalism, which in Japan took place after the Second World War. In Indonesia, after independence in 1945, the country declared itself a democracy and launched a land reform program. Japan moved towards industrialization while Indonesia was still in the stage of nation building, adopting capitalism in 1967. After a land reform program, the farmers in both countries become small farmers. In Japan, the average land holding per family is one hectare except in Hokkaido.[1] Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the average land holding is only 0.35 hectare. On the island of Java, where the land is fertile and suitable for farming and hence, the population relatively dense, the average land holding is only 0.25 hectare. In Japan, the farm population is decreasing. In 2005, 1.96 million families were farmers

out of a total population of 127.8 million people. In Indonesia, the majority are farmers. In 2003, there were 25.4 million farm families, making up 56 percent of the total population.

The most important agricultural change in the two countries was the Green Revolution. The Green Revolution transformed the pattern of agriculture from traditional farming (which used human and animal labor and was very nature-dependent) to modern agriculture. This form of modern agriculture required the use of chemicals and new technologies, including improved seeds and animal breeds. High Yielding Varieties which required the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides were developed. Farmers had to depend on these external inputs produced by agribusiness companies. Before the Green Revolution era, Indonesia had more than 8,000 native rice varieties (Brookfield and Byron 1967). By 1988, 74 percent of these native rice varieties had been lost (WRI 1998). Native rice varieties were replaced by high yielding varieties promoted by the government with support programs such as input subsidies. In 1984, Indonesia achieved food self-sufficiency but the country faced environmental problems as a result of agricultural chemical use. Soil and water were contaminated; pest problems spread as pests grew resistant to chemicals. The volume of production stabilized and then began to decrease due to environmental changes. Japan also faced environmental and chemical contamination problems. Western influence had entered Japan since the Meiji reign; at that time, Japan adopted modern technology and external inputs in its agriculture. Experimental research on agriculture was introduced, although it required many years to be applied in the Japanese context. After the Second World War, there was an increase in chemical use in order to meet the country's needs for food self-sufficiency. Japan began to experience environmental problems in 1965, which is the same period during which Indonesia adopted Green Revolution technology in its agricultural sector.

Changes in agriculture under globalization

Agriculture in both countries is confronting problems from trade liberalization. Both multilateral and bilateral agreements are moving Japan and Indonesia towards liberalized economies. The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)[2] affected the Indonesian agricultural sector. In addition, under regional agreements that have been made, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), domestic support from the government to the agricultural sector has been abolished. The role of

the government in the rice trade has been reduced. The government has had to change its policies and allow the private sector to expand its role in trading; this was been done together with the reduction of export and import tariffs. For example, import tariffs on agricultural items were reduced to five percent in 1999. The process of tariff reduction began in the early 1990s and, even as Indonesia was confronted with economic problems in 1998-99, the country still had to follow its international agreements. As the country faced economic problems, it had to borrow money from the IMF and the World Bank. The loan came along with conditions that forced Indonesia to adopt free trade policies.

Japan also faced strong pressure to open its country up to free trade agreements and reduce its import tariffs. In 1990, Japan had to reduce its tariffs on oranges and beef and, in 1993, on rice. It has had to abolish domestic support for agriculture. As a result, it has adapted its laws to follow the terms of international agreements. In 1999, Japan declared the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas to replace the Basic Agriculture Law of 1961. The new law addressed production efficiency, increased competitiveness and food security. The details of how this change has impacted the agricultural sector are outlined below:

1. Food self-sufficiency and trade competition
There is no exemption for a developed country like Japan nor for a developing country like Indonesia. After signing free trade agreements, both faced problems due to decreased food self-sufficiency. In Japan, food self-sufficiency decreased and the role of the agricultural sector declined after the Second World War. Japan has to depend on imported food. This is because the country became an industrialized country. Free trade should benefit net-food importing countries like Japan but the ratio of the nation's food self-sufficiency has declined: Japan's food self-sufficiency was 48 percent in 1990, but declined to 43 percent in 1995 and 40 percent in 2000. At present, Japan imports food such as bananas, mangoes, chicken, shrimp, beef and vegetables. More than 60 percent of its imports come from the USA, Australia, China and Thailand. The domestic price of agricultural products has likewise decreased. Since the beginning of trade liberalization, with the importation of oranges and vegetables from China, domestic vegetable producers have suffered since they cannot compete with cheaper Chinese vegetables.

Indonesia faced economic problems in 1997-1998, and with them, problems of food insecurity and poverty. In 1999, the number of poor increased to 23 percent. Indonesia imported 5.8 million metric tons

of rice in 1998, 4.2 million metric tons in 1999 and two million metric tons in 2003 (Sidik 2004). Rice has become a food security issue for Indonesia. In 2004, the government prohibited the importation of rice during the harvesting season and charged an import tax IDR430/kg. At present, Indonesia imports many kinds of food such as soybean, sugar, fruit, meat, milk and cotton. When these products are imported, the domestic price goes down and farmers suffer. At the same time, the government is unable to launch a domestic support program because of Agreement on Agriculture under the WTO. Although Indonesia is an agricultural country, it is dependent on imports. Thus, it will face the problem of food insecurity over the long term.

The study of rice-based communities, such as the case of Pucangan community and the community network in Ngawi District and Setrorejo community in Wonogiri District, found that farmers' cost of production has increased. However, the price of domestic rice has remained low as it has to compete with the low price of imported rice. Indonesia imports rice from America, Thailand, Vietnam, Japan and Myanmar, and because of the free trade agreement within the ASEAN and the WTO, this rice import is tax-free. This brings down the price of rice from these countries, and Indonesian farmers end up selling their rice at a very low price. At the same time, the prices of other goods such as cooking oil, clothing, gasoline and education-related expenses have gone up; therefore, farmers do not earn enough income and become indebted. Many have to work at other jobs, as laborers or furniture makers, for example, or migrate to work in town. Woman farmers have also been affected by the economic problems and their role has changed. Like the men, they also have to migrate to the towns or to other countries. Most of the women who leave the country work as housekeepers in the Middle East or Malaysia, or as workers in the service sector or in factories in Jakarta and other large Indonesian cities. In some villages, almost the only people left living there are old men and children. During the economic crisis, landless people also faced difficulties in finding jobs. Although the government has a program to help the poor by selling rice at a cheap price, there is not enough of this rice to meet the demand. In some cases, children have had to leave school since their parents could not afford to pay their school fees. Some landless farmers rent land and have to share their produce with the landowner or pay the rent in cash. This further increases the cost of production for these farmers. Land ownership is a problem for farmers in Indonesia, and the government had a policy for land reform since the 1960s but access to land is still a big problem. Many farmers have reflected that the government should

launch a policy to protect small farmers. The national and international policies for trade liberalization were made without the people's participation in the decision making processes.

2. Changes to agri-food production and the trading system
Changes in farming patterns since the Green Revolution and changes in government policies in response to free trade have resulted in changes in the national production structure. In Japan, the government prioritizes farms with areas larger than four hectares; meanwhile, most small farmers own only one hectare, except in Hokkaido. The government still supports small farmers living on mountains where small parcels of land cannot be easily combined to support agribusiness. However, the trend for Japanese agriculture is to become large scale and for agribusiness to play a more important role. Small farmers in Japan are now mobilized and have adapted their production patterns by combining land parcels or setting up production groups or companies. In the future, this pattern will multiply. Farmers may change their relationship to a joint venture and draw salaries as in the case of a business firm. Some farmers may survive, especially those living in areas where parcels of land cannot be combined and those who establish self-help systems within the family or group by practicing sustainable agriculture. The principal farmer group that may survive is the group that receives support in the form of direct payments on five major crops, namely soybeans, wheat, barley, beets and Irish potatoes. In 2006, other items being supported by the government have been added, such as vegetables, fruit and animal products.

In Indonesia, the government launched a policy to increase rice production for the nation's food security. Normally, farmers rely on external inputs such as chemical fertilizers, pesticides, improved animal breeds and plant seeds, and technology. After the implementation of free trade, trading in agricultural inputs has become easier and the traders' business is booming. While trading small farmers' rice is a problem, the business firms, especially large scale ones, play a greater role. An agribusiness company, a joint venture between Thai and Indonesian entities, produces maize seed. There is another company, a joint venture between Indonesian and Dutch entities, that produces vegetable seed and fruit seedlings. Meanwhile, the promotion of palm oil is under the control of Indonesian and Malaysian companies. For poultry, although farmers raise native chickens, 75 percent of poultry is produced by a Thai company. As the structure of food production changed, the trade system also changed. Some goods are under the supervision of the Indonesian government, such

as wheat, rice and soybeans, but the government has allowed the private sector to trade these commodities and changed the law to support private sector trading. The country also faces a cooking oil shortage as the price of cooking oil went up due to the production of palm oil for export to meet the demand for biofuel. The private sector does not pay attention to the domestic demand since exporting palm oil is more profitable. This situation has led to a domestic food problem. After the introduction of free trade in 2001, Indonesian food imports were valued at USD2.9 billion; in 2002 this increased to USD3.3 billion, 30 percent of which was processed food and beverages. The volume of imports from the USA was 25 percent or USD809 million out of the total value. The food business will probably expand further since Indonesian consumers mainly consume non-local food.

3. Intellectual property rights

Under the WTO agreement, intellectual property rights have been applied to agricultural products. In Indonesia and Japan, laws have been amended and new laws have been passed that pay more attention to breeders' rights than farmers' rights. The concept of intellectual property rights is based on capitalism, which considers everything to be a commodity. This law was developed from the system of copyrights for industrial products. The industrial sector is, however, different from the agricultural sector, which is considered in many places to be characterized by a culture of helping one another and sharing of seeds and knowledge. In agricultural societies, seed is not a commodity but can be exchanged and shared among farmers. In this way, seed genetic diversity has increased. Although society changed and farmers began to buy seeds from the market, nobody had dominant control over the seeds. However, the system of intellectual property rights has changed the structure of agriculture and converted common property into individual property.

In Japan, the government passed the 2002 Intellectual Property Basic Law and launched a policy to use intellectual property rights to create efficient competitiveness for agriculture and the food industry. The government promotes the innovation of new technology, including new varieties of plants that are to be used in production and the food industry. It has developed regional brands and strictly controls violations of the patenting system for imported products that are produced without permission from the breeder. The regional brand and patent system will result in a high cost of inputs. It can also be used as trade barrier.

In Indonesia, the country passed laws and amended

some laws on this issue, particularly the Plant Variety Protection Law. The Plant Variety Protection Law was passed in 2000 and has created complications for the agricultural sector, as well as increasing conflicts. For example, an agribusiness company involved in maize seed production sued farmers in East Java for selling maize seed and using breeding technology belonging to the company. The farmers were arrested and sent to court and a guilty verdict was handed down. This case reflects the trend where a more dominant control over genetic resources will prevent farmers from having access to seed. The monopoly control over seed will increase the price of seed and this will no doubt add to farmers' expenses. In addition, the development of technology has so far been directed towards the development and promotion of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). GMO technology will decrease farmers' self-reliance. Moreover, the law does not recognize farmers' rights over native seeds and animal breeds. The new laws not only reflect the changes in agricultural technology, they also change the culture from self-reliance based on small farmers' system of exchange and sharing to a system of trading (i.e., buying and selling).

Sustainable agriculture: Paradigm of self-reliance and farmers' freedom

The paradigm of sustainable agriculture is the paradigm of self-reliance and farmers' freedom. Sustainable agriculture emerged from farmers' adaptations in response to corporate control over mainstream agriculture. Sustainable agriculture includes the concept of environmental protection, since the environment is part of farmers' capital. The use of external, non-local inputs increases the cost of production and makes farmers dependent on them. Sustainable agriculture is not only a set of techniques for non-chemical agriculture but also includes the concept of farmers' self-reliance and struggle for survival.

Sustainable agriculture has many forms in accordance with each ecosystem in which it is found. In Japan, farmers practice natural farming; this system was derived from the traditional way of farming but integrated with new innovations. The pattern of organic farming developed later. In Indonesia, sustainable agriculture refers to a system of traditional natural farming or Integrated Pest Management (IPM), which has developed into organic farming. These systems were developed based on farmers' experiences in the two countries. This study found that sustainable agriculture is dynamic and plays many important roles, detailed as follows:

1. Conservation of agrarian culture and food self-reliance

Small farmers who practice sustainable agriculture in Japan acknowledged that the idea of conserving local food culture comes from family farm production which aims at food self-sufficiency for the farm family. Sustainable agriculture is practiced for the purpose of food self-sufficiency in good quality, pesticide-free food, while at the same time conserving the environment, soil and water. Thus, sustainable agriculture provides food security, with the surplus for sale as income for the family. Families practicing sustainable agriculture may process food from the materials found on the farm. For example, Mr. Furuno processes some fresh products, such as duck or vegetables, into local food. Mr. Shimpei makes *sembe* (local bread) from rice, while Mr. Kitahara, a Hokkaido producer of organic onions, produces an onion-based salad dressing. Based on family consumption, sustainable agriculture production has to be diverse and plant and animal production must be integrated. What is produced will depend on the size of families and the family's demands for food and income.

Indonesian farmers also practice sustainable agriculture in rice-based communities. The traditional culture of the farming community, where farmers produce mainly for household consumption, still exists. Although farmers grow rice two or three times in a year, they also grow many other kinds of crops. They normally divide their land into a plot to grow cassava, chilies and peanuts, and in some plots, they grow fruit trees. They also raise animals in their backyards. This pattern was adapted from the traditional farming practices of farmers in Ngawi District, East Java. The farmers of Wonogiri District, Central Java, practice a system of growing multi-purpose trees mixed with peanuts, soybean, maize and cassava. The system is designed based on the local eco-system and the limitation of water shortages in rice farming. In some villages, the farmers grow many local varieties of beans. They also have good cultivation plans. Because of the limited size of their land holdings, they grow many kinds of plants both at the same time and at different times. In this way, farmers have food for consumption all year round. This agricultural pattern is designed to respond to their own family's needs. They are able to produce enough food for consumption and to provide some income from the farm. This can be considered the rural economy of small farmers. This system is the basis of food security for the family and the community. This study found that the community produces a surplus of food and that farmers also have a system of storing rice for the next season, and have other food crops for consumption, such as corn and potatoes. This is the cultural practice in all communities. These communities have enough food and they are part of an economic system that uses both cash and rice. They divide their produce into three parts, one for the family's consumption, one part for building social capital and the third part for sale. The main problem that these Indonesian farmers faced is income insecurity.

2. Establishment of a local food system

Farmers practicing sustainable agriculture set up activities that link themselves with consumers or develop local markets. These systems take many forms. Farmers and consumers in Japan have created an interesting and innovative local food system. It is called the *teikei*[3] system which takes the form of a direct relationship between farmers and consumers. This system allows farmers to produce food and send it directly to consumers. The consumers learn and understand the production patterns, and support the producers. Communication is important. The producers provide information about their produce for each week and share stories about the limited number of products. Sometimes, there are suggestions on food processing. Some groups organize activities for consumers. For example, in Mie prefecture, farmers groups organize *miso*-making for urban housewife groups. In some areas, they have a system of product exchange, such as trading vegetables for soybean starch that one of the farmers interviewed, Mr. Kaneko, uses to make compost. Farmers also develop delivery services on their own or through a service company. On special occasions, farmers may send small gifts to the consumers with whom they have a relationship. Mr. Shimpei, for example, sends a small bag of sticky rice.

Cooperatives are another way of managing production and establishing a relationship with consumers. The farmers sell their organic products to a distribution center, such as the network of the Ainou Kai Distribution Center. There are many cooperatives in the network, and these are found in Osaka, Nagoya and at Ainou Kai. At Nagoya Center, the farmers set up the cooperative because, at the initial stage, farmers faced marketing problems since their organic products looked bad compared to products grown with agro-chemicals. Consumers did not want to buy organic products. The farmers, through their cooperative activities, provided consumers with information on organic production and create a better understanding of the system. Other cooperative systems have been organized by consumers, while some cooperatives mobilize themselves as small cooperatives to sell organic products and environmental protection goods, such as the case of Green Co-op in Fukuoka prefecture. Other

cooperatives are established to support sustainable agriculture systems and environmental protection, such as the Seikatsu Club, which was established in 1968 and has 26 branches nationwide. The Sanchuko Club has two shops in Fukuoka. There is also a group called Hyakusho Yakai (1977) that wants to conserve the environment in cooperation with producers in promoting organic farming. This consumer cooperative acts as a link between producers and consumers. They have a home delivery service and also deliver products to the representative of the consumers' group. They have also organized educational and welfare activities for mothers and children, as well as the elderly. In the late 1990s, they also developed a certification body that is still being used.

In Indonesia, the system is different. Production management is done by the community through the local market. Consumers consume local food made from products from the farm. For example, the farmers of Boto community make *tempeh* from soybean wrapped with teak leaves collected from the farm. This process allows farmers to make use of all the materials found on the farm and, in turn, provides cash for the family. Some also process Koro beans, which are a native bean, or sell fresh Koro at the local market. In addition, farmers try to develop the local market through group mobilization. The members of *Yayasan Duta Awam* process maize into animal feed and sell it to the animal-raising group. Some have also developed a local market for native rice and processed herbs and sell directly to consumers. For the past few years, local NGOs have organized themselves as a network called Aliance Organic Indonesia and established the Biocert, a certification body to certify organic products. The target of the sustainable agriculture movement in Indonesia is to establish a market system that farmers can easily access and within which they can receive a fair price for their products.

Sustainable agriculture under globalization

Mainstream globalization, with its concepts of free trade and consumerism, has had an impact on the development of sustainable agriculture. Farmers have to confront the changes in the whole society. In Japan, consumers are aware of chemical-free products and this made a way for organic farming to exist as an alternative. It is a good example because there has been a great shift from conventional to organic farms. However, the change is based more on fashion rather than on a real need; therefore, sometimes the movement created confusion among consumers. As a result, organic certification was needed. However, certification does not support organic farmers but rather serves to allow the consumer to distinguish between organic and conventional products while the farmers have to bear the burden of paying the certification fee. In Indonesia, the system of certification has just started but there is a need for the movement to learn from other countries.

There are a great deal of organic and natural products in the market. With consumers' awareness, consumer cooperatives and distribution centers may face changes as they have to deal with the issue of product standardization, which will replace the consumer-producer linkage system. They have to adapt and try to set up a certification system for their consumers. Furthermore, there have been changes in consumer behavior due to the impact of globalization such as a preference for home delivery, especially in the big cities such as Tokyo. The cooperatives may need to improve their member systems or they may have to work with consumers. There is a question of whether the cooperatives need to work with consumers alone or if they may have to work and establish relationships with producers as well, as in the concept of *sanchoku*[4] or the *teikei* system. Another question is concerned with the expansion of the cooperatives from small-scale to large-scale, and how can they can conserve their identity in selling local food if, as a large-scale cooperative, they have to sell non-local products as well.

The changes in government policies, especially on domestic support and the role of the Japanese Agricultural Cooperative Association (JA), may affect medium-scale cooperatives. At present, there is a need to use JA to buy products from farmers in large volumes. Green cooperatives buy from JA in lower volumes. However, if cooperatives have to change their systems, green cooperatives may require more capital to buy products directly; thus, there is a need to manage the relationship and management system among these cooperatives.

In Indonesia, sustainable agriculture has developed from traditional farming; some of the products are sold at both local and regular markets. The regular market is not a place where farmers can easily go and sell their products. The development of consumer and producer linkages is still at the early stage. They are now trying to develop a local market based on local conditions. The complications of globalization and free trade affect Indonesian farmers who have to deal with more issues starting from the basic rights over their natural resources, genetic resources, and market access, as well as the issue of farmers' participation at the policy level. The issue of food sovereignty becomes crucial as called

for by small farmers and civil society. The appeal for food sovereignty is not only being heard in Indonesia but is happening in many countries. The main demand is to recognize farmers' rights to natural resources and to preserve a food base of food production and market access, and a local economy where all farmers have the freedom to set up their own food production and distribution system.

The link with partners in society

The need to seek alternatives in organic farming and the link with consumers has led to the development of new relationships and social activities. There are links between organic growers groups and consumers such as the Rainbow Plan Project, which mutually manages garbage, or the Hiroshima Group, whose members together protect the environment. There are other relationships established by people such as the network of the Asian Farmer Exchange Center, consisting of farmers and city dwellers working together, or a women's group called We 21 at Kanagawa, where they have opened a recycling shop and donate part of the money to support development work in Asia and Africa. A group called Kurume in Fukuoka prefecture was formed, with members working as volunteers and sending support to African countries. In fact, these groups have coordinated with local governments and people's organizations in many countries.

In Indonesia, cooperation between farmers' group, NGOs and academics has existed for a decade, and has developed into a social movement to address people's problems. The development of a local plan under the joint cooperation of NGOs, GOs and farmers or research and experimentation on bio-fertilizer or organic farming techniques are the starting points for civil society to address the agricultural sector's problems. However, sustainable agriculture has not received support from the government. Social relationships are forming under the framework of building a peaceful and just society. This is one social movement among many which fights against the globalization current.

Conclusions: Agricultural methods in the global context—different conceptions and ideologies

The free trade system has brought about significant changes for small-scale farmers in both countries. As a result, the food sovereignty of the two nations has not only been decreased but has also become less secure, particularly under the current global energy crisis. Agricultural areas have been turned into energy resources regardless of the consequences of global warming. It is most likely that the agricultural sectors of these two countries will increasingly become large-scale or industrial. Small-scale farmers have been pushed aside physically, economically and culturally. Food production is no longer limited by borders. Economic marketing in the context of globalization has created a borderless system across the globe, regardless of the type of food, monetary system, trade, society or culture.

Within such transformations, an alternative has developed and grown up against globalization, which focuses on materialism, while abandoning spiritual values and concern for the environment. Alternative schemes have been initiated such as natural farming in Japan and traditional agriculture in Indonesia that have become modern-day organic farming. These systems oppose globalization and create social alternatives. In reference to global and national changes, Fukuoka-*san* (1987), the Japanese farmer, clearly stated his opinion about agricultural and social methods in his book, *The One Straw Revolution*: "An ultimate goal of agriculture is not growing crops but building up human fertility." As we are unable to separate any parts of our lives, if we modify our agricultural methods, then we alter our food and social character, as well as our values. Sustainable or organic farming has linked humans to the environment, not to mention the connections that have grown among local communities. The eagerness of Japanese and Indonesian consumers to consume organic food grown using sustainable methods reflects how they have turned their ways of life back to nature. The *teikei* system is an effort to build up a direct connection between producers and consumers, that is, an attempt to create a new social relationship between farmers and consumers through organic products. Similarly, the Rainbow Scheme initiated in Nagai, Yamagata prefecture builds up a relationship between urban people and farmers within a common society. These alternatives have improved common knowledge among organic farmers in terms of harnessing lunar and seasonal cycles. Traditional knowledge has been refurbished through a common process. This has revealed an effort to systematically develop agricultural alternatives by focusing not only on production but thoroughly combining production with its surroundings. For instance, Indonesian farmers have kept up their agricultural traditions such as the ritual to worship Mother Rice. Thus, while some rituals have already been modified, others still exist in some form.

The application

Like Indonesia, Thailand is an agricultural country. Small farmers in Thailand face the same problems as the

small farmers in Japan and Indonesia. Thai farmers have also adapted to globalization and formed a sustainable agriculture movement. The lessons learned by the two countries included in this study in terms of national policies and experiences of small farmers in preserving their livelihood can be adapted to strengthen the sustainable agriculture movement in Thailand. These are:

1. Market access for small farmers. The main lessons learned from Japan concern the establishment of a direct relationship between producers and consumers and the cooperative system as the mechanism to create a better understanding with consumers. The main lesson learned from Indonesia regarding establishing a network between producers and consumers is the concept that the producer is also a consumer. For example, there is a relationship between the corn growing group and dairy farmers. Consumers are not only middle-class city dwellers but also farmers who produce different products; this can be a market space for small farmers. This concept includes the community culture of food security and the strong culture of local food and local markets (including retailers). These systems can be adapted to create a diversity of markets that can easily be accessed by farmers and consumers. Thai farmers can learn from these systems and develop their own market spaces that will strengthen the self-reliance and freedom of Thai farmers.

2. Policy monitoring on changes in the agricultural sector and food system in Thailand. This is significant for national self-reliance on food. This study found that self-reliance on food in both countries decreased because of economic integration under the concept of neoliberalism. The integration of markets and production processes, including intellectual property rights, supports transnational company more than small farmers. The case of palm oil for biofuel in Indonesia has created a shortage of cooking oil and led to a food crisis because it has created a conflict within the agricultural sector about its role in producing food and its role in producing biofuels. Decision-making about this role rests with the business firms. The case of the corn farmers in Indonesia who were arrested under the intellectual property rights system reflects the neglect of farmers' rights. Policy monitoring should be implemented at both the national and international levels.

3. The establishment of relationships and the exchange of information, knowledge, and farmer's local wisdom through groups or civil society are important. These groups will stimulate the movement of the agricultural sector towards self-reliance and freedom. They will also improve social values. This kind of relationship has been established in some places such as the link between Japanese farmers and Thai farmers facilitated by the Rainbow Plan Project. There is a sharing of lessons learned on the issue of local markets. This relationship should be expanded and developed towards the goal of fostering social justice and a peaceful society.

NOTES

[1] Hokkaido is considered to be very different from other parts of Japan. In the land reform program after the Second World War, a farmer could have a maximum of 12 hectares.

[2] The Uruguay Round, the third phase of the GATT from 1986-1994, extended the agreement fully to new areas such as intellectual property, services, capital and agriculture. Out of this round the WTO was born.

[3] The *teikei* system is a Japanese direct distribution system for agricultural products. It focuses on the direct mutual relationship between farmers and consumers.

[4] *Sanchoku* is a cooperative which provides the agricultural product directly to the consumers. It is characterized by direct transaction or direct buying routes from producers to consumers. *Sanchoku* is seen as a way of guaranteeing the safety of products for members and also the information exchange between producers and cooperative members.

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ACTIONS OF NON-STATE GROUPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: ORIGINS, DRIVING FORCES AND NETWORKS

I Ketut Gunawan

Introduction

This work centers on non-state groups' actions in the form of terrorism and/or insurgency utilizing terror tactics in Southeast Asia. These actions potentially undermine a transformative Asia that shows promise in moving forward into its political maturity and socio-economic advancement and threaten the very basics of human security in the region. To deal with such threats or problems, one should better understand the nature of such groups' actions. In doing so, this research sheds light on their actions in three religiously distinct countries, namely Indonesia (predominantly Muslim), the Philippines (predominantly Catholic) and Thailand (predominantly Buddhist).

The main objectives of this work are, first, to better understand the origins and driving forces of these actions and the networks built by the perpetrators, and second, to identify the historical, structural and ideological roots of the problems. The significance of this work is, first, it can be used as an entry point to deal with the issues highlighted, second, it can promote the increased use of non-conventional approaches (non-military approaches) in solving the problems, and third, it can promote religious tolerance in building a more peaceful society.

This study applies a qualitative analysis to data obtained through in-depth interviews, personal communications, focus group discussions and library research. While the analysis of the Philippine and Thai cases is mainly based on the data collected during fieldwork in Manila and Mindanao (Zamboanga, Basilan, Davao, Cotabato) and Bangkok and the Thai southernmost provinces (Pattani, Yala, Naratiwat, Songkla, Satun), respectively, the analysis of the Indonesian case is based on my academic observations of the case, library research and content analysis of related documents. The findings are presented as a comparative study.

Conceptual framework

Non-state groups' actions are defined as actions by non-state actors. Categories of non-state groups' actions vary widely, from peaceful demonstrations and street confrontations against the state security apparatus to insurgencies and terrorism. This work focuses on terrorism and insurgency utilizing terror tactics. While insurgency can be easily understood as a non-state group's action, terrorism in fact can be grouped into two main categories, namely state terrorism and non-state terrorism. State terrorism is beyond the discussion of this study.

There are over one hundred definitions of terrorism proposed by experts and governments (Schmidt and Jongman in Malik 2001), and attempts to find a single universal definition have "been long and painful and [are] now living a separate life of [their] own." They have come "to resemble the quest for the Holy Grail" (Malik 2001, vii). This particularly becomes problematic when it is related to independence struggles, guerilla movements or insurgencies, as described in the conundrum, "one state's 'terrorist' is another state's 'freedom fighter,'" (UNODC nd) "one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter," (Primoratz 2004, xi) or "what one's enemies do is terrorism, what one does oneself is not" (Kronenwetter 2004, 14).

One important clue to define terrorism, as Primoratz (2004, xii) suggested, is that one should "seek a definition that does not define terrorism in terms of the agent, nor in terms of the agent's ultimate goal" but "should focus on what is done and what the immediate point of doing it is, and put to one side the identity of the agent and their ultimate and allegedly justifying aim." In this line, Ricolfi (2005, 80) distinguishes between terror attacks "which have civilian targets" and guerrilla attacks "which have military targets." Therefore, it is wrong to say that all insurgents' violent acts regardless of the type of the violence are not terror attacks (e.g., the terrorising of innocent civilians by insurgents). In the same line, not all violent acts carried out by terrorist organizations can be categorized as terrorism (e.g., certain violent robberies committed by certain terrorist organizations).

The discourse on violent actions was dominated by grievance theories until the late 1990s. This is because grievance "is not only much more functional externally, it is also more satisfying personally" (Collier 2000,

92). As has been widely recognized, the success of certain movements (e.g., collective actions, rebellions) relies heavily on the support of individuals as well as communities. By "disseminating" grievances, the movement can recruit supporters more cheaply. Hence, "even where the rationale at the top of the organization is essentially greed, the actual discourse may be entirely dominated by grievance" (Collier 2000, 92). In relation to terrorism and insurgency utilising terror tactics, Stern observed some types of exposed grievances such as alienation, humiliation, demographic shifts, historical wrongs and claims over territory (Stern 2003).

However, grievance theory collides with Olson's theory on the phenomenon of free-riders in a situation of collective action (Olson 1971). Since justice is a public good (Collier 2000), the movement will face the problem of free-riding. Collier is evocative of the fact that "even though everyone is agreed that rebellion is desirable, it is even more attractive if the costs are borne only by others and the success of rebellion will not be dependent upon the participation of any one individual" (Collier 1999). Thus, grievance-based factors are insufficient to drive rebellions or collective violence in most cases. This is the case due to "the non-excludability of the consumption of justice" (Collier 1999).

In view of these problems, Collier looked at the important role of economic motives. In order to underline the contrast to the grievance theory, he called this theory "greed theory." He suggested that it is greed or the economic motive of certain parties that drives a conflict. The greed theory is also regarded as capable of embracing the above problems. As Collier found by means of empirical cases, the true cause of violent conflicts is "not the loud discourse of grievance, but the silent force of greed." In his study of worldwide rebellion cases, he found that "greed considerably outperforms grievance" (Collier and Hoeffler 2001). In summarizing her case studies of terrorism and insurgency using terror tactics, Stern (2003, xix) maintained that what surprised her most in her research was the "discovery that the slogans sometimes mask not only fear and humiliation, but also greed—greed for political power, land or money."

Such approaches are useful when analyzing terrorism and insurgency using terror tactics. However, there are some curiosities left concerning the use of such approaches in explaining such terror attacks as suicide bombings in Indonesia. Hence, this research also attempts to go beyond these two contending perspectives.

Terror attacks and their origins in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand

Indonesia, with a total population of 208.8 million in 2005, is a Muslim-majority country where Muslims make up 87.2 percent of the total population, Christians, 6.2 percent; Catholics, 3.3 percent; Hindus, 2.2 percent; and Buddhists, 1.1 percent (BPS 2005). The Philippines is a Catholic-majority country with a total population of 76.5 million in 2000, where 84.2 percent of its people are affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church, 5.4 percent with Protestant denominations, 4.6 percent with Islam, 2.6 percent with the Philippine Independence Church, 2.3 percent with Iglesia ni Kristo and 2.2 percent with others (including animism) (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). Thailand's population is predominantly Buddhist, numbering to 95 percent of the total population of 60.9 million in 2000. Muslims make up 4.5 percent of the total population and the rest are Christians, Hindus and Sikhs (Abuza 2003).

These three countries have experienced numerous terror attacks or terror related actions in the recent past. Some of the attacks in Indonesia were the attacks on 16 churches across Indonesia on Chrismas Eve, 2000, resulting in 16 people dead and over 100 injured; the so-called Bali bombing I on October 12, 2002, resulting in 202 people dead and 317 injured; the Marriott Hotel attack on August 5, 2002, killing 14 people and injuring 132 persons; the Australian Embassy attack on September 9, 2004, killing 11 people and injuring tens of others; and the so-called Bali bombing II on October 1, 2005, killing 23 people and injuring 148 others.

In the Philippines, some of the attacks were a grenade attack in Zamboanga that killed two female American missionaries; bomb attacks in 1993 targeting a missionary ship, the MV Doules, in Zamboanga; Zamboanga airport, and Catholic churches, injuring several people; the kidnapping of three Spanish nuns and a priest in 1994; the kidnapping of 52 teachers and students in Tumahubong, Basilan, in which two teachers were beheaded; the Sipadan kidnapping of 19 foreigners and two Filipinos; the kidnapping of ten Western journalists (mostly Germans); the kidnapping of three French journalists in 2000; the kidnapping of three Americans and 17 Filipinos at Dos Palmas Resort (Palawan) on May 27, 2001; the SuperFerry 14 bombing in 2004 that killed 118 people and injured hundreds of others; and the Makati, Davao and General Santos bombings in February 2005 that killed 13 people and injured 140 others.

Some of the attacks in Thailand were the attack on three

Buddhist monks and novices on January 24, 2004, in which two were killed; bomb attacks on August 22, 2004 in Yala, injuring 13 people and damaging more than 30 vehicles; the assassination of 95 village headmen and assistant headmen (Buddhists and Muslims) by militants from January to June 2005; bomb attacks at a hotel, a restaurant and convenience stores on July 14, 2005, injuring 17 Buddhists and Muslims; the attacks on schools and teachers in 2004-2007, in which 71 teachers (including Muslims) were killed, more than 100 teachers were injured, and 170 schools were burned down; the attack on a commuter van on March 14, 2007, where eight Buddhist passengers were shot to death at close range, execution-style; the killing of two Muslim men by militants in a drive-by shooting on April 14, 2007; the assassination of a 29-year old Muslim (a local government official) in Naratiwat on June 22, 2007; and the killing of a Muslim vendor in his pick-up truck by militants on August 13, 2007.

There is no doubt that such non-state groups' actions were terrorism, terror attacks, or terror related actions as they systematically and/or repeatedly killed or intimidated civilians and spread fear among the communities.

From a historical perspective, such attacks are not isolated or independent events. They have their own historical traits. The groups' actions in Indonesia stemmed from the passions of its members to establish an Islamic state of Indonesia, which was first promoted by Kartosuwiryo in 1936. (Kartosuwiryo later established *Darul Islam* (DI) in 1947, *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic Army, TII) in 1948, and *Negara Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic State, NII) in 1949.) The recent attacks were contributed to by the rise of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which vowed to establish such a perceived ideal state. In fact, JI was established due to a rift in the DI/NII leadership between Abdullah Sungkar, the founder of JI, and Ajengan Masduki. In its development, it had a shared ideology with Al Qaeda and turned its target to American interests. In the Philippine case, terrorism is rooted in the historical disputes concerning the forced incorporation of the Moro Sultanates into the Philippine state. The rise of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which was founded by Abdurajak Janjalani (a former member of MNLF, or the Moro National Liberation Front), has highly contributed to these attacks. In its development, the ASG had a link with Al Qaeda operatives and became notorious for its kidnapping-for-ransom activities, particularly against Westerners. As for the Thai case, the issue is similar to that of the Philippines, namely the forced incorporation of the former Sultanate of Pattani into the Thai state. In the recent terror attacks, the central figure is *Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi* (National Revolution Front-Coordinate, BRN-C), particularly its mobile combat unit known as *Runda Kumpulan Kecil* (RKK, or small patrol unit). BRN-C has a loose, cell-based network with a broader new generation of village-based separatist militants who called themselves *Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani* (Pattani Freedom Fighters), whom local people refer to by the generic term "*pejuangs*" (freedom fighters). While RKK also belongs to the *pejuangs*, not all *pejuangs* are the members of BRN-C. It is also important to note that not all *pejuangs* attack civilians.

In short, the Philippine and Thai cases have a shared historical origin centering on the issue of regaining their "occupied" land. This is totally different from that of Indonesia, which originated from a strong passion to establish a perceived ideal state.

Indonesia	The Philippines	Thailand
US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, where many Muslims have been killed	Grievance on the suppression of Bangsamoro identity (e.g., transmigration program, Filipinization)	Grievance on the suppression of ethnic Malay identity (e.g., language/education policies, Thainization)
Israel's occupation of Palestine, where many Muslims have been killed and are living in misery	State-treatment of Muslims (e.g., Jabidah) and injustice	Injustice towards and state-treatment of Muslims (e.g., Krue Se, Tak Bai)
Grievance on secular state of Indonesia	Grievance on secular state of the Philippines, particularly in Mindanao	Grievance on secular state of Thailand, particularly in the southernmost provinces
Perceived suppression of Islamic movements to establish an Islamic state and/or *sharia* law	Natural resource exploitation in Mindanao (ancestral domains)	Natural resource exploitation in the southernmost provinces
Grievances on perceived Christianization and against Christians in the communal-religious conflicts	Perceived discrimination and marginalization in economic development	Perceived discrimination and marginalization in economic development

Table 1: Rough ranking of main grievances in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.

