AMPO

NO.5

A Report from the Japanese New Left

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BEHIND THE BARBED WIRE: BLACK REBELLION AT IWAKUNI MARINE BASE

Unprecedented things are happening at the Marine Corps Air Station at Iwakuni. On April 5 more than 200 anti-war and radical citizens demonstrated outside the base. This was no ordinary demonstration, for added to the old demands for an end to the war and removal of the base were some significant new slogans: "Solidarity with anti-war G.I.s", "Opposition to racism", "opposition to riot training on the base". These slogans were no empty words. For months now the base has been in a state of near rebellion. Rising discontent has been met with greater repression. The new mood showed in the response of the GIs...where ten years ago they would have been giving the demonstrators the finger, now they were flashing the V sign.

The Marine Air Station at Iwakuni is a base of increasing importance in U.S.-Japanese military strategy. It is the Headquarters of the First Marine Air Wing, most of which is in Vietnam. As in Nixon's withdrawal program proceeds, units are being pulled back from Vietnam to Iwakuni, and the base is growing in strength. "Withdrawal" it turns out is not quite the same as sending the troops home; Iwakuni has been redeveloped into a major strategic center facing China and...most important for 70s...Korea.

But inside the barbed wire things are not going smoothly. The Marine Corps has been far from immune to the mood of discontent which is spreading through the U.S. military everywhere. The last of the services to integrate, the marines have been hushing up race riots since at least the fifties. But the new generation of blacks is notoriously hard to hush up. And now they are not alone: at Iwakuni there is also a branch of the American Servicemen's Union.

Between October 22 and November 22, 1969, the Air Station was kept on a state of perpetual riot alert. Significantly, this was precisely the period when Japan was in a condition of near-rebellion on the occasion of Prime Minister Sato's visit to America. Following this the Pentagon sent a special inspection team to Iwakuni to look into the condition of disorder. The squadrons began to receive intensive riot training...one squadron received 20 hours of such training between Feb. 23 and 27. It appears that this training is for use both against rebellions of G.I.s and against Japanese.

On Jan. 5 black rebellion erupted at Iwakuni. There were many arrests and many injuries...at least one man was hospitalized. Following this outburst...which was not the first...the command really began to crack down. Barracks patrols were established. Black Marines walking in groups of threes and fours were ordered to break up. The common was clearly frightened.

In an attempt to ease the pressure, the command set up a "Human Relations Committee". And on Feb.5 the new base commander, Brig. Gen. William C. Johnson, arranged a meeting in which he personally heard complaints from G.I.s. About 80 marines, fifty black and ten white, attended. One of them smuggled in a tape recorder and taped the entire proceedings. When the command learned that the meeting had been taped a search was initiated, and suspects were questioned and harrassed. The tape was not found, however, and was turned over to Beheiren, which made its contents public at a press conference several weeks ago. AMPO is now in possession of a transcript of the tape, a document which runs 34 pages single spaced. We plan to include an edited version of it in our next issue; at present we will limit ourselves to a few comments.

This transcript is a truly fascinating record of our times. The General, behaving like a perfect Liberal, worked hard to come on like a True Friend of the People. He proceeded to break up the problem into a series of piecemeal reform measures that could be handled by the system: a few new books in the library, a change in the regulations for civilian dress, a post order reminding people not to call black marines "boy" and "nigger," etc. The blacks, on the other hand, grew increasingly frustrated with this and insisted on raising the discuss-

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ion to a different level. The general was treated to language like the following:

"...you don't have no way of findin' out about us, and because you don't have any way of findin' out about us you think we're the same dumb old niggers or the sex fiends or the sex dudes that you've always been afraid of deep down inside. So therefore the same thing is goin on and on.... time is just retrogressin' as far as our progress is concerned....And we rebel against it...you say they're riots. Well a riot is something that happens sporadic; we say they're a rebellion. A rebellion is a physical discontentment or a physical way of showin' your dissatisfaction for the system the way it is today. Then when we fight and when we express ourselves in the only way we know how, we get the shaft. And the reason I say the only way we know how, is because...that's the only thing you understand. The reason that's the only thing you understand is because that's what America stands for! No. no, it represents the land of the free and the home of the brave, it doesn't stand for that... that's 180 out. You stand for fightin' and you stand for violence and you stand for bloodshed and when we start doin this this is when you react. We've been tryin'...brothers in the services, brothers on the outside, the people who we represent have been tryin' to talk to you people, we've been tryin to get with you people. Ever since we were freed in 1865...but you refused to see it that way and then along about 1965 when brothers really started gettin' themselves together, going out there and throwing knuckles, and givin' the power, and takin heads...then you people sit back and say well, I guess we better do somethin' about these niggers because if we don't watch out, they're gonna git us..."