The driving forces

The driving forces of such terror attacks or terror-related actions in the researched countries could be highlighted from two contending perspectives: grievances vs. greed. These contending perspectives, however, insufficiently explain such phenomena. Therefore, the paper goes beyond these two contending perspectives by highlighting perpetrators' ideology of volence.

The grievance issue

The findings reveal that terrorism, terror attacks, or terror related actions in these three countries (Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand) were driven by grievances. Table 1 compares the groups' main grievances.

The grievances listed below and the attacks as noted have a religious dimension in each of these countries. Although in the Indonesian case the current top grievance is anti-American sentiment, there is still a strong religious dimension. Such grievances along with the origins of the problems (the historical origin) become the root causes of terrorism and terror attacks, consisting of both historical and structural roots. The existence of these root causes implies the existence of gaps between the state and the community and between two different communities.

It seems that addressing some of these grievances is beyond the authority or capability of the respective governments (e.g., the issues of the US and Israel's policies and actions in the Indonesian case). Some of them are certainly opposed by the existing governments (e.g., the conversion of the secular state to an Islamic state in Indonesia, the establishment of independent Islamic states in the Philippines and Thailand). The rest could be discussed. As experienced in the past, the groups may provide concessions if the governments are also willing to give some. Thus, there is a space to deal with the existing gaps, at least to improve the situation. Civil society could play an imperative role in bridging the gaps.

Indonesia	The Philippines
Money funnelled by Al Qaeda to JI	**Money funnelled by Al Qaeda to the ASG**
Al Qaeda to Hambali (I) = USD30,000	Jamal Khalifa to ASG = PhP160,000
Al Qaeda to Hambali (II) = USD100,000	Jamal Khalifa to ASG = PhP6,000,000
Al Qaeda to JI (1995) = IDR250 million	Al Qaeda to ASG = Est. USD3,000,000
Al Qaeda to JI (1997) = IDR400 million	
Al Qaeda to JI (2000) = IDR700 million	**In-country fundraising**
Omar al-Faruq to JI = USD200,000	***a. Main Kidnappings***:
M Jabarah to JI = USD70,000	Sipadan kidnapping = at least USD10,000,000
Hambali was captured with USD70,000	Ten journalists kidnapping = USD25,000
	Three journalists kidnapping = Est. USD5,500,000
In-country fundraising	Palawan kidnapping = at least USD330,000 (for
Jewellery shop robbery in Serang (Banten) = IDR6 million and 4.5 kg of gold	Gracia Burnham's release) + PhP5 million (for Kimberly Jao Uy's release)
Lippo bank robbery in Medan = IDR113 million	
Local government's fund robbery in Poso = IDR490 million	***b. Others***
Jewellery shop robbery in Pasar Tua (Palu) = n/a	Extortion, blackmail = n/a
Jewellery shop robbery in Monginsidi (Palu) = n/a	Taxing businesspeople, farmers, teachers, among others
	Marijuana cultivation & sale of shabu = n/a
Expenditures	
Bali bombing I = Est. IDR80 million	**Expenditures**
JW Marriot bombing = Est. IDR80 million	New teenage recruits in Basilan = PhP5,000/ person
Australian embassy bombing = Est. IDR80 million	New recruits in Jolo/Sulu = PhP50,000/person
Others = n/a	Others = n/a

Notes: (1) n/a = data not available

(2) The currency at that time was about Rp 10,000 and PhP42 to the US dollar in Indonesia and the Philippines respectively.

Table 2: Terror financing in Indonesia and the Philippines.

The greed/economic issue

A terrorism expert, Gunaratna, maintains that "money is the terrorist's lifeblood" (*Time Asia* 2003). This is not an exaggeration in the JI and ASG cases of Indonesia and the Philippines, respectively, as Table 2 shows.

Some of JI's funds mentioned in the table below may be overlapping while others are untraceable. However, it is clear that huge amounts of money were funneled by al Qaeda to JI. With such flows of money, *Time Asia* (2003) argues that Al Qaeda was subcontracting its "projects" to JI. To raise more funds, JI also carried out in-country fundraising activities through robberies, as seen in Table 2. In total, regional intelligence officials estimated that "at one point in 2002 Hambali had as much as USD500,000" (*Time Asia* 2003). The "business" size of JI was, however, outnumbered by that of the ASG. While JI ran a hundred thousand dollar "business," the ASG ran a multi-million dollar "business," drawing from foreign sources (e.g., Al Qaeda), kidnappings, drug trafficking, extortion, blackmail and taxing peasants, fishermen, coconut growers, businessmen and teachers (Ressa 2003; Bale 2003).

A Filipino journalist maintained that "the Abu Sayyaf began making money from everyone—starting with journalists. I saw the learning curve and the greed of the Abu Sayyaf grow" (Ressa 2003, 113). One defector from the ASG, Ahmad Sampang (a pseudonym), maintained that during its formative years, the ASG received a great deal of support from foreign sources. "Even our uniforms came from abroad. We were even issued bulletproof vests," said Sampang. He admitted that in the past the ASG members kidnapped people because they did not have enough money to buy arms, bullets and food. Realising that the group's orientation later changed, Sampang left the ASG. He said, "I left because the group lost its original reason for being. The activities were…for personal gratification. We abducted people…for money" (in Torres Jr. 2001, 41). He left the ASG in December 1998; thus, he recognized this change in orientation before a series of high profile kidnappings in 2000-2001. An American woman, Gracia Burnham, who was kidnapped on May 27, 2001 and spent more than a year in the ASG's hands, observed that "the bottom line was money" in the ASG kidnappings (in Ressa 2003, 111; see also Burnham 2003).

In the Thai case, there are only intelligence reports mentioning that "the southern Thailand insurgents are being funded by the Saudi Arabia-based Islamic fundamentalist Wahhabi movement." (*World Politics Watch* 2007) Another report says an association of Thai students in Indonesia (PMPIT) "takes care of the finances of the insurgency" through its fundraising activities overseas (*Bangkok Post* 2007). However, there is no hard evidence on the exact amount of money used to finance the terror attacks. What is clear, by assessing their use of cars and motorcycles as bomb carriers, their constant supply of explosives, weapons, and bullets, and the commando-style training courses they have received in the jungle and plantations, is that they certainly need funds. In one case, a professional bomb maker confessed that he had been charging the militants THB2,000-5,000 per bomb from 2004 until his capture in July 2007 (*The Strait Times* 2007). The availability of funds can also be inferred from the statement of Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) leaders (in Malaysia and Sweden) who offered a bounty of THB90,000 (USD2,250) to those who killed any governors or prominent officials of Pattani, Yala and Naratiwat (Gunaratna, Acharya and Chua 2005, 83). In addition, BRN-C has five units, and one of them is the economic and financial affairs unit whose main task is to collect and manage funds.

In short, money plays an important role for the ASG and JI in carrying out their operations. It is not exaggerating to say that money is the lifeblood for their activities. The difference is that while the ASG wrapped their silent force of greed within the discourse of grievance, JI seemed to use the money for its operations and for the costs of its members' personal living. In the Thai case, it is certain that they need funds to finance their operations. Whether the funds are also used for living costs are unclear.

Disrupting the financial networks of terror financing is the responsibility of the state. If the perpetrators of the violence are full-time "workers" in resorting to violence, it is also the state's responsibility to bring jobs, and it is the responsibility of civil society to carry out economic empowerment to ensure that local people do not need to rely on terror "projects" to cover their living costs.

Beyond greed and grievance: The ideology of violence

When the field coordinator of the Bali Bombing I, Imam Samudra, mentioned that JI employed suicide bombers, no one believed his statement as it had never happened before. As time passed, it was clear from the forensic evidence that the bombings were carried out by two suicide bombers. This announcement shocked many government officials, analysts, observers, experts and religious leaders. Later, suicide bombings in Indonesia turned into something usual, as seen in the following table.

Date	Targets	Suicide bombers	Location	Victims
12 October 2002	Bar, Night Club (Bali Bombing I)	Feri (aka Isa)	Paddy's Club, Bali	202 people dead, 317 injured
		Iqbal	Sari Club, Bali	
5 August 2003	Hotel	Asmar Latin Sani	J.W. Marriott Hotel, Jakarta	14 people dead, 132 injured
9 September 2004	Embassy	Heri Golun	Australian Embassy, Jakarta	11 people dead, tens injured
1 October 2005	Café (Bali Bombing II)	Misno (aka Wisnu aka Yanto)	Benega Café, Bali	23 people dead, 148 wounded
		M. Salik Firdaus	Nyoman Café, Bali	
		Ayib Hidayat	R'Ajas Café, Bali	

Table 3: Suicide bombers in Indonesia.

It is interesting to understand what is driving these actions. This can be traced from Imam Samudra's statement after he received a death sentence. The *Sydney Morning Herald* reported the case of Imam Samudra:

Sentenced to death for his role in the nightclub attack in October 2002 by the Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiah terror network that killed 202 people, he said he does not fear facing a firing squad. 'It's the key to paradise, everything will be very, very nice,' he told Sydney radio station 2UE from his prison cell in remarks broadcast yesterday. He believed paradise held the promise of 72 virgins for single men, but only 23 if a man had been married on earth, as he has. 'We kill to get peace,' said Samudra, adding that his message to the United States and Australia—which lost 88 citizens in the Bali bombing—was 'I win.' (*Sydney Morning Herald* 2004)

The research identified a number of other forces that drive JI, ASG and RKK (and some other new generation insurgents) to carry out terror attacks or terror-related actions in Indonesia, the Phlippines and Thailand, respectively, which are summarised in Table 4.

The ideology of violence is an important driving force. It has been used to justify the terror attacks or violent

JI (Indonesia)	ASG (The Philippines)	RKK and others (Thailand)
Ideology of violence		
Violent Jihadism: - Global (primary) - Local (secondary)	Violent Jihadism: - Local (primary) - Global (secondary)	Violent Jihadism: - Local
Takfir (excommunication, enemizing perceived infidels): - America and its allies - Non-believers (particularly Christians) - The existing (secular) government - Believers (certain Muslims who are believed to undermine the religion and its perceived ideal practices)	*Takfir* (excommunication, enemizing perceived infidels): - The existing (secular) government - Non-believers (particularly Catholics) - America and its allies - Believers (some Muslims who betray, oppose or do not support the struggle)	*Takfir* (excommunication, enemizing perceived infidels): - The existing (secular) government - Non-believers (particularly Buddhists) - Believers (Muslims who collaborate or work for the government [*munafik*/hypocrite] and betray, oppose or not cooperate in the struggle [*murtad*/apostate])
Incentive Expectation		
Dying as a martyr	Dying as a martyr	Dying as a *syahid* (martyr)
Going to paradise	Dying as a holy warrior	Dying as *Wira Shuhada* (army of martyrdom)
"Dear my brother and wife, God willing, when you see this recording I'll already be in heaven."	"Ride on a white horse to heaven when [...] die"	"When martyrs are killed, they are not dead but alive next to God."
Getting married or become a bridegroom (in heaven)	Going to heaven	"They [the *munafiks*] will not be welcomed in heaven."
Marrying 72 virgins for a single man (23 for a married man)		Marrying 72 virgins

Table 4: The ideology of violence in the researched countries.

acts of these organizations. In this ideology, there are two interconnected notions used by such groups (i.e., JI, ASG, RKK), namely violent jihadism and *takfir* (enemizing perceived infidels, thereby rendering them legitimate targets). If these groups only used one of these notions (i.e., the former), it would not lead to terror attacks, as *jihad fi sabillillah* (jihad in the path of God) is allowed only in a declared war against the combatants. If the latter (*takfir*) is incorporated into the former, the target becomes mostly civilians. Moreover, in the views of the militants, the incentives they believe they will receive in the after-life for their actions are instrumental in providing their motivation.

It is interesting to note that Muslims can also become the targets of terrorism. This work, however, finds a different treatment of them by the groups under study. In the Indonesian case, the groups target Muslims who are believed to be undermining the religion. JI operatives, for instance, targeted Ulil Abshar Abdalla (an activist of the Liberal Islam Network, JIL) and even Megawati Soekarnoputri (before she was President) for assassination, but these plans failed to be realized for various reasons. Imam Samudra tried to avoid Muslim casualties; but if they got killed in the blast it was considered to be their destinies, like collateral damage. He even apologized to the families of Muslim casualties in the 2002 Bali bombing (Samudra 2004). However, the ensuing bombings by JI continued to kill many Muslims.

The ASG under Abdurajak Janjalani was known for protecting and helping Muslims. After his death and when Abu Sabaya threatened Christians and urged Muslims to remove all crosses in Basilan, a former ASG member, Ahmad Sampang, said, "It is not right anymore… If only Abdurajak was still alive, he would not allow it. Innocent Muslims will be affected" (in Torres Jr 2001, 39). The ASG under Khadaffy Janjalani also protected Muslims by, for instance, releasing Muslims who were kidnapped by mistake (e.g., in the kidnapping of 52 teachers and students in Tumahubong, Basilan, in March 2000). However, they would try to kill the defectors (perceived traitors) of the ASG; Sampang confessed that at one time Abu Sabaya's group went to his house and tried to kill him, but that "I was able to escape" (in Torres Jr 2001, 42). The ASG also hated the Muslim Congressman Abdulgani "Gerry" Salapudin, a former MNLF Commander. Sampang said, in the past, "He did not help us. We asked him once to give us at least a few sacks of rice. But he failed us. We cannot kill him because he has a lot of armed men" (in Torres Jr 2001, 39-42).

The Thai case is, however, totally different. While JI and the ASG mostly try to avoid Muslim casualties (if they occur, they are considered collateral damage), the new generation of insurgents in Thailand has intentionally targeted many Muslims who work for the government, oppose their deeds and ideology or do not cooperate with them. This has contributed to the fact that between January 2004 and August 2006, more Muslims than Buddhists were killed in the recent violence and terror attacks in Thailand. One of the ideological explanations for this phenomenon can be found in a captured document entitled *Berjihad di Pattani* (Waging Jihad in Pattani).

The majority of Muslims in Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, are, however, moderate. They, including religious leaders, do not agree with the deeds and the ideology used by JI, the ASG and RKK to justify their terror attacks or violent acts.

The networks: Actual and virtual networks

The networks can be distinguished into actual networks and virtual networks. An actual network can be divided into an internal network and an external network. The actual networks of such groups in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand are summarised in Table 5.

Another type of network—the virtual network—has played a considerable role in the JI case. Discouragements to commit terror attacks have been carried out by many Indonesian religious leaders. Abu Bakar Baa'syir even released a "*fatwa*": "Don't do bombing in Indonesia." However, according to one security analyst, Noor Huda Ismail, "his '*fatwa*' discouraging violence in Indonesia has not been well received by fringe young and impassioned jihadi recruits. Young jihadists have instead turned to the Internet to download *fatwas* from mainly Middle Eastern jihadists, including *fatwas* from the late Jordanian-born Zarqawi and a jailed Saudi Arabian cleric, Al Maqdisi" (Ismail 2007).

The International Crisis Group (ICG) has noted that since the 2002 Bali bombing, the terror groups in Indonesia have reached the third generation and at present are not necessarily under JI's structural commands. Abdullah Sonata, for instance, denied his membership with JI. He instead declared himself and his cohort as "*mujahid* freelance" (freelance mujahidin), meaning their movement is leaderless or under a leaderless organization. One former member of JI from Central Java confirmed that Sonata was not a member of JI. It is also interesting to note that "about 18 '*mujahid* freelance' have been under detention" (*Tempo* 2005).

1.	Internal networks	Intra-organisational links	In-country links
a.	JI (Indonesia)	*Wakalah* (district-based organisation) I Surakar-ta, *Wakalah* II West Java, *Wakalah* III Central Java, Wakalah IV East Java, *Wakalah* V Southern Sumatra, *Wakalah* VI Northern Suma-tra, Cell in Sulawesi, Cell in Malaysia, Cell in Mindanao, Cell in Singapore, Cell in Cambodia	Ngruki Network, Kompak, Laskar Jundullah, NII, freelance *mujahid*
b.	ASG (the Philippines)	Basilan-based ASG (Khaddafi Janjalani), Jolo-based ASG (Commander Robot), Maguindanao-based ASG, ASG lost commands	MNLF lost command, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) lost command (Pentagon group)
c.	RKK (Thailand)	BRN-C (parent organisation), Pemuda (youth wing of BRN-C), *Pejuangs* (BRN-C's loose network with broader village-based insurgents)	GMIP, Pusaka, Bersatu, PULO/New PULO, Jamaah Salafi
2.	External networks	Types of links	
a.	JI-Al Qaeda	Financial network, personal network, training (Afghanistan; Poso, Indonesia	
b.	JI-ASG	Personal network, training (the Armed Forces of the Philippines estimated that more than two dozen JI members had been working with the ASG in Basilan and Sulu)	
c.	JI-RKK	No hard evidence. JI attempted to build cells in Thailand, but there is no evidence on the existence of an active JI cell in Southern Thailand. Some RKK operatives are reportedly trained in Bandung and Medan by Indonesian militants (not necessarily by JI members). A Thai Students Association in Indonesia (PMIPIT) is reported to play a role in overseas fundraising and in facilitating the training and recruitment of RKK operatives and other militant insurgents.	
d.	ASG-Al Qaeda	Financial network, personal network, training (Afghanistan; Basilan, the Philippines)	
e.	RKK-ASG/Al Qaeda	No evidence	

Table 5: Actual networks in the researched countries

How did a leaderless movement build its network? Besides through personal contacts and friendships, the role of the virtual network is of importance. In fact, two of the Sonata group's members are Internet savvy, and were tasked—besides to communicate with Dulmatin in the Philippines via email—to communicate with the world via websites. By tracing the JI case, there is also no doubt that Imam Samudra was Internet-minded. He spent a great deal of his time surfing jihadi websites and chatted with persons who have the same views as him. After the Bali bombing, he extensively communicated with other JI members via email and monitored the post-Bali bombing case via websites. He was captured with his laptop and the investigators found material for his future website claiming responsibility for the Bali attacks, expressing his violent ideology, stating 13 reasons for the attack and warning America and its allies concerning future attacks (see Adisaputra 2006; Samudra 2004). Two JI-linked lecturers from Semarang (Central Java), Agung Prabowo and Agung Setiadi, also made a website (www.anshar.net) for Noordin M. Topp, which was used to post their ideology of violence and news of Noordin's activities as well to communicate with other jihadists. In jail, Iman Samudra was also able to communicate with other jihadists, as well as with Agung Prabowo and Agung Setiadi, and posted his views on www.anshar.net via a laptop smuggled to him. This shows that members of this group have built and used virtual networks to communicate with the world for their cause.

The ineffectiveness of the discouragements by religious leaders and their choice to trust the Internet shows how effective the Internet is in sustaining the movement. The improved technology of the Internet to hide certain messages and its easy access means it will continue to be used to build and maintain the JI network as well as to nurture its ideology. Because of this, "this may be part of the explanation for how in the last seven years JI has shown resilience as a clandestine organization and demonstrated an ability to adapt to internal rifts and crackdowns by the authorities" (Ismail 2007). The easy use and access of Internet material, as one jihadist maintained, means that "the sprawling and anarchic nature of the web makes it easy to operate: Just put up a site, run it until it is closed down, and then put it up again somewhere else" (Ismail 2007). Thus, even if the organizations of JI and other terror groups could

be tracked down by security and intelligence officials, leaderless jihadists could still find their own way to further their goals through the virtual network.

With this kind of network, the terror groups can easily build communities that resemble what Ben Anderson called "imagined communities." However, the "imagined communities" here are not related to a sense of ethnicity, but a sense of religiosity where the ideology of violence is used to cement the concerns of these communities. This kind of network is more difficult to deal with compared to an actual network as its drive is located in the minds of individuals. This is a challenge to civil societies advocating peace or to those who work for a more peaceful world.

Conclusion

While Asia has promisingly transformed itself toward political maturity and/or economic advancement, it faces imminent threats that could undermine its current and future advancements, either locally or regionally. One of the threats is non-state groups' actions in the form of terrorism or terror attacks. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand are countries in Southeast Asia that have suffered from such actions.

Such non-state groups' actions have their own origins. In the Philippine and Thai cases, they have originated from a dispute about claimed areas (those of the Sultanate of Sulu/Maguindanao and the Sultanate of Pattani, respectively). Insurgencies attempting to regain the perceived lost areas and create an independent state have led to the emergence of groups that use terror tactics to further their goals. In the Indonesian case, terrorism has originated from a strong passion to establish a perceived ideal state. The recent lethal attacks, however, are strongly related to US policies and actions in world politics.

The grievance approach is insufficient to explain the phenomenon of these non-state groups' actions. The greed explanation also has some limitations in explaining the phenomenon. Alternatively, the ideology of violence has considerably contributed to these actions in the researched countries.

While the group's actual network is vulnerable to the state security apparatus, the virtual network is more resilient since the core force in this network lies in the minds of individuals, cemented with a shared ideology of violence. The use of this type of network has been observed in the Indonesian case. In the future, the network could contribute to the establishment of a wider, leaderless movement with its own "imagined communities." It is not exaggerating, therefore, to say that the members of such "imagined communities" could carry out independent terror attacks without the command of, or being tied to, certain actual organizations.

Due to the complexity of the issues, multi-dimensional efforts should be carried out to overcome the problems. The use of non-conventional approaches (i.e., non-military approaches) should be given emphasis, particularly through investments in education, economic empowerment and the promotion of religious tolerance.

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GLOBALIZATION, INFLUENCE AND RESISTANCE: CINEMATIC REPRESENTATIONS AND EXPERIENCE IN JAPAN AND THAILAND

Krisnadi Yuliawan Saptadi

Introduction

Ben Okri, a Nigerian writer, once said that if anyone wants to conquer a nation, first they have to invade their stories. Sometimes, when we talk about globalization, many people believe that Hollywood, with all its blockbusters, has already done exactly what Okri said. As Wim Wenders, a famous German film director, once said to his fellow Germans, "The Americans have colonized our subconscious."

The feelings represented in Okri's and Wenders' statements are the reason why Hollywood is often criticized for overwhelming global audiences with "American culture." In the eyes of the world, Hollywood is America. It represents not only the glamour of American movie stars, but also their "soft power"—what many see as the cultural imperialism—of the world's lone superpower.

It is a fact that although Hollywood produces only a small fraction of the world's feature films, it garners about 75 percent of theatrical motion picture revenues and even more of the video rentals and purchases. Moreover, despite some twists and turns in individual years, the long-term trend has clearly favored Hollywood's increasing domination. Hollywood's proportion of the world market is double what it was in 1990, while the European film industry is one-ninth of the size it was in 1945. Further, in Western Europe in 1985, 41 percent of the film tickets purchased were for Hollywood films; by 1995, however, the figure was 75 percent.

Starting in 2000, Hollywood films generally had greater box office sales outside the United States than at home. Eighteen such films took in over USD100 million internationally, a total not matched by any film produced outside the United States. While there was an interloper in 2001 (the Japan animated film *Spirited Away* took in over USD200 million), it was the exception that proved the rule, as the top 10 films at the box office in 2001 were all Hollywood products. The global situation in years after was no different.

Historically, Asian markets have not been very significant for Hollywood. They have not generated as much revenue for the studios as have European and Latin American markets. However, this began to change in the 1980s and especially the 1990s. Nowadays, Hollywood movies take about 96 percent of box office receipts in Taiwan, about 78 percent in Thailand and about 65 percent in Japan.

A number of factors have contributed to the growth of Asian film markets and to Hollywood's increasing domination of them. Trade liberalization has allowed many more Hollywood movies to come into Asian theaters, and economic growth has given more people the means to see them. The building of modern multiplexes has dramatically increased the number of venues for film exhibition, while the privatization of television and the development of new distribution technologies such as video, cable and satellite have created whole new markets for film beyond the theatres.

While the distribution-exhibition sectors of Asian film industries have welcomed this market expansion, the production sectors have not always been so enthusiastic, insofar as multiplexes and the new home-based entertainment outlets tend to fill up with Hollywood films. Hollywood's economic, institutional and political power gives it a competitive advantage that few industries in the world can match: only Hollywood can afford to spend USD200 million on a single film; only Hollywood has the global distribution network and publication powers that can get its movies into theaters worldwide; and only Hollywood has the US government behind it, pushing to open foreign markets even further.

As markets around the world expanded and as Hollywood claimed a bigger and bigger portion, the logical thing happened: Hollywood studios began to earn more of their money outside of the US than they did inside. From the 1950s through the 1970s, Hollywood earned about 30 percent of its money overseas. That percentage began to climb in the 1980s and today the average studio production earns well over 50 percent of its revenue abroad. That number is expected to grow over time, with some industry figures predicting the foreign share of box office earnings could rise to 80 percent within the next 20 years. This means that Hollywood is

becoming an export industry, making movies primarily for people who live outside the United States.

Asia is Hollywood's fastest growing regional market. Some analysts predict that within 20 years Asia could be responsible for as much as 60 percent of Hollywood's box-office revenue. No wonder that the American film industry now sees the growing markets of Asia as its next great frontier. In the pursuit of the two billion-plus viewers of Asia, Hollywood is expanding its embrace to include actors from Hong Kong, scripts from South Korea or Japan and also production facilities in China or Thailand. Perhaps nothing indicates globalization as much as the growing ties between the Asian and American film industries.

However, is it only *Hollywoodization* that is happening in Asia? How about an *Asianization* of films? We can, of course, ask questions about influences among film cultures in Asia. Nowadays, as people travel between countries pretty much like they traveled between cities in the old days, Asian people and Asian films also travel. As neighboring countries, ties between Asian countries are supposed to be stronger than ties between Asian countries and Hollywood. However, in the field of cinema, is this the case?

With this Asian Public Intellectual Fellowship, I proposed a project to see how globalization works in the field of cinema. I wanted to see globalization through cinematic representations and cinematic experience in Japan and Thailand.

Japan

During my stay in Japan in October 2006, the 19th Tokyo International Film Festival was being held. This is one of the major, if not the most important, film festivals in Japan. This festival has a famous competition section where many international films compete to be the best. However, already for three consecutive years, the programmer of this festival also holds a special section that is called "Japanese Eyes," in which s/he selects and screens the best Japanese films produced each year.

What was really interesting for me was when, at the end of the festival, out of 13 films that were selected by Yoshi Yatabe, the Japanese Eyes Programming Director, *The Cats of Mirikitani* was picked as the best film in this category. This was not only interesting because *The Cats of Mirikitani* was the only documentary film shown in the Japanese Eyes section that year, but also because of the production nature of this film.

The Cats of Mirikitani can hardly be described as a Japanese film in a traditional sense of production. The director of this documentary is Linda Hattendorf, an Ohio-born New York film editor who has been working in the New York documentary community for more than a decade. This film is a directorial debut for her. Lucid Dreaming Inc., the company which produced this film, is also not a Japanese company, but American.

The subject of this film, Jimmy Mirikitani, can be dubbed as Japanese because his parents were Japanese. However, Mirikitani is not a Japanese citizen. He was not even born in Japan, but in Sacramento, America. Mirikitani is a Japanese-American. All of the events in this documentary were shot and took place in America. The city of New York is the ultimate landscape of this documentary.

Jimmy Mirikitani was a street painter who was all of a sudden noticed by Linda Hattendorf when she walked in the freezing cold streets of Manhattan on the first day of 2001. When Hattendorf saw him, Mirikitani was sleeping under many layers of clothing in front of a grocery store. An intimate, yet strange relationship began between Hattendorf and this 80-year old homeless man when she agreed to "buy" one of his drawings in exchange for taking a photograph of him, which was the payment he requested.

Starting with that first encounter, Hattendorf documented their relationship with her video camera. The result, *The Cats of Mirikitani*, is no doubt a treasure of personal filmmaking. Slowly, in a very subtle way, *The Cats* brings in the fact that Jimmy Mirikitani is a very unique and special person. As quickly revealed by an examination of his art, Mirikitani was held in a Japanese internment camp during the Second World War, as a part of the anti-Japanese campaign after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The strong message and relevance of Jimmy Mirikitani's experiences is thrown into shocking relief when, about nine months after Hattendorf began recording, the events of 9/11 took place. That evening, Hattendorf found Mirikitani alone in the toxic cloud that had taken over lower Manhattan. Feeling worried, Hattendorf asked him to come home with her. Surprisingly, Mirikitani, who up to that point had refused virtually all assistance being offered to him, agreed.

This film, which started with the awkward relationship between Hattendorf and Mirikitani, develops a great, unspoken affection at this point. With Hattendorf's help, Mirikitani, who was very bitter about his life and

his experiences in the internment camp, slowly made peace with his past life.

Maybe everyone will agree that watching *The Cats of Mirikitani* is a privilege. The hidden message of this film is very strong: connecting every prejudice that is affecting the world after 9/11 with an experience of a victim of such prejudice during the Second World War. I witnessed the loudest applause at the end of *The Cats of Mirikitani* screening, far louder than for any other film included in the Japanese Eyes Category at the 19th Tokyo International Film Festival that I watched.

In term of quality, I know no one will question the judgment of the jury when they picked *The Cats of Mirikitani* as the best Japanese film at the Tokyo International Film Festival 2006. However, for me, one interesting question still comes up: is *The Cats of Mirikitani* really a Japanese film? Does the fact that *The Cats of Mirikitani* falls in a Japanese film category tell us about something more than just a simple film categorization?

Yes, Masa Yoshikawa, the producer of this film is Japanese. He had previously worked on many productions for the Tokyo Broadcasting System and NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation). Keiko Deguchi, the editor of *The Cats of Mirikitani*, is also Japanese. However, both of them are now based in New York. Yoshikawa has written and produced many feature films and American television programs, while Deguchi has edited many big American feature films, including Steven Shainberg's recent narrative feature *Fur*.

So, why can *The Cats of Mirikitani* easily be categorized as a Japanese film? Is it because the hidden narrative in this film tells the deep feelings of the victimized Japanese under American domination? Or is it because, nowadays, the nature of film production is really difficult to keep within one national boundary? For a long time, questions about national cinema were not easy to define or answer. Film theorists agreed that national cinema is a term used to describe the films associated with a specific country. However, its meaning is still being debated by film scholars and critics.

For the industry, it is easier. National cinema is determined by the place that provides the capital irrespective of where the films are made or the nationalities of the directors. For the industry, a film is sometimes just a number on a balance sheet. However, cases like *The Cats of Mirikitani* call this definition into question, as well.

Jimmy Choi, in his paper *Is National Cinema Mr. MacGuffin?*, suggested we look into the artifact, or the film itself, to find out what elements in the film text constitute national cinema. Borrowing a term from Walter Benjamin, Choi wrote that national cinema has an "aura." It is not just any "aura;" it is an aura that bespeaks a national identity. In films, it embodies the language spoken, the nationalities of the protagonists, the dress, the setting, the locale, the music and many different elements that Choi call cultural icons. To give the "aura," many of these elements have to act together.

Choi also acknowledged that this "aura" is something you can feel when it is there but is hard to fully explain. Maybe this is the case in *The Cats of Mirikitani*. However, being international is not something new for Japanese cinema. Some say that, in Japanese history, cinema was always international before it was national. The first films to be exhibited in Japan were produced abroad while the first Japanese productions depended on foreign-made equipment and advisors. Even the spread of cinema as a key element in early Japanese mass culture during the Taisho and Showa period can be said to be a result not of Japanese traditions but of vernacular modifications of industrial and textual practices developed by Hollywood studios in the 1910s.

Starting with that introductory phase, a big culture of cinema-going slowly arose in Japan and the Japanese film industry grew stronger and larger. As an industry, we can say that the Japanese film industry was copying Hollywood's success. Its studio system and star system was similar to Hollywood's. At one point, in the 1950s, the Japanese film industry reached its peak and produced about 650 films a year; at that time, this was even more than what was produced in the United States.

While the influence of Hollywood's modes of production deeply penetrated the Japanese movie industry, Japanese cinema provided a different image internationally. Since the 1950s, great directors like Kenji Misoguchi, Yasuhiro Ozu and Akira Kurosawa burst onto the international stage and became darlings of world cinema. Some of them, like Misoguchi, were sometimes slow to be recognized, and only known long after their productive years, but all of them definitely changed the way people saw Japanese cinema.

Masterpieces by Misoguchi, Ozu and Kurosawa suddenly provided fascinating alternatives to crude Hollywood spectacles with their insipid narratives. Thanks to them, suddenly Japan became Western cinema's "privileged other." *Rashomon*, *Sansho Dayu* and *Tokyo Story* were

celebrated because these Japanese films purveyed serious humanist themes in a style derived from a deep artistic heritage.

After the Ozu, Misoguchi and Kurosawa era, Japan introduced Shohei Imamura, Nagisa Oshima and their generation to the world. This new generation expressed themselves with greater freedom by tackling subjects that were more social and violent. Despite the differences, Imamura and Oshima still impressed world viewers with their vivid and pure forms, which were mysterious and challenging but always identifiably "Japanese." All of these famous Japanese directors became living proof of an old formula that to be truly international, a cinema must first be truly national.

Despite the international success of these famous directors, success was never theirs at the local box office. These directors, whose films had what international experts called strong "local" flavor, never became number one in the local box office records. Hollywood movies took over. Even though the Japanese film industry always considered itself one of the strongest in the world (with an average production of three hundred films every year, it comes number three after India and the United States), it could not deter the Hollywood invasion.

The 1970s was the start of the decline in the Japanese movie industry. Falling attendance rates combined with an economic downturn dealt a sharp blow to the Japanese industry. The major distributors—Toho, Toei and Shochiku—made money only by filling their cinemas with foreign films or animation. Slowly, Japan became Hollywood's single most profitable export market.

During these hard times, only Japanese animation, more popularly known as *Anime*, could still challenge Hollywood domination. Since the 1980s, names from the *Anime* World, such as Hayao Miyazaki, Mamoru Oshii and Satoshi Kon, have been shaping the Japanese film industry. We can always say that *Anime* is one form of resistance to Hollywood domination, because *Anime* has distinct Japanese expressions, portrays Japanese problems and is executed in a very Japanese style.

Aside from the *Anime* world, in those times it was very difficult for new film directors to break into a major studio network because, to put it simply, the studios brushed aside the newcomers. Fortunately, starting in the 1990s, several young Japanese filmmakers employed their creative energy to try to put up a resistance to Hollywood domination. These young filmmakers have given new life to Japan's battered film industry.

At that time, these filmmakers were all between 20 and 40 years old, and produced their films with extremely limited resources. In Japan, one of the world's most expensive countries to live in, this sometimes meant that these directors also worked in television, advertising or cartoons, and held down several jobs to make ends meet.

Interestingly, all of these new Japanese filmmakers tended to focus on social and psychological themes, like delinquency and senseless crime, which mirrored the confusion and malaise of a generation that had rejected the old ambitions of getting rich, blind loyalty to one's employer and social harmony. Without access to major distribution networks, they made films in a ghetto of art cinemas where competition was fierce: this new genre could never earn much money.

Financing the productions was also a nightmare for them. With budgets ranging from USD100,000 to a million dollars, most often they had to go into debt to get the film started. One of these directors is Shinya Tsukamoto. Making fantasy films in the tradition of the Frenchman Georges Melies, Tsukamoto was director, cameraman, set designer, actor and producer all rolled into one. It is said that it took Tsukamoto eight months to make *Bullet Ballet*, his seventh film, whose street scenes were largely shot clandestinely.

Another name is Kiyoshi Kurosawa, who started his career by making film noir on 16 mm or video, even though since the beginning, he infused his works with a surprisingly philosophical dimension. Two of Kurosawa's major works, *Eyes of the Spider* and *Serpent Path* (1998), were shot one after the other, each in two weeks, with the same crew and the same actors. The same plot of revenge, however, is handled very differently in the two cases.

Takeshi Miike is another director in this generation. His work, despite seeming too violent, is highly regarded and has many cult-followers internationally. Another name is Akihihiko Shiota, who made a couple of erotic films before his remarkable *Moonlight Whispers* in 1999, which follows three children growing up in a city suburb and cost less than USD200,000 to make. This young filmmaker, whose later more popular works were categorized as "Japan New Wave of the 1990s," really loved experimenting.

This new generation of directors made their films without any thought for the big studio networks.

Look at Hirokazu Kore-Eda, who directed *Wonderful Life*. For *Wonderful Life*, Kore-Eda, who was trained in documentary production, sent his assistants out on a five-month mission to capture on video "the best memories" of about five hundred elderly people. He looked at the rushes, did the casting and then contacted those he had chosen to appear in the film.

Or look at Aoyama Shinji. His feature *Eureka*, deals with a recurrent theme in 1990s Japanese cinema—that of a new life, a transition to an alternative state of existence following a traumatic experience. It shows three people, a man and two children, who have escaped from a bloody hostage-taking episode and struggle throughout the film to find their way out of a maze of misfortune. Last but not least, I have to mention Takeshi Kitano, who played an essential role as "big brother" to this new generation of filmmakers.

All of these new generation directors from the 1990s were celebrated internationally with many award and prizes, but did they change Hollywood domination locally? No. Look at Takeshi Kitano, for example. His company, Office Kitano, produced a steady stream of independent films, but this company made most of its money by selling movies to television. The Japanese box office was still not too generous with this talented filmmaker.

My travel to several cities in Japan during my fellowship revealed how strong the Hollywood presence is in local cinema. As I met with people, I noticed that their knowledge about Hollywood films, actors or directors was much better than their knowledge about all of "the new wave of the 1990s" directors. I had similar experiences, not only in the big cities, but even in medium-sized cities like Yamagata.