The general seems to have been genuinely puzzled, not understanding how or why anyone would raise problems which could not be solved within the context of the Marine Corps organization: "Now if you've asking an impossibility to begin with, can you really expect solutions? If you're proceeding with good faith, that's something else again."

The blackmmarines, on the other hand, saw things in a different light: "...I don't see how the problems can be solved when you consider each one, each problem as an individual problem.and...fail to see how each one of 'em are connected in a certain way."

The resistance movement of Iwakuni has reached a stage of open rebellion. As at all bases in Japan, cooperation is increasing between rebellious GIs and Japanese peace groups. A new branch of "Radio Camp-Must-Go" has been opened at Iwakuni. The GI's own underground paper "Semper Fi" is distributed with the help of Japanese groups. And of course this is only a beginning.

This new alliance between resisting GIs and Japanese radicals is something to watch...it may become the basis for some of the most powerful political developments of the early 70s.

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PART : 4

OKINAWA IN THE AMERICAN EMPIRE

"The Ryukyus, surrounded on three sides by major powers of East Asia, are the most strategic outpost of freedom in the Far East. Known as the "Keystone of the Pacific," Okinawa, the most important island is 800 nautical miles southwest of Tokyo, 325 nautical miles northeast of Taipei, 750 nautical miles northeast of Manila and 700 nautical miles northeast of Hong Kong."

Thus begins a brief survey of the geography of Okinawa in the official 1968 Facts Book of the U.S. High Commissioner of the Ryukyus. Delicately left unstated is the fact that the nerve center of America's mammoth military network is also less than 1,500 miles from the capitals and major industrial centers of North Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union. As a result of this strategic location, the United States has turned Okinawa into the major armed fortress for its far-flung military operations in Asia.

President Kennedy, on March 19, 1962 emphasized Okinawa's importance as the United States was realizing its military strategy for the era of counter-insurgency:

> The armed strength deployed at these bases is of the greatest importance in maintaining our deterrent power in the face of threats to the peace in the Far East. Our bases in the Ryukyu Islands help us assure our allies in the great arc from Japan through Southeast Asia not only of our willingness but also of our ability to come to their assistance in case of need.

Within a few short years Okinawa lived up to Kennedy's highest expectations. As the Vietnam War was rapidly accelerating, the August 30, 1965 Newsweek reported on military operations in that "strategic keystone"

> which has become one vast supply dump, training ground and advanced staging area for U.S. forces in the Far East. Virtually every item in America's mighty arsenal---from jungle knives to nuclear weapons ---is stored here. Kadena Air Force Base, just north of Naha, is one of the world's busiest airports, handling 10,000 landings and take-offs per month. Attack transports and other Navy vessels steam endlessly in and out of White Beach harbor. Camps, firing ranges and supply depots are scattered the length and breadth of the island and the roads are clogged with jeeps and olive-drab troop trucks. Guerrilla-warfare specialists train in the island's steamy jungles and Army and Marine units maneuver in battalion strength on the ridges, beaches and coral-encrusted flatlands. And somewhere on Okinawa are four launching sites for Mace B nuclear missiles* which, with a range of 1,200 miles, can easily reach into Communist China.

Kadena Air Base has of course subsequently become much busier as a major staging area for B-52 bombing raids which have devastated North and South Vietnam. But Okinawa is not only military hardware and nuclear bases vital to the perpetuation of America's Asian empire. It is also the home of nearly one million people who have lived for 25 years under American colonial rule. This article considers the record of "democratization and modernization" of the major area of direct American administration in the postwar era. Here if anywhere, unimpeded by the vagaries and vested interests of reactionary native elites, American ideals of progress and development would surely flourish. As the U.S. prepares for the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty (simultaneously maneuvering to insure the perpetuation of its bases and nuclear installations), the time has come to assess the record of Okinawa's colonial era.

*While the U.S. officially refuses to acknowledge whether it has installed nuclear weapons in Okinawa, "Somewhere" has since been identified as Yomitan, Katsuren, Kin and Onna villages.

STRIKING BASEWORKERS (ZENGUNRO) REPRESENT GROWING DETERMINATION OF OKINAWAN PEOPLE TO RECLAIM THEIR FREEDOM.

In 1945 American taught the Okinawan people, whose homeland had never before been the site of a major armed conflict, the meaning of war. In a three-month campaign that left much of the islands a sea of flame and decimated its population, American forces broke the back of the Japanese military effort. The U.S. has not subsequently resorted to napalm and saturation bombing of the civilian population. It has not had to. Until recently the Okinawan people have been relatively quiet in the face of American might. Nevertheless, since 1945 they have been victimized by American militarism: as nuclear hostages, since the islands are of course prime targets in the event of global conflict; as economic hostages because the Okinawans are lashed to the military-base complex for their livelihood; as political hostages, forced to live under the colonial domination of the American military; above all, as hostage human beings the Okinawans are forced to lead a life of degredation, humiliation and dependency.

The consequences of American rule flow directly from conceptions governing official policy established at the outset. In the bland phraseology of the Facts Book, "The mission of the United States Civil Administration of Ryukyu Islands is to assure that this strategic area will contribute most effectively to the peace and security of the free world." Behind the rhetorical flourishes of democratic concern for the Okinawan people, administrators have gone about their real business of strengthening American military power to the detriment of the local population. Okinawa's "civil administration" is directly controlled by the Pentagon which appoints its High Commissioner, invariably a high ranking general. While the people are tutored in democracy through the ritualistic election of a legislature and executives, the American High Commissioner retains absolute control over the islands. The High Commissioner

> if such action is deemed by him to be important in its effect, direct or indirect, on the security of the Ryukyu Islands, or on relations with foreign countries and international organizations with respect to the Ryukyu Islands, or on the foreign relations of the United States, or on the security, property or interests of the United States or nationals thereof, may, in respect of Ryukyuan bills, laws or officials, as the case may be (1) veto any bill or any part or portion thereof, (2) annul any law or any part or portion thereof within 45 days after its enactment, and (3) remove any public official from office... The High Commissioner may assume in whole or in part, the exercise of full authority in the Islands, if such an assumption of authority appears mandatory for security reasons.

In short, Okinawan democracy is a puppet show in which a powerless people is manipulated by its military masters. But it is not only in the realm of electoral politics that democracy is a sham. In the entire range of institutions from a dual system of justice which shields Americans from convictions for crimes against the Okinawan people, to the ban on such elementary civil liberties as the right of labor unions to strike (an issue to which we will return below), we find the stamp of direct military exploitation.

Nowhere is this pattern of military domination more evident than in the economy. The Oriental Economist in its January feature on Okinawa summed it up this way:

> Okinawa has for more than two decades since the war been segregated from Japan and its economy is completely subservient to the U.S. dollar because of overwhelming dependence on United States military base operations...Described in the simplest terms, the economy of Okinawa is a "military-base economy."

The Okinawan economy is not merely tied to the American dollar which is the official currency ("Liberty" and "In God We Trust" go to market with every peasant villager). The entire economy exists to serve the military.

The first step in this militarization of the economy came in 1945 with the confiscation of vast areas of primary farm land which previously provided the livelihood of the overwhelming majority of Okinawans. American bases today span 75,000 acres, 26 per cent of the entire chain. But this does not begin to tell the real story. Concentrated in the heavily populated area in the center of the major island, the bases turned 46 per cent of Okinawa's arable land into a sea of cement airstrips and missile installations. The result was to cripple Okinawa's agrarian economy, forcing dependence on American food imports and depriving tens of thousands of their livelihood and way of life. The single option for survival was to accept employment from the American military.

The dependency and humiliation characteristic of colonial status have taken on a singularly brutal form in Okinawa where American and Okinawan life-styles are so sharply juxtaposed, where economic alternatives to serving the military have been systematically eliminated, and where the colonial rulers consist almost entirely of soldiers. Perhaps nowhere in the world is the landscape so dominated by barbed-wire enclosed military bases, guarded airstrips and barracks alternating with the garish symbols of the American military life-style abroad---golf courses, swimming pools, recreation areas, clubs and dependent housing, a parody of Los Angeles suburbia.

For more than 50,000 GI's, the Okinawa population exists to provide them ease and pleasure. Above all this means sex which sells for about $4 except when payday sends the price up to $5. Moreover, with the active support of the American military authorities, Okinawa has recently become the "pot capital" of Asia. Reliable estimates indicate that 70 to 80 per cent of the GI's buy oblivion while serving their time by smoking marijuana and turning on many of the local prostitutes. The pure power of American wealth has produced a whole new subculture, utterly alien to traditional modes of behavior, in which the daughters of farming and fishing villages don scarlet dresses to act out the tortured fantasies of American teenagers in khaki. Perhaps the ultimate expression of imperialist power lies in forcing its victims to conform to the grotesque patterns of the repressed lusts of the conqueror. The combination of degradation and dependency is rooted in the new economic order which the Americans have brought to Okinawa.