For me, this is interesting, because a Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) report said that the Japanese film industry entered a steady recovery phase in 2004. JETRO is convinced that constant increases in movie attendance and box office revenue indicate that full recovery is underway. In 2004, box-office revenues were split 62.5 percent for foreign films and 37.5 percent for Japanese films. After so many years of Hollywood domination, even this small share is considered a sign of Japanese films' promising future.

Another optimistic figure came up in the *Japan Times* newspaper. *Japan Times* journalist Yoshio Kakeo reported that, in the first quarter of 2007, Japanese films outperformed Hollywood because, for the first time in 21 years, Japanese films held more than 50 percent of the market share. Therefore, if the JETRO and *Japan Times* numbers are true, how can we explain the "unpopularity" of Japanese directors?

We have to look closely at those optimistic numbers. Yes, it is true that Japanese films have started gaining a bigger attendance lately. However, as I mentioned earlier, the Japanese films that are receiving a large attendance are different than the ones that receive many awards from international film festivals. The Japanese films that are attracting many viewers mainly do not came from all of those challenging directors I mentioned earlier.

Anime, as always, is the most popular film genre in Japan. Then came a genre that has lately been called *J-horror*. Hits like Hideo Tanaka's *Ringu* and another Japanese horror movie *Ju-on* are the record holders at the local box office. Other popular genres are action and teen flicks. Interestingly, except maybe for the *Anime*, all of those hits have one thing in common: they somehow mimic Hollywood in terms of narrative structure.

Most commercially successful Japanese films are not concerned with the exploration of national themes and styles. Like Hollywood films, their basic formal concern is merely story telling or narrative. Stories are routinely designed along a precise temporal dimension and spatial lines: look at successful films such as *Bayside Shakedown 2* or *Always—Sanchome no Yuhi* (*Always—Sunset on the Third Street*).

Even though these films can beat Hollywood blockbusters in term of box office revenues, we can say that both films fall strongly into Hollywood conventions. It is not that those films were bad. Aside from its success in commercial distribution, *Always*, for example, was awarded with 12 prizes at the annual Japanese film awards. However, watching this film will take you to places where Hollywood films have gone before.

Always has very good computer graphic special effects, almost perfect. However, in the words of Japanese film critic Kenichi Okubo when we talked about this film, "the depiction of emotions by the characters in *Always* was hardly Japanese." If watched carefully, we will find that *Always* is very disciplined in following Hollywood narrative conventions, like the simple *balance-destruction-resolve* structure that makes audiences passive.

As a result, despite the recent "revival" in the local box office, Japanese films still suffer defeat from Hollywood. Look at the case of the J-horror blockbuster *Ringu*. The success of this Hideo Nakata's film made Hollywood offer him a contract for a Hollywood remake. Many

critics agree that *The Ring*, Hollywood's remake of *Ringu*, was not as good as the original. However, in Japan, this remake film brought in more revenues than the original!

Unfortunately, even though the directors from the "Japan new wave of the 1990s" are still working and have made many films, their films are hardly as influential as before. It seems that they are only continuing on with what they have already achieved. In one interview, Aaron Gerouw, a Japanese film expert from Yale University, agreed that there is nothing as good as "generation 1990s" in recent Japanese films. According to Gerouw, Japanese films desperately need new blood.

Fortunately, independent films are always strong in Japan, and became even stronger when digital moviemaking became more popular. This is a place where another resistance to Hollywood domination could emerge. This independent mode of production, which is free from big studio, marketing-driven product, has also made international collaboration easier. *The Cats of Mirikitani* is one such case.

With a small crew, and collaboration between an American-woman director and several of her Japanese friends, *The Cats of Mirikitani* breaks many conventions. It is still considered a Japanese film, even though it tells a non-Japanese story in a non-Japanese land. While *The Cats* is "only" a documentary, it can also easily compete with big budget production films and win a prestigious award.

The Cats of Mirikitani also provides evidence that, nowadays, the nature of film production is really difficult to keep within one country because creativity cannot be kept within one country's boundaries. In Japan, there is a big trend in international collaboration, especially within the far eastern countries. Look at how Takeshi Kitano's production company helps nurture some of the best talent from China. Kitano's company is a major force behind many of Jia Zangke's award winning films.

Korea is also starting to influence Japanese films more and more. There is a "booming" interest about Korean movies in Japan, inspired by the smash-hit TV drama *Fuyu no Sonata* (*Winter Sonata*). Some Korean blockbusters have also been remade into Japanese versions. Another interesting fact is the rise of Korean film distribution in Japan. By 2004, Korean movies become the second biggest foreign movies in Japan, replacing French movies.

Maybe in the future, these trends in Asian collaboration will broaden the old boundaries into new boundaries. As noted by Kurosawa Kiyoshi, one of the directors from the "Japan new wave of the 1990s," when being interviewed: "After 1998, I was traveling to many film festivals around the world. I made films that were usually dubbed J-films (Japanese films), but all in those festivals, my films fell into the Asian-film category. Even Iranian films are mentioned in one breath with my films."

Thailand

As in Japan, Hollywood also dominates the Thai film industry. In 2000, Hollywood movies took in about 78 percent of the box office receipts in Thailand. This is of course, inviting "resistance." When interviewed, Wisit Sasanatieng, director of *Tears of the Black Tiger*, the first Thai film to be officially selected for the Cannes Film Festival in 2001, said in a very resistant voice, "Globalization tries to make the world the same as America."

In this kind of world, Wisit admits he is always searching for a Thai influence when he makes films. "We must use our traditional culture as a weapon to fight back. Don't let Hollywood steal our culture," he said. That is why Wisit's films always seem to pay homage to old Thai films, especially some of those directed by Rastana Pestonji, a Persian who was once dubbed the "Father of Thai films."

In *Tears of the Black Tiger*, for example, he cast Sonbati Medhanee as one of his main actors to play a tough, Charles Bronson-style leader of mountain bandits. Sonbati was one of Pestonji's actor, and also a star whose name is recorded in the *Guinness Book of Records* because he starred in six hundred feature films. When choosing Sonbati, Wisit Sasanatieng also wanted to be proud of what many call as the golden age of Thai cinema.

Long before Hollywood domination, the period of the 1960s and the early 1970s can be considered the golden age of Thai films. At that period, the Thai film industry could produce almost two hundred films a year. Not only did the film studios enjoy booming revenues from their action flicks, melodramas, horror or teen movies, this period also saw a group of intellectuals enter the film industry and make so-called "socially critical cinema."

These young and energetic intellectuals, who came from universities, political movements or journalism, used filmmaking as a medium to present their sociopolitical

views. Their social concerns were triggered by two important political events: the student uprising on 14 October 1973 and the attack on demonstrating students on 6 October 1976. These intellectual-director films are still considered classics and are some of the most important films in Thai history.

Some of these films are *Dr. Karn* (1973), *The Angel* (1974), *The Citizen* (1977) and *The Gunman* (1983) by Prince Chatrichalerm Yukol, *Mountain People* (1979) and *Son of the Northeast* (1982) by Vichit Kunavuthi, *The Angel of Bar 21* (1978), *The Story of Namphu* (1984) and *Butterfly and Flower* (1985) by Euthana Mukdasanit, and *On the Fringe of Society* (1980) by Manob Udemdej. However, history tells that these socially critical films did not "fit" with the nature of Thai society.

Censorship prevented Thai directors from attempting any controversial or political films. When Surasri Phatum made *Country Teacher* (1978), depicting social injustice in 1970s, he was forced to escape a clampdown by the authorities by temporarily hiding away in the forests of northern Thai. In the 1980s, when Euthana Mukdasanit attempted to depict the political terrorism of 1932, his project was never given permission by the authorities.

Starting in 1985, Thai cinema experienced another type of film: a flood of teen flicks. The teen flick genre was so popular that even Prince Chatreechalerm Yukol, a director from the social commentary era, eventually made two teen films. As a result, when later facing the flood of Hollywood blockbusters, Thai film could hardly survive. With low quality movies, Thai films could only attract audiences in remote rural areas of Thailand.

When, in 1993, the Thai government was forced by the American government to reduce its tariffs on imported films, the number of American films being shown in Thailand increased. This Hollywood invasion grew even more potent when Thailand's Entertainment Theatres Network and the Hong Kong/Australian-based Golden Village established EGV, Thailand's first multiplex theater.

In this context of Hollywood's strong domination, Wisit Sasanatieng and his generation emerged as challengers. The turning point for this new generation of Thai films was when Pen-Ek Ratanaruang launched his directorial debut *Fun Bar Karaoke* in 1997. This movie was followed by Nonzee Nimibutr's feature debut *Dang Bailey and the Young Gangster*. Later, Pen-Ek became famous because his films won many awards abroad, and Nonzee because his movies broke many Thai box office records.

After his directorial debut, Pen-Ek Ratanaruang made *Sixtynine* (1999), *Monrak Transistor* (2002), *Last Life in the Universe* (2003), *Invisible Waves* (2006), and *Ploy* (2007). *Monrak Transistor* opened as the Thai debut in Cannes' Directors Fortnight, *Last Life in the Universe* in Venice, and *Invisible Waves* in Berlin's competition. All of his works gave him a reputation as one of the few Thai auteurs with anti-narrative structures and experimental cinematography.

Different from Pen-Ek, Nonzee Nimitbutr's success lies in box-office revenues. After *Dang Bailey and Young Gangsters* (1997), he made *Nang Nak* (1999) a horror movie that was adapted from the well-known legend of a female ghost who refuses to accept her death and insists on spending life with her husband. Both of them broke all previous Thai box office records. After that, Nonzee made two films, *Jan Dara* (2001) and *Baytong* (2003), which were more personal, not visual heavyweights and without big box office revenues.

Another name in this generation is Yongyoot Thongkongtoon. His directorial debut *Iron Ladies* (2000) expanded the borders of Thai cinema from festival circuits to international commercial markets. Unfortunately, this generation of directors, can only challenge Hollywood in a small way. Yes, Nonzee Nimibutr and Yongyoot Thongkongtoon can have their share of box-office revenues. Their films can even beat Hollywood blockbusters. However, unlike Wisit or Pen-Ek, their narratives are not that different from the enemy: Hollywood. When watching a short uncut version of Nonzee's newest film, *Queen of Lakansuka*, I feel like I was watching another *Pirates of the Caribbean* movie.

As a whole, the birth of this 1997 generation has been unable to change the face of the Thai film industry. The majority of annual releases are still occupied with popular genres like action, slapstick and horror. The most recent popular movies like *Ong Bak: The Muay Thai Warrior* or even Prince Chatreechalerm's *King Naresuan* all borrow Hollywood narratives with Thai flavor only as an addition.

In an interview, when asked to describe the current status of the Thai film industry, Pen-Ek said, "The problem is Thai films over the past 10 years have been crap. It was better before. Now, Thai cinema lacks originality." For Pen-Ek, most Thai films are marketing-driven and market-oriented. "There are so few directors here. Most directors do not even have a voice because all of their works are defined by marketing officers," Pen-Ek said.

However, another "resistance" is taking place within the Thai film community. The Thai Film Foundation, for example, has held an annual Thai Short Film and Video Festival since 1997. Many talented directors are born through this festival. However, if we talk about Thai alternative filmmakers, no other name is worth mentioning than Apichatpong Weerasethakul.

Almost unknown, Apichatpong became an overnight legend when in 2004 he brought his film, *Tropical Malady*, to the official competition in Cannes and won a Special Jury Prize. In 2006, his *Syndromes and a Century* was also the first Thai film to compete in Venice. A graduate of filmmaking studies from the Art Institute of Chicago, Apitchapong brings his own approach to film, and is sometimes dubbed the most genuine filmmaker in the world. His well-known trademarks are fragments of images and sound, an anti-narrative structure and experimentation with exotic elements.

Aphichatpong is not alone in this independent alternative cinema. There are other important indie figures including Aditya Assarat, Uruphong Raksasad, Pimpaka Tohveera and Mingmongkol Sonakul. Like Aphichatpong, Uruphong Raksasad is also a very gifted filmmaker. His nine-shorts-collection compiled into one feature, *The Stories from the North*, is a challenge to almost every feature film convention.

Realistically, except for Apitchatpong, who can always request foreign funds, these indie-alternative filmmakers still suffer from a lack of financial support and cinematic limitations. Therefore, despite their stubborn resistance, it is really hard to say if, except for Apitchatpong and few other names, Thai independent filmmakers will bring an alternative approach to developing Thai film culture.

Conclusion

My travels in Japan and Thailand showed me the depth of Hollywood's influence over both countries' film industries. However, during that time, I also felt that Hollywood's "domination" has made traditional cultures or the cultures of other nations start to question their identity. This has led to resistance, in many ways and forms. In cinema, some of this "resistance" can be easily traced, but some are difficult to see.

Yet, globalization is not only about Hollywood. Thailand and Japan are also affected by the tide of cinema globalization. In the case of Japan, Asian influences prevail strongly. Korean films have become fashionable, while collaborations between East Asian countries are also developing. In Thailand, interestingly, the independent-alternative filmmakers are also using globalization as a way to make their voices heard.

THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION AND CONSUMPTION: SPIRITUALITY IN JAPAN FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A THAI

Sing Suwannakij

INTRODUCTION: Chasing reality, shift of focus

From my research experience, I learned what is almost a life truth: that there is always a chasm between reality and one's understanding of reality. My primary interest was Buddhism and, before the actual research, I naïvely thought, gathered from books I read, that Japan was primarily a Buddhist country, and that perhaps I could study it in comparison with Thailand. This is what I wrote in the proposal to the API:

> While still in monkhood in the Theravada tradition, I was intrigued and greatly inspired by the teachings and characteristics of Mahayana and Zen Buddhism, as well as their forerunner, Taoism. In particular, I am fascinated by the emphasis on quietism, simplicity, minimalist way of living, and more importantly, their down-to-earth, natural, and ordinary approach to truth in everyday life, as opposed to text-based hierarchical, rigid, yet highly arbitrarily interpreted, complex phases to attain the great Enlightenment in the Theravada tradition. The fascinating aesthetical virtue of wabi-sabi, for example, runs counter to the celebration of permanent and grandiose construction of symbolic materials.

Although I also wrote that Zen and Taoism "… themselves have been conceptualized, institutionalized, and broken into often-contending sects and schools, and later, in the context of Globalization, repackaged and commodified," indicating that somehow I was already cautious of the danger of the over-idealized image of another culture, this was just a bookish level of caution. After arriving in Japan, I found in myself countless 'misunderstandings' or misconceptions about Japanese society and its spirituality, which shall be outlined below. Doubtless, to correct these is certainly the purpose of research, which should bring about more understanding, trying to get as close as possible to reality. I then set myself, in the first few months, the task of covering the existing literature on Japanese spirituality as much as possible. At the same time, I also tried to get to know people, talk to them and make friends, bearing in mind that natural interviews can take place at any time.

As a result, I learned more about Japan and Japanese religions. For instance, I learned that the present state of Japanese spirituality is typically segregated and compartmentalized into different beliefs, and various sects and schools within even one belief system, comprising a plethora of religiosity, with greatly diverse features of teaching, ritual and practice, although certain similar patterns also exist. Take Buddhism, for instance: there are the sects of Shingon, Tendai, Zen (which is sub-divided mainly into Rinzai and Soto), Pure-land (or Jodo, with a (dis-)affiliation of Jodo-shinshu) and Nichiren (split off into Nichiren-shoshu and its modern next of kin, Soka Gakkai, etc.), among others. All these are further liquefied in their details, and yet have solidified into new religious organizations. To give one example, one of the people I met was the head of a new Buddhist organization based *around* Tendai teachings, yet it does not belong to the Tendai sect. The actual practice of Buddhism is tied with local temples, which are usually run like a family business, and *ie* (the household system) further breaks down the specificity and diversity of the religion. A friend of mine kindly pointed out that Buddhism and Shintoism could hardly be separated before the official segregation in the Meiji period. This is not to mention some of the *shinshukyo* or New Religions which often draw and fuse inspiration, worldviews, concepts, ideas, rituals and practices from various major religions. The notorious Aum Shinrikyo, for instance, encompasses the teaching of three major Buddhist schools, Theravada, Mahayana and Vajarayana, but also includes some elements of Hinduism (note the word *aum*), and Christianity (the belief in the apocalypse, also the group has changed its name to Aleph, the first letter of the Hebrew alphabet), and the practice of Chinese gymnastics and yoga. To confuse things even more, I learned that not a few religious followers belong to more than one sect at any time, or change from one to another after some 'trial period' to see if the faith can offer solutions to their problems (Reader 1991). Meanwhile, among the non-believers, or so they claimed to me, which seem to be the majority of the people I encountered, the celebration of many traditions around yearly events, such as the Buddhist-related *bon* festival, Christmas or visiting Shinto shrines during the New Year, seems to be a perfectly normal practice, without any

contradictory feelings about observing many faiths. All these are to briefly illustrate how, when one takes a closer look, Japanese spirituality can vary and diversify greatly, defying any simple classification, whether in terms of organizations, locality, teachings or practices. Down to the individual level, one still has to discern the differences from one person to another even within the same faith, and even within one person at different times.

Considering this, the gap between the reality and what I had in mind earlier seemed to widen even further. Even after I was already in the research site, it took me a long time to make heads or tails of what was going on in the complex Japanese spiritual landscape. I already thought at that time that to compare it with Buddhism in Thailand was beyond any possibility. When I started to be able to grasp a vague understanding of it, I still encountered something 'deviating' from the picture I had, but it remained hazy. It seemed to me that I could only ever chase reality[1] because the more I tried to grasp it, the more it eluded me; the chasm mentioned above could never be filled.

However, this does not mean that we should not try to study anything, but that we also need to bear in mind the limitedness of our perceptions. This opened up the question of how I should proceed with my research. To find similarities between the religious practices of the two countries risked the over-glossing and over-simplification of a complicated reality. To descend into the minute details of the diversity would be an endless task. Even specialists who can speak the language and have been in the country for a long time still struggle with it. The task would have overburdened my capacity and limited time frame. Apparently, a shift of focus was necessary.

Certainly, I could easily discard my earlier 'misunderstandings' and try to elaborate what is 'true' of spirituality in Japan, collecting and quoting at length what specialists have said about it, and present it here. However, I came to notice the significance of this misperception. Firstly, I asked, why is there such a stark difference between reality and its representation? In my case, why did I think that Japan was primarily a Zen country while in reality there are people who have no relation whatsoever with Zen, or have absolutely no idea about it? Certainly, there are many factors involved; my ignorance must share part of the blame, but beyond that there was the issue of how, in other countries, Japan and its spirituality are represented, mainly through print media, but also through other kinds of pop culture, especially visual mediums, including films, *manga*

and animation (think about Studio Gibli's animation movies). In Thailand, for instance, most of the books on Japanese religion are translated from English, with embedded Western perspectives and preoccupations, but are usually treated as natural. The famous works on Zen by Thomas Merton, for instance, are based principally on the comparison between Zen and Christianity, but are translated into Thai without this caution. Even such a pioneer in translating, sparking off discussion, and popularizing Zen Buddhism in Thailand from the 1970s onwards as the late Buddhadasa Bikkhu seemed not to be overly concerned on this point. The Western view of the East, in a rather romanticized, Orientalism-like fashion, is definitely in the working, and the discourse on Zen which has been massively popularized since the 1960s in the West is not an exception. However, I shall also show below that this politics of representation is by no means a case of the last century, but was occurring already much earlier, with a particular emphasis on the visual, scientific bias.

Secondly, it is a representation that competes with reality to replace reality. Representation is not necessarily a 'wrong' or 'mis'-conception but "representations have a strong built-in tendency to self-naturalization, to offering themselves as if what they represented was the definitive truth of the matter… representations define worlds, subjectivities, identities, and so on" (Pendergrast 2000). This means that nothing can be classified easily as false or true, if the person believes that it is true. In anthropology, researchers often encounter situations where the time-line in the memory of the informer is 'distorted.' Nationalistic discourse is usually a 'distorted' version in the eyes of revisionist academics, but a majority of the population in a country still believes that it is the natural, absolute truth about their history. Therefore, we must also, instead of merely attacking *representation* as illusion, consider and analyze how the process of *representing* works. In my case study, the representation of Zen in Western countries is also re-introduced and adopted by the local Japanese, who look at themselves as such, calling to mind the process that Harumi Befu calls auto-Orientalism (Befu 2001).[2] However, this 'looking at oneself through the eyes of others' (Dubois 1989) in a recent context differs from any previous eras on the point that it usually occurs in the form of consumption, especially among those who are susceptible to the flows of images, ideas, perspectives and information in the globalized, consumerist society.

Having laid out my groundings for an argument, I will present my findings by dividing them into two main interrelated themes—the representation and the consumption of Japanese spirituality.

Representation

When one is not satisfied with the situation one is in, it is easy for that person to idealize another situation, another society or culture, as being beautiful, more beautiful than the one s/he is in. Buddhism in general, and Zen in particular, was often idealized as offering a worldview that goes beyond the limitedness of the logical/rational Western mind and/or the predicaments of Western society and values. David Loy, for instance, writes that Buddhism emphasizes "…the centrality of humans in a godless cosmos and neither looks to any external being or power for their respective solutions to the problem of existence" (Loy 1998). While this is certainly inconsistent with the actuality of everyday practice of Thailand, Japan and most other societies where the Buddha is widely regarded as similar to a god who will come to save believers in times of trouble, this kind of ideational image and representation exerted a significant influence on the generations who were disoriented and dissatisfied with the Western way of life and society and looked elsewhere for inspiration, especially the new romantic 'hippie' movement of the 1960s in the US and Europe whose impression of Buddhism largely stemmed from writings by, among others, Alan Watts, D.T. Suzuki and Philip Kapleau, and produced such work as Jack Kerouac's *The Dharma Bum*. Much of the representation of Japanese spirituality, particularly Zen, in Thailand today can also trace its derivation, without much change in debate or argument, from this period of romanticization, as it was largely mediated through translations of the literature written by and through Western perspectives, rather than arriving directly into the country.

However, studying this in Japan itself offers quite a different outlook. Instead of being a thing of the East —a distinctive worldview and entity quite foreign and apart from the West—Buddhism was brought closer to its Western counterpart, Christianity, and became greatly rationalized when it came into contact with the scientific ethos at the onset of modernity. Centuries before the 1960s, representations of Buddhism in the eye of Westerners also took place,[3] but rather in a negative way, as something native and backward, as opposed to science-based Western modernity. In Japan, before the clear shift of paradigm to wholeheartedly adopt the modern worldview and pursue modern national goals during the Meiji era, there was a watershed period of clashes of ideals and ideas in the Edo era. Being Chinese and adopting Confucian values was an archetype for the Japanese for a long time, and it was still very much so in the Edo era. Despite its seclusion and a ban on travel, a close tie, imaginative if not physical, still remained

between the Japanese and Chinese; for instance, as late as 1802, Hishiya Heishichi, a Nagoya textile merchant, in his travel journal, *Tsukushikikou* (*A Kyuushuu Travel Journal*), wrote, "The scenery in Nagasaki Harbor was like a Chinese landscape painting, and I felt as if my boat was in the midst of it all." Actually, Hishiya Heishichi's attraction to Chinese Nagasaki was the driving force behind his visit. Although there were also attempts to define unique 'Japanese-ness' by such early Nativist (kokugaku) writers as Motoori Norinaga (18th Century)—the forerunner of 19th and 20th-century Japanese nationalism and Nihonjinron (theories about unique Japanese-ness)—the Other at that time from which the Self of Japanese tried to differ was predominantly Chinese.

The wind turned towards the West, significantly the US, with the arrival of the Black Ships of Commodore Matthew Perry, who forced the opening of Japan with the Convention of Kanagawa in 1854. Although change was arguably already under way long before that year, as contact with Westerners, their technologies and their entrenched scientific mindset could still be found despite the official isolation—exemplified by Tachibana Nankei (1753-1805), a medical doctor and traveler, who exclaimed when he encountered the Dutch microscope that "the precision of a microscope… exceeds even the Buddhas' eyes" (Screech 1996)—it was after the Meiji Restoration that frenzied catch-up with Western modernity in every aspect and fabric of society took place full-scale. In the spiritual realm, this led to the rise in prominence of people like Inoue Enryo (1858-1919) who advocated the exorcism of superstition from Buddhism (resulting in him being given the nickname 'Dr. Monster'). By doing so, as Josephson (2006) argues, he helped bring Buddhism closer to being a 'religion'—a term that had a different meaning in Japanese before—with Christianity as a model or prototype. In other words, Buddhism was previously not a 'religion,' in the modern sense of the word, but when it became one:

> More than a mere word game, this change of status would profoundly transform Buddhism. It would lead to sect restructuring, radical re-conceptualization of doctrine, and even a new term to refer to the tradition – a shift from the pre-modern norm "Buddhist Law" (*buppo* 仏法) to the contemporary "Buddhist teachings" (*bukkyo* 仏教) (Josephson 2006).

A similar trend can also be witnessed around the same time in Siam/Thailand if we look at, for example, the writings of Kum Bunnag who argued in 1867:

…what we call the deity coming to be born on earth that we see floating in the air must actually be some kind of animal which can fly up high, just like the snake or fish swimming in the sea. As for the rays of light… is actually a meteorite, which wherever it falls will burst a glowing light around (Tippakarawongse Mahakosadibbhadee 1867).

As a result, Buddhism has become formalized and rationalized, with a scientific worldview permeating the fabric and order of things of the Buddhist cosmos. A good example would be the belief in the existence of the Buddha Amida's Pure Land, thought to be located in the 'West,' a purely symbolic belief referring to the sunset of this life. However, with the new geographical knowledge that came with the Western-style globe, many simple believers were confused. Today, many Thais also believe that *nibbana* is a place or a space to reach for or to go to, often associated with the image of the universe as scientifically constructed. Spirituality was made modern in its essence so that it could easily be referred to or incorporated into other modern discourses emerging around the same time, such as the building up of the modern nation-state, as can be witnessed in the cases of Japanese State Shintoism, Bushido, Hachiman Daibutsu and the Thai nationalist ideology of Nation-Religion-Monarchy. This transformation usually took place in the center of a nation where contact with the West was immense, but the process was usually inconsistent in more distant areas, such as Okinawa or Chiang Mai, whose spirituality and spiritual worldviews varied, although imposition of the central culture also occurred, often with violence.

Consumption

As Clifford Geertz (1973) observes, the more you learn about another culture, the less foreign, and the more normal it becomes. The more we study about Japanese spirituality and its development, the less exotic or romantic it becomes. It is like everything else that moves with time and operates within an ever-changing socio-historical context. However, during the research period, I also came to realize that it did not matter how much I knew that that kind of image was only a version of a representation of a reality, which was not even necessarily a reality itself, although there were still many people who were ready or would like to believe in that image. To say that they were wrong and I was right was simply to hold a certain academic arrogance and, more importantly, to be ignorant of another important phenomenon that was emerging.

Therefore, the investigation into the history of Japanese

spirituality stopped at that point, and, towards the end of the research period, I set out the task to visit as many of the temples that offered *zazen* meditation sessions to lay people as possible. Heeding Foucault's warning that "discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it occurs" (Foucault 1972), I thought that these temples would be the place where this reluctant state of constructing oneself through the image represented by others would actually take place. Perhaps this half-baked representation-cum-reality would be best summarized by a simple comment from a person I befriended with in one of these sessions: "I come to try Zen meditation because I want to know why Westerners are so interested in it." On another occasion, I found a similar incongruity when I came across a book of collected English-language *haiku* poems translated into Japanese by a Japanese collector who mentioned:

> I was born, grew up, and have always lived in Japan, but I've never read a haiku until I read Tenement Landscape by Paul David Mena. For me, reading English language haiku is a pleasurable meditation. Why? I found Paul's haiku to be surely haiku. It reveals the deep haiku mind, but at the same time, it presents a very contemporary and openminded view. So I was greatly moved by it. (Daikoku in Mena 2001)

This search for one's self, one's own identity, may recall the characteristics and development of theories of the uniqueness of the Japanese (*Nihonjinron*), as well as its Nativist and nationalist precursors. Yet, the current phenomenon departs from the previous ones in that it is not directly linked with the idea of being a Japanese subject of the government or the nation (although the prospect that this can be resorted to in the future cannot be ruled out as a rise of right-wing sentiment is being seen), but involves mediation through the mass media and the consumption of its images in a personalized, individualistic way. For example, at the end of each *zazen* session in one temple, all the newcomers were asked to introduce themselves and to tell how they came to know about the place. The majority of the people—who, to my surprise, were young people from around the age of university student to early thirties—said that they learned about it from the Internet (see Figure 1). Only one person, a middle-aged woman, reported that she saw it in a newspaper column. Other sources included TV programs, which made one of the temples I visited very popular, magazines, some of which you could pick up for free at train stations, and direct advertisements made by the temples themselves (see Figure 2). In the urban context, the sense of sharing

a spiritual community is no longer fixed by physical proximity, but is mediated through the impersonal mass media so that one can come to these temples without knowing anyone beforehand, and when finished with the business, one can leave them without knowing anyone, too.

Figure 1: A piece of an internet news. The subtitle reads "the quiet boom", referring to the popularity of meditation.

Figure 2: Advertisement on a train about a zazen *retreat at a temple in Okayama. It reads: "Zazen & Vegetarian Food Tour." The package price, 4,980 yen, includes bus fee, food and* zazen *session cost.*

At first, I was a little surprised to learn that, in Japan, it is almost politically correct for most of the people I met to claim that they are non-religious, although they might actually practice otherwise. This might stem from many reasons; one might be the recent activities harmful to the public of some religious organizations or cults. Another might be that some people are well aware of the implanted historical and political meaning of religion and its usage during imperialism and war, and deplore anything that has religious overtones. For example, when the writer Yukio Mishima built his house, he decorated it a style that he claimed to be 'anti-Zen,' reflecting his post-war nihilistic attitude. In Thailand, it

is the opposite: to say that one has no religion is usually taken as strange or radical.

However, even among those who participated in obviously religious activities, the way they approached spirituality was more diversified and personalized than in previous eras. It involved more postmodern-style mix-and-match, trial-and-error, and, in many cases, the de-stressing of a sensation-gatherer (Bauman 1997), perhaps an escape from what Hegel called 'the unhappy consciousness of modernity' (Prendergast 2000) into Walter Benjamin's 'the unconscious of the dreaming collective' (Buck-Morss 1989). Many seek spirituality in order to elude problems in their personal life, family, workplace or relationship; a friend of mine told me that she started to believe in reincarnation after suffering severe trauma due to a break-up. However, she also tried many things that have a spiritual element, especially New Age health-related, healing treatments from *zazen*, yoga, spa massage, body-and-mind therapy and personal aura-reading, many of which combined scientific methods and devices. Again, these trends seem to be generated and popularized first in the West, employing ancient Eastern beliefs and methods, before they spread to the Eastern countries itself, most notably through the demand of the tourists to consume 'things East,' making some Easterners proud of themselves along the way. However, as a consequence, these 'things East,' including spirituality, have become a sign or a symbol to be consumed without necessarily having a relationship with its traditional or original meaning; it has become what Baudrillard calls 'pure simulacrum.' Two examples will suffice to illustrate this point: one is the traditional symbol of Zen's *sunnata* or Voidness used as a substitute for a Roman alphabet "O" on the cover of


Figure 3: A Soto Zen booklet.

Figure 4: Image of the Buddha's head on a music booklet.

a booklet produced by a Soto Zen sect; another is the head part of a Buddha image on the cover of the book, *Japanese Club Groove Disc Guide* (see Figures 3 and 4).

Conclusion and Implications

Before the research began, my basic thought was that there might be some lessons that could be learned from the Japanese experience for Thailand, but many Japanese monks I met told me that things were the other way around. Some even felt that Japanese Buddhism had come to a *cul-de-sac* of materialism and, in fact, Thailand was still in a far better situation. Some Japanese temples drew inspiration from Socially-Engaged Buddhists in Thailand and tried to apply it to their communities. There are, in fact, a number of individuals who are working on this, trying to rescue spirituality from material corruption.

I do agree with and respect such efforts. However, it must be said that Socially-Engaged Buddhists are really a minority in Thailand while the majority seems to be moved by waves of modernization, Westernization, consumerism and globalization. Certainly, criticism on increasingly materialistic religion has to be made but, in my opinion, there seems to be an unbridgeable gap between the two camps. My point is that to simply condemn consumerism and materialism is not enough, but we must also understand its inner logic, how it works in everyday life, as well as how it seeps into and transforms spirituality. We must take into account how religions are part and parcel with society and history, and when people's way of living changes, religions are also affected, both in form and content. If one wants to subvert consumerism or other such illnesses, more understanding about them is necessary first.

What I argued in this paper, therefore, runs against the recently generally accepted dualist discourse that

puts the Global in distinctive opposition with the Local, in which the latter is often seen as inferior, threatened and in need of being saved. While I am not naïvely repudiating that such dualism does not exist or contending that the Local should not be saved, to simple-mindedly perceive and define 'the Local' should be cautioned against: the problem does not lie with any locality but with our perception of it. In the dualist perspective, the Local is static, slow, sluggish and representing a good, former time—which often easily becomes an object of glorification in nationalistic rhetoric or of romanticization in many versions of localism—set in opposition to the flux of the speedy and ever-changing Global. My study, while employing the terms East/West and Global/Local, attempted to move beyond simple conceptual antagonisms by illustrating throughout the text that these binary identities are, in fact, in relationship with each other and are closer to each other than is usually thought, exemplified here by the fact that Japanese spirituality was brought into its present form by a comparison with its 'Western' counterpart, and it is still constantly being constructed through this representation, which provides an avenue for consumption. It shows how it is drawn into and becomes a part of visual culture, fashionable trends and an Orientalism-like relationship.[4] Clarke (1997) shows that the reversal (i.e., the influence of the 'East' on the 'West') is also pervasive. At the same time, having argued against fixed positions, I have postulated another important point in this essay, to prevent ourselves from assuming the other extreme end of the spectrum, which is to nihilistically claim that everything is just discourses and nothing exists and 'anything goes': the binary oppositions will not disappear just because we say so. There is a constant construction, re-construction, affirmation, implementation and consumption of them in society which should not be ignored, although they should not be accepted at face value either. This position of not fully accepting or ignoring in criticism is important in charting concepts that are dangerous but necessary.

If, out of these, I am going to give perhaps any clear and practical recommendations, I would say that I do not have any for spiritual organizations, but may have one that is directed more at lay persons, who are in the midst of consumerism, globalization and so on, and looking at religions and spirituality as outsiders. The recommendation would be to go back to where I started this essay, that we can never grasp reality but only chase it, including the reality of religions. This does not mean that we should not try to understand anything at all, but one conclusion we might come to only pushes us away from approaching the same reality from other

perspectives. In other words, we have to be careful of the limitedness of our perception, of what we consume and believe. Only with this awareness of the limitation of the self can we allow Diversity—not only of physical appearance, such as ethnicity as generally understood, but also diversity of the meanings of things—to truly exist and operate.

NOTES

[1] I do not want to drop names here, but in order to confirm that this is not just a personal imagining, but that some academics have already taken it very seriously, I would like to refer to Jacques Derrida, who coined the term *différance* to explain the process in which words, what we write, read, speak, always defer meaning—although my experience here may be a simpler version of *différance*. In Derrida's deconstruction, in which *différance* operates, to find a meaning of a concept/sign involves a process of pointing beyond itself, of always referring to something else, something different. The concept/sign is, therefore, never fully present, and its meaning is always deferred. Likewise, when I was in the field of research, I would have liked to capture the reality of it. But all I found were many versions of it, told by many people as they perceived it. These multiple explanations of reality are endless, and the reality (if there is one behind those explanations), thus, is always deferred. When I held to one version of an explanation of reality, I pushed away other possible versions. Realizing this, therefore, I was in a constant state of "chasing reality."

[2] For the same reason as Note 1, I would like to refer here to what Foucault calls the empirico-transcendental doublet—where one is in the reluctant state of being both the subject and object of gazing (Foucault 1994).

[3] It should be noted that this representation and mixing across cultures also took place long before the modern period and has continued to take place since then.

[4] It should be mentioned here that a kind of 'internal Orientalism' also exists, such as how the Japanese view, say, Okinawa or Thailand, and how Bangkokians view other parts of Thailand, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.

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SPIRITUAL HUNGER AND THE CONSUMPTION OF SPIRITUALITY IN JAPAN (OR: WHILST I SEARCHED FOR MY SOUL IN A SOULLESS METROPOLIS…)

Mohd Naguib Razak

Note: This current version has been abridged and simplified by the author from the original final paper in order to meet the publication requirements of the Foundation.

Shinjuku, Tokyo
Sunday, April 27, 2008

I stand here before a 10th floor hotel window,

looking down at the sea of grey concrete structures before me.

Of bland low-rise apartments and mundane office blocks.

Away from the soaring skyscrapers.

Away from the suggestive lights of Kabukicho.

I am here, back in Tokyo again.

By myself, of my own volition and my own means.

At the very heart of this soulless metropolis.

Just six months earlier, I was in the midst of packing up and leaving Tokyo. I had depleted my entire grant from the fellowship and all my personal savings. And I was nowhere near understanding the subject matter I had chosen.

I was totally numb and empty within myself. My project in tatters.