Through the manipulation of power, water, roads, ports and air facilities, the U.S. administration has created an economic infrastructure geared to reinforcing the islands' military potential. Once again Okinawa interests have been sacrificed in the process. One-sixth of the entire work force is directly employed by the military (40,000 workers) and government (34,000). And this is but a fraction of those forced to live off the American presence. There are an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 prostitutes and bar girls as well as more than 10,000 maids employed by American servicemen (all officers and many enlisted men have servants, a luxury made possible by the depressed Okinawan wage scale). Tens of thousands of others work in the wide range of subsidiary industries and services which cater to American pleasures.

Despite the Vietnam-war-inspired economic boom of the past five years, the Okinawan people remain locked in the grip of poverty. Per capita income in fiscal year 1967 was $580, barely sixty per cent of the Japanese average. The $.17 per hour average wage the U.S. government and military paid its Okinawan employees in 1955 had of course risen---along with inflation. By January 1968 these employees averaged a munificent $.71 per hour including bonuses.

The overwhelming dependence of the Okinawan economy on the military is revealed in the pattern of exports and imports.

Foreign Trade Summary (in thousands of U.S. dollars)

	Imports	Exports	Trade Balance
FY 1955	$51,200	$10,682	$ -40,518
FY 1960	116,811	24,037	-92,774
FY 1965	210,704	79,403	-131,301
FY 1968	373,662	87,369	-286,293

By fiscal year 1968 Okinawa's mounting trade deficit had climbed to $286,293,000, nearly one-third of its entire $644,000,000 gross national product. The total value of exports was barely twenty per cent of imports, a characteristic feature of the entire period of American rule. This massive deficit was balanced, and could only be balanced, by the influx of U.S. dollars to pay government and military employees, thereby completing the circle of military dependence. The islands are deprived of their richest land. Their power, transport and resource facilities are channeled to the service of the military. Okinawan economic life develops inevitably as a parasitic appendage of the American military. Okinawans man the bases from which America wreaks destruction throughout Asia and staff a civil administration which is the pawn of American designs. Starvation is virtually the only alternative to degrading service in the direct employ of the American military, except of course becoming servants or prostitutes to its men in uniform.

The tragic dilemma of the Okinawan people has been highlighted by the wave of strikes by Zengunro, the Okinawan military base workers union. Representing more than 20,000 base workers, Zengunro was organized in the face of severe

official repression. The union is not recognized by the American authorities as a bargaining agent for the workers; strikes are illegal, and workers, particularly union "troublemakers," can be fired with little notice by the arbitrary action of the military. Indeed, the recent decision to fire several hundred base workers was the immediate cause of the current wave of strikes which have severely crippled the functioning of the bases. Beginning in January 1970, the strike is shortly scheduled to enter its third wave. For the first time in twenty-five years Okinawans have effectively challenged the American military by striking at the heart of its power. On an even more fundamental level the strikes represent a new level of Okinawan political consciousness. Zengunro strikers are fighting not only to protect the livelihood of their members; they are attacking the bases themselves, struggling against American military domination over Okinawan life and challenging the use of their homeland as a staging area for the Vietnam War. The strikers have simultaneously demanded an end to Okinawa's base-ridden economy and society while struggling to protect the only livelihood presently available to them---work on the bases.

The military is not the entire Okinawa story, however. During twenty-five years of colonial rule the administration has insured the iron grip of American capital on the Okinawan market. In the words of Oriental Economist, "In a nutshell, the Okinawan economy can be described as foreign controlled." We have already observed the effects of U.S. control of Okinawan resources and establishment of the dollar as official currency. In addition, the banking system is dominated by the American government and private enterprises in combination. Bank of America and American Express are the major private banking institutions. But the most important bank on Okinawa is the official Ryukyu Bank, directly controlled by the U.S. administration, which holds more than 50 per cent of its capital. As of June 30, 1969 American investments of $229,254,000 (exclusive of banking, insurance and airlines for which statistics are not available) constituted the lion's share of a total $240,055,000 of investment. If these are dwarfed by American investments elsewhere in Asia, they nevertheless dominate major sectors of the Okinawan economy. In contrast, Japanese investments, centered in sugar refining, pineapple canning and hotels, total only $8,000,000. The record of foreign investment in Okinawa reveals the classical pattern of colonial dependency. Investment by the colonizing power dominates the economy. The major flow of dollars is into extractive industries, agriculture and tourism, while industrial capacity is virtually non-existent. Enterprises operated by Okinawans invariably lack the strength to compete with the foreign giants. The political and military dependency of the colonized people is mirrored in the econom

If Okinawa as an economic entity casts only a pale shadow beside its immense strategic stature, in one industry the multi-national corporations are waging a fierce battle for control. That is oil. The $217,000,000 investment in refineries by four American giants (Gulf, Caltex, Esso and Kaiser Cement) overshadows the remainder of the American economic stake and suggests important dimensions of the struggle not only for Okinawa but for entree into lucrative Japanese markets. In establishing