In the beginning…

It began as a journey to discover, unravel and understand "Spirituality in Japan's Material Utopia" as my theme and subject matter for a feature-length documentary film with an international audience in mind. Nevertheless, it soon became obvious that the funds and resources available at my disposal during this fellowship simply would not allow me to produce such a film.

Therefore, even before arriving in Japan, I had already recalibrated my plans to use this fellowship period only to discover, unravel and understand my theme thoroughly and convincingly in order to then, later on, produce a documentary film that was exceptional, insightful, fair and far-reaching on this subject-matter, upon a 'second coming.'

For better or for worse, I chose to be based in Tokyo because of the vast number of contacts, resources and the network of people I already had here. There was also always something about Tokyo that kept me coming back to it again and again—like a journey to the cutting edge of civilization, like standing on the precipice of mega-modern madness, or enduring that final, most remote mile of understanding about the nature of our humanity in this multi-faceted, multi-layered, multi-nuanced day and age. Tokyo is a place for all that.

"Spirituality in Japan's Material Utopia:" A Thematic Dilemma

This was the title I had arrived in Japan with. It was no doubt a vast and daunting theme, but one that I felt convinced enough to be inherently important, globally relevant and significantly far-reaching.

But I had not yet really factored in the extreme complexity of the situation in Japan surrounding this theme in reality, beyond my own superficial estimations and presumptive formulations.

And so I quickly began to realize what an even more daunting, dizzyingly complicated terrain this was for an untrained non-scholar like me to navigate. Especially with the myriad of material to trawl through, from all sorts of sources, be they libraries, scholars, newspapers, television, journals, and local culture as well as popular culture. Plus a sizable amount of cultural, academic and media stereotyping to side step or at least be wary of.

To take it all in, one would have to really consider the politics of modernization during the late 19th Century Meiji Restoration; the repositioning of Shintoism to State Shintoism and the curbing of local and folk religions or belief systems; the rise of militarism that led

to Japan's involvement in World War II; the disastrous end to Japan's military campaign in World War II; the reversed policies of the American Occupation in countering rising Communist influence in Japan; the social efficacy of Buddhism in addressing the need for rites and rituals in certain stages of life; the emergence of the New Religions, and then the New New Religions (yes, that's right); culminating with the Sarin gas attack in Tokyo's subway system by the religious cult group, Aum Shinrikyo; the negative image of religious cults following that incident; and the long list of text, context and subtext just go on and on and on (to put it all very simply).

I realized quickly that I didn't want my work to be overwhelmed by so much historical baggage and an inconsequential amount of anecdotal detail. I did not want to spend so much time setting up, explaining or clarifying the circumstances preceding or surrounding this theme that I would be left with very little space to judiciously and naturally develop and present my own conclusions and perspectives.

Nor was I interested in a study that had to be limited by a specific geographical or situational parameter, nor reliant upon some compact or useful angle, cliché or stereotype, nor an approach that would fragment this subject-matter, even though I realized that it may render some to see this study as unsubstantive, ambiguous and non-scientific.

More than just for academic research or study, I wanted to tailor it according to the immediate and genuine concerns of current society in Japan and the rest of the world, without creating another piece of 'pseudo' social commentary geared merely for consumption and distraction, or else for conspicuous social affirmation.

These were just some of the considerations besetting my mind during those early stages, whilst I descended further into the shadowy valley of my first full experience of autumn and winter in Japan. I was still in a state of non-arrival, languishing out in the wilderness of misapprehension, misconception and misadventure over all that is spiritual and material within today's Japan and Tokyo.

This Soulless Metropolis

Ultimately here in Tokyo, we live in a metropolis over-populated with people and material possessions, material conduits and material distractions, but depopulated of souls.

Or rather the souls of people everywhere are simply nowhere to be seen nor felt.

Try scanning around on a subway train or whilst walking a busy thoroughfare. The soul is just something you never really see in public here in Tokyo, much, much more than in other major cities. It is perhaps a commonplace reality, given the discrepancy between the *tatemae*, or public face, and the *honne*, or inner feelings, in the daily life of the Japanese.

This is not to say that everyone in Tokyo is in fact without a soul.

But simply, their souls are nowhere to be seen. Perhaps tucked away carefully from common view, perhaps tucked away so well that even they have forgotten where to find them.

I, for one, certainly forgot where I left or tucked away my soul at some point during my fellowship, and have been spending something like a year trying to coax it back into the centre of my existence.

Every now and then, whilst living in a decent residential area, I could see how some foreigners would, for the briefest moments, get excited upon seeing me—a fellow *gaijin*, or foreigner, in their non-touristic area—only to see them quickly switching back their expression to something emotionless and blank as everyone else around them.

Even foreigners here—besides tourists and other short-term visitors—are apprehensive about being out of step and inappropriately behaved here in Tokyo. Myself included.

As a result, everyone lives within himself or herself—alone—emotionally and psychologically. Amongst people they may be, but they are always alone.

The father is typically alone in his own role-playing obligations and career insecurities. The mother is typically alone in her never-ceasing obligations and responsibilities, if not to her children, then to her neighbors and her social circle. The children may be fortunate enough to have a sibling to share their childhood with—but ultimately each and every one of them must carve out his/her own niche in the world eventually. They are taught very early in life not to be a burden on others nor to depend on others, and they, too, rapidly become alone.

Beyond a certain age, one is obliged to start 'being an adult' and fulfill one's designated role, one's promise or potential in society, and from that time, one becomes emotionally 'an island' at the *honne* or inner level, having to conceal personal thoughts and feelings for the sake of maintaining social obligations and meeting the demands of group cohesion.

Physically and inter-personally though, at the *tatemae* or exterior level, one is never allowed the luxury of being 'an island,' unless one has already been banished as a social misfit. Every action, gesture, utterance or movement bears consideration for others before oneself.

Even on a train amongst strangers, entering a lift with people you have never ever seen before, in a crowded café or narrow aisles in a convenient store, everyone is always mindful of people around them, and being consciously and visibly mindful to the others, albeit without a single bit of genuine emotion given or taken in the exchange of gestures.

'Why smile when a grin will do?'

In fact, to smile to strangers may be overdoing the '*tatemae*' somewhat, and may leave the other person uncomfortable or even suspicious about our intentions. Better just to offer a restrained grin, that's it. Nice and simple, nothing too expressive, nothing too committal, nothing out of the ordinary.

Living in Tokyo, especially whenever I am out and about in the 'big, bad' metropolis, I feel like my soul is redundant. Never is it engaged, never will it be required in order to navigate through my daily existence in this 'material utopia.' I only need to be armed with a retinue of small gestures, such as nods, raising of the hands, small bows, stiffening the body when someone takes a seat next to me or enters a cramped lift next to me, *et cetera*.

In fact, having my soul fully engaged on a daily basis would often leave me mentally exhausted, overwhelmed, confused or depressed, so much so that it made more sense to shut off my sense of feeling and cease engaging my soul when it was not in any way necessary or required.

After awhile, the soul, feeling so neglected and divested of interest, will gravitate towards items of material pleasure, seeking out something nice to eat, some visual stimuli to consume or distract, a cool product to own, a new piece of cosmetic tool, a clothing statement, a stylish place to be seen, a TV program to collectively have half-hearted laughter with, an accessory that 'fits' one's image of oneself; oh, the possibilities go on and on and on.

And so I became more and more of an isolated creature in deep hunger for some compassion and some sense of warmth amongst people, finding satiation only in the temporary release of material pleasure and comforts.

Much Ado about Nothing

Till today, I have not been able to make my Japanese friends truly understand what I had been going through in Japan. They all kept echoing the same declaration of incredulity, "But you have a Japanese wife with you!"

I realize now that, in their eyes, I was more than privileged in my own situation. A spouse was in fact the only person one could appropriately share one's burden with, in principle. Not your friends, not even your best friends on most occasions, nor colleagues, nor one's relatives, nor even one's parents at times (depending on how welcoming they are, in fact).

For myself, as a Malay, a sense of compassion amongst a larger group or network of social allies is essential to our good state of mind, confidence and well-being.

When my father passed away last year, I was touched to see even long-forgotten friends and former work colleagues show willingness to come out of their way to attend my father's funeral, even though they had never met him. It was simply a genuine, and strong, expression of regard, support and compassion for their fellow brethren, even from amongst non-Malay and non-Muslim friends and colleagues.

Even some total strangers who had known my father came and approached me, opening up to me, expressing their deep and genuine sympathy for me, sometimes even struggling to hold back the tears in front of me. These are but a handful of examples of how we often step up to the plate and offer some gesture of compassion and love to soothe those we see in need, even when not called for and even when with strangers.

I was saddened by the fact that hardly any of my Japanese friends knew what to say to me (assuming that they even wanted to say anything to me) with regards to the loss of my father. Perhaps I cannot really judge them; perhaps it is not something that they even knew how to respond to appropriately. Perhaps it is not something they would even bring up with a friend, in the manner that I did to them.

At the end of the day, the saddened *honne* (true feelings privately held) always remain locked away from public eye, and the appropriate *tatemae* (public face) is all that matters within the sphere of social interaction. No amount of compulsion for *ninjo*, or a sense of emotion or compassion, could ever override the incontestable demands of the *giri* code of conduct—the obligation to the group and community.

Even though I may seem fortunate to at least have a Japanese wife to help me deal with all these problems, in fact, it was harder to deal with for that very reason. Because I have a Japanese wife, I was expected by everyone else to already know and understand comprehensively my way around the *giri* and the *tatemae*.

To her credit, my wife had indeed been trying to help me understand these rules and values of Japanese life. But what if I did not wish to, or did not agree to some of it, or if it was so much and too much against my own moral persuasion, my own moral code, my own sensibilities?

It is in fact really impossible for me to incorporate these rules and values without abdicating my own principles and convictions without diminishing my own cultural and moral identity. What is the point then in me being who I am, to come here and investigate this society?

My envy for my wife's natural ability to adjust to these requirements made me feel alienated from her. It all seemed so easy for her. Time and again, I found myself feeling isolated and misunderstood, and feeling less than human within this society.

Would North Be True?

I lost my father on April 4th, 2007 just seven weeks after receiving news that he had been diagnosed with advanced pancreatic cancer. I still cannot write this without tears falling down around me. It never gets easier. You just learn to sidestep those things you know will trigger it. But to avoid the tears is to avoid ever thinking about it, to avoid feeling something real about what it meant, or how it was, or where I am now. And the feeling is so raw.

Lately, I have been remembering a song that the singer-songwriter, Sting, wrote in coming to terms with the death of his own father. I find myself hanging on to the words to this song because I cannot myself seem to find my very own words. They just seem to melt away every time.

The Deep Blue Sea of Meaninglessness

Much of everything else after that remains a blur from where I stand now. I cannot see back into that part of history without the rain of the year that has passed welling up upon my eyes again.

All I know is that I did try to give myself some time off and remained in Kuala Lumpur for a few more weeks than originally planned. But I soon found myself struggling to contain my remorse. And so I decided to plunge myself into work and obligations there for a couple of weeks. Upon returning to Tokyo, I carried on very much in similar vein.

Suddenly, one day, just one plain and not-so-dramatic day, I found that I could not construct any sense of meaning for whatever thing I had set out to do. Nothing had meaning anymore. No desire, no meaning. I could not carry on.

I kept trying. I kept trying to deny within myself that which I was feeling, or rather that state of unfeeling in itself. I tried to force myself to keep going, to keep on pushing. I felt that this was simply too indulgent a thing for me to do, too much of an escapist's solution to my troubles for my liking.

But nothing mattered anymore.
And all my work ground to a halt.

Ramadhan had arrived just in the nick of time. I turned to my religion for refuge and shelter.

Started reading the *Qur'an* again. Chapter by chapter. Day after day. Night after night.

It helped me stabilize myself emotionally and spiritually, but I could only find peace and calm within my home, or at best within the local area that I lived in.

I could not bring myself to go out and meet people, whether working colleagues, old friends or people I had to get in touch with for my work.

It was a strange, strange feeling for me. I have had anti-social tendencies before, and have always had a disinclination towards socializing in groups larger than two. But this time it was very different.

I felt a deep irreplaceable, irretrievable hollowness within me. I could not even begin to reason myself into meeting people, even when I had initiated them myself, or even when I knew I was socially obligated to meet them.

Spiritual Hunger in Japan

Even as late as mid-October 2007, well beyond the last official day of my Fellowship (and whatever funds came along with it), I was still bent towards making a final stab at completing my work before time ran out, living on funds I had set aside for our return to Malaysia.

I found myself heading to Osaka again, to the city that had shaped an early part of my father's career when he served as the Director of the Malaysian Pavilion at the World Expo '70 there in Osaka. He had been in his 30s then, just as I was during my two long spells in Japan.

I had hoped and earnestly prayed that something of an encounter there would trigger me back to my senses and awareness, and have me finding my way back into my work.

But as I stood before that famous Tower of the Sun, that famous tower I had seen so often during my childhood from photographs of my father's time there in Osaka, during which time I was left behind in Malaysia because I was still barely a year old then—I found nothing. I felt nothing.

Just the sad blue sea of meaninglessness.

For all the great resounding success I have had so many times before in snatching victory from the jaws of defeat, for all the times I have been so successful and even excelled in working under the severe pressure of an imminent deadline or some against-sheer-odds situation, I had absolutely no answer and no response this time. I was numb. Absolutely numb.

I came back to Tokyo and to my wife, and told her, "It's over. I'm finished. I've got nothing left that I can do here."

"Let's go home."

I needed my home, I said to myself inside my heart. Home meant more than just a building, a place, a space, this time.

Hence the abrupt response to the folks at the Foundation, and hence my absence from the API Workshop later that November.

But then, even as I was busy packing up my things and preparing to head back to Malaysia, and as I began to feel a slight sense of relief and life flowing back into me in anticipation of heading back, I also began to feel a tinge of sadness to be leaving Tokyo finally.

I could not quite grasp what this sadness meant at that time, but looking back now, I think I know.

Once I had made the decision to leave Japan, I was not one with the people there anymore. I was not another sardine in their tin can anymore, I was not another soul struggling to swim in this metropolitan (miso) soup.

Now, only now, could I finally feel detached from the state of being that pervaded every person's life in Tokyo.

Then, and only then, I finally felt again what I used to feel at the end of my previous long-stay in Tokyo: sadness… sadness for the people. Sadness… without any pity. Without any judgment. Without any feelings of iniquity.

But empathy. And brotherly affection. And also guilt—for taking the easy way out myself.

Finally, finally, I had reached my point of arrival, for which I had long sought, just as I was about to abort, abandon ship and escape from Tokyo.

I felt like Charlie Sheen's character in *Platoon* as he waited for his helicopter to take him home from his blighted tour of duty in Vietnam. He was finished with Vietnam but he still felt a strong sense of compassion for his fellow unknowing soldiers just arriving by the same helicopter that was about to take him home. Compassion that was beyond words. Compassion that seeps through one's eyes.

Suddenly it all came together before me.

I was taken back in time to my conversations and interviews in 2002 from my earlier film on Tokyo, *Glass Enclosure: Tokyo Invisible*. I had sensed emptiness, then, within the young people I had spoken to. They hungered for another country to return to. Perhaps not physically, but rather spiritually.

A place they could escape to, that was in fact always home. A spiritual hunger they had no name or conception of, even.

When did home become just a place or a space one merely laid a physical claim to? These young people were yearning and aching for a home. A real home. Physical or spiritual. Social or emotional.

Now that I was in fact going home, I had finally become aware of the state of the young in Japan.

A spiritual hunger that drives them either to escape or salve their emptiness. And so they consume and consume, for satiation, sublimation or salvation, but still they are hungry.

And I am not talking about religion here. But something even more primordial than that.

Return to Tokyo, April 2008

And so it was finally revealed to me that my return from this one-year Fellowship period was in fact just the end of the beginning, the hard-fought journey towards understanding and revelation that I had sought from the beginning.

I know now the angle or approach my documentary film will take. I will still be taking aim at Spirituality in Japan but, to be more specific, I will focus on spirituality or the absence of spirituality in contemporary Japanese society, especially amongst the young; the current "spiritual boom" in Japan; the role of 'spiritual counselors' such as Hiroyuki Ehara and Kazuko Hosoki and the consumption of spiritual experience; the meaning of death, life and afterlife; and the growing numbers of suicide and parricide amongst the young; the incidence of bullying, acute social withdrawal, depression and wrist-cutting as well as other social anomalies and psycho-social disorders in Japan.

My return to Tokyo this time in fact allowed me to re-contextualize my feelings, concerns, responses and meditation on the metropolis, as well as to intellectually and emotionally engage with selected experts and activists involved at the heart of my subject-matter in an honest, open-ended, exploratory, two-way dialogue and essentially test how accurate or even how naïve my views and pre-conclusions might have been, and to gauge how ready I was to contemplate and address these issues in an effective, well-reasoned and well-empathized manner.

I began by interviewing Professor Nobutaka Inoue, Head of the Institute for Japanese Culture & Classics and a Professor of Shinto Studies at Kokugakuin University, who was also Host Professor for my entire Fellowship period.

Professor Inoue set the tone for the many revelations that were to come by stating emphatically, amongst other things, that there was a clear detachment or separation between the people responsible for the religious environment in Japan and the people, especially the younger generation, who actually need some form of spiritual dimension, guidance and bearings within their current everyday lives; that the religious environment urgently needed significantly large effort in redefining its roles within the context of the needs of the younger generation today; and furthermore, there was instead a lack of genuine drive and initiative to understand the situation of the young today amongst the people at the decision-making level.

This was followed by an interview with Ms. Fumie Kamitoh, a Psychotherapist/Mental Health Counselor and Director of the Child Protection Project with the Tokyo English Life Line (TELL) Community Counseling Service, as well as a Mental Health Counselor with a University in Tokyo.

Ms. Kamitoh delivered a hammer-blow of reality when she confirmed that the desire for suicide, certainly amongst those she has counseled, represented a total annihilation of the self, rather than a 'resetting,' 're-booting' or 're-starting' of the 'program' suggested by some analysts citing the special influence of reincarnation beliefs and a 'multiple-life' video-game mentality.

Furthermore, it often had little social dimension, such as a sign of protest or escapism or statement, as it may be in other countries or previous generations in Japan; rather, today's suicides, or the desire for suicide amongst younger people in Japan, are largely borne by a deep sense of nihilism or, at least to me, that sea of meaninglessness that I had described earlier.

Next, I interviewed Mr. Yasuyuki Shimizu, Founder and Director of Life Link, a non profit organization (NPO) focusing on suicide prevention and suicide recovery therapy.

Mr. Shimizu, on the other hand, warned that one must be careful in reading too much into media reports on youth suicide, since the highest percentage for suicide in Japan is still amongst middle-aged men, and the reports of youth suicide tend to be sensationalistic and repetitive. Nevertheless, he affirmed that there was indeed a disturbing trend, even though represented by small numbers, pointing towards a far more disturbed state of the heart and mind amongst the younger generation, beyond what the general public is well aware of.

He lauded the opportunity 'spiritual' TV programs, such as Ehara-san's *Aura no Izumi* (the Fountain of Aura),

offered in initiating dialogue or contemplation amongst the younger generation, and hence becoming a possible catalyst for their spiritual or psychological maturation, but he also lamented the fickle and fleeting sense of opportunism within the popular media in Japan, very quick in embracing such 'spiritual icons' when it serves their own interests well, and readily cutting them down to pieces when it becomes 'obligatory' upon them to do so later.

This was followed by an interview with Professor Naoki Kashio, Associate Professor in the Faculty of Letters at Keio University, specializing in "Spirituality in Contemporary Japan" and one of the initiators of the website Spiritual Navigator.

My discussion with Professor Kashio yielded a very interesting point for consideration when he underlined that as Japanese society continued to evolve through the Bubble Economy-period, and the post-Bubble period, the *giri* (obligation to the group or community) aspect of society remained very much intact, whilst the *ninjo* (a sense of emotion or compassion) aspect largely diminished and disappeared, belying the fact that *giri* and *ninjo* were dual aspects that went hand-in-hand traditionally, so much so that they were often referred to in tandem as *giri-ninjo*.

To which I labored the point, if *giri* is so inevitable as something fundamental to the 'Japanese way,' what about *ninjo* then—was it not also so inevitable as something fundamental to the 'Japanese way'?

Next, I interviewed Mr. Nouki Futagami, Founder and Director of New Start, an NPO focusing on the recovery of *hikikomori* (acute social withdrawal) and NEETs (Not in Education, Employment or Training); and I also had a chance to attend one of New Start's *nabe* parties (like a steamboat or fondue party), where I met and mingled with many who were recovering from *hikikomori*.

Talking to Mr. Futagami opened up a door to a completely different, and ultimately sad and tragic, reality—that of the *hikikomori*. It is easy to dismiss them as weak-minded social escapists or the being part of the privileged curse of affluence, but the implications, I realize now, are much more devastating and outright disturbing to our sense of humanity.

Mr. Futagami described how these young people have fallen into a state of 'total absence of desire, hope or volition,' lost in a state of mental stasis, and how this disconnection can last for years, even beyond a decade or so. And with more than a million people said to be in this state, is it not already a crisis of society? While he was very emphatic about the positive results of the many initiatives and programs in New Start, as well as underlining the government's own extensive 'outreach' programs in trying to return this million or so into the local workforce, I was shocked to hear him admit that these were all in fact programs for the 'recovery or rehabilitation' of the *hikikomori*, but there was hardly any concerted nor significant effort to 'prevent' other young people from sliding into this state of *hikikomori*, even now.

I asked Futagami-san, "What happened here? Was it a case of someone leaving 'a gate' wide open, or was it more like that there were 'gates' after 'gates' left open up to this point, and finally the last one was also breached?" He didn't actually answer my question. He understood my point.

I followed this up with an interview with Professor John Clammer from the United Nations University, who specializes in material culture and consumption in Japan.

Professor Clammer affirmed the views similarly expressed by Professor Kashio, that while there is supposedly a "spiritual boom" right now in Japan, much of this boom, as reflected in TV programs such as "*Aura no Izumi*" and the nation-wide touring Spiritual Convention or SupiCon (with up to 60 conventions held across Japan throughout each year), is catering to middle-aged housewives searching for some meaning in their lives after completing their chores of raising their own children. But this "spiritual boom" is certainly not speaking to, let alone reaching out to, the young people so desperately in need of a spiritual dimension within their lives or some sort of spiritual guidance or orientation.

Finally, I rounded off all my interviews with a session with Ms. Ritsuko Yamaguchi, Founder of Mood Disorder Association Japan, an NPO focusing on the recovery of people suffering from mood disorder and depression.

This last session with Ms. Yamaguchi was probably the most heart wrenching and the most compelling of them all. Here I learned how there were in fact many filmmakers, especially documentary filmmakers, attending her mood disorder recovery programs. Some of them may be there to investigate depression and mood disorder, but many were seeking some sort of 'therapy' for themselves.

I reasoned with her that perhaps this was surprising, because, from where I stood, at least prior to my time in Japan, documentary filmmakers have always been privileged in being able to pursue a career that is richly rewarding to their own sense of well-being and also made them better exposed to the hidden truths, realities and challenges of life, and thus should be much better equipped in coming to terms with it, but Ms. Yamaguchi clarified that, conversely, that made them even more vulnerable, more susceptible and in danger of over-exposure to the problems of society and the conflicts of their subjects' inner psyche.

She reported how a respectable documentary film director from one of the biggest nationwide TV stations in Japan had recently conducted a very comprehensive study of depression in Japan, through her organization and some of her participants, and to her surprise she discovered later that the TV station had decided against screening the director's finished documentary film.

He later took his own life, she told me.

"Was it an act of protest or grievance of any sort? Or was it out of a sense of hopelessness?" I asked her.

It was hopelessness, she told me.

This was like, indeed, yet another hammer-blow to my heart, since I, myself, had lost a Japanese documentary filmmaking friend and colleague to depression-driven suicide in September last year; he was a very prominent and proactive documentary filmmaker as well as someone with whom I shared mutual appreciation in one another's work.

I realized that sometimes people living on the frontline of these social tragedies and insanities are the ones who are at greater risk. So I wondered then how she could herself cope with so much trauma with such regularity and such proximity, considering that she had just told me about a patient of hers who, after some three years of therapy under her watch and advice, had just committed suicide three days prior to my interview with her.

It was then that she revealed to me that she was a 9/11 survivor in that a freak accident had forced her to cancel her confirmed ticket on the tragic and infamous United 93 flight that perished on September 11, 2001. She said it took the trauma of that experience and the feeling of guilt in causing another human being to die in her place to ultimately give her the determination and commitment to establish MDA Japan and to play a role in society to help other people facing trauma and other psychological disorders.

She said that we must all be prepared to give back to society if we wished ourselves to be saved and protected, be it from natural disaster, acts of terrorism or personal psychological trauma.

Although I could never compare my experience with that of hers, nevertheless I could take some wisdom from her: that everything one goes through in life has its own hidden meaning and purpose, and mine was becoming more and more tangible with every interview and every stone unturned.

"Is spirituality or the lack of it, then, the problem? Is it 'the' problem?" I asked them all at the end.

As I mentioned before, this was just the end of the beginning of my journey into this theme. The middle is the making of the film, and the end will be the relationships and connections the film will make with the people who will make up its audience.

At every stage, there will be many bridges to be built, the bridges between myself and the people within my film during the making, and the bridges between the film and the audience in the end.

In Conclusion…Sort of…

I am suddenly drawn back to the memory of attending the *nabe*-party at New Start after my interview with Futagami-san. I was myself rather intimidated by the thought of meeting so many *hikikomori*, unsure of how to deal or interact with them, and insecure about my own awkwardness in group situations such as these. Little did I expect to see them boldly and ebulliently approaching me, sometimes even 'cornering me' just to have some—often disjointed—conversation with me, at times in English, at times in Japanese, their thoughts and logic not at all so polished but their genuineness and sheer enthusiasm so touching and inspiring.

I left the party rather late, filled with warmth and real feelings, something that I felt once again severely deprived of upon my return to Tokyo this time.

'I had a potful of human contact and emotion tonight,' I remember thinking to myself, 'And I think and hope I gave back as much to some of them as I took.'

Was I in need of it more, or were they?

Interesting question.

A STUDY OF COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN PROCESSES ON THE ISSUE OF COMMUNITY RIGHTS TO BIODIVERSITY RESOURCES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Varinthra Kaiyourawong Boonchai

Introduction

Globalization takes place in the form of the domination of economic and cultural centers as well as in the protests against the domination of marginalized cultures. It makes people's attempts to transcend sociocultural differences more difficult. Although local communities and farmers make up the biggest subgroup of the population, the state marginalizes local people and excludes them from managing biodiversity and local resources because local people have no power to mobilize. They have limited channels of communication and, therefore, cannot push policies forward.

Local people's movements are asking for more rights to manage local resources in order to conserve their ecological systems and strengthen their economic and social self-reliance. The experiences of non-government organizations (NGOs) in the Philippines in communicating and establishing a dialogue among communities to gain public acceptance of communities' rights and local wisdom paint a successful picture of how grassroots people's movements can create communication patterns that are able to transcend sociocultural and political differences. Their campaigns on local rice varieties have successfully changed farmers' behavior from growing the high yielding rice varieties promoted by state agencies, which are expensive since they require chemicals (e.g., fertilizer, pesticides) to achieve their high yield potential, to developing new varieties from farmers' own initiatives. It is, therefore, interesting to study how the NGOs in the Philippines communicate with farmers to create and develop their own rice varieties.

The objectives of my research are: 1) to study the communication strategies and patterns used by NGOs to promote farmers' rights to biodiversity resources; 2) to study which social conditions and contexts are able to transcend sociocultural and economic differences; 3) to find out what conditions have contributed to the success or failure of such communication campaigns; and 4) to find out the ways to apply these patterns of communication campaigning to people's movements in Thailand. I chose the Southeast Asia Regional Initiative for Community Empowerment (SEARICE) to be my host organization because it is an NGO working on the issue of farmers' rights to biodiversity resources in the Philippines. It also has a vast experience in campaigning on this issue not only at the local and national levels but also at the international level. SEARICE works towards a just democratic civil society that upholds people's creative and sustainable utilization of natural resources. It implements the Community Biodiversity Development and Conservation and Biodiversity Use and Conservation in Asia Program (CBDC-BUCAP).

My case study focused on the Biodiversity Development and Conservation (CBDC) program, a ten-year old global program on plant genetic resources. CBDC evolved around formal-informal system partnerships, developing methodologies and undertaking researches while organizing farmers into groups to secure their seed supply system, improve their economic gains and build social and political spaces (SEARICE 2007). I conducted a review of the literature written by SEARICE as well as other documents related to the issue. I also organized key informant and group interviews of the organizations' campaign staff and representatives of the campaign target groups, and observed communication campaign processes in the local areas. The study took twelve months.

The Community Biodiversity Development and Conservation (CBDC) Program—Bohol Project: A case study

SEARICE chose the towns of Bilar, Batuan, Carmen and Dagohoy in the province of Bohol as the Philippine sites of the Southeast Asian location for the Community Biodiversity Development and Conservation (CBDC) program because of the very low genetic diversity in these towns when the project started in 1996.

In 2001, SEARICE released a technical report regarding rice farming from the CBDC Bohol project. The socioeconomic survey, which included the barangays of Campagao and Cansumbol in Bilar and Malitbog in Dagohoy, showed that the rice situation is as follows: farmers have limited resources of land and capital. This lack of resources, particularly capital, affects the net farm income of farmers.

The report also recognized that farming is not only the simple conservation and utilization of resources. It requires the correct allocation of resources and the help of external forces in the environment. Farmers make necessary observations about their immediate natural resources, such as soil, labor and environmental conditions, and then determine their actions. When the country experiences a rice crisis, it inevitably resorts to importation. A rice shortage is both a political and an economic issue because it is a question of the government's incapacity to provide the support services and infrastructure needed by rice farmers to produce sufficient rice. Socioeconomic constraints, such as credit and input availability, are generally considered the factors that slow down the acceptance of sustainable agriculture. The need to maintain contact and communication with farmer-partners is essential to monitoring farmers' conversion from inorganic to organic farming (Community Biodiversity Development and Conservation Program—Bohol Project 2001).

Addressing the abovementioned factors, the general objectives of the Bohol Project were to enhance on-farm conservation, to develop plant genetic resources (PGR) through participatory varietal selection (PVS)/participatory plant breeding (PPB), to strengthen local seed supply systems, to mainstream support for farmer-led conservation, to develop PGR among farming communities, universities and formal research institutions, to enhance gender equity in PGR conservation and development and to promote policy regulations to support farmer-led conservation and development of PGR (SEARICE 1995).

The feedback of farmer-partners on the CBDC Bohol Project

In 2005, the CBDC Philippines (Bohol) Project year-end report featured the project's work on lowland rice research in plant genetic resources and conservation, development and use (PRG-CDU) in seven communities in Campagao, Cansumbol, Riverside and Zamora (Bilar), Poblacion Vieja (Batuan), Katipunan (Carmen) and Malitbog (Dagohoy). There were seven active people's organizations, made up of 116 members, from the partner communities of the project. Of the 116 members, 66 percent were active participants. Farmers were classified as active members if they were practitioners of sustainable agriculture (SA)-organic farming, conducted on-farm research and trials on participatory plant breeding (PPB) or participatory varietal selection (PVS), actively attended and participated in the meetings and activities of the organization and were also active in the mainstreaming

activities of the project, especially in the implementation of the season-long training at the PGR-farmers' field school in the province (SEARICE 2005).

Various farmer-partners in Bohol, both men and women who have participated in the CBDC training program on traditional and organic farming techniques, provided feedback about seed conservation and development. Some of their comments are shown below:

> "At the start, I did not believe that rice breeding could be done but I also like to try inventing. My breeding objectives are to solve the problem of sourcing seeds and to develop a new variety suited to my field. I was happy when I heard that the harvest of farmers with whom I shared my seeds increased using my developed variety. Other groups which wanted to learn about breeding have also invited me to share my knowledge. Other than that, I did not depend anymore on seeds developed in laboratories." (Gerardo Calamba from Cansumbol, Bilar, SEARICE 2002).

> "One of the things that gave me the inspiration to create a new variety is the dream to develop a new variety from my own initiative and which I can leave as a legacy to my family. It developed my self-confidence to do things like this even though I am already old. Doing plant breeding and selection helped me a lot, especially in the economic aspect. I did not have to buy seeds anymore. I was also able to sell my produce. It enabled me to help other farmers since it gave me the opportunity to share my knowledge in breeding..." (Ruperta D. Mangaya-ay from Zamora, Bilar, SEARICE 2005).

These comments indicate that SEARICE uses the concept of alternative development in implementing its project. The attributes of this alternative paradigm are: that it is need-oriented, endogenous, self-reliant, ecologically sound and based on structural transformations (i.e., self-management by the community). Alternative development involves the improvement of the knowledge, attitudes and skills of disadvantaged people to utilize, sustain and improve the productivity of available resources (Kaewthep 2000). It uses a human approach and recognizes that the people know their own needs best. Therefore, the technician (in this case, SEARICE's field staff) who believes in this approach first spends his/her time learning the needs and priorities of the people before introducing technologies for improvement. The initial act of the technician under this approach is to learn rather than to teach. The ultimate objective of the technician is to develop the knowledge, attitude and skills of the people

toward self-reliance (Smolders 2006).

In practice, the human approach is applied to the concept of the farmers' field school (FFS), one of the initiatives that SEARICE has implemented. An FFS uses a learn-by-doing approach with farmer groups. It teaches them to apply what they have learned through the program to develop new activities to gain greater control over local conditions.

The communication patterns of the CBDC Bohol Project

In this section, I analyze the communication patterns of the CBDC Bohol project in order to understand how SEARICE encourages farmers to accept the CBDC program and to change their behavior from growing the rice varieties promoted by state agencies to their own rice varieties and how it convinces the general public to accept and support farmers' rights. The results and analysis are organized into: target groups; the message; and communication methods.

Target groups

There are four levels of communication in this project: the community, national, regional and international levels. At the community level, SEARICE's field staff identified farmers in the seven communities as the project's main target group. The strategy is to strengthen community management of community agricultural resources and to increase farm productivity.

At the national, regional and international levels, there are many target groups: farmers in other communities, other NGOs/academics, political leaders and partners in service delivery. The communication strategy is to increase awareness and technical and policy advocacy capacity at the mainstream level for plant genetic resources conservation, development and use, and agricultural policy-related issues. The approaches implemented at these levels are networking, lobbying, advocacy and collaboration.

Messages

Messages deal with both technical issues and policy issues. The technical messages sent to farmer-partners at the community level and other farmers consist of three important components. The first is the conservation and continuous utilization of, for example, community seed banks and home gardens. The second deals with development, such as selecting and actual breeding according to farmer's own breeding objectives. The last

one includes sustainable agricultural practices such as organic agriculture and integrated farming systems. These messages are vital to the main target group because they can actually apply the knowledge they gain.

> *"I first learned about breeding when SEARICE entered our barangay in 1996. In that training, they taught us how to breed rice, and when I went back to our barangay, I immediately tried rice breeding. Rice breeding helped a lot in my farming since I was able to have my own variety adapted to my field conditions. It is not hard for me now to find seeds to be planted in my field. I was also able to share my knowledge and methods in breeding with other farmers. They recognized the seeds that I developed as those developed by a farmer-breeder."* (Cisenio Salces from Campagao, Bilar, SEARICE 2002).

To deal with policy issues, SEARICE set up a policy and information unit. The unit is involved in lobbying, advocacy and networking on issues related to biotechnology, intellectual property rights (IPR), biodiversity and plant genetic resources at the national, regional and international levels (SEARICE 2007). The policy issues are focused on the protection and promotion of farmers' rights and other issues that affect farmer-partners. The main point of spreading these policy issues is to claim farmers' relationship with the land and their right to conserve, develop and freely share plant genetic resources, to market agricultural products, to access technology and knowledge and to have the right to participate in decision making (SEARICE 1996).

At the Regional Conference on Sustainable Community-based Initiatives as Expressions of Farmers' Rights held on 18 October 2006 in Tagbilaran City, SEARICE launched the Rice Festival Declaration Supporting Farmers' Rights for Food Security. Following is an excerpt from the Declaration which highlights policy concerns:

> *"… Concerned about the absence of legislation or policies in many countries in support of farmers' rights to seeds and sustainable community-based initiatives as a means to enhance food security and contribute to poverty alleviation, and conscious of the need to provide a supportive policy environment to promote food security and poverty alleviation…*(Rice Festival Declaration Supporting Farmers' Rights for Food Security, 18 October 2006).

Another example of how effective messages can inspire target groups to take action comes from the community

registry in CBDC Bohol. When farmer-partners from the Campagao Farmers' Production and Research Association (CFPRA) in Bilar received information on the Plant Variety Protection Act of 2002, they decided to establish a community registry as the community's way of asserting its control over and access to seed and other genetic resources (Community Biodiversity Development and Conservation Program 2006).

SEARICE has produced three publication formats for its messages. The first is handouts containing technical messages for farmers such as, "Enhancing Farmers' Role in Crop Development: Framework Information for Participatory Plant Breeding in Farmer Field Schools." The second is books and newsletters about policy issues, such as the *SEARICE Review*. The last is books and booklets summing up field work experiences from the CBDC Program such as *A Profile of Farmer Breeders in Bohol, and, Pathways to Participatory Farmer Plant Breeding: Stories and Reflections of the Community Biodiversity Development and Conservation Program*.

Communication methods

The CBCD Bohol project prioritizes interpersonal communication as a method of communication at the community level. This interpersonal communication consists of many channels: personal media,[1] specific media[2] such as seminars, trainings and exchange visits, as well as printed media and electronic media produced by SEARICE. One finding of the study is that the most effective communication method at the community level is when field staff play their own role as personal media.

The SEARICE information flow model features the interaction of "sender" (field staff) and "receiver" (farmers) through interpersonal communication. In this model, the field staff members have two working processes. The first process is reflection and the second one is action. To communicate with farmers-partners, SEARICE staff then use a three-way communication process. This model illustrates:

1) Feeding, which refers to the source gathering information about the problems, knowledge, attitudes, skills and practices of intended receivers. In practice, feeding is done through baseline surveys, focus group discussions, training needs analyses and pretesting of materials.
2) Feed forward which refers to the source planning, packaging and delivering the messages to the receiver(s) through group and interpersonal communication.
3) Feedback which refers to source gathering information

about the receiver's reactions to the information or the channels. In practice, feedback is gathered through monitoring and evaluation (Mercado 1991).

Data from six focus group discussions[3] show that every farmer accepted SEARICE as the/a community organizer. SEARICE gives a presentation that informs farmers of PPB/PVS techniques that can minimize farmer's production expenses, teaches them to conserve and develop seeds, encourages basic organic farming rather than conventional farming and empowers them to lobby the Department of Agriculture to support farmers' organizations.

Moreover, all the farmers acknowledged that SEARICE's role is different from that of government agents because the government promotes conventional farming while SEARICE promotes organic farming and sustainable agriculture. The Department of Agriculture gives synthetic chemicals to farmers without actually inspecting the fields while SEARICE uses ecological materials and continues to monitor its services. Government agents provide loans but rarely services from farm technicians.

Thus, an important point is that farmer-partners need close monitoring in the implementation of new technology and other services. They want the technicians or staff to be hardworking, smiling, friendly, supportive and approachable. The field staff should, therefore, continue monitoring and know how to train the farmers well. They should also never give up, even if the farmer-partners are having difficulty with the new activities.

Apart from personal media, SEARICE emphasizes specific media such as trainings, meetings, policy discussions, seminars, exchange visits and close monitoring to communicate with farmer-partners. The communication methods create public spaces for farmers to share their ideas and thus, claim their rights and protect the public interests of their communities.

The significant attributes in the communication patterns of SEARICE—especially at the community level—are smallness of scale, interchange of sender-receiver roles, horizontality of communication and deinstitutionalization.

At the national, regional and international levels, SEARICE uses networking and collaboration with other farmers, NGOs and academics. Many activities at these levels take the form of technical assistance and policy discussions with different organizations. There has also been the formation of a provincial farmers' seed network.

The communication methods at the higher levels focus on group communication and publications, such as meetings, launching events, seminars, demonstrations of methods and printed media. The main purposes of group communication are to create awareness, increase knowledge and convince target groups to adopt their practices.

For political leaders, policy advocacy and campaigns are the most effective strategies. SEARICE's staff regularly attends committee hearings and lobby political leaders on the issue of farmers' rights at the provincial level. They also had an initial discussion on farmers' rights with one of the Congressmen in the province and lobby for church support of farmers' rights.

Furthermore, SEARICE participates in and supports CBDC's regional and global policy and mainstreaming activities. For instance, it participates in the meetings of the regional partners and attends conferences and policy workshops for farmers at the regional level, contributes news to CBDC's website and its global video documentary, writes papers and reports to advocate CBDC's policies for global mainstreaming, and also participates in CBDC policy events and regional trainings.

Communication methods at the regional level include mixed specific media and electronic media such as websites, video documentaries and publications. The important point of communication at the regional and international levels is to create "a community of sentiment." It means that SEARICE tries to create a group that imagines and feels things together by participating in regional partners' meetings and the production of electronic media. These communication methods are not limited to the national level; they are transnational. Using these channels, SEARICE and its partners create communities in and of themselves from different landscapes that have a common ideoscape of farmers' rights to biodiversity resources and move from shared imagination to collective action. This media also has become massively globalized; that is, it is active across large and irregular transnational terrains (Appadurai 1996). The table below summarizes the communication patterns being employed by SEARICE.

The process of constructing the meaning of farmers' rights to biodiversity resources

Social movements are not just shaped by culture; they also shape and reshape it. Therefore, the process of meaning construction is one cultural strategy of social movements for changing power relations and legitimizing their identities. Symbols, values, meanings, icons, and beliefs are adapted and molded to suit the movement's aim and frequently are injected into the broader culture via institutionalization and routinization (Johnston and Klandermans 1995, 9).

SEARICE has been constructing the meaning of farmers' rights to biodiversity resources through three processes: public discourses, persuasive communication and consciousness-raising during episodes of collective action.

Strategy	Target groups	Messages	Communication methods
Behavior development communication (users/clients)	Farmer -partners • Men • Women	Technical • Conservation • Development • Sustainable agricultural practices Policy issues • Farmers' rights • GMOs, hybrid rice • Intellectual property rights	Interpersonal communication • Personal media • Specific media • Farmer field school • Training • Exchange visit • Meeting • Policy discussion • Seminar • Printed media
Social mobilization/ Behavior development communication (partners in the community)	• Other farmers • Other NGOs • Academics • Youth	• Technical messages • Policy issues	Group communication • Training • Exchange visit • Meeting, seminar • Participatory research • Collaboration
Advocacy	• Political leaders • Opinion leaders	• Policy issues that affect farmers	• Lobbying • Seminars • Printed media
Social mobilization (partners in service delivery)	• NGOs • Media producers • Regional partners	• Technical messages • Policy issues	• Orientation program • Seminar, joint events • Study tour, workshop • Printed /electronic media

Table 1: Communication patterns of SEARICE.

Public discourses

SEARICE collaborates and shares information on farmers' rights issues with NGOs, academics and other civic groups at the local, national, regional and international levels. It also campaigns on the discourse of farmers' rights to biodiversity resources with the public through public forums, platforms for the discussion of relevant issues, and websites. There are many signs and slogans referring to the farmers' rights discourse such as, "Make organic food as your medicine." Although this slogan does not directly refer to farmers' rights and biodiversity, "organic food" refers to farmers and biodiversity, while "your medicine" reflects the value of plant varieties which farmers give to consumers. Therefore, the farmers' rights discourse is legitimized by farmer practice and consumer acceptance. This is one example of various slogans through which SEARICE tries to communicate the meaning of farmers' rights to biodiversity resources with the general public.

However, both SEARICE's collaborations and its campaigns are limited to people associated with its program partners and do not include the general public. SEARICE rarely releases its issues to the mass media or forms links with other networks around different issues. Thus, it does not widen public discourse on farmers' rights as it lacks a diversity of networks to support its campaigns.

Persuasive communication

Persuasive communication refers to specific communication with target groups in order to change their actions through slogans, exhibitions, and farmer field schools. One of the slogans that SEARICE communicates with farmers is, "The seed of rice is the seed of life." This slogan aims to redefine "rice" as "life." It means that farmers' right to their life cannot be separated from farmers' right to their rice.

SEARICE has succeeded in convincing its target group farmers to develop their own rice varieties. The persuasive communication of SEARICE is a crucial process, not only for local practice, but also for policy participation. However, it cannot continue to develop this process and to make the farmer network push forward its own policy at the national level by creating signs, slogans and other symbolic actions to present the specific meaning of farmers' rights to each crucial group.

Consciousness-raising during episodes of collective action

Community participation in activities aimed at developing seed varieties is used to construct the meaning of farmers' rights and to raise farmers' consciousness. SEARICE has used personal media, a dialogue process, focus groups, trainings, and farmer field schools to develop the skills and analytical potential of farmers. The signs or slogans about farmers' rights always emphasize the importance of empowering farmers' confidence, potential and rights to develop biodiversity resources, such as, "You can develop your own varieties." or "Farmers are breeders."

The findings also show that the direct community participation process is effective but it is not enough to widen the initiative. SEARICE should collaborate with the local mass media, such as local radio, as a channel for broader social mobilization by employing a learning process and giving useful information about farmers' rights to biodiversity resources. Whenever farmers open more learning spaces by themselves, they can develop their own meaning and progressively practice their rights.

Conditions for communication success

Initiatives require an enabling environment to register success. The success of the CBDC Bohol Project can be traced to a conscious identification of project components, selection of farmer-partners, enhancement of their status, establishment of an administrative structure and the development of support networks.

Appropriate components of the CBDC Bohol Project

The identification of target audiences is necessary for the selection of appropriate communication methods and message and is vital for successful communication. SEARICE clarifies its target groups at the community and mainstream levels. Then it plans to use the appropriate channels with each target audience. Every activity is also based on participation and the exchange of ideas.

> *"…all activities which we have implemented in the project are a campaign. At the local level, our style of campaign is to work with farmers through farmer field schools (FFS), among others, so that farmer partners can observe actual examples, adapt knowledge and know how to implement techniques on their farm. We also conducted FFS, seminars and conference workshops with municipal agricultural officers. At the regional level, we organized consultations and workshops to build networks. Since ten years ago, we already worked and campaigned together with some groups of farmers, NGOs and local government*

officials. …Our farmer partners have shifted from growing traditional varieties to developing their own seeds… I think we have gained some victories…" (Interview, Alywin Darlen Arnejo, coordinator of CBDC Bohol Project, 13 December 2006).

The objectives and work plan of this project are tools that can solve the problems of farmer-partners. The main impediments that keep farmers from accepting the technologies that SEARICE advocates are a lack of access to superior genetic material, a narrowed genetic base for the major crops in the community (few varieties available, specific demand for traits that the seed market cannot supply), a reduced number of crop species available to the community, limited individual skills to manage genetic resources, and a lack of collaborative efforts to manage plant genetic resources.

Most of the technical/scientific activities, especially PPB/PVS, organic farming and farmer field schools, are concrete activities that farmers can put to use on their own farms. Moreover, SEARICE is a non-governmental organization that has worked and campaigned continuously on the issue of plant genetic resources and seed for ten years. SEARICE's goals are to work with every sector, including farmers, academics, civil society, businesses and government. For that reason, every sector is always welcome to any events, seminars, or campaigns that it organizes.

Efficient organization administration

SEARICE has an efficient administration. The organizational structure has four parts: administration and finance, information and communication, policy advocacy and technical work. This structure is the key to SEARICE's success because each part has its own work plan and clear mechanisms. For this reason, the staff in each part can deeply develop their specific skills. For example, the technical staff can concentrate on their work in the field without worrying about fundraising and sending reports to the funding agency because the executive director and policy staff are responsible for those tasks. Thus, the field staff can continue to work with and closely monitor farmer-partners, while the policy staff can disseminate useful information to their target group and closely monitor policy developments.

Attitudes of farmer-partners

Whether the project fails or succeeds depends on the attitudes of the farmers. The six focus group discussions show that farmers accepted this project because it taught them techniques they did not know

before. Furthermore, the new methods developed and strengthened farmers' own abilities to breed new varieties and minimize their expenses. Because the farmers themselves see the usefulness of this project, they have changed from growing the rice varieties that the state agencies promote to planting traditional varieties that they have developed themselves.

"Participatory plant breeding is useful because with it, we do not need to buy high-cost varieties of seed, and at the same time, we preserve the traditional seed. The Farmer Field School imparts knowledge about sustainable agriculture." (Participant of a focus group discussion with farmer-partners in Cansumbol, Bilar, 6 December 2006).

Status of farmer-partners in society

In general, farmers are poor. When they decide to plant a specific variety, they must buy the seeds at the market. Often, these seeds cost more than they can afford. Since SEARICE introduced organic farming to them, farmers have been able to spend less than they did with the conventional farming that the Department of Agriculture promotes. Accordingly, they have shifted to organic farming.

Vast networks

SEARICE has networks that push for the recognition of farmers' rights to biodiversity at many levels, such as a network of NGOs that work at the grassroots level, and an international people's network that campaigns against free trade, genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and patents. Since 2001, the project has been very productive in terms of mainstreaming and policy advocacy through linkages with other NGOs and POs. Collaborative activities undertaken with other civil society organizations have also been conducted. In 2001, SEARICE provided orientation and training on sustainable agriculture development to the members of the Wahig Sierra Bullones Irrigator's Association in Sierra Bullones, Bohol. Moreover, the Montevideo Farmers' Association in Carmen, Bohol, through the Peoples Fair Trade and Action Center; the Omjon Farmers' Association in Valencia, Bohol, through the Soil and Water Conservation Foundation; and the Calanghan Farmers' Association and Kabasaken Farmers' Association in Sagbayan, Bohol, through Feed the Children, Inc., requested trainings on sustainable agriculture development, particularly participatory rice variety development.

Constraining conditions of the CBDC Bohol Project

Though SEARICE has a great deal of networks with which to collaborate, it still lacks a strong campaign strategy for constructing a public discourse. "Farmers' rights" is the key public discourse that SEARICE needs to establish in the social cognition. However, it cannot do this alone; the many networks with which it collaborates now are not broad enough to raise the awareness of people to accept the idea of farmers' rights. In order to successfully create this public discourse, SEARICE should collaborate with other movements and initiate social spaces for people from different classes, ethnicities, cultures and other identities to learn about the value of biodiversity resources, local knowledge and farmers' rights.

SEARICE still does not have a clear strategy and mechanism for creating policy processes and policy contents. For this reason, it cannot create a strong public discourse that strengthens policy-making on farmers' rights and farmer participation at the national level. In order to do that, it should facilitate a "think tank" group for developing alternative policies and monitoring current policies by collaborating with social science academics and science academics, public intellectuals and activists who are interested in farmers' rights.

A number of activities in the work plan were also not conducted due to lack of time, shortage of staff and events such as the national elections (SEARICE 2004). A lack of interactive learning in community planning between policy and community level staff prevents SEARICE from working with farmers for advocacy work. Furthermore, a shortage of staff prevents it from mainstreaming and networking, from having a detailed monitoring plan, and from projecting collaborations and other project events. However, effective communication at the local level cannot be denied; it is a good example of the strides that communication campaigns in the Philippines have made.

Conclusion and recommendations

A number of lessons can be learned from the work of SEARICE. A communication strategy or plan should be devised at four levels: community, national, regional and international. Human and participatory approaches are practiced at the community level while networking and collaborative approaches are considered at the national, regional and international levels.

Participation is key for successful communication and project success. The identification of target audiences is necessary for the selection of appropriate communication methods and messages. Interpersonal communication, using personal media and specific media, is likewise fundamental in communicating with the main audience at the community level. At the same time, group communication, using specific media such as seminars, meetings, publications and electronic media, is to be used at the national, regional and international levels.

Moreover, the main message sent to the target groups should be focused on plant genetic resources and farmers' rights. It consists of technical and policy messages that provide useful knowledge to target groups for adaptation and actual practice at the community level. Thus, campaigns on the concept of farmers' rights should be done to build a public discourse; to persuade strategic partners to practice the farmers' rights concept, such as local practice and policy initiatives; and in the process of consciousness-raising, to create a learning process and spaces for practicing farmers' rights at the grassroots level.

However, success at the community level does not necessarily carry over to the mainstreaming level because of staff constraints and the lack of a full-fledged monitoring plan.

The findings indicate that SEARICE should, therefore, link community-managed initiatives with academic institutions, other non-governmental organizations, people's organizations, the mass media and government agencies at the municipal level in order to widen the concept of farmers' rights. It should also create a public space for farmer's voices by setting up a working group to be directly responsible for lobbying, coordinating and closely monitoring the plans that it makes with its program partners at the community level. The working group should be composed of both field staff and policy staff, who can share their ideas and sum up their experiences from both the field and policy arenas through mutual work and interactive learning.

SEARICE should also channel information about policy issues that affect farmer-partners through local radio stations since radio is the medium of communication most easily accessible to farmers. Likewise, sending printed materials such as press releases and newsletters directly to local mass media and other change agents will not only disseminate information but also inform listeners about important points that it wants to communicate. Finally, SEARICE should integrate both

mass media and personal channels if it wants to speed up the diffusion process at any level.

NOTES

[1] Personal media means a person who is a sender in the interpersonal and intergroup media systems. Personal media may be composed of leaders in a community and persons from outside the community, such as specialists from government agencies or NGOs.

[2] Specific media means media produced for specific content and receivers. Specific media include the printed media, electronic media and activity media.

[3] Six focus group discussions were conducted: Malitbog on 22 November 2006, Riverside on 27 November 2006, Zamora on 29 November 2006, Campagao on 4 December 2006, Batuan on 5 December 2006, and Cansumbol on 6 December 2006.

[4] Farmers' rights are rights arising from the past, present and future contributions of farmers in conserving, improving and making available plant genetic resources, particularly those in the centers of origin/diversity (International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Resolution 5/89, November 1989). Farmers' rights consist of: rights and relationship to land; rights to conserve, develop and freely share plant genetic resources; rights to market agricultural products; rights to technology and knowledge; rights to participate in decision-making; and other related rights (SEARICE Review, December, 1996).

[5] Of the different types of media (e.g., television, radio, newspapers), the radio is the most accessible to respondents.

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CULTIVATION OF TRANSFORMATIVE LEADERSHIP IN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE CO-CREATION OF THE ENERGY FIELD FOR DEMOCRATIZATION IN ASIA

Chaiwat Thirapantu

The challenges of the 21st century: Democracy in crisis and the roles of civil society movements

In the 1930s and 1940s, many European and American scholars turned their attention to the crisis of democracy that followed the economic depression and the rise of totalitarianism (Strang 2006). Since the fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of 1989, people in Eastern Europe, in Latin America, in Asia and Africa have been throwing off dictatorships and tyrannies. However, democracy, the political system that they are yearning for, cannot fulfill their hopes for a better life. Even in Western Europe and the United States, people have turned their backs on their governments. Voter turnouts sink, public debates get nastier, and democracy seems stymied in the face of mounting multiple challenges. The problems that the world faced before the Second World War were not as complex as those we face now.

We live and work in an era of turbulence and challenges. The winds of change sweeping the world—digitalization, globalization, migration, demographic shifts and terrorism, as well as the degradation of social and natural capital—are giving rise to arenas of clashing forces. These clashing forces play out as tension between multiple polarities: speed and sustainability, market and society, progress and conservation, global and local ways of organizing, and top-down and bottom-up leadership (Scharmer 2001). In the last decade, there have been many articles and books and media reports warning us about the world's crises. Otto Scharmer has summarized these very poignantly:

> "The crisis of our time is not just a crisis of a single leader, organization, country or conflict. The crisis of our time reveals the dying of an old social structure, and way of thinking, and old way of institutionalizing and enacting collective social forms" (Scharmer 2007).

In the last decade, civil society has become a new "power" in the virtual and real world. The growth of social forums and the anti-war movement represents what social movement theorists call "political opportunity structures," a new framework within which individuals can participate in local and global debates. In particular, the social forums have become the institutionalization of the newest social movements from so-called anti-capitalist movements to environmental, social and migration concerns. Moreover, in many parts of the world, civil society joins with the state and the business sector as the key institutions that are trying to shape globalization and sustainable development.

However, civil society also has its weaknesses, particularly in Southeast Asia. There are diverse groups with widely varying agendas that occupy the space that can be defined as civil society. There is no single viewpoint but rather multiple views, sometimes contradictory. After the tsunami, there were some voices talking about the accountability and transparency of civil society organizations. The double challenge, then, is not to promote civil society *per se* but rather to strengthen the parts of it that can enhance the quality of public policy outcomes and help advance progressive values. In pursuing these aims, there is a first crucial step to create a positive change in the complex system of civil society networks and then weave these changes into the fabric of the modern world. This is the most crucial task in building a community of committed and distributed leaders in civil society movements. My research methodology is a kind of action research that combines three dimensions of observer, namely, the first person, second person and third person.

As the first person, I reflected on my tacit (intrinsic) knowledge from personal experiences in training around five hundred change agents and local leaders in the last seven years. Moreover, I have used my body to experience the *ki* energy flows and the field of energy through practicing *aikido* and Japanese calligraphy. *Ki* (energy in Japanese; *qi* in Chinese) is a thousands-year-old Eastern concept that Yasuo Yuasa has tried to investigate in a scientific way. Yuasa (1993) has defined the concept of *ki*-energy as "an energy unique to the living human body that becomes manifest, while being transformed, at psychological, physiological and physical levels of self-cultivation." Self-cultivation in Japanese is called *shugyou* and refers to training the body. However, it also implies training, as human beings, the spirit or mind by training the body. This is the self-cultivation method, or mind-body training method. In other words,

shugyou carries the meaning of perfecting the human spirit or enhancing one's personality (Yuasa 1993). *Ki* energy is an energy unique to *aikido* and Japanese calligraphy. Practitioners of *aikido*, a Japanese martial arts, regard their ultimate secret to be the unification of mind, *ki* (energy) and body skill (power).

The first person research is aimed at understanding the intangible factors of leadership performance. As a second person observer, I interviewed and had discussions with some civic leaders and academics in three countries to collect information and insights on how they have dealt with leadership development issues. Finally, as a third person observer, I studied documents on transformative leadership in management science, new science and Eastern traditional wisdom.

Systemic change: Be the change you want to see in the world

We must change the way we change

In his book, *Hope is Not a Method*, General Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the US Army, emphasized that to meet the enormous challenges encountered in transforming the post-Cold War army, we must not only change but we must also change the way we change (Sullivan 1997). For me, it is an important message (notion) for the leaders in civil society organizations all over the world to rethink their future work and lives because civil society organizations, particularly in Southeast Asia, are facing tremendous pressures from dramatic developments at both the local and global levels. I have seen symptoms of stress and burn out or "inward resignation" in many leaders and social workers who have worked longer than 10 years. In Thailand, leading social, political and environmental activists are coming into their 50s and one is hardly able to find young promising leaders in civil society organizations. When I was in Manila in February 2007 and had several conversations with many Philippine civic leaders, I found similar concerns. Sixto Donato Macasaet, executive director of the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE), told me about CODE's "nurturing program" to give encouragement to "the successor generations"—future leaders from the community of non-government organizations/ peoples' organizations. He is conscious that the capacity building process still faces a long journey of supporting transformative leadership development. Meanwhile, in Indonesia the civic leaders have not seen the consequences of this dilemma. In comparison to the civil society organizations in Thailand and the Philippines, they are young. They are getting involved in a huge pile of dynamic problems that they are trying to solve. They lamented about heavy workloads, loss of their work-life balance and struggles with their day-to-day work but did not know how to cope with the middle- and long-term challenges facing Indonesian society. My conversations with Sutoro Eko, director of the Institute for Research and Empowerment (IRE), and Poppy Winanti from Gadjah Mada University, who is an advisor of IRE, revealed the fundamental problems of civil society organizations within Southeast Asian countries. They have no time for the individual and collective reflection that is the core process of learning capability. They just learn to "react" to the problems they face but do not learn to "tune in" to the emerging future. From my personal experiences working in this field for more than 30 years, I am afraid that the core groups of Indonesian civil society will repeat the same mistakes that we have made in Thailand over the last two decades. In my opinion, the future of civil society is in our hands when we commit to organizational turnaround and energize ourselves, the leaders and the activists. The basic rationale for civil society organizations is that in a situation of complex and rapid change, only those that are flexible, innovative and productive will excel. For this to happen, it is argued, organizations need to "discover how to tap people's commitment and capacity to learn at all levels" (Senge 2006).

Transformational change begins with personal transformation

Most civil society organizations all over the world are established for noble purposes—to make their own societies and the world a better place to live. It is a tremendous achievement that needs transformational change, which is a process that intertwines the personal, the team, the organization and the society at large. It is a process of change that shifts the leaders inside themselves as well as outside. Hence, transformative leadership takes on important new meanings in leading the changes. In essence, the transformative leaders are those building the new community or organization and its capabilities. They are the ones "walking ahead," regardless of their management position or hierarchical authority. Such leadership is inevitably collective (Kofman 2007). Transformative leadership can have many faces or many names, such as servant leadership, authentic leadership or resonant leadership (Greenleaf 2002). The idea of transformational leadership was first developed by James MacGregor Burns in 1978 and later extended by others. He showed the contrast between this type of leadership and traditional leadership that wielded power in organizational hierarchies and worked in a top-down manner. For Burns, transformative leadership occurs when one or more persons engage

with others in such a way that leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality. Leaders and followers may be inseparable in function, but they are not the same. The leader takes the initiative in making the leader-led connection; it is the leader who creates the links that allow communication and exchanges to take place (Burns 1979). Peter Senge's definition of leadership can evoke a powerful image of the transformative leadership that we want to cultivate. Senge's notion of leadership is the capacity of a human community—people living and working together—to bring forth new realities. Leadership breathes life into the enterprise, without which nothing truly emerges. Put another way, leadership is about tapping the energy to create—especially to create something that matters deeply (Senge 2002).

Therefore, the cultivation of transformative leadership starts with our mind shift by changing our worldview and paradigms. We must change the dominant worldview of the modern culture—the world as a machine. The Newtonian/Cartesian view sees the world as comprised of separate things, particles, and of the relationship between them. Cause is separate from effect. Subject is separate from object, fact from value. Relationships among things are linear, they begin and they end (Wheatley 2006). The leaders must commit to a journey toward lifelong learning, meaning and exploring. Joseph Jaworski, founder of Generon Consulting and author of the book, *Synchronicity: The Inner Path of Leadership*, has eloquently emphasized the power of mind shift:

> "In this process of continuous learning, growth, and development, we undergo three fundamental shifts of mind that set the stage for our becoming more capable of participating in our unfolding future. The first is a shift in the way we think about the world. Instead of seeing the universe as mechanistic, fixed, and determined, we begin to see it as open, dynamic, and alive. The second shift occurs when we come to understand that everything else and that relationship is the organizing principle of the universe. The third shift occurs in our understanding of commitment. It's not, as I once thought, doing what ever it takes to make things happen. It is rather, a willingness to listen, yield, and respond to the inner voice that guides us toward our destiny.
>
> When we follow our purpose and experience these fundamental shifts of mind, a sense of flow develops and we find ourselves in a coherent field of others who share our sense of purpose. We begin

to see that with very small movements, at just the right time and place, all sorts of consequent actions are brought into being. We start to notice that the people who come to us are the very ones we need in relationship to our commitment and the door seems to open for us in ways that we could hardly imagine" (Jaworski 1998).

Some models of leadership building

Charles Handy, a renowned business guru, was asked about his experience in working with outstanding leaders from various organizations. What did he see as the key attributes that make them successful? He answered, "The effective leaders that I have met are a strange combination of passionate human beings who can communicate that passion to others and who at the same time forcefully take risks." This answer means that leaders are born, not made. Handy argued that those are skills which cannot be learned from others and cannot be taught, but are often the matter of finding oneself in the right place (Handy 1997). I also share some part of his thoughts that extraordinary, great leaders such as Gandhi, Martin Luther King or Nelson Mandela are born, but ordinary, good leaders can be taught. However, in this paradoxical and complex world, one extraordinary, great leader would not succeed if s/he was the only heroic one to solve the world's wicked problems. S/he also needs a community of transformative leaders that support and work with him/her. I must emphasize again that leadership cultivation involves both individuals and collectives.

Despite crises and challenges in our societies, we cannot simply wait for "born" leaders to appear. I believe that effective leadership can be taught. There are many examples of leadership cultivation that we can study and apply to our contexts in Southeast Asia.

Across more than two decades, Ronald Heifetz and his colleagues at Harvard University have pioneered a distinct, bold approach to learning and teaching leadership, created and practiced in a manner that is responsive to the hunger for a new story about what leadership means and the ways of learning it. Other theorists and practitioners have explored a new understanding of leadership that more adequately honors an interdependent, systemic awareness and the need for significant shifts in perspective and practice (Parks 2005). The Center for Public Leadership has offered degree programs and executive programs. Its executive programs are designed from one week to several weeks long.

Senge and his colleagues have also facilitated the Foundation for Leadership workshop for more than 20 years. The three-day program is based on the leadership development process described in *The Fifth Discipline* by Senge. The purpose of this course is to explore sources of leadership (Scharmer 2001).

A final example of leadership building is the leadership project of the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management, which started in 1980. This Institute was established by Konosuke Matsushita, the founder of Panasonic, who spent seven billion yen from his private fortune to promote leadership for the 21st century. I will describe some details of the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management (MIGM) because it is an interesting example of a servant leadership building program or transformative leadership cultivation, particularly in Asia. Here are some parts of Matsushita's statement:

> "In a world where complex and difficult problems threaten human society in unprecedented ways, a fundamental reevaluation of human nature has become necessary. A rethinking, properly connected, would provide a deeper understanding of the relationship of all individuals to themselves, to community, to their nation, to the world, and to the environment around them. Only then can humanity realize, for the first time ever, its full potential, with civilization advancing to a new and higher stage. But as I thought about these great challenges and great opportunities, I realized that this search for a new philosophy of peace and prosperity requires leaders of great vision and ability who would be capable of implementing these new ideals. Since so many of the world's and Japan's problems can be attributed to the lack of a clear, future-oriented perspective and of a long term national and global policy, it seemed to me urgently necessary to begin fostering talented and promising young people capable of assuming the responsibility for these great tasks. Surely, neither the world at large and Japan in particular have done enough in this regard previously… For these reasons, I decide to establish the Matsushita School of Government and Management in order to give talented young persons the opportunity to realize better futures for themselves, for Japan and for the world…" (Matsushita 2007).

In selecting associates for its three-year training course, the Institute seeks applicants who demonstrate fortitude in character, initiative and vision. Particularly, it seeks those associates who demonstrate that they have a *sunao*

mind, a Japanese concept referring to a mindset that is capable of accepting life in a constructive way and is able to see things as they are without prejudice or preconceived ideas. The three-year curriculum of MIGM is very intensive in cooperative research, global literacy skills and Japanese traditional culture (Matsushita 2007). Finally, the associates should commit to five vows:

1) To realize heartfelt ambition;
2) To have a spirit of independence and self-reliance;
3) To learn from all things;
4) To be on the cutting edge of a creative innovation;
5) To have a deep-felt spirit of gratitude and cooperation (Matsushita 2007).

In my interviews with alumni, I asked whether all alumni still keep the five vows in their work. The answer was that not all of them do; especially those who have become politicians cannot maintain the vows. This does not surprise me at all, because leadership is not a one-time act in which you pass an exam and become a graduate. Training courses are useful to learn new methods and new skills, which should translate into everyday life; even an executive leader cannot solve "wicked problems" alone. Leaders still need to work as part of a good team and learn together to create lasting change. Transformative leadership is a life-long learning process done individually and collectively.

Learning organizations or communities of practice as places for leadership cultivation

In an interview by Melvin McLeod (2001), Senge described a learning organization as a community of practice. The concept of a community of practice refers to the process of social learning that occurs when people who have a common interest in some subject or problem collaborate over an extended period to share ideas, find solutions, and build innovations. The term was first used in 1991 by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, who used it in relation to situated learning as part of an attempt "to rethink learning" at the Institute for Research and Learning. In 1998, Wenger extended the concept and applied it to other contexts, including organizational settings. More recently, Communities of Practice have become associated with knowledge management as people have begun to see them as ways of building social capital, nurturing new knowledge, stimulating innovation or sharing existing tacit knowledge within an organization. In T*he Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*, Senge defined a learning organization as human beings cooperating in dynamic systems that are in a state of continuous

adaptation and improvement. According to him:

> "Real learning gets to the heart of what it means to be human. Through learning we re-create ourselves. Through learning we become able to do something we were never able to do. Through learning we re-perceive the world and our relationship to it. Through learning we extend our capacity to create, to be part of the generative process of life. There is within each of us a deep hunger for this type of learning" (Senge, 2006).

For Senge, a learning organization or community of practice is a place where people are committed to practicing collective cultivation or collective being. He uses the term "cultivation" in this context to mean deep development, becoming a human being. Furthermore, for Senge there is no genuine cultivation without discipline (McLeod 2001). He emphasized the matter of the mastery of five basic disciplines to achieve the results participants want to see. They are: 1) system thinking; 2) personal mastery; 3) mental models; 4) building a shared vision; and 5) team learning (Senge, 2006).

System thinking is the conceptual cornerstone of the learning organization approach. It is the discipline that integrates the others, fusing them into a coherent body of the theory and practice. System thinking is based upon a growing body of theory about the behavior of feedback and complexity—the innate tendencies of a system that lead to growth and stability over time. System theory's ability to comprehend and address the whole and to examine the interrelationship between the parts provides, for Senge, both the incentive and the means to integrate the disciplines (Smith 2001).

Personal mastery is the discipline that emphasizes that organizations learn only through individuals who learn. Individual learning does not guarantee organizational learning, but without it no organizational learning occurs. It goes beyond competence and skills, although it involves them. It goes beyond spiritual opening, although it involves spiritual growth. Personal mastery is the discipline of aspiration and involves formulating a coherent picture of the results people most desire to gain as individuals (their personal vision), of focusing our energies, of developing patience and seeing their current reality objectively. Learning to cultivate the tension between vision and reality can expand people's capacity to make better choices and to achieve more of the results that they have chosen (Smith 2001).

The discipline of mental models starts with turning the mirror inward: learning to unearth our internal pictures of the world, to bring them to the surface and hold them rigorously to scrutiny. It also includes the ability to carry on contemplative conversations that balance inquiry and advocacy, where people expose their own thinking effectively and make that thinking open to the influence of others. If organizations are to develop a capacity to work with mental models, then it will be necessary for people to learn new skills and develop new orientations, and for there to be institutional changes that foster such change (Smith 2007).

Building a shared vision is a collective discipline that establishes a focus on mutual purpose. Moreover, it is an important task of leadership to inspire and nourish a sense of commitment in organization by developing pictures of the future they seek to create. Such a vision has the power to be uplifting and to encourage experimentation and innovation (Smith 2007).

Team learning is a discipline of group interaction. Through techniques like dialogue and skillful discussion, teams transform their collective thinking, learning to mobilize their energies and abilities that are greater than the sum of the individual member's talents. When dialogue is joined with system thinking, Senge (2006) argues, there is the possibility of creating language more suited for dealing with complexity.

All these disciplines are concerned with a shift of mind from seeing parts to seeing wholes, from seeing people as helpless reactors to seeing them as active participants in shaping their reality, from reacting to the present to creating the future.

Furthermore, each discipline provides a vital dimension. Each is necessary to the others if organizations are learning to connect people's energies. In 2006, I used these five disciplines to create common core values for two business companies in Bangkok. We saw some shifts in people's thinking and interacting that led to team learning. I really do believe that these practices in the work place can lead to the building of a "community of commitment" because, without commitment, the changes required will never take place.

Implications: Self-cultivation and skilful facilitation for the co-creation of the field of energy

An effective leader will have the capacity to use his or her "Self" as the vehicle—the blank canvas—for sensing, tuning into and bringing into presence that which s/he wants to emerge. William O'Brien, the former CEO of the Hannover Insurance Company, summarized his experiences in leading change as follows, "The success

of an intervention depends on the interior condition of the intervener." In other words, the success of a tangible move in a particular situation depends on the Self of the intervener. Although the various Eastern and Western traditions of inner cultivation and development differ in their beliefs and assumptions, they all focus on practice as key for enhancing personal cultivation and spiritual growth (Scharmer 2007).

In my action research, I began practicing *aikido* in *dojo* (an *aikido* school) and also practiced Japanese calligraphy to understand by direct experience how to create energy and connect my energy with other persons. Leadership is the capacity to take effective action with others in full awareness of one's impact on those others, whether individuals, communities, organizations and even society. As I emphasized at the beginning of this paper, social and organizational transformation begins with personal transformation—changing the perceptions, intentions and commitments of those who can influence the future. In the last two decades, there have been many examples of leaders being engaged in experiences that broaden worldviews, enhance readiness to act with others and tap inner sources of inspiration and motivation. Tom Atlee, founder of the non-profit Co-Intelligence Institute, has articulated his personal journey in connecting the field of energies in his writing, "Democracy and the Evolution of Societal Intelligence." He wrote, "I have experienced a few rare groups where everyone's a peer, where leadership is shared, where a special kind of energy among them allows them to explore and solve problems together, successfully. I have watched people with very different ideas, backgrounds, aptitudes and knowledge using that diversity creatively. They come up with brilliant solutions and proposals—better than any of them could come up with alone. The group seems more intelligent than its individual members…I call these dynamics 'collective intelligence'—which manifests as 'group intelligence' in groups and 'societal intelligence' in whole societies" (Atlee 2007).

To facilitate such collaborative action, leaders must learn to embody social technology skills. Nowadays, there are many methodologies that could be learned and practiced, such as appreciative inquiry, open space technology, future search, dynamic facilitation, the World Cafe and the U-Process. There are many reports about using these new social technologies for systemic change. Here is an example:

> "The work in Zambia exemplifies that the U-process offers both a methodology to address challenges, as well as a way to learn how to make

a shift in how we pay attention. The Zambia team used the U-process to design the workshops, as well as to affect the overall process" (Kaeufer and Flick 2007).

I have used those social methodologies such as community planning and city participatory planning to ignite and connect people's energy since 1997. In July 2004, I organized and facilitated the first people's political meeting, "Big Bang Bangkok," with 1,000 participants. We invited Bangkok residents to share their concerns, find common goals and present their views to the candidates of the gubernatorial election. The meeting was a success. The people's forum was broadcast live on cable TV and was televised on the evening news and reported in the newspapers the next morning. On 8-9 October 2005, I used the World Café and appreciative inquiry methods for the facilitation of a "People's Assembly" with 3,000 participants from around 60 provinces of Thailand. My intention was to showcase a strategic dialogue between people's politics and partisan politics. This could open a chance for Thai society to start taking a journey on a road less traveled to a "new democracy," as Tom Atlee put it in *The Tao of Democracy* (Thirapantu 2007). Unfortunately, we could not pursue the follow-up actions as we had planned because one month later a political turmoil started in Thailand that eventually triggered the 19 September 2006 coup. All political and civil society work has stopped for almost two years, but I think that the "People's Assembly" still has some impact on the Democrat Party's strategies. In the *Bangkok Post* newspaper's top stories on Monday, 23 July 2007, there was an article reporting that the Democrat Party had kick-started the electoral race with its first general meeting on Friday, 20 July, and held its first fund-raiser a day later. Television spots featured a confident Abhisit Vejjajiva, the party leader, proclaiming that the party's new agenda, "People First," had been aired (Prateepchaikul 2007).

I believe that civil society organizations will have more impact on the destiny of their own societies when they "transcend" themselves to become real human beings and if the transformative leaders utilize the social technologies mentioned above to convene conversations that result in vitalizing a community that knows what it wants, a community with a vision and capacity for revitalizing even governmental systems. This can result either from communities taking the initiative to act on their own behalf or an ongoing representative constituency that knows what it wants and which cannot be ignored.

Some years ago, civil society organizations in Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand started to pay attention to cultivating transformative leadership as a key factor to foster and strengthen their movements. The learning processes in these four countries could be faster if their civil society leaders had opportunities to share their working experiences and reflections together regularly.

Rosa Zubizarreta has manifested this belief in energetic words:

"We need positive leadership of all kinds, beginning with the 'creative leadership' that inspired us to offer the seed of a compelling vision to the large whole. These visions can serve as 'organizing principles' that draw others in to work collectively on a common project for the benefit of all. Once a group has converged around a particular vision, 'facilitative leadership' is needed to ensure that every voice is heard in a way that is not a cacophony of voices. We need to offer simple structures that encourage the growth and engagement of all participants, so that each person's creativity can serve to benefit the whole. In this manner, we create the conditions where a vision can live, grow, and be shared" (Zubizarreta 2007).

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INFORMING GOVERNANCE? SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IN INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES

Adnan A. Hezri

Background: governance and sustainable development

The 21st century has been dubbed the century of the environment because human economic activities have caused unprecedented changes to global ecosystems (Lubchenco 1998). Concomitant with the global environmental changes throughout the 20th century are changes in society's response to emerging ecological threats (McNeill 2000; Simmons 1996). Two broad waves of the institutionalization of environmental policies can be identified (Janicke and Weidner 1997). The first occurred in the late 1960s to early 1970s. The second wave came in the aftermath of the Brundtland Report in 1987 and the Rio Conference in 1992, bringing in its wake the worldwide spread of new or revised institutional arrangements for effective environmental protection, with its new focus on the concept of sustainable development or sustainability (Kraft and Vig 1994).

The two waves of institutionalization are different in terms of policy content and corresponding policy instruments. The policy content of the first wave can be seen as a reaction to early forms of environmental threats. Even though predominantly driven by domestic policies, the first wave diffused internationally following the United Nations Conference on Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972. The second wave, in contrast, was a direct response to global ecological challenges, such as biodiversity loss and climate change. Dovers (1997; c.f. Lafferty 2004) argues that these are sustainability problems, 'different in degree and in kind' from the discrete environmental threats that were characteristic of the first wave. Arguably, sustainability is a higher-order social goal equivalent to democracy and justice. The number of policy instruments that governments have applied has been more pervasive in the second wave mainly to address the integrative logic of sustainable development, which is to combine environmental, social and economic factors and goals.

The shift to multiple instruments is also characteristic of government reorganizing itself by engaging with other parties, suggesting the shift from government to governance in tackling long-term goals for sustainability.

Environmental governance is synonymous with interventions aimed at changes in environment-related incentives, knowledge, institutions, decision making and behaviors. More specifically, governance refers to the set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through which political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes. It includes the actions of the state and, in addition, encompasses actors such as civil society, businesses and NGOs. Governance is, therefore, not the same as government (Rhodes 1996).

Indicators are important for decisionmaking and governance. With the purported aim of measuring and reporting on progress towards sustainable development, variants of sustainability indicator systems have been developed by governments and civil societies spanning multiple scales of governance (Parris and Kates 2003; Hezri and Dovers 2006). In theory, by integrating information from the environmental, social and economic domains and then feeding knowledge and direction back to a correspondingly wide range of policy sectors, sustainability indicator systems may facilitate cross-agency and portfolio policy connectivity. Additionally, information such as sustainability indicators, if appropriately designed and used, may mediate the connection between the state and civil society. In this regard, sustainability indicators assume the role of a tool for social justice.

Before the emergence of contemporary ideas of sustainability, development indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and the Human Development Index (HDI) were used for measuring progress, directing policy and allocating resources. Indicators are also intended to enhance transparency, accountability and democracy (Solesbury 2002). If made available in the public domain through enhanced socialization (that is, by involving users in the development and use of indicator systems), they may allow civil society to provide political feedback that encourages decisionmakers to connect decisions to the contents of the indicators. There is an expectation that by opening up more communication channels through the development and use of indicators, we will establish a public sphere, an agora in which to discuss and work

together for the resolution of the very difficult issues that face us as societies. Implicitly, indicator systems ought to function as a policy instrument connecting scientific knowledge to a system of users.

Uncertainty regarding the role of information in policy-making is not a theme unique to the sustainability debate. The notion of adapting knowledge to the needs of society, or the general relationship between knowledge and decision-making, dates back at least as far as the time of the Ancient Greeks (Rich 1979). The informational contents of most knowledge systems, indicators included, are consistently subjected to multiple interpretations in any modern society. This ranges from absolute instrumental rational assumption to the more volatile, power-based relational concepts such as secrecy, concealment and manipulation. The underlying question is how do we optimize public policy decisions by basing them on accurate and adequate information?

Despite the popularity of sustainability indicator systems, the understanding of how they are connected to policy processes is still limited. Although there exists a substantial body of literature on sustainability indicators, most of it is mainly technical with less treatment on the issues dealing with processes around indicator development (Hezri 2004). As sustainability has been gradually integrated into public policy across the world, there is a need for research that sees beyond the production of sustainability indicators to their communication and reception in policy processes. Of central concern is the question of what *outputs* and *impacts* indicator-based assessments have had, or could have, on policy processes and associated social debates. Such a process-based perspective requires an analysis of the social and institutional basis of sustainability indicator systems (Hezri and Dovers 2006; Rosenstrom and Kyllonen 2007).

Research objectives and design

Against this background, the paper provides a preliminary exploration of this subject through two case studies drawn from primary and secondary data research using semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis. The two case studies are on the national sustainability indicator systems in Indonesia and the Philippines. The overall goal is to understand the dynamics of the interaction of sustainability indicators with policy systems and processes. The objectives of this research are four-pronged:

• To understand the salient features of policy processes

for sustainable development in Indonesia and the Philippines;
• To review the attributes of the major national sustainability indicator systems and how they are shaped and utilized by the policy systems;
• To investigate the extent and impact of sustainability indicator systems on policy processes through policy learning; and
• To compare the two case studies by contrasting similarities and differences.

The study proceeded in three stages: the field study, the two singular case study syntheses and a multiple case synthesis at the final stage of the research. The field study for both Indonesia and the Philippines took four months each. The first two months involved documentary research and the identification of the key policy community in the area of sustainable development. The final two months were used to interview key officials, practitioners and civil society representatives involved in developing and using sustainability indicators.

Policy processes for sustainable development in Indonesia and the Philippines

Before the East Asian economic crisis in 1998, Indonesia had achieved remarkably rapid growth, poverty reduction and other forms of social development for several decades. This high growth, accompanied by unprecedented industrialization, high population growth, structural transformation of the production and consumption base and rapid urbanization, was not conducive to the attainment of the country's environmental sustainability. Sustainable development became a recognized public policy framework that took into account socio-political, economic and environmental aspects to support the development of solutions to these pressing problems. A strategic articulation of the challenges toward sustainable development for the country is found in an 'advisory' document entitled *The Agenda 21 Indonesia* (State Ministry for Environment 1997). Prior to its release in March 1997, the preparation of the eighteen-chapter report took two years, with the involvement of 22 national consultants who formed working groups comprised of 1,000 government officials and members of NGOs, academe, the private sector and the general public. The document contains recommendations for sustainable development up to the year 2020 for each sector of development. This was followed by the release of Sectoral Agenda 21 documents in 2000, covering the mining, energy, housing, tourism and forestry sectors. These processes marked a shift from the hitherto formal-legalistic approach that gave sole responsibility to the

state in environmental policymaking (Santoso 1999; Setiawan and Hadi 2007).

Although *Agenda 21 Indonesia* started as a promising approach to envisioning a sustainable future, its institutional and policy supports were not fully developed. The 1998 economic crisis caused both civil society and the government to react to the more urgent demand for national political reforms following the sociopolitical upheavals. As a result, the *Agenda 21 Indonesia* document failed to be followed up with credible commitments for institutional change. The following observation was made in an evaluation of the implementation of sustainable development in Indonesia:

> "Despite some achievements, the implementation of Agenda 21 was less than satisfactory and much remains to be done. The implementation of Agenda 21 in Indonesia is confronted with several problems, ranging from inadequate public and government awareness to lack of funding and inadequate political will." (Ministry of Environment 2003, 2)

Many of the goals and programs in *Agenda 21 Indonesia* found their way into a business-as-usual mode, largely assimilated into existing planning mechanisms and processes. The implication of this is that the distinction between separate environmental issues and sustainability problems (which should be seen as integrative) could not be established. A further consequence of this is a lack of facilitation of bird's-eye-view monitoring and the coordination of progress toward sustainability. The above notwithstanding, other indirect policy reforms are not contradictory to the principles of institutional change for sustainability. Apart from the twin processes of democratization and decentralization, a recent policy change to institutionalize Corporate Social Responsibility principles is a step in the right direction in the spirit of sustainable development.

In contrast to Indonesia, policy processes on sustainable development in the Philippines can be traced back to as early as the 1980s. The first concentrated move towards sustainable development in the Philippines began in 1987 with the drafting of the *Philippine Strategy for Sustainable Development* (PSSD). A semi-governmental body, the Philippine Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD), was created to chart environmental and sustainable development initiatives in the country. The PCSD adopts the principles of consensus-building in their structure by institutionalising the participation of members of civil society as the counterparts of government representatives.

A major product of this process is the formulation of *Philippine Agenda 21* (PA21), a blueprint for sustainable development which was launched in 1996. President Ramos, in the foreword to the *Philippine Agenda 21* (PCSD 1996), considered sustainable development as "a matter of survival." The PA21 strategy provides, for the critical issues of sustainability for the next thirty years, implementation strategies as well as time bound qualitative and process-related targets in relation to the institutions involved. It adopts two-pronged strategies to map out the action agenda, creating the enabling conditions to (a) assist the various stakeholders to build their capacities towards sustainable development; and (b) direct efforts at conserving, managing, protecting and rehabilitating ecosystems.

In contrast to Indonesia, whereby the strategy processes had institutional grounding in the environment department with limited influences across government, the Philippines has taken a more strategic approach, as seen in the chairmanship of the PCSD. This council is chaired by the vice-chairman of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), which is also the designated lead government agency for PCSD. The facts that PCSD Secretariat is located within the NEDA premises and that national planning in the Philippines has a high component of multi-sectoral integration have facilitated the work of the PCSD to introduce the sustainable development framework in national planning. The PA21 case has provided a conceptual framework for integrating sustainability concerns in the country's medium- and long-term development plans. Through *Memorandum Order Number 33*, NEDA was directed to integrate the PA21 into the *Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan 1993-1998* (MTPDP), which is the master plan for development in the Philippines. The above notwithstanding, it was argued in the report, *From Rio to Manila: Ten Years After An Assessment of Agenda 21 Implementation in the Philippines*, that although the extent and quality of implementation of the PA21 commitments appear to be generally high, the impact of implementation has been low.

Indicator systems in Indonesia and the Philippines

This research is premised on the distinctiveness of sustainability as opposed to discrete environmental issues (see Dovers 1997; Lafferty 2004). A similar logic underpins the view that the development of sustainability indicator systems involves a reorientation of the macro-information system from discrete environmental issues to sustainability. This would require the extension and integration of environmental and social assessment,

monitoring and planning that should be particularly stressed in connection with sustainability assessment and reporting. Moreover, the evolutionary reference necessitates societal willingness to change the policy content from environment to sustainability, integrating multiple perspectives by absorbing the logic of integration. As a distinct policy area but one comprising multiple sectors, values and perspectives, sustainability demands a greater stock of information compared to traditional policy areas.

However, it was quickly realized from the outset that the sustainability indicator systems that are used in practice in the Philippines and Indonesia are mostly *propositional*. Examples include sector-based indicator systems such as *Housing and Environment Health Indicators* (Philippines) and *Forestry Criteria and Indicators for Sustainable Forest Management* (Indonesia), to name just two instances. Although these indicator systems contribute toward the understanding of sustainability, or more precisely inform sustainability, they are not fully-fledged sustainability indicator systems. Within this context, the research reported here examines 'symptomatic' indicator systems for sustainability, that is, emerging fragmented and non-holistic indicator systems that measure some aspects of sustainability. *Ceteris paribus*, these indicator systems should in the long run contribute to the development of sustainability indicator systems that resonate with policy and societal decision-making.

An indicator assessment that tries to measure the holistic notion of sustainability is the green accounting system. It allows analysis of the inherent trade-offs and interlinkages among the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. Both Indonesia and the Philippines have experimented with variants of green accounting since the early 1990s. In the Philippines, a pioneering work called the Natural Resource Accounting Project (ENRAP) began in 1991 with funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The *Philippine Agenda 21* process developed the concept further in 1994 by implementing a program called Integrated Environmental Management for Sustainable Development (IEMSD) to support efforts in the integration of the environment in decision-making. A parallel aim was to strengthen people's participation and constituency-building for environmental policy advocacy. Funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), IEMSD has six sub-programs focusing on formulating sustainability indicators through components such as Environment and Natural Resources Accounting (ENRA), Sustainable Development Models (SDM) and the Environment and

Natural Resource (ENR) Database (Cabrido 1997).

Similarly, there are empirical exercises that try to develop a green accounting system specifically for Indonesia, or at least include Indonesia in their cross-country studies. The Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) and the Ministry of Environment undertook similar steps by conducting case studies in constructing a natural resources account and estimating the Indonesian Eco-Domestic Product and Green GDP. The resources covered were timber, oil, gas, and coal, and the net-price method to calculate the depletion of resources was used. As in the Philippines, the construction of a green accounting system for Indonesia was pioneered by researchers from international organizations such as the World Bank and the World Resources Institute. Funding provision from these external organizations has the downside of difficulty in ensuring a capacity for repeated measurement and monitoring beyond the project timeline. Benefits to policy-making can only happen when a green accounting system is maintained, tested and adjusted over time, allowing institutions to change and adapt accordingly.

Although highly desirable, an integrated environment and development linkages measurement tool such as green accounting requires high investment for its comprehensive data requirement. Indicators need to be underpinned by data. Data availability and their quality vary greatly between policy sectors and countries. As far as the evidence goes from the two case studies, adequate basic data to support the development of sustainability indicators is still a distant possibility. Moreover, data collection methodologies are frequently inconsistent. The Philippines' participation in testing a core set of indicators under the auspices of the United Nations Commission for Sustainable Development (UNCSD) highlighted this data gap situation. During this indicator testing process, the need for institutional support to build agencies' capabilities in data collection, compilation and analysis, along with training for the development of skills in the use of indicators, was pointed out.

The collection of environment statistics is important to assess the current environmental problems of a country and to make informed decisions about environmental policies. The data gap problems faced by Indonesia and the Philippines include inaccessible existing and unavailable information. While both nations have long had statistical offices that monitor various aspects of the economy and society, most environmental statistics are locked up in sectoral monitoring and reporting systems. The challenge is to develop sophisticated governmental

capabilities to collate and integrate information from the disparate sources. The integration of socio-economic information with environmental parameters began to be addressed with the development of environmental statistics by the Central Statistics Bureau (BPS) in Indonesia and the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) and National Statistics Office (NSO) in the Philippines. BPS began publishing *Environmental Statistics Indonesia* annually in 1982 while the NSCB issues the *Philippines Compendium of Environment Statistics* (PCES) once every two years. The PCES was a joint effort of the NSCB and other agencies represented in the six inter-agency technical working groups that were established to institutionalize environment statistics in the Philippines. The formulation of the *Philippine Framework for the Development of Environment Statistics* (PFDES) was undertaken to solve the inadequacy in the collection and compilation of environment statistics. Although the approach undertaken to develop these environmental statistics was rather conventional in nature, it nevertheless takes advantage of existing infrastructure and requires minimal new investment. Compared to the green accounting system described above, environmental statistics are often less integrative in the sense that they do not integrate nature-society parameters.

Important as environmental statistics may be for decision-making, their utility is limited to the provision of facts and figures. Absent in these environmental statistics publications are analyses of the interaction between human activities and environmental conditions. State-of-the-Environment Reporting (SoER) is the way many governments typically report on trends in biophysical environmental parameters in relation to socioeconomic indicators. This narrative reporting tool is used worldwide to describe human activities that exert *pressures* on the environment, changing the quality and quantity (the *state*) of natural resources. Human management *responses* to the changes include any form of organized behaviour that seeks to reduce, prevent or ameliorate undesirable changes. Indonesia's first *State of the Environment Report* was released in 2003 by the Ministry of Environment (KLH) in cooperation with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The aim of producing this document was to provide a yearly overview of environmental conditions and sustainable development in Indonesia.

Apart from government initiatives, international organizations and civil society are also actively involved in developing other forms of SoE reports. The World Bank's Environment Monitor series is a periodic reporting system that presents thematic reports which vary among different years. Examples of past reports include *Philippine Environment Monitor 2000: General Environment Trends* and *Indonesia Environment Monitor 2003: Pollution Reduction*. The World Bank has also engaged in a more extensive SoE-type analysis of the prospect of sustainability in Indonesia with the publication of *Indonesia Environment and Development Report 1994*. In addition there are also snapshot and non-periodic SoE reports such as the *Country Environment Analysis for the Philippines 2005* prepared by the Asian Development Bank. Apart from these official environmental reports, NGOs in both countries have also developed numerous unofficial SoE statistics and sector profile indicators (for example, on biodiversity, energy and human settlements), which may not necessarily tally with official figures.

Both in Indonesia and the Philippines, the most policy-relevant indicator system with bearing on sustainability is the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Indicators. Governments globally have to abide by the Millennium Declaration, which is a commitment amongst a large number of developing and developed countries to achieve certain social development objectives. The Declaration's operational targets and goals are made explicit in the MDG. Indonesia and Philippines, along with countries participating in the MDG effort, have declared a 25-year achievement plan, which will end in 2015. The United Nations Secretariat and its specialized agencies and programs, as well as representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have defined eight goals, 18 targets and 48 indicators to measure progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. Among the eight goals, Goal 7 is to ensure environmental sustainability, which includes three targets and eight indicators.

Indonesia's and the Philippines' institutional responses to the development and monitoring of the MDG are impressive. Key development planning agencies, such as the Philippines' National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) and Indonesia's National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), are undertaking the development of national MDG with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). National statistical agencies such as BPS and NSCB are responsible for providing quality statistical information in the form of measurable, quantitative indicators in order to monitor Indonesia's and the Philippines' MDG targets achievement. MDG indicators have become an important reference in development implementation in Indonesia, from the planning phase as stated in the Medium-Term National

Development Plan (RPJMN) to its implementation.

Participation in the MDG, which require reporting against stated targets, could reveal many areas of information irregularities. For instance, there is some uncertainty about the amount of forest cover in the Philippines. Data from the Forest Management Bureau (FMB) indicate that 34 percent of forestland contains some form of forest cover but that forest cover has been declining over the past ten years. In contrast, the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) data indicate that 49 percent of the total land area of the Philippines contains some sort of forest cover and that this percentage has been increasing in the past several years. This is a case whereby indicator development forces improvement in the quality and precision of existing data. Moreover, advocacy for the MDG also comes from Houses of Congress and other sectors of society. For instance, the Philippine Sustainability Watch, a network of NGOs, provides feedback and comments on the implementation performance of the MDG targets in the Philippines. This is a case whereby an indicator system begins to have a significant impact on policy processes. The following section discusses this further.

Uses and impact of sustainability indicator systems on policy processes

Despite popular acceptance of sustainability as a policy goal, the provision of data and statistics on environmental conditions is still lagging behind. Within this milieu, most of indicator systems discussed above (except the MDG system) are still in their early stages of development. In other words, case studies in Indonesia and the Philippines characterize situations whereby institutional reporting for sustainability is still embryonic.

As pioneering policy experiments, indicator initiatives in these countries involve only minimal dissemination to and socialization among potential users. This notwithstanding, a credible commitment, albeit only through experimentation, to couple indicator development to a solid policy process is still absent in both countries. Although the Philippines has institutionalized one of the most innovative processes for sustainable development globally, the construction of indicators has not been coupled effectively to its *Agenda 21* process. Efforts thus far still do not fulfil the integrative logic for sustainable development. Without a sustained effort to develop the capacity for empirical-based environmental policies, the sustainability discourse will remain issue-based and responses will

continue to be formulated mainly along environmental logic, fragmented and piecemeal. The onus is on both government and civil society to engage continuously in developing indicators that tell a story understandable to society at large. Examples elsewhere include the promotion of the Genuine Progress Indicator by independent organizations such as Redefining Progress in the USA and the Australia Institute in Australia.

As for existing indicator systems in Indonesia and the Philippines, there is a need to leverage the information developed within the science and policy domains to the public domain as well. Findings from this research indicate that without the substantial pre-testing and revision of indicators, efforts to communicate with stakeholders and the public could be frustrated. For example, the inadequate socialization of users to Indonesia's *State of the Environment* report through workshops and forums caused potential users, such as environmental NGOs, to be suspicious of the chosen indicators as 'only telling half-truth.' Some informants interviewed stated their preference for indicators provided by international organizations for their 'neutral' and 'non-partisan' values. Strategies are, therefore, needed for better socialization and dissemination of indicators and sustainability indicator systems. This, however, has to take into account the specificities of indicator programs. For highly technical systems such as green accounting, indicators are developed by agency scientists and external consultants with specialized expertise, who determine which data collected by the department are sufficiently useful and reliable to develop into standardized indicators. Therefore, the socialization of these indicator systems is still inevitably limited to the circle of participating scientists and government officials.

For indicator systems that are confined within government policy and science domains, the level of awareness of these systems among potential users, be they from civil society or industry stakeholders, is still low. The development of such governmental sustainability indicators reflects a lengthy process of agency scientists and managers engaging in 'knowledge selection' that yields concise, understandable presentations of environmental data. Therefore, the corresponding impact of indicator systems on policy processes in both countries, if viewed from the framework of policy learning (see Hezri 2004), constitutes mainly instrumental and government learning. This means that only selected government officials and participating civil society members will gain lessons about the efficacy of specific indicators or the suitability of institutional arrangements related to indicator programmes. One

implication is that these indicators will be inaccessible and incomprehensible to the general public. In this context, it is unlikely that indicator development would enable social and political learning, whereby social values and a normative understanding of sustainability are enhanced and empowered to move social actions.

Within this context, the usefulness of a sustainability indicator system as a tool of governance follows the traditional function of information in governance, that is, information is used to define and 'control' the emerging policy area of sustainability. With the guiding logic of technical appraisal, indicators will be more useful for providing baseline information to guide government decisions, and less as a tool for communicating with various stakeholders. In the Philippine case study, it seems plausible for NGOs to provide alternative environmental statistics, albeit modest in sophistication and quality. This raises the question of what is stopping more members of civil society from replicating such an initiative.

As with most developing countries in the world, Indonesia and the Philippines are still encumbered by the inadequacy of ecological data to develop national level indicators. Indicator systems demand a strengthened capacity in innovation systems and scientific infrastructure. At a basic level, this entails an improvement in data acquisition and assimilation, especially the operating technology of data pooling, calibration and archiving. In theory, a strong science base enables indicator development to reach the processing and application stages, transforming data translation and mediation into indicators amenable for use. In policy systems such as Indonesia and the Philippines, where the base of science is weak or at an earlier stage of development, the utility of indicators is limited to pointing to areas where more information is needed, compromising the potential to steer actual policy change. As a result, the translation and mediation of sustainability indicators into a negotiation space whereby official information is debated and contested by civil society are therefore negated. Due to the high investment needed in developing this capacity, national governments in cooperation with donor agencies are likely to dominate efforts to develop indicators in the near future. More severely, the existing trend could persist whereby governments dominate information and civil society thrives on issues. International benchmarks will continue to play a mediating role, with the MDG as an example.

Conclusions and Implications

Disconnect and disjuncture are the hallmarks of modern governments. This is especially true for a relatively young policy area such as sustainability. When the conceptual logic is still ambiguous, measurement will suffer accordingly. In theory, liberal societies such as Indonesia and the Philippines ought to be more receptive to developing and using indicator systems compared to a conservative society such as Malaysia (see Hezri 2005). The success of embedding sustainability indicator systems into the decision-making fabric is contingent upon the nature of interactions between state and society. The more liberal the nature of interaction is, the more possible it becomes for a sustainability indicator system to be a useful tool for governance; that is, if indicators are made available in the public domain, they will allow civil society to provide political feedback to decisions made by governments. Moreover, the twin processes of democratization and decentralization in both countries offer further promises for the widespread use of sustainability indicator systems. These alone are, however, insufficient to effect significant changes in Indonesia and the Philippines as far as sustainability policies are concerned. Indeed, a policy-resonant indicator system is a function of *robust science* and *credible policy processes* requiring a strong scientific underpinning and a solid institutional basis. The following three strategies are imperative to promoting sustainability indicators as a tool for governance:

1. The scientific infrastructure and innovation system of both Indonesia and the Philippines should be continuously developed. The existing technological capacity in both countries to monitor the environment using tools such as remote sensing, geographical information system (GIS) and modelling is still underdeveloped. The uptake of these technologies could be enhanced not just by higher research and development (R&D) allocation, but also by coupling them to long-term ecological monitoring initiatives which will provide appropriate data for indicator development. This strategy could pacify polemics arising from a data-poor debate such as the present claim of Indonesia being the world's third largest net emitter of carbon dioxide;

2. An unambiguous coercive government structure, be it formal or informal, is desirable to enable information and indicators to move across scales as needed. Indonesia could emulate the Philippines in establishing a coordinating agency/committee which is not separated from the mainstream decision-making process. To institutionalize indicator assessment, both

governments could underpin sustainability reporting by providing a statutory basis, and connect indicator development to the budgetary allocation system and core public administration bureaus. These steps could be the basis for incorporating sustainability indicators as an agenda in institutional politics; and

3. A liberal interaction between the state and society is the precondition for a more functional penetration of indicators in public policy and governance. The policy community in Indonesia and the Philippines should actively release indicators into the public domain and to other branches of government including the legislature and judiciary. This is the essence of indicator socialization. Information technology and the internet should be utilized as key dissemination media. This has to be complemented by the conventional mass media distribution of indicators. Furthermore, policy advocacy in both countries ought to be harmonized with the use of indicators, so that policy debate becomes more quantitative.

These strategies are only a guide, and hence should not be treated as more than that. Their application in Indonesia and the Philippines should be advanced carefully, based on a case-by-case examination. That notwithstanding, adherence to these principles would significantly enhance the connectivity of indicators and policy, and hence its utility as a tool to inform governance.

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REDEFINING THE ASIAN SPACE: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF EVOLVING STREET CULTURE AND PEDESTRIAN SPACE DEVELOPMENT IN BANDUNG, BANGKOK AND MANILA

Iderlina Mateo-Babiano

Introduction

Asian streets convey a sensorial experience distinct from the Western model. Traditional knowledge resulting from the environment and sociocultural histories is imprinted on how people use the streets and how these streets are formed. The veneration of nature spirits, as seen by the presence of street shrines along the sidewalks, is an Asian phenomenon reflective of animistic roots. Diverse activities such as street vending and hawking add to the thriving character of the sidewalk, imitating the diversity of the Asian forest and further enhancing the pedestrian experience. However, from a transport viewpoint, the presence of these activities serves as a barrier to smooth pedestrian flow and contributes to the deterioration of the street environment. Moreover, street use has also become a political issue wherein vendor presence has become a symbol of a city's poor economy and, because of its unregulated characteristic, encourages irregular migrants. Streets are also being blamed for hosting other negative activities such as being a haven for drugs and becoming a living space for the homeless.

This study works within the premise that the traditional knowledge systems that evolved throughout a city's history, starting from its forest beginnings to the strong influence of acculturation, may provide a better understanding of pedestrian street culture, and in particular, how the amalgamation of cultures tangibly shaped street configuration and contemporary street use, especially in Asian colonial cities. This may provide inputs to address pedestrian issues and the improvement of contemporary streets.

Objectives

The objectives of the study are: (1) to examine the spatio-historical development of urban street space and pedestrian culture within three case cities: Bandung (Indonesia), Bangkok (Thailand) and Manila (Philippines); (2) to compare the influence of historical trends, with Bangkok having limited external influence and Bandung and Manila representing colonial cities, and examine how these historical trends affected space morphology, street sociology and pedestrian psychology;

and (3) to identify factors that influence local street culture to further understand street morphogenesis, the interplay of movement and non-movement behavior and street space utilization.

Methodology

The study analyzed three case cities: Bandung, Bangkok and Manila. Bandung is a colonial city in a mountainous, temperate zone; Manila is also a colonial city but on a plain with a tropical, humid climate. Like Manila, Bangkok also developed on a plain with a tropical, humid climate but, unlike Bandung and Manila, experienced only limited colonial influence.

The study starts with the sociocultural perspective of spatial use as a way of understanding Asian pedestrians and street use. It is descriptive, interpretative and empirical, utilizing culture to define the parameters that sustain people's use of the street environment. Data gathering was conducted through a review of historical precedents on street space use, an intensive review of primary and secondary resources, direct observation and street user questionnaire surveys. The aim was to prove that present space utilization is still a consequence of and reflects the underlying pedestrian culture of the past. An extensive examination of streets focusing mainly on emergent pedestrian spaces, referring to both movement and non-movement, was conducted.

Initially, three types of data collection activities were implemented in Bandung to examine street user behavior: a pedestrian diary, an ocular inspection survey and interviews. However, the low response rate of 15 percent led to a major change in the research process. Instead, a street user need survey was developed utilizing the analytic hierarchy process (AHP), which was introduced by Saaty (1980). AHP is a decision-making tool and evaluation procedure that incorporates both qualitative and quantitative factors. It has the advantage of reflecting the way people think and make decisions by simplifying complex decision to a series of one-to-one comparisons. The survey's goal was to elicit user response on what a positive pedestrian environment is.

English and Thai versions of the survey instrument were

developed, which underwent pilot testing. Aware that this type of study poses the danger of oversimplification and unwarranted generalizations, the author reiterates here that these are inferential concepts and need to undergo more extensive empirical study.

Findings

The findings illustrate the results of the comparative analysis of Asian city streets to validate the influence of the forest environment within their street spaces. Even with diverse historical trends and the influence of acculturation, a deep and underlying parallelism on how people utilize space gives rise to a distinctly Asian culture of space. The forest-based concept clarifies sociological similarities arising from the similarity in ecological context that produced related sociocultural adaptations.

Factors influencing Bandung, Bangkok and Manila

Geography and climate have a deep impact on people's way-of-life and behavior. This section discusses various environmental as well as sociocultural factors that influenced the development of the three cities. The Asian region's tropical forest environment serves as an appropriate starting point in discussing the various influences ranging from the physical and social context to socio-cultural adaptations and settlement formation.

Environmental factors: Climate, geography and ecosystem

In general, Southeast Asia is described as having diverse climatic influences with a naturally dense forest cover, high biodiversity and riverine coastal movements. Bandung is the fourth largest city of Indonesia and the capital of West Java. The southern portion is relatively flat compared to its hilly northern counterpart (Siregar 1990). Thus, typical developments are located in the lower valley. Bangkok lies adjacent to the Chao Phraya River, which is considered the central artery of the whole territory. The average altitude of Bangkok is significantly low, and thus prone to flooding. Similarly, Manila lies on the flat plains of Luzon and developed on the shores of the Pasig River. In the three cities, the river is considered a critical component in settlement development because it facilitates transportation, communication and trade with other areas (Blakemore 1996). Moreover, socioeconomic and cultural development are linked with rivers and streams. The Cikapundung River runs north to south through Bandung, dividing the area into two geographic features with only a single bridge to connect both sides. The Chao Phraya River is known for its role as

an initial point of development. In pre-colonial Manila, the Pasig River and the Canal de la Reina served as a communication route and a distribution network for the produce brought to the city from the provinces (De Viana 2001).

Sociocultural adaptations: Thought development and acculturation

In the three case cities, the development of polytheistic religious thought was highly influenced by the forest environment and indicates the closeness of religion to the way of life of its inhabitants. Pre-colonial Indonesia and the Philippines practiced animism with a strong emphasis on ancestor worship, while for the Thais, homage and respect was the key feature of their social relations as it is customary to pay their respects towards the land spirit (*chao thi*) of their homes (Askew n.d.). Polytheistic belief was present wherein an ordinary person perceived the natural world to be animated by a vast array of deities who inhabited the trees, rivers and caves (Andaya and Ishii 2000). However, acculturation in the region led to the introduction of Islam by Arabic traders in the 13th century. In the Philippines, aside from Islam, Catholicism was also introduced through Spanish colonization. Ongoing trade with India and China further shaped Southeast Asia's sociocultural lifestyle. The amalgamation of cultures contributes to the evolution of distinct ways in which people utilized their streets. This is further reflected in the contemporary period in the ubiquitous presence of Chinese enclaves: Chinese Camp in Indonesia, Chinatown in Bangkok and Chinese *Sangleys* in Binondo, Manila.

Morphological development in the case cities

The section discusses the morphological development of the three case cities as a function of their forest-based roots as well as the acculturation process that followed.

Settlement formation

The oldest reference to Bandung was in 1488 when it was the capital of the Kingdom of Pajajaran. The majority of Bandung's population has Sundanese roots, and the polytheistic beliefs of animism still dominate their present life cycle in congruence with their strong Islamic beliefs. Elements present in the Sundanese urban residential quarter (*kampung*) include a water source, open space (*lapangan*) serving as social venue for its inhabitants, and a rectangular house plan reflecting the democratic characteristic of the village inhabitants (Salura 2006). The pre-Dutch *sunda* village consisted of about 40 families, usually related to each other. When

the maximum number was achieved, another settlement was developed in another area. This practice created sporadic clusters distributed all over the Priangan region. There was a distinguishable absence of material culture while a very high oral culture was distinctly present (Affandy 2006). The *lapangan* served as the inhabitants' venue for socialization while the open square or *alun-alun* became the starting point for major roads and helped establish the town's grid dimension. *Kampungs* have existed since the pre-colonial period. Thus, the contemporary urban *kampungs* are reinterpretations of the traditional village pattern (Geertz 1965) of pre-Dutch Indonesians. Similarly, the Philippine *barangay* reflects the traditional village morphology of pre-colonial Philippine settlements.

Bangkok was originally built in 1782 to succeed Ayuthaya as the national capital. Most commoners lived on floating houses (*phae*) or houses on stilts in rivers or its tributary canals (Askew 1996) to adapt to the physical environment. Typical districts or neighborhoods (*yarn*) were often designated with a specific function or community. However, Thailand lacks the colonial legacy common to its Southeast Asian neighbors, making it stand out from the rest.

Bangkok and Manila are port towns. Both developed adjacent to bodies of water. Prehistoric Manila was a thriving river settlement which took on a *strassendorf* (linear) form (Reed 1978), with the chieftain's house at the center serving as residential palace and venue for other religio-socio-political activities of the village. Rivers, canals and other waterways served as distribution network, public space, market and social space (Iwake n.d.).

Historic districts in Asian cities may be described as conducive to walking as well as other non-motorized transport modes because of their intensive land use mix and compact quality. The typical density is pegged at 100 to 250 people per hectare (Barter and Raad 2000) but could go as high as 600 persons per hectare in the case of Indonesia (Diwisusanto 2006). Low to medium-rise structures dictate the typical urban form, wherein within these enclaves it would be possible to experience the inhabitants' local culture. An examination of a Sundanese *kampung* in Bandung would show the lack of a restrictive social hierarchy among the inhabitants. Community members are considered part of one family. People flexibly adapt to the various changes happening around them.

Colonial Bandung and Manila

In 1919, the North Development Plan was developed and implemented in Bandung with the aim of creating a wholly European district in a tropical country. It was even called the prototype of an *Indische* colonial city. Greenery was an important characteristic in the new development (Soewarno n.d.). In Manila, segregation was enforced during the colonial period with Spanish inhabitants living inside the walls (*Intramuros*) while the natives lived in the surrounding suburbs. This was also true in other colonial cities such as Bandung. Two concepts that physically influenced town building in the Philippines were *bajo de las campana* wherein the *indios* (natives) were allowed to settle within hearing distance of the church bells, thus defining settlement size, while the *cuadricula*, which was lifted from the Laws of the Indies, defined the urban form of the community core as consisting of an open plaza with the principal streets laid out on a grid pattern based from the four sides and corners of the plaza.

Development of access ways

In historic districts, access ways are narrow pathways where only foot traffic can be accommodated. Among the three cities, Manila's street network is the most formal, with an original rectilinear plan reflecting a strong Castilian influence. In contrast, Bandung's road layout, while originally formal, had to be adjusted to conform to the site's mountainous topography while Bangkok's first major road, the New Road, extended south parallel to the river and was built on an old elephant track.

Bandung's pre-colonial roads were not defined clearly and almost all access paths were referred to as *jalan*. This term is still being used at present and may refer to pathways, roads or streets (Siregar 1990). Access ways into *kampungs* were referred to as *gang* and differ from the *jalan* because of their width and the type of transport mode that can be accommodated. *Gangs* can only accommodate pedestrians and motorcycles. Within the *kampung*, alleys fronting the houses are not only considered as access paths but also act as integrators that bring together the inhabitants within the surrounding area. The *kampung* became an extension of living space, a children's play area, a meeting place and a utility space. Bangkok had virtually no roads during its first one hundred years of existence and depended on the network of waterways, creeks and *klongs* (canals), which served as both a distribution and communication network (Fisher 1971). The motive behind road building was to accommodate the building of shophouses, which

proved advantageous in increasing trading activities. At present, Bangkok's *sois* are defined as areas where people live. They recreate a village (Pichard-Bertaux 1999) and still serve as a communication venue wherein a very rich street life culture can be observed. Within Manila's *barangays*, alleys serve as living spaces, common spaces for socialization and spillover spaces where they serve various functions such a place to relax and sit and enjoy recreational activities.

Figure 1: The above photos show pathways along the different enclaves: in Kampung Ciumbuleuit*, Bandung where only pedestrians are allowed access (left), in Manila which features elevated wooden planks along* esteros *(right) and in Bangkok's* soi *where pedestrians are usually greeted with food stalls (center).*

The typical inner city dwellings are still present in the three cities. Figure 1 shows three typical access paths within these settlements.

Street culture in Bandung, Bangkok and Manila

The historic parts of the cities of Bandung, Bangkok and Manila reflect strong traditional knowledge systems, especially in the morphological development of their street space. These systems may provide alternative insights that would reconnect urban design proposals with the cultural context so as to be able to spatially express localism. The section reiterates that understanding the socio-cultural history and indigenous knowledge of a group is a prerequisite to improving pedestrian transport policy and provision given that a different culture requires a different treatment of space to be able to match it with users' needs and desires.

History of walking

The walking culture in Asia has a long history and an overview of transport development will prove its presence. The walking period in Asian cities may be defined as the period prior to motorization. The pre-colonial era and the early colonial period in both Indonesia and the Philippines were characterized by a predominantly walking society while the pre-

modernization period of Bangkok was a combination of water-based transport and walking, which influenced the urban pattern of the area. There was a limited number of roads, which were usually narrow and unpaved. Town centers had compact urban structures with very dense, intensively mixed land use. The structures were low-rise (two to three levels), dictating a pedestrian scale urban form. Building materials were made up of impermanent products such as wood, bamboo and palm leaves, illustrating the impermanence of Asian traditional structures. Residences in special quarters were close to each other, located either along the town center or waterways. Travel distances were short. In the 1970s, walking was still a major mode of transport for most of Asia (Barter and Raad 2000). The percent of non-motorized trips in select cities during the last two decades of the 20th century shows that walking still constituted a large percentage of the overall trips in Asia (e.g., 40 percent in Jakarta, 20 percent in Manila) (Barter 2000). However, this percentage is slowly decreasing because of efforts to increase motor vehicle traffic, a lack of pedestrian facilities and a worsening environment.

Purpose of walking

Walking is considered the most basic mode of transportation given that all travels usually start and end with a walking segment. However, similar to other modes, walking is a derived demand given that the decision to walk is highly motivated by achieving a purpose such as to get to a destination or to realize a goal.

Walking may also be considered as a spiritual exercise. In some countries, such as Edo-period Japan, traveling was only allowed if it was for the purpose of spiritual exercise, such as going on a pilgrimage to visit holy places, shrines and temples, oftentimes located in outlying areas. In contemporary Manila, a tradition that has been passed on is the religious procession, which is conducted through walking. The slow pace of walking relative to other modes (i.e., inside a vehicle) provides time to meditate, absorb and commune with one's surrounding environment. This increases the intimacy and involvement of the individual in relation to his/her environs and allows a person to become attuned to his/her humanity.

Street space consumption

Street users may be considered consumers of space as they undergo certain activities. Some of the main motivations to use streets include: (1) utilitarian—to

work, to study; (2) economic—the need to pursue economic activities such as selling, buying, bartering and trading; (3) leisure—activities that contribute to ease and relaxation; (4) socio-cultural—enjoying the cultural assets along streets, whether intangible or tangible, such as street performances; (5) social—the need to be with others such as meeting in a restaurant and chatting with a friend; and (6) personal needs—for example, to provide an outlet for one's personal expression.

Street user behavior is complex and composed of two aspects, namely: movement and non-movement. Walking is considered movement behavior; some examples of non-movement are waiting and resting. The concept of non-movement within Asian streets grew out of the realization that in order to provide sustainable spaces, it is necessary to consider the multitude of behaviors exhibited by pedestrians as well as other street users.

The presence of a diverse group of street users contributes to street liveliness. Asian pedestrians do not differentiate between public and private space, using the communal space as an extension of their living area, a venue for commerce and exchange and a place to socialize. Also, there is a direct correlation between walking and non-movement spaces. An area that attracts high pedestrian volume usually has a greater tendency for non-movement activities. As such, the opportunity to increase sidewalk sustainability requires the reconsideration of non-movement activities in the design of such space.

Non-movement concept

The concept of non-movement, forwarded by Mateo-Babiano and Ieda (2005), has emerged theoretically based on the premise that streets serve not only as distribution but also as communication networks. The latter refers to streets serving as a venue for the socialization and interaction of inhabitants. It is further argued that non-movement space played a significant role in the evolution of Asian space. Thus, it is within this premise that the perceived non-movement behavior of Asian pedestrians is examined.

To further examine this concept, the study collected pedestrian diaries on September 2006 in Bandung; out of the 200 forms given out only 33 respondents or 16.5 percent of the sample returned the forms. Thus, preliminary results do not allow generalizations. The respondents were requested to record their daily walking activities starting from the time they left their residence.

The average number of daily walk trips an individual underwent in a day was six. Also, the results showed that those taking more than six trips in a day spent a longer time outside per walking trip. Since the study was taken during the Ramadhan period, the distribution of daily walking activity patterns of pedestrians, both movement and non-movement activities, did not reflect the regular pattern of pedestrian behavior. It is common during this period to start the day as early as three o'clock in the morning.

The study of non-movement behavior provides us with the knowledge that Asian space is temporally-dictated. As such, it requires flexibility so as to accommodate various activities that are conducted at different times of the day. For example, a tofu (*tahu*) vendor who sells his product in the mornings and stations himself in front of the community commercial center may occupy the same space which in the late afternoon serves as neighborhood playground for the children and could be the venue for musical performances in the evenings. The temporal segregation of activities and the vertical quality of Asian space should be one of the main considerations in sidewalk design. As an example, pocket-sized activity spaces should be placed strategically along the sidewalk path. The space should be versatile enough to accommodate a multitude of activities. The seemingly disorganized spatial quality of Asian space is one of its unique characteristics that is not encountered in most parts of Europe or the United States. Based on previous studies, the apparent disarray actually contains a measurable hidden order (Rodin and Rodina 2000). Diversity comes from the influence of the forest environment wherein the cacophony of sounds, sights, smells, tastes and touches can be experienced simultaneously within the Asian street space. The perception is further demonstrated by the presence of food vendors. The variety of food sold in Indonesian street shops (*warungs*) and the Philippine traditional restaurant (*turo-turo*) brings forth a combination of visual, olfactory and gustatory sensations which compel passersby to taste their flavors. In most Southeast Asian cities, vending has become an institution in itself, albeit informally. The present approach calling for their total removal from the streets has never been effective and, therefore, can never be a favorable end solution. Furthermore, the pedestrian survey shows the important role street vendors play not only in economic terms but also at the cultural level. A compromise between vending and regulating should be arrived at so as to define the locations most appropriate for such activities as well as improving the aesthetic quality of their presence. Regulation may take the form of permit issuance to allow certain complementary

activities to be conducted within a given radius of an activity generator.

Worth mentioning are the various street elements that have sociocultural roots. As an example, outdoor benches (*golodog*) can only be found within Sundanese settlements. This refers to a 50-cm bench connected to the dwelling unit facing the alleyways where people can sit and talk to each other. This defines the main alleyway as opposed to the back alley. However, in urban *kampungs* where the majority of inhabitants are Sundanese, the *golodog* is still present but has been transformed into a terrace which uses a different material from the original wooden bench (i.e., ceramics) (Rahaju 2006). Although this type of element is not present within Javanese *kampungs*, there is, however, always a specific place provided for the social venue of its inhabitants such as the *alun-alun*, which serves as the local landmark and centralizing element for the Javanese *kampung* (Siregar 1990).

Animistic reflections on the streets

There are also various street practices that have animistic roots. Animism is the pre-colonial belief of most of the colonial cities in Southeast Asia. Animism was borne out of the forest (Suzuki 1978). In Bangkok, it is often common to see street trees that have colored rope-like fabric going around the trunks. The older the tree, the more of these fabrics going around it. Also, the presence of street shrines and spirit houses on or near the sidewalk is said to reflect the reverence of the present owners towards the spirits who lived on the land. Some commercial establishments bring out food in the morning to offer to the gods so that they will have higher profits for the day. Also, some pedestrians bring out food and offer it to the increasing dog population within metropolitan Bangkok. Thus, indigenous knowledge, both positive and negative, should be

Figure 2: Spirit houses in Bangkok complete with flowers, incense, leis and food in the foreground.

determined, considered and evaluated if the aim is to create a sustainable street space for its users. Figure 2 shows images of spirit houses.

The street market and the informal street culture

Given that the typical Asian is a social individual who does not go out alone and prefers to do activities together with other people, the Asian street space is transformed into a destination itself, replete with eating places, shopping venues and meeting areas. Within the case cities, the presence of market places reflects the strong Indic-Chinese influence that has evolved into a distinctive *pasar* (bazaar) culture. In Bandung, flea markets and bazaars draw a large crowd, such as the regular Friday bazaar along Ganesha Street in Bandung that has the mosque worshippers as its captive market. McGee (1967) writes that the highly compact and densely populated commercial-residential precinct of Sampeng, which hosted the largest concentration of Chinese-born people in Bangkok, reflected the indigenous Thai city and at the same time served as the great bazaar and provided a hierarchy of commodity and food markets.

However, a major component in street space sustainability is social equity. This refers to the accessibility of the streets to all users such as pedestrians, the informal street economy and other street users. Often, and in various transport studies, informal street users are considered obstructions to pedestrian flow. However, their rampant presence in almost all streets surveyed in Southeast Asia and how the corresponding government deals with them deserves mentioning. As a matter of policy, and in the name of cleanliness and beauty, street vendors are being cleared off of the sidewalks. However, this is often met with low compliance. Again, the concept of street takes on the Western view that it is solely for movement. However, Asian streets do not only distribute people but serve as a market place and trading venue as well. This also has sociohistorical roots.

The informal sector is comprised of those who undertake activities that do not pay taxes, do not submit regular government reports, and at times, routinely violate certain rules or law (Habito 2005). They are a significant presence in most commercial areas. In more traditional districts in the Philippines, they occupy the "five-foot-way" contributing to a unique sidewalk culture. The streets become makeshift marketplaces where the informal economy thrives. Vendors and hawkers display their wares wherein buyers may use the art of bartering to purchase goods and services. Informal activities

continue to proliferate because of the ease of entry and reliance on indigenous resources, family ownership, small scale of operation, lack of regulation and location within a competitive market (Bangasser 2000).

Informal economy agglomerations are generally found near activity generators such as school entrances, in front of shops and stores, churches, shopping malls, access towards train stations and at intersections. This provides them the assurance of a steady flow of customers. The type of economic activity is dependent on the activity generator, usually complementing that enterprise. Snack food vendors are found outside universities and schools, fruit stand vendors are found outside malls, and flower vendors are found outside churches and other places of worship. Most common goods sold by these sidewalk peddlers and hawkers are consumables such as food products. Within the central business districts, the most common stalls are shops providing lunch, snacks and drinks. Sometimes, tables and chairs complete the ensemble creating a distinct street architecture, however inferior the materials used or shabby they may seem to onlookers. The inventive minds of these storeowners allow them to set up and take down these stalls within a few minutes. In the Philippines, the original vendor cart has evolved from the common wheeled wooden pushcart (*kariton*) to the converted bicycle. This shift occurred because of the mobility and flexibility of using bicycles. In Bandung, one may be presented with a multitude of stalls from the fixed *warungs* along the sidewalks to the semi-ambulant and ambulant *kakilima*. Dago Street in Bandung has already banned sidewalk vending. However, daily observations conducted by the researcher show a different reality. The vendors are still present at a lower density; however, they do not vend on the sidewalks but are conveniently accommodated at the front corner of the adjacent commercial shops, sometimes with their wares abutting the sidewalks. This is also true in Bangkok, where Monday is a 'No Vending Day' along Silom Road. Vendor resourcefulness only transfers the stalls from the main Silom Road to the intersecting *soi* where vending is not banned. These are socioeconomic and cultural realities that transport professionals have failed to consider but must be taken into consideration, especially in the design of sidewalk space within Asia.

The need to satisfy pedestrians

The consideration of pedestrian needs is a significant prerequisite in the design of sustainable street spaces. The basic premise of the need-concept adopted from the area of consumer behavior is that pedestrians behave in a similar fashion to consumers as they utilize space in a way comparable to consuming a product. Needs and values are the micro-level driving factors of human behavior (Vallacher *et al.* 1994), which are realized through opportunities. The latter refers to products or services that have the capacity to satisfy one's needs (Jager 2000). In this case, opportunity refers to sidewalk attributes such as the ability to provide seamless travel, comfort and convenience, to name a few. These are parameters or attributes that would encourage user loyalty or sustain people's use of the street environment. However, these factors do not influence choice but support or inhibit pedestrian decisions (Mumford 1937). The pedestrian need-hierarchy resulted from an extensive literature review on effective pedestrian environments and was inspired by the human needs theory postulated by Maslow (1954) and Max-Neef (1992). The concept of pedestrian level of service (PLOS) (Fruin 1971) is defined as the elements that attract potential users to the system (Vuchic 1981). At the base of these needs is the desire for movement (mobility). Aside from this, pedestrians have other physiological or psychological needs such as protection, ease, enjoyment, equity and identity. This illustrates the six criteria and the attributes which would fulfill each criterion. The pedestrian need-hierarchy considers both movement and non-movement as contributory towards increasing pedestrian satisfaction.

To define the six criteria: mobility refers to a walking environment that allows barrier-free movement from the point of origin to the destination at a comfortable walking speed with no or limited impedance and ensures ease in orienting oneself within the street network. Protection refers to the state of being free from danger or injury while walking by limiting pedestrian-vehicle conflicts, providing provisions to ensure that accidents will not happen. Ease refers to the quality that makes one feel emotionally and mentally secure, comfortable and stress-free while walking. Enjoyment or leisure refers to the quality of the walking environment which allows access to transport-disadvantaged persons (TDPs), allows equal opportunities for other activities besides walking (e.g., sitting, chatting, eating), and does not limit sidewalk use to pedestrians but allows access to other street users such as vendors and leisure walkers. This environment also creates venues for socialization and interaction. Equity refers to opportunities for self-expression, with the sidewalk serving as a venue for socialization and interaction, providing ways of enjoyment and leisure and adding vibrancy to the place. Identity refers to elements that acknowledge sociocultural needs by creating venues for cultural activities, producing a sense of place and encouraging a feeling of belonging amongst its users.

The author established a preliminary hierarchical order wherein the base need would be movement based on the premise that streets are used as distribution networks. The criteria can be divided into two, personal and social. Personal refers to individual needs while social means population-level needs. Personal needs are near the base while social needs are found on the upper levels. The theoretical basis for this is that in order to increase satisfaction, personal needs should be provided for before population-level satisfaction can be accommodated.

The study then conducted a pedestrian survey in Bangkok, Thailand and Manila, the Philippines to evaluate the order and relevance of the concept of the pedestrian need-hierarchy and the significance of each criterion. A total of 150 and 90 samples were collected in Bangkok and Manila, respectively. A number of alternatives were defined that would potentially fulfill the six criteria. It was assumed that individuals tend to fulfill their personal needs before focusing on their social or group needs, and that pedestrians usually walk to be able to fulfill the need for mobility. Thus, mobility was placed at the bottom of the hierarchy. This reflects that each criterion may be fulfilled by a number of criteria while at the same time each alternative may fulfill a single or more than one criterion.

In general, the results show that the most frequent mode taken by the majority of the respondents was walking. This may be due to the fact that any kind of trip starts and ends with a walk trip. The respondents were informed they should consider walking as a mode if they covered a significant walking distance. In previous surveys, walking was often undercounted. The most common mode choice was followed by tricycle, public bus and private vehicle (e.g., car). Also, respondents were asked about their walk trip attributes referring to the number of times they go out of their building to take a walk. The majority of respondents went outside the building one to three times a day. The purpose most often cited was 'to eat lunch,' followed by 'doing some errands.' Furthermore, those who went out were asked if they stopped temporarily along the way before arriving at their destination. Almost half of the sample answered that they stopped while the other half did not. The reason most cited for stopping was 'to buy from a sidewalk vendor.' This reflects the high demand for the informal sector. With respect to the perception of pedestrians on the hierarchical structure of the need-hierarchy, the survey illustrated that mobility is not the most influential element in the decision to utilize streets. Instead, protection came out to be the main consideration reiterating the importance given towards physical safety.

The criterion 'equity' surprisingly garnered a relatively high score, specifically on giving importance to the presence of other street users such as sidewalk vendors, while 'enjoyment' was the least important.

Conclusions and implications

Sustainable street space should address the mobility, protection, equity, ease and identity needs of pedestrians and other street users. In Bangkok and Manila, the most important considerations are protection, ease and equity. The alternatives that could provide such needs were the following: adequate lighting, the installation of monitoring devices and police stands at intersections were determined to provide the highest satisfaction for the need for protection and ease, while for equity, the provision of street vendor areas and encouraging street performances and street art displays came out as the most effective alternatives. However, this was based on people's perceptions and preferences. Such preferences are not absolute and may be substituted for more effective ways of providing a specific pedestrian need. The concept of mobility management was then introduced as a strategy for attaining sustainability in transport. In the sub-field of pedestrian transport, one strategy is to encourage a user-centered approach to space design and management so as to improve mobility. A user-centered approach refers to basing management strategies on the needs and desires of users and how these may be physically manifested. Thus, this paper focused on pedestrians by considering their needs, discussing the spatial environment as dictated by the relationship of movement and non-movement within the pedestrian space and the street culture created by the social interaction of the street users. This shared knowledge and meaning is produced when individuals interact in a common space (i.e., pedestrians, vendors in an urban space). At a higher level, this interaction produces a common culture that is transmitted, learned and shared, thus evolving into a distinct heritage and social tradition. The sociocultural history of the streets provides a potential window to discover the pedestrian street culture of the past wherein the latter may provide us with design recommendations on contemporary street improvement so as to encourage more users to utilize a given space. Thus, discussion also focused on the development of walking within the Asian context as well as an overview on the vending culture that is rampant within Asian streets but is oftentimes ignored. In the Asian space, various policies should focus towards encouraging the revival of street culture as well as the humanizing of streets within the Asian context. These may be gleaned from the previous sections such as the *golodog* in the Sundanese *kampung*, creating social

spaces, and recognizing the importance of the *pasar* culture, to name a few.

One of the most important key points in this study is the idea of a forest-based culture as a jump off point in the design of sidewalks. The present morphology of Asian settlements, especially within urban enclaves, allows for pedestrian-oriented developments. To give a few examples, pocket-sized intimate spaces should be strategically provided along the sidewalk. Their presence signifies flexibility, encourages social contacts and maximizes interactions. The strategic placement of benches and the appropriation of vendor space on specific points along the sidewalk encourage social interaction. Segregation is also necessary in order to maximize space utilization. However, the segregation of activities should use psychological rather than physical compartmentalization to make it culturally appropriate for Asian pedestrians. To minimize anxiousness, an appropriate combination of activities, specifically at intersections, should be considered so as to allow a pertinent mix. Natural elements which may serve as points of orientation and as sacred spaces as well as provide cover become necessary given forest-based, animistic roots. Implementing a green sidewalk becomes a viable option. The important role played by vendors along sidewalks has been explicit and is further reinforced in this paper. Proper guidance and regulations should be in place at the national and local levels, allowing and allotting these vendors space whether within the bounds of public or private space.

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ACADEMIC LIFEWORLDS, THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND DEEP DEMOCRACY IN THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES

Sharaad Kuttan

Introduction

The following essay is an expression of a journey, which is why the personal figures as prominently as the political. I begin with a personal narrative but end with a section entitled "Six points of comparison," which is a modest attempt to summarize my tentative findings. I conclude with a brief call for institutional support for the documentation of Asia's intellectual heritage which, I believe, The Nippon Foundation through the API Fellowships Program is well placed to encourage.

As a preface, let me note that the generosity of spirit embodied in the API fellowship was crucial as it gave me the space to think through the assumptions I had made when I first conceptualized my research proposal. As the program is not primarily geared to the production of outputs and "deliverables," Fellows like me are able to invest time and energy in ways not often available in our adult working lives. My years as a graduate student, activist and researcher, while enriching, have also in many ways de-limited the ways in which I approach questions of society, culture and social change. It is clear that the question of institutional structures is of central importance for us who have come through the API process since institutions and institutional processes that promote knowledge production but simultaneously constrain the ability, both on the level of individuals and groups, to think "freely" are problematic. The acceptance of self-reflexive critique is an on-going process and I look forward to an opportunity to explore the connection between institutional structures and processes on the one hand and "creativity" and "freedom" on the other.

An institutional critique is, in fact, the very object of inquiry identified in my proposal title. The way I structured the terms of the proposal, typical of social science inquiry, was to work on the hypothesis that a connection exists between ideas (social sciences), institutions (academics/universities) and social processes (substantive democracy/public culture). This was nothing short of ambitious and perhaps impracticable considering the timeframe for preparation that I actually had. Truth be told, the unstated model lurking in the back of my mind was that of a doctoral candidate embarking on fieldwork. However, without the rigorous preparation to which such candidates in the social sciences are subjected to, was this model viable? Those familiar with academic practices will understand that the questions that a doctoral candidate takes to the field are wrought through a process of deep and systematic reading, coupled with a dialogical process initiated in a structured institutional setting, peopled by senior faculty and contemporaries. In some serious sense, I found myself parachuted into my field with a vague idea of what I wanted to achieve, much like a journalist who is rushed to a conflict-ridden city he is familiar with perhaps only as a mark on a map. Was this fatal to my project or was it in fact productive in bringing about a different form and methodology of inquiry?

To interject: it must be said that I suffer from a form of denial, a suppression of frameworks of knowledge that are not institutionally validated. I have gathered in my short but moderately adventurous life a range of experiences and, dare I say, *feelings* about the world in general and my society in particular that nevertheless informed the line of inquiry that I proposed. That I felt compelled to inflect the style of my proposal in a social scientific manner was both a product of habit, institutional anxiety (that is, a desire for affirmation from the institutions I was going to interact with) and, most importantly, a lack of an alternative vocabulary. When I embarked on this trip last year—a year of living in intellectual discomfort, I must add—the vocabulary that I thought most important for my project was a social scientific one, consisting of concepts, theories and paradigms underscored by a sociological imaginary. This was the ideational stuff of my two university degrees, the second of which, a Masters, was from a department of sociology and anthropology. I had an unquestioned belief in the need for conceptual clarity and theoretical rigor, and an almost naïve faith in Reason in public life. I do not think that I am unique in this; I share a belief with many that human welfare—expressed through notions of peace, stability, wealth, equality, democracy, beauty and truth—can be gained or apprehended through genuine and informed dialogue. My hand on my heart, I am a child of the Enlightenment, and cling to its promises as a baby to its mother's breast.

Has my year of living in intellectual discomfort weaned me of this dependence? The simple answer is, no. Do I feel that a commitment to these values and modes of being is still necessary? The simple answer is, yes. Then, what more? I ask myself.

I caught sight of something other than what I was looking for, almost at the periphery of my visual field. It is nothing of significance except perhaps to me, nothing new or novel. It is no mountain-top epiphany, and might strike others as rather prosaic and ordinary. Maybe it is something remembered that I had once forgotten. It requires no drum roll and if I were to blurt it out now, it would probably flounder about, looking as desperate and as tragic as sea-creatures on the deck of a fishing trawler. This is an image that one often glimpses on the Discovery Channel. Perhaps if I render the image poetically I just might be able to produce an arresting image. This image could be productive of a re-thinking, making it a counterpoint to this essay. Imagine a trawler, not of fish and edible crustaceans, but of ideas, a trawler tossed about on the high seas after a successful catch; the once lively catch, now sorted and graded, lies chilled in its hull.

Perhaps this image does not work; it is too easy, and a touch whimsical. Besides, the deck of a trawler is no place to set out an idea, especially not one so embedded in my personal history. So I shall begin with a brief pre-history, keeping it as best I can from being an indulgent story about my life.

Singapore and Malaysia, a pre-history

When I was a young boy, I would rummage through old photographs kept in the living room cabinet of my maternal grandmother's home in the border town of Johor Bahru. (The town is so close to Singapore that you could almost hear the efficient and pragmatic gears of government machinery hum, but JB, as we call it, is decidedly Malaysian, the chaotic other to the unnerving neatness across the Straits of Johor.) The monochrome snaps—not sepia tinge—were like fragments of family memories, kept rather unceremoniously in a box rather than laid out in chronological or thematic order in an album. The one that struck me most and over which my child's gaze lingered was that of my uncle, whom I both feared and adored for some unfathomable reason. He lay, almost reclining, in an "easy chair," as they were called, surrounded by books. An unremarkable image, perhaps, except for the extraordinary fact that it was taken in a prison cell in Singapore during the turbulent nationalist period of the late 1950s. From that, his second term in prison, my uncle produced what is

considered a seminal analysis of colonial Malaya's economy. Since I had neither read the book nor did I understand economics, the awe with which it held me was clearly not that of intellectual understanding. If I had to name it now, I would identify it as a certain effect produced by the image itself. A muddle of feelings and notions: it was the sense of authority in the figure of my uncle, the authority of books (to which my mother was devoted and to which I later came to make a fetish of as well), and the bewildering terror of prison and forced confinement. As I grew up and encountered a 'mature' political vocabulary, I borrowed much of it to shore up that image, propping it up with the then already faded romance of the socialist-nationalist struggle. I would be, from then forth, susceptible to misreading images regarding people, ideas and authority. (When I first came to the Philippines, I thought how profound it was for a nation to choose as its national hero a writer of novels. I found myself corrected on this later in my stay.)

Fast-forward: I came of age in the Singapore of the 1980s. While the political hegemony of the People's Action Party had been almost unassailable for more than a decade, the Parliament witnessed the entry of a lone opposition figure at the beginning of that decade. Democratization, irrepressible as it seems to be, was on the intellectual agenda and stayed on it until the mass arrests of what we would now term civil society activists in May 1987. What was this talk, this discourse, of democracy? What was it informed by, when, in fact, the only competing ideology to the governing regime had been all but eliminated? By the end of the 1970s, Singapore's political Left had been erased—as Malaysia's had been, with its specter last encountered in the haunting echoes of China's Cultural Revolution. This was felt most poignantly in the mid-1970s in the world theater and the arts. Socialist Realism, as theory and practice, had had its curtain call, forcibly or otherwise in the Peninsula. Moreover, not only was there nothing to replace it, but memories of it and traditions associated with it were assiduously erased.

I told many Filipinos that I encountered in my seven months there about how the Philippines emerged in my consciousness as a place, as a society. For my generation in the mid-1980s in university in Singapore, at least, the struggle against the Marcos dictatorship was probably the most significant for the region, as the fall of the New Order regime of Indonesia was for the late 1990s. Despite our lack of ideological moorings, the saga of the Marcos dictatorship had all the elements of high drama and kept us glued to the radio and newspapers until the final twist. Unfortunately, the journalistic offerings

we consumed, so often caught up in the present and without space—in minutes or in column inches—rarely had the ability to communicate the deeper processes afoot. When the Marcoses were flown out of the coop, I was left with little understanding about the structure of Filipino society or its politics and culture beyond leading actors and the anonymous cast of thousands.

It was also in the 1980s that the Filipino struggle for democracy came rippling onto Singaporean shores via theater, almost a century after Jose Rizal disembarked and visited the Botanic Gardens before continuing on to Europe. The "training" given to Singaporean theater practitioners laid the foundations for several forms of theater practice, one strain of which I would later join. One particular production centered on the story of a Filipino domestic worker and was particularly compelling for its description of issues of class, gender and transmigration. This, and several other political productions, became the subject of a sociological thesis I worked on in 1988. I had wanted to understand the power of theater but ended up describing, and thus perhaps re-inscribing, the power of the state.

In the midst of the trauma that many Singaporeans felt following the mass arrests of 1987, I spent several years working with working-class children in an educational project run by non-evangelical Christians, believing that no possibilities existed for challenging the status quo in Singapore. Then, I saw no connection between welfare work with the children and the discourse of democratization that I was, in principle at least, committed to. Welfare work to me was socially necessary, perhaps even personally rewarding, but it lacked the heroism that the struggle for Democracy seemed to demand. Working with delinquent children was a challenge but only in the realm of the emotional and, at a stretch, spiritual. These were not dimensions, or modes, of being that I associated with the concept of democratization. This work—serious and demanding as it was—was decidedly "private," not "public" in the way I understood the concept.

I then abandoned what seemed to be the never-ending trials that children encounter in their daily lives (and the community of volunteers I worked with) to become an advocate of "intellectual discourse" through a journal called *Commentary*. We sought and courted a public that we believed was out there in the "mass society" created by the People's Action Party. We labored to extend an opening provided for in the public sphere by the new dispensation of the incoming Prime Minister.

We began without fully recognizing that the culture of writing for a "discerning public" and, equally, the culture of reading were limited, having been diminished by a successful, if authoritarian, government. Cultivating the voice of our writers and a strategic tone for the university-based journal was central to our politics. Without telling the entire story—one not without its own public drama—suffice it to say that I learned to think of the political landscape as a complex territory. I became grudgingly aware of the role of society, and of social conservatism in particular, in the authoritarian practices of the states that I was most familiar with.

Briefly, under our editorial leadership, the journal —which had a decade before been embroiled in controversy—took on questions of "civil society" and "politics." These themes served as the titles for our second and third collections of essays and discussions. If there was a perception that the journal was challenging the establishment, the government's hand was in all probability stayed by a very disciplined and academic tone. However, neither our judiciously elliptical language nor a strategic balancing of views could save our fourth issue. (We even ran a letter that both criticized the journal's liberal outlook while welcoming us as an intellectual interlocutor to the prevailing conservative establishment.)

The issue centered on a controversy in the arts with the attendant proscription of forum theater and performance art. The former was a dialogical theater practice conceptualized by Marxist dramatist Augusto Boal as a radical critique of agitation-propaganda theater (in which I acted) and the later an energetic practice in which the body, in all its presence and immediacy, becomes the stage; both appeared to the state as un-censorable forms and this, ultimately, made them subversive. This was coupled with the fact that the government had already announced its desires to develop the arts as a new industry. It was a convergence of competing desires in which the state was determined to come out on top.

While committed to this form of engagement, I also harbored contempt for "elliptical speech" as cowardly, as evidence of the intellectual's fear of "speaking truth to power." With the controversy at its height, I sought a principled gesture and the editorial board chose to resign. (Singaporean writer Catherine Lim later eulogized the debacle as one of many signs that the new and avowedly "friendlier" regime was in fact unwilling to give up the substance of Lee Kuan Yew's style of governance.) I now think very differently about that choice and of elliptical speech.

It would seem to me now that there is a need for a variety of forms of speech including the seemingly abstract and those not immediately amenable for application to the problems of the day. In many real ways, academics, concerned citizens and artists were trying to create a variety of publics, each with its own register, vocabulary and frames of reference.

I returned to Malaysia and went to work in a newspaper, then involved myself in human rights activism and academic work. Again, the challenges were fundamentally the same; though the space available for open politics was much wider, it was not immediately clear if there was any depth to the public discourse surrounding or informing this politics. One could reasonably ask of both the authoritarian administration and its detractors whether they contributed to a deepening of public culture. (They in turn might ask how "depth" is defined and, indeed, quantified.)

I would like to make one brief reference to the question of the media in Malaysia to underscore my concerns. The Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s reverberated throughout Malaysia's then fast-paced economy as well as in politics. Images of the anti-regime street demonstrations—known by its borrowed slogan of reform, "Reformasi"—carried in the traditional media were then accompanied by the development of the so-called alternative media. Journalists and observers alike looked to the Internet as a new, perhaps even revolutionary, tool. These early assessments were to prove too exaggerated. In many respects, the new media was new only in respect to the forms of dissemination of "information" defined broadly. What remained the same, however, was the quality of that information. If there was potential for new relationships to be formed between the producers of information and its recipients, for new structures of knowledge production to be created, something other than the Net had to come into play.

One commentator astutely identified the problem when he complained about the character of Malaysian political discourse. He said that opportunities to educate the public (the "electorate," more specifically) at public rallies were being squandered because politicians replicated what we in Malaysia call "coffee shop talk." This coffee shop talk—its fascination with rumor, 'insider' knowledge, conspiracy theories and the like—was being disseminated in new ways and at new speeds but it was "coffee shop talk" all the same. My friends and I thought that the best way to address this problem was to develop different strategies and 'values' in our website, titled "Saksi" which in the Malay language

means "witness." We were not without our failings but the general register of our site was in marked contrast to the partisan and polemical character of much that passed for "alternative" media then.

I think one of the challenges that arose in those times of heady political confrontation was to persuade ourselves, and others, that there is value in complexity, that one can fashion a politics out of complex political and ethical positions. This belief in the value of an analysis that is adequate to the object in question—whether it is a politician, a political party or a socially disadvantaged group—is not a widely nor deeply held one in my country, I am afraid.

Our website grew into a larger project with the development of a media NGO called the Center for Independent Journalism. Together with an Indonesian media group, Radio68H, we developed a joint project to circumvent the very tight regulations governing broadcasting. Without getting into a rather nasty narrative about the many conflicts that erupted among "progressives" that I had the misfortune of being caught in, suffice it to say that the project floundered on a fundamental difference in the perception of the role of the media in times of crisis. One leading academic went so far as to claim that even honest public criticism of the political was not to be encouraged, as this provided resources for the ruling party against the nascent democratic movement. His position was popular and in some respects intuitive. Its hazardous consequences would arise only later and could conceivably be dealt with in the future. This is a debate that is never ending, perhaps.

I edged back into academic work after the collapse of the Center's radio project on a long-term group research project on the Malaysian electoral system. It proved that academics could respond to important issues but in a manner consistent with the specificities of their labor. (Our book—I contributed a chapter on civil society involvement—has made a lasting contribution to the debate on electoral reform in Malaysia.)

For argument's sake, let me make a sweeping generalization. Politics and the media share a similar pace and tone which contrasts markedly with art and academia. Think of it as a spectrum with a variety of practices in each of these fields lying on various points of this line (or multiple lines—speed, tone, depth) and with neither end of the spectrum defined in normative terms, meaning I do not ascribe values to being fast, for example. Does Malaysia have a full range of practices that gives expression to these terms? This is a question

I took with me on my journey and which informed the construction of my proposal, but one that was decidedly in the present.

A year before I had been toying with another project that was more historically orientated. It arose from the general dissatisfaction with the quality of my own questions and frameworks. Browsing the shelves of an older relative, I came quite by accident upon a book. Since I had browsed those same shelves for decades, it was clearly something in my own desire to see that made the book visible. What drew me to it was its title, embossed in faded gold lettering, *The Cultural Problems of Malaysia in the Context of Southeast Asia*. Out of the permafrost of a Malaysian suburb, I pulled out a fossil from the mid-1960s. The collection of essays from a similarly titled conference was the product of the intellectual impulses of a visiting academic from Indonesia, Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana (a man whose life would be worth a workshop or two). At that moment, I only recognized him as the author of a book I had picked up at a second-hand bookshop. My inquiries into the man, his milieus and the organizations he was associated with led me into the 1950s and 1960s, a period which I had not, until then, considered as crucial to my self-understanding. The question of how the two decades following the end of the Second World War shaped our consciousness remained on the back burner while I considered how best to shape my project. Needless to say, the year away provided me with a way of seeing these two questions as intimately connected. In some respects, the historical project has come to seem to me to be much more urgent to attend to as materials and, more crucially, people recede from the present.

Quezon City, caught in a cyclone

One of the many of things one is likely to overlook when conceptualizing a research proposal (in the humanities, at least) is the weather. I had checked up on semester schedules and the like but I had no idea about the annual season of cyclonic winds that come off the Pacific Ocean and crash into the beautiful islands of the Philippines. (I was blessed to survive the worst cyclone Manila had suffered in over a decade.) In fact, I was not particularly aware of the Pacific and its rim (home to China and the USA) as a cultural and historical matrix. One of the most arresting images I came across while in the Philippines was one produced by a French historian. It was quoted by a Filipino anthropologist in an essay about the "Asian" character of Filipino culture(s). The historian noted that the Philippines was the farthest point that Christianity had reached on its westward journey and the farthest point that Islam had reached

on its eastward journey. Not only did it alert me to the need to read a great deal more about the journey of cultures—languages, ideas, cuisine—that traversed the archipelago but it more importantly shifted the very frame in which I saw the country. While I had been to the Philippines on two previous occasions, I carried a mental map that was very much like the map I had on my wall of Southeast Asia: Indonesia and Burma framing the left margin and the Philippines framing the right margin. There is little of the Pacific Ocean and what this essay spelled out for me was everything that Filipinos share on that side of the globe, from flora and fauna to the Manila Galleon and US imperialism.

My previous encounter with the Philippines—as a journalist and as an NGO activist—was marked by a certain speed and lack of depth. I penned an article—entitled "Pinoy's Complaint"—which recorded the thoughts of many Filipinos I interviewed, from political prisoners to activists. I had learned much but I was puzzled by the thwarted expectation that this was another Asian country and therefore essentially the same as Malaysia. When it was not the same, I simply did not have the frame to identify what this difference was.

This inability to understand fully what I was encountering dogged much of my time there. The more I read, the more I felt I did not understand enough or adequately, and the more inhibited I became about asking questions. I felt that my questions were too basic, something a primer on the Philippines would adequately address. Still I met with people and watched movies.

One movie in particular struck me as incomprehensible, beautiful but "incomprehensible." It was Lav Dias' *Heremias*. Nine and a half hours of landscape, emotions half articulated, buried deep and a protagonist, who lends his name to the movie, whose responses to a crisis completely baffled me. Prior to watching the movie I had the opportunity to ask the director what he was trying to do with his movies and he said, "To show my culture." It was a question I had to ask but whose answer I did not have the resources to understand except in the most facile way. I then watched the movie and later I read Rey Ileto's history, *Pasyon and Revolution*, a history that was difficult for me to read but rewarded me later with a sense of a longer and deeper history of Filipino culture. It revealed to me some things about the protagonist I could previously not comprehend, like the meaning of his posture and his political imaginary. The foreword to Ileto's history notes that a dissatisfaction with positivist social science coupled with a reading of philosophy helped him re-conceptualize this history.

I met Professor Ileto at a political science conference in Zamboanga City but I was only able to secure the promise of an interview in Singapore. I wanted to understand the process of re-thinking that he underwent while reading philosophy. I was not able to ask Dias if he had read Ileto's history (and I am certain he has) but the connection between the two works seemed to me to be that both work from a common understanding of their culture (in this case, perhaps low-land Christian Filipino culture). One self-conscious attempt to quote Ileto's work in film—"Indio Nacional"—succeeded only in establishing the filmmaker's relationship to the iconic text rather than some common cultural pool.

While I read the newspapers, particularly columns by social scientists, I was impressed by the consistency of engagement but left a little cold by the form. I learned many facts about the country and its culture but I was less clear about how all this, presented to a local audience, could affect any kind of cultural shift. This was also true of my experiences in Thailand.

Palawan, voyage to the periphery

The typhoon that hit Manila coincided with a trip to a university in Palawan and my encounter with academics at a state university. The ferry trip in the first month of my stay forced me to re-think the strategy and purpose of my research. I conducted long interviews with two very senior academics (retired from the University of the Philippines (UP) and the Ateneo de Manila University) and with younger faculty. I had come with a sense of some disquiet about my ability to use a social science discourse as the pivot of my research. I had read the work of Cynthia Bautista and realized that it would take a profound familiarity with the many decades of Filipino social sciences—sociology, economics, psychology, etc.—to actually pull this off. In recognizing my own limitations in this regard, I thought that a focus on the term "deep democracy" and the notion of public culture that underscored it would be more realistic.

What I did benefit from in the Philippines was the publication of various histories of universities, with those dealing specifically with the experience of the Marcos dictatorship being of particular interest. It took me back to the 1970s, and at Ateneo's library I was able to begin a process of unearthing more histories. I found the journal *Minerva*, which detailed the disciplining of my own *alma mater*, the National University of Singapore (then University of Singapore), and its radical twin, Nanyang University. It helped me to begin to piece together the experiences of the region refracted through the struggles in and around the university and

the very idea of the university and the intellectual. It also led me back to the regional journal *Solidarity*—which I only knew as it was fading—and an interview with its then editor F. Sionil Jose about the existence of intellectual networks across the region. Intellectuals like Sulak Sivaraksa of Thailand were also part of this network and, as I dug deeper, it seemed to me that a forgotten history which underscores, perhaps silently, the contemporary situation, awaits unearthing.

Six points of comparison

In many ways, Malaysia is the yardstick by which I measured the Thai and Filipino experiences of both democracy in its relation to the specific institution of the university and the social actor broadly referred to as the intellectual. Here are some broad points of comparison that I noticed while conducting research.

First, intellectuals are recognized as an important voice in the public sphere in both Thailand and in the Philippines in ways that do not exist in Malaysia. This recognition comes from many segments of society and is notable in the way the media often designate the contributions of intellectuals. This is especially marked in Thailand.

Second, a visible and vocal segment of academics see themselves as public intellectuals and participate vigorously in the shaping of the public sphere. I found that this self-identification as architects in the drafting of future models of society—asking questions addressed to the means as well as the ends of society—very compelling.

Third, many academics in Malaysia have participated in politics by becoming members of either the ruling or opposition political parties. A strategy of participating in the political life of the nation as intellectuals is not often opted for. This is related to my first two observations. While in the Philippines, I was told, in half jest, that presidents of the UP often think they can run the country better than the politicians do. (The alleged involvement of the former UP President, Francisco Nemenzo, in the failed Oakwood Mutiny, the role of his "Blueprint" and his association with a leftist political grouping, is a telling instance of direct involvement.) However, in Malaysia, while a few notable academics have become leading lights in opposition politics, there is nothing akin to the progressive or radical tradition of the UP. Pockets of progressive, pro-democratic academics have emerged, such as the "Aliran" group in the Science University of Malaysia (USM, Penang), but these remain isolated instances.

Fourth, the successful developmental policies of the Malaysian government might be credited with absorbing and institutionalizing some progressive forces. Unfortunately, the pro-indigenous race politics, which in part led to the democratization of the universities, have led to some perverse consequences. One is the increasing bureaucratization of state universities and the rise of an academic class owing much to their political masters. Their reason for being is to legitimize the current order. The nationalist sentiments that animated the policy of deepening inclusivity have turned into a rear-guard action of defending racial quotas and the promotion of staff and students on criteria other than merit. Neither the Philippines nor Thailand seem to share a similar history.

Fifth, universities in the Philippines and Thailand served in some measure and to varying degrees as sites of resistance to dictatorship and repression. While all three countries had politically volatile decades, by the 1970s the Malaysian government had been able to stabilize the situation. There have been several histories on the role of universities in relation to the Marcos dictatorship, such as *Down from the Hill* about the Ateneo, which serve as compelling tributes to the spirit of autonomy and commitment to democracy, though not without their low moments.

Sixth, state universities in Malaysia seem to lack a deep pedagogical philosophy and I found reading about the history of the Ateneo quite instructive on the need for tertiary institutions to have such philosophical foundations. A diversity of pedagogies is also healthy. While I could not discern this dimension in the Thai situation, it seemed much more marked in the Filipino context with a range from Catholic to secular discourses on the means and ends of education.

A modest proposal

What I see as a real possibility is the creation of an awareness of the intellectual heritage of Southeast Asia in the world, of the contests over the meaning and role of the intellectual and the university as they engaged with their newly independent nations. This debate needs to be made contemporary and our program is well placed to initiate one, not just for ourselves, but also for the larger community. By broadening the term intellectual beyond the professional academic and at the same time recognizing the importance of the "public" character of the university, this dialogue can help the region to mobilize the cultural resources it will need to move itself forward.

APPENDIX I

WORKSHOP SCHEDULE
The Sixth Workshop of Asian Public Intellectuals
Davao City, Philippines, 25-29 November 2007

<u>**Day 1, Sunday, 25 November 2007**</u>

1700 - 1730   Registration
1730 - 1800   Cocktail
1800 - 1820   Group Photograph
1820 - 1940   Opening Ceremony and Dinner

> Welcoming Speeches:
> *Surichai Wun'Gaeo*, Program Director of API Coordinating Institution;
> *Fr. Jose M. Cruz, S.J.*, Director of API Partner Institution in the Philippines; and
> *Yohei Sasakawa*, Chairman of The Nippon Foundation
>
> MC & Introduction of Keynote Speaker:
> *Fr. Jose M. Cruz, S.J.*
>
> Keynote Address:
> *Edilberto de Jesus*, Director of Southeast Asian Ministers of
> Education Organization (SEAMEO)
> "In Search of Asian Public Intellectuals"
>
> Dinner:
> Toast by *Fr. Antonio Samson, S.J.*, President of Ateneo de Davao

<u>**Day 2, Monday, 26 November 2007**</u>

0830 - 1030   **INTRODUCTION SESSION**
> Moderator: *Surichai Wun'Gaeo*
> On API Fellowships Program and API Workshop: *Tatsuya Tanami*
> Overview of the Workshop: *Czarina Saloma-Akpedonu*
> Introduction of Workshop Participants

1030 - 1050   Coffee Break
1050 - 1310   **PARALLEL SESSION I: Intermingling of Continuity and Discontinuity**
> Chair: *Fr. Jose M. Cruz, S.J.*
> Discussant: *Danilo Francisco M. Reyes*
> **PARALLEL SESSION II: Specificities of Globalization**
> Chair: *Koji Tanaka*
> Discussant: *Wataru Fujita*

1310 - 1410   Lunch Break
1410 - 1610   **PARALLEL SESSION III: Collages of Civil Society's Mediations**
> Chair: *Surichai Wun'Gaeo*
> Discussant: *Prangtip Daorueng*
> **PARALLEL SESSION IV: Circles of Power and Counterbalances**
> Chair: *Ragayah Haj. Mat Zin*
> Discussant: *Fr. Jose Magadia, S.J.*

1610 -   Coffee Break
1900 -   Dinner

Day 3, Tuesday, 27 November 2007

0830 - 1030   **PARALLEL SESSION V: Blurred Borders and Social Integrations**
Chair: *Taufik Abdullah*
Discussant: *Herry Yogaswara*
PARALLEL SESSION VI: Persistent Problems, Promising Solutions and Beneficence
Chair: *Mary Racelis*
Discussant: *Narumol Aphinives*
1030 - 1050   Coffee Break
1050 - 1310   **PARALLEL SESSION VII: Reconfiguration of Identities and Futures in Times of Transformation**
Chair: *Louie David*
Discussant: *Khoo Su Nin (Salma) Nasution*
PARALLEL SESSION VIII: Cultures as Ordinary and Everyday
Chair: *Tatsuya Tanami*
Discussant: *Yeoh Seng Guan*
1310 - 1400   Lunch
1400 - 1600   **Mindanao Talk**: *Fr. Albert Alejo, S.J.*
1600 -   Coffee Break
1900 -   Dinner

Day 4, Wednesday, 28 November 2007

0830 - 1930   Field Trip

Day 5, Thursday, 29 November 2007

0900 - 1010   **PLENARY DISCUSSION: Contexts and Processes of Social Transformations**
Chair: *Muktasam*
1010 - 1030   Coffee Break
1030 - 1210   **PLENARY DISCUSSION: Origins and Consequences of Social Transformations**
Chair: *Theresita V. Atienza*
SYNTHESIS: Asian Transformations in Action
Czarina Saloma-Akpedonu
1210 - 1330   Lunch
1330 - 1430   **Response from the Fellows: Reflections and Applications**
Moderator: *Surichai Wun'Gaeo*
1430 - 1530   Closing Remarks: *Tatsuya Tanami* and *Fr. Jose M. Cruz, S.J.*
1530 - 1550   Coffee Break
1610 - 1730   **API Hour**
1900 - 2100   Farewell Dinner / Cultural Night

APPENDIX II

WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS
The Sixth Workshop of Asian Public Intellectuals
Davao City, Philippines, 25-29 November 2007
(information at the time of participation)

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APPENDIX III

ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS

<u>*Circles of power and counterbalances*</u>

POLITICS AND TIMBER IN MALAYSIA
Akiko Morishita
This paper discusses who controls timber resources and how in a forest-rich state in Malaysia. The federal government has given great autonomy to the state government, including the entire control over forest concessions. Here, the state Chief Minister has retained his strong political influence for more than 25 years. Local entrepreneurs, especially those with timber interests, have to rely on his patronage for their business success. The paper examines how he has concentrated political power into his hands, how local business people have made links with him and became successful in business, and what factors have brought the concentration of power into the Chief Minister's hands.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND OPPOSITION FORCES IN MALAYSIA: THE POLITICAL PROCESS OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL
Ayame Suzuki
The interaction between Malaysia's political institutions and people's perceptions of and attitudes towards these institutions are examined to explain the dynamics of opposition forces in Malaysia. The study focuses on a series of amendments to the Official Secrets Act (OSA) in 1986, which aimed to restrict the right to know and freedom of speech. When the government drafted the restrictive OSA, various actors, including opposition and governing parties, NGOs, business groups, and trade unions opposed the bill. The increased opposition forced the government to relax some of the act's provisions. This was followed in turn by a decrease in the size of the opposition when governing parties and business groups realized that the new law did not violate their opportunities for interest articulation. The diminished size of the opposition has remained constant because of the law-abiding nature of the implementation of the OSA and because the National Economic Consultative Council (NECC), a deliberative institution, provided business groups and governing parties with alternative channels for interest articulation. The findings of the study show how the current non-liberal political institution came to be in force, how the institution thus established affected the size of opposition forces, and why this institution has been maintained in spite of the persistent opposition from pro-liberal actors.

THE DISCOURSE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE AND ISLAMIC LAW IN MALAYSIA
Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad
This paper discusses the debate on the Islamic State and Islamic law in Malaysia after the reformasi. It will argue that this discourse can be seen through different Muslim and non-Muslim interpretations of Islam as a political source in Malaysia. The Muslim voice in the state on this debate shows that their understanding of Islam follows their interests in the political arena. However, in between these spectrums there are Muslim groups that act more like a civil society rather than promoting an Islamic state and Islamic law in Malaysia. By doing ethnography with one Islamic missionary group in Malaysia, *Jamâ'ah Tablîgh*, I argue that there is an Islamic movement that plays an important role in disseminating Islamic teaching through 'reform from below.' In contrast, for non-Muslims, the issue of an Islamic state and Islamic law is to turn Malaysia into a theocratic state, which is against the constitution and the context of Malaysia's plural and multi-ethnic citizenry.

Persistent problems, promising solutions and beneficence

FROM CHARITY TO SOCIAL INVESTMENTS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY OF PHILANTHROPIC INSTITUTIONS IN INDONESIA

Josie M. Fernandez

Philanthropy is a complex social intervention phenomenon constituted by values and organizational and community activities through an array of local, national and international institutions. It takes the forms of voluntary giving, voluntary service and voluntary association for the benefit of people and the environment. Charity provides immediate relief while philanthropy is a long-term commitment for building the capacity of people, facilitating social change and promoting global peace and security. In Indonesia, contemporary philanthropic practices are profoundly driven by religion, cosmological practices, social justice concerns and a growing emphasis on corporate social responsibility. Philanthropy is conditioned, too, by the social, political and economic conditions of particular periods. The last two decades have seen tremendous growth in Islamic philanthropy given the huge potential for Islamic obligatory giving and voluntary contributions, with institutional philanthropy on the rise. Indonesia has harnessed pluralism in philanthropy for strengthening diversity and addressing socioeconomic needs.

SOCIAL IMPACT OF JAPANESE PRIVATE-SECTOR PROJECTS ON LOCAL PEOPLE IN THE PHILIPPINES AND MALAYSIA

Hozue Hatae

While the defects of public aid by the Japanese government, or Official Development Aid (ODA), have been discussed and criticized in many books and reports, Japanese private-sector projects which are also playing a large role in the development initiatives in Asia have yet to be examined more closely. A great number of Japanese private-sector projects have been found to have added up to more suffering in the lives of local people and made them much poorer in the name of sustainable development. This report, mainly based on interviews with local people affected by three Japanese private-sector projects in the Philippines and Malaysia, considers the factors that have turned sustainable development projects into destructive ones. One such factor is the failure of developers and investors to anticipate and avoid the social impact of projects by neglecting local peoples' voices and concerns. To have genuine development for local people, it is necessary to respect and uphold the basic human rights of the locals affected by the projects, including their right to determine their own plans for their community's development.

POLICIES AND VICTIM SERVICES IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM INDONESIA, JAPAN AND THAILAND

Heru Susetyo

Asia is a continent prone to disasters, both human-made and natural. Natural disasters occur frequently in Asia in various forms, from earthquakes in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Japan; floods in Bangladesh and Vietnam; tsunamis in Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka; and typhoons in Taiwan, to volcanic eruptions and landslides in the Philippines. However, only a small number of Asian countries seriously pay attention to disaster management. One such country is Japan, which is one of the best countries equipped with natural disaster management and policies. Scholars believe that natural disasters are unavoidable since they are part of nature or God's plan. However, the state has a strict obligation to mitigate or reduce risks/damages due to disaster by introducing a disaster preparedness program. Part of a disaster preparedness program is creating policies or laws related to disaster management which will serve as guidelines or grounds in dealing with the disaster management programs. Providing services for the victims as part of disaster response is also important in disaster management. This paper describes policies and victim services in natural disaster management based on fieldwork in Japan and Thailand from August 2006-February 2007 to use for comparison in order to understand the current situation of Indonesian disaster management and polices. For Indonesia, the legislation and enactment of natural disaster management policies are among the country's top priorities since it has been seriously affected by earthquakes, tsunamis, massive floods, landslides and fires for the past several decades.

Intermingling of continuity and discontinuity

REVALUING JAVANESE COURT DANCES (*SRIMPI* AND *BEDHAYA*) WITHIN THE CURRENT SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT

Michi Tomioka

Surakarta Court dances were allowed to be performed for the public in the 1970s as part of a national project. The Indonesian people, however, did not preserve them as they had been and made shorter versions instead. They thought it more important to innovate in accordance with the changing times. In this project, I tried to search for the meaning of the full versions of court dances among the public under current circumstances by producing stage performances and documenting these in videos and music recordings with the involvement of Indonesians. The project was highly appreciated by participants, audiences and the mass media. Performers found they could get more absorbed in their playing and dancing as time passed, which then enchanted the audience. This proved that there is now every possibility that performing arts in their pre-innovation form, which was denied in the 1970s, can still appeal to the public. The value of the arts can be limited or changed according to social and cultural contexts. Indonesian performing arts have been influenced largely by government art policy. It would be effective to spontaneously revalue and reconsider the results of former art projects in search of their own roots or demand by the public.

TRANSFORMING THINKING, TRANSGRESSING BORDERS

Jo Kukathas

Our global civilization is a world heritage and not simply, as nationalists would have it, a collection of disparate local cultures. Persistent global movements of the curious and the entrepreneurial have often had a positive impact on culture, providing fresh challenges to artists and authority figures. These challenges have led to exploration and innovation. Hundreds of years of isolation and a rift between traditional and contemporary theater engendered by the Meiji Restoration has created a unique theater in Japan. However, artists in Japan come from a long tradition that is cumulative, syncretic, pluralist and evolutionary. The challenge now lies in bridging the divide between contemporary and traditional art and balancing cultural recovery with a critiquing of tradition.

TRANSMISSION, PEDAGOGY AND EDUCATION: A CRITICAL STUDY OF ASIAN TRADITIONAL MUSIC CULTURES IN POST-COLONIAL AND POST-MODERN TIMES IN THAILAND AND INDONESIA

Ramón Pagayon Santos

As a contribution to the discourse on changing identities and their social, historical and cultural contexts, this study was undertaken to gain deeper insight into the transformative state of Asian expressive cultures as reflected in the contemporary modes of the transmission of traditional artistic practices in Thailand and Indonesia. With reference to the teaching and learning of the musical arts, this study investigates traditional and indigenous techniques of knowledge transfer *vis-à-vis* the present formalized institutional structures for professional artistic training and education. While pursuing the initial assumption that orally transmitted practices are highly vulnerable against the overpowering effect of formalized and literate teaching strategies in modern times, the study has found a much more complex phenomenon. It focuses on three major factors by which musical traditions and their essential expressive and cultural properties could be either eroded and undermined or preserved and developed for future generations through imaginative and creative negotiation and exploration. These three factors are: a) human resources; b) institutional agency; and c) the social environment.

THEATER CHRONICLES: LESSONS IN THEATER DOCUMENTATION FROM TRADITIONAL AND CONTEMPORARY THEATER PRACTICES IN THAILAND AND INDONESIA

Glecy C. Atienza

The task of interpreting the artistic craft and documenting the aesthetics of theater practice for posterity has remained a challenge for artists. This study identifies concerns and practices in developing a theater documentation system for traditional and contemporary theater practices from an artist's point of view through observation of and interaction with various artists, theater groups and theater institutions, and visits to libraries in Thailand and Indonesia. It discusses the critical role of artist and artists' interactions with the community in realizing theater documentation.

Blurred borders and social integrations

EXPLORING ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS AMONG FILIPINO MUSLIM URBANITES IN THE QUIAPO AREA: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF MODERNIZATION AND URBAN LIFE

Mokhammad Yahya

The fusion of religion and politics, a key feature of Islamic fundamentalism, is very much a part of the aspirations of Filipino Muslims, although they may differ in their positions on whether or not an independent nation (*Bangsa*) for *Moros* (Filipino Muslims) can actually be achieved and whether or not their goal can be reached only through armed struggle. Clusters of Muslim groups in the Quiapo area have been formed around these aspirations and the struggle of political movements, and around emerging schools of Islamic thought. The differences among these clusters can be understood in the context of three types of Filipino Muslims' struggle: armed struggle, collaboration with the Philippine government, and an apolitical movement. The first and the second are operating politically at societal levels while the third type is primarily a struggle in the cultural realm at the individual level. The factors that have shaped the rhetorically fundamentalist but pragmatic and moderate approach to the Islamic state of a sample of Filipino Muslim urbanites are: the experience of centuries of *Bangsamoro* struggle against colonialism and continuing political and economic imbalances; the enclave character of Quiapo and the mosques that have allowed Muslims living there to retain their ethno-cultural identity against the onslaught of the Christian majority ideology; the modernizing/secularizing tendencies of urban life; and an orientation toward the imagined community of Muslims in the Philippines.

FLUID BOUNDARIES: TOWARD A PEOPLE-CENTERED APPROACH TO BORDER ISSUES IN NORTH SULAWESI

Djorina Velasco

This paper explores border issues on the Indonesian side of the Indonesian-Philippine border. It surfaces the contestations between state and society over the maintenance of the border and the social construction of identities. It traces the history of the porous maritime border in order to contextualize contemporary problems relating to "illegal" cross-border flows. In so doing, it puts forward a critique of the predominant frameworks of understanding border issues, namely, the security and cultural approaches, for not being sufficiently attuned to realities on the ground, and proposes a more people-centered perspective in addressing the needs of border populations.

THE HISTORY OF TOMORROW: THE DISCOURSE OF SCIENCE AND THE IMAGINATION OF THE FUTURE IN ASIAN SCIENCE FICTIONS

Alwin C. Aguirre

This study presents a reading of Japanese and Indonesian science fiction (in translation) in various media. Through discourse analysis, we attempt to examine the representation of science and technology (ST) in these texts and, along with it, the representations of the future. We aim to make palpable the political in our constructed relationship with science and technology, especially highlighting skepticism toward pervasive discursive binary oppositions between science as truth and others as myth. At the risk of exposing an offhanded attitude, the texts as subject matter in this project are seen as repositories of both personal and shared psyche of particular societies and their members. Though seen as (just) fantastical and even frivolous at times, science fiction as a cultural product is a representation of the sentimental, ideological, theoretical and philosophical musings of a people's inescapable interaction with ST. For the marginalized and oft-disregarded members of the "third world", the significance of this extends to its continued existence as a sovereign and actively engaging agent and recipient of change.

Refiguration of identities and futures in times of transformation

BONES IN _TANSU_—FAMILY SECRETS
Yoshiko Shimada

From an interactive art project which I conducted in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, I found underlying problems behind the façade of "family values" in Asia. Many secrets seem to be written by women and young people. The project provides those who are silenced a safe place to voice their experiences and share them anonymously with the public. Through workshops and talks, I learned about the social, political, religious, geographical and historical background of these problems. Furthermore, I interacted with some of the victims of these problems and conducted a workshop to seek the possibility of visual art as a tool for recovery from traumatic experiences. Some problems are particular to the region/country; others seem to be more universal. However, regaining human dignity should be a basic and universal human need. I hope this project contributes to the effort of achieving this purpose.

CULTURAL ATTITUDES TO ANIMALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: HUMAN-ANIMAL RELATIONS AS A DIMENSION OF CULTURAL IDENTITY FORMATION AND DYNAMICS
Myfel Joseph Paluga

Samples of animal-relating practices and attitudes happening in varying ecological and cultural contexts in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines show the extent of the diversity that Southeast Asians have woven as a result of their long-term interactions with nonhuman animals. The picture is both complex and patterned, so that although we cannot justifiably give a single unifying label to the phenomena, we cannot also discount the broad themes emerging out of the interactions. Monkeys, for example, are variously feared, venerated, and hated, but through all these, one also observes their propensity to actively assert themselves and, by their trainability and adaptability, to find niches despite the expanding spaces of humans. There are also enduring dichotomies (e.g., forest/village, wild/tame) that shape the attitudes of local people _vis-à-vis_ animals. These patterns form the wide settings in which human-animal relations play themselves out in Southeast Asia. The paper argues that human-animal relations, to varying degrees, are involved in the shaping of identities—as humans, as communities, or as selves. In these dynamics, the animal threads might be explicitly evoked or may be only implicit in practice but always integrating these in our narratives is important in forming a broader view of Southeast Asian realities.

NARRATING THE NATION: MODERN HISTORICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF IDENTITY IN INDONESIAN FILM
Iskandar Sharifuddin bin Mohd. Said

Indonesian films in the past tended towards a martial ideal in their depiction of the national struggle for Independence. The first part of the paper will be devoted to the ideas surrounding the construction of the idea of nation; this necessarily incorporates issues on identity and history and the manner and ways it is constructed textually via the moving image, taking two feature films as examples. The principles or narrating the nation organizes itself towards a homogenous perspective. What this homogeneity excludes and denies are alternative histories, other representations and spaces of public memory that express the heterogeneous as an absence. And absence assumes finding and recovering, as a beginning, a cycle of beginnings, as texts and practices that are engaged and defined via spatial categories and thereby its articulations and contestations as spatial politics. My paper proposes to look at the construction of identity and the ideas of nation by way of textual analysis of filmic texts and ground practices and their articulations and narrating of the nation, across Indonesian films as culturally, socio-politically and historically located.

RECONSIDERATION OF LOCAL IDENTITY THROUGH PERFORMING ARTS IN THE ERA OF OTONOMI DAERAH
Kaori Fushiki

This study attempts to indicate how people recognize and practice their local identity through the performing arts. It focuses on Bali in Indonesia, which is well-known for its flourishing performing arts. In recent years, a concept, _Ajeg Bali_, has infiltrated Balinese society, and the number of people who want to practice performing arts as a representation of _Ajeg Bali_ is increasing. The study, thus, surveys the concept of _Ajeg Bali_, which has become

the basis of local identity and examines people's activities *vis-à-vis* the concept. The *gamelan* activities of women, children and youth, and two non-traditional performing arts are presented as examples. The study arrives at the following conclusions: 1) the local identity is not yet firm and includes fluctuation and anxiety; 2) *Ajeg Bali* may become ethnocentric and create social tension; and 3) the performing arts, which are performed as representations of the local identity, have become tools of agitation by those in power and are always deeply wrapped up in politics.

Specificities of globalization

TRANSFORMATIONS IN AGRARIAN LIVELIHOOD AND THE SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE MOVEMENT UNDER GLOBALIZATION

Supa Yaimuang

Trade liberalization has forced countries to open their territories to trade and competition. It has impacted the agricultural sector in terms of food self-sufficiency and caused changes to the agri-food systems in both developed countries like Japan and developing countries like Indonesia. Small farmers have to confront huge changes; meanwhile, they are not allowed to participate in decisionmaking on national and international policies. However, there are concrete examples of farmers' adaptation to the new situation based on their culture and through the development of community innovations such as the so-called" sustainable agriculture." Sustainable agriculture, with its promise of self-sufficiency and freedom for small farmers, has been challenged by trade liberalization and consumerism. However, the role of civil society has grown and is moving towards the sustainable development paradigm in creating a balance within global society. The movement has gone forward with people's participation and cooperation within the nation and beyond national boundaries.

ACTIONS OF NON-STATE GROUPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: ORIGINS, DRIVING FORCES AND NETWORKS

I Ketut Gunawan

This paper discusses non-state groups' actions related to terrorism or terror attacks in Southeast Asia with case studies from Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. It highlights the groups' origins, driving forces and networks. First, it shows that while the origins of such actions in the Philippine and Thai cases are traceable to disputed territorial claims and have a strong link with insurgency, in the Indonesian case, terror actions have originated from a strong passion to establish a perceived ideal state and are inspired by the goals and struggles of the insurgent group in the past. Second, greed and grievance approaches are not sufficient to explain such non-state groups' actions. The findings reveal that the ideology of violence contributes considerably to these groups' actions in these countries. Third, the paper points out that groups have built their networks to sustain their movements and further their goals. A stronger link is found between the groups in Indonesia and the Philippines, while in the Thai case, the group is seemingly still in its "formative years" of establishing links with organizations abroad, particularly those in Indonesia. The evidence also shows that, besides utilizing its actual network, the Indonesian group in particular mobilizes a virtual network to sustain its movement. The virtual network is more resilient than the actual one and, therefore, the threat of terrorism is still imminent. In dealing with the current problems and future threats, the use of a multi-dimensional approach is necessary, particularly through investments in education, economic empowerment and the promotion of religious tolerance.

GLOBALIZATION, INFLUENCE AND RESISTANCE: CINEMATIC REPRESENTATIONS AND EXPERIENCE IN JAPAN AND THAILAND

Krisnadi Yuliawan Saptadi

The growing ties between the Asian and American film industries can be viewed as an indicator of globalization. While Hollywood has an increasing domination of Asian film markets, a growing Asianization of films is also happening. This study examines the complex relationship of cultural influence and resistance as shown in Japanese and Thai cinematic creations and concludes that globalization of cinema is no longer only about Hollywood.

THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION AND CONSUMPTION: SPIRITUALITY IN JAPAN FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A THAI

Sing Suwannakij

I expand my topic to cover spirituality in general, instead of only Buddhism as in the pre-research proposal. This was due to my 'misunderstanding' that Japan is primarily a Buddhist country; soon after arriving in the country, I realized that the reality is much more complex. Buddhism is only one part of a plethora of Japanese spirituality. Delving into this complexity, and trying to understand it, is one point, but I chose to focus more on this 'misunderstanding,' which was born out of the representation of Japanese religion outside of the country. I came to learn later that much of what I knew about Japanese spirituality, especially Zen Buddhism, is represented through

a certain Western perspective while what people perceive and practice in everyday life is another thing altogether. However, this represented image is also thrown back into reality and is equally consumed by local people, especially those who are susceptible to the flows of images, ideas, perspectives, and information in a globalized, consumerist society. Despite the fact that, after finishing the research, I was of the feeling that the characteristics of spirituality in Japan and Thailand could hardly be compared at all, this aspect of the representation and consumption of religions can be witnessed in both Japan and Thailand alike.

SPIRITUAL HUNGER AND THE CONSUMPTION OF SPIRITUALITY IN JAPAN (OR: WHILST I SEARCHED FOR MY SOUL IN A SOULLESS METROPOLIS…)

Mohd Naguib Razak

In this final paper, Mohd Naguib Razak presents a personal account of the evolution of his investigation into Spirituality in Japan's Material Utopia, the unexpected problems and conflicts he encountered along the way during his one-year fellowship in Japan, the changing perspectives that emerged from his sense of frustration, isolation and dejection during this stay, the additional emotional crisis of losing his father within this period, his eventual emotional recovery and renewed sense of perspective, insight and empathy, and finally, the fruitful results of his return to Tokyo in April 2008. The paper was conceived within the context of this whole experience being a necessary interceding stage before embarking on the actual production of his documentary film on the same theme.

Collages of betterment

A STUDY OF COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGN PROCESSES ON THE ISSUE OF COMMUNITY RIGHTS TO BIODIVERSITY RESOURCES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Varinthra Kaiyourawong Boonchai

This research aims to study the communication strategies and patterns of the Southeast Asia Regional Initiative for Community Empowerment (SEARICE), a non-governmental organization in the Philippines, by focusing on its global Community Biodiversity Development and Conservation (CBDC) program. It also studies the social conditions and contexts that transcend sociocultural and economic differences and identifies what conditions contribute to the success and failure of such communication campaigns. The study indicates that a communication strategy has been devised at four levels: community, national, regional and international. Human and participatory approaches are practiced at the community level, while networking and collaborative approaches are considered at the other levels. The main message sent to the target groups focuses on plant genetic resources and farmers' rights. Interpersonal communication, using both personal media and specific media, is fundamental in communicating with the main audience at the community level. At the same time, group communication and specific media are the communication methods used at the mainstream level. The identification of the target audience, participatory approaches and attitudes of farmers are the important conditions that contribute to the success of the project's communication campaigns, especially at the community level. However, a lack of interactive learning between policy and field staff, including the lack of a full-fledged monitoring plan, are constraining conditions that prevent the project from having a broad effect on the general public.

CULTIVATION OF TRANSFORMATIVE LEADERSHIP IN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE CO-CREATION OF THE ENERGY FIELD FOR DEMOCRATIZATION IN ASIA

Chaiwat Thirapantu

Civil society organizations, particularly in Southeast Asia, are struggling to respond to today's increasingly complex problems: democratization, ecological destruction, migration, terrorism and social and cultural degradation. The idea of transformative leadership has been presented and is receiving considerable attention as a means to cope with the challenges. During the last decade, various civil society organizations around East and Southeast Asia, including Japan, the Philippines and Thailand, have produced leadership training programs, addressing personal mastery processes to foster transformative leadership. In this context, this paper aims to examine the intrinsic factors in which transformative leadership can engender social paradigm shift and co-create new and better realities for society. To gain insights into this, I applied an action research approach based on three-levels of observation. First, from the first person perspective, I reflected on my tacit knowledge, which has been acquired through a personal mastery process such as practicing *aikido* and Japanese calligraphy and conducting trainings for over five hundred change agents and local leaders during the last seven years. As a second-person observer, I conducted interviews and discussions with some civic leaders in three Southeast Asian countries to understand how these scholars dealt with leadership development issues. Last, as a third-person observer, I studied some of the literature on transformative leadership. The research shows that transformative leadership programs seem to fall short of delivering necessary leadership qualities, reflecting on the way in which they are not conducted to support collective learning communities. The next step, then, is to find the means to tap people's commitment and to cultivate a community of committed leadership.

INFORMING GOVERNANCE? SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IN INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES

Adnan A. Hezri

Governance for sustainable development necessitates multiple flows of information. As natural resource and environmental management requires improved partnership between the state and civil society, information is needed as a tool for social justice. One of the main informational policy instruments is a sustainability indicator system. This paper presents a comparative case study of national sustainability indicator systems in Indonesia and the Philippines. The overall goal is to understand the dynamics of the interaction of sustainability indicators with policy systems and processes. Evidence suggests that many of the goals enunciated in Indonesia's sustainable development

strategy found their way into a business-as-usual mode, largely assimilated into existing planning mechanisms and processes. By contrast, the Philippine policy processes for sustainable development have been considered as one of the most innovative strategies by global standards. Despite popular acceptance of sustainability as a policy goal, the provision of data and statistics on environmental conditions, however, still lags behind. Within this milieu, most indicator systems are still in their early stages of development. At present, these indicator systems are only useful for government and civil society officials participating in their development. More strategic approaches are needed before these indicator systems can inform governance effectively.

REDEFINING THE ASIAN SPACE: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF EVOLVING STREET CULTURE AND PEDESTRIAN SPACE DEVELOPMENT IN BANDUNG, BANGKOK AND MANILA

Iderlina Mateo-Babiano

Asian cities reflect a strong traditional knowledge distinct from their Western counterparts. This justifies the need to study a city's local knowledge to serve as potential input for a better understanding of pedestrian behavior and street use. The study is an extensive examination of streets in Bandung (Indonesia), Bangkok (Thailand) and Manila (the Philippines) on morphology, street sociology and pedestrian behavior. It identifies factors that affect local street culture, including the influence of historical trends, to further understand street morphogenesis, the interplay of movement and non-movement behavior and street space utilization. Asian space use, being unique from its Western counterpart, must be treated accordingly; the insights derived from this study may provide the key towards increased street livability in Asia.

ACADEMIC LIFEWORLDS, THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND DEEP DEMOCRACY IN THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES

Sharaad Kuttan

This essay outlines the process which transformed an abstract academic proposal into a re-examination of personal as well as collective struggles over the notions of the "intellectual" in both its institutional and social settings. It ends with a call to document intellectuals' histories as well as re-kindle the debates about the role of intellectuals and universities in society.

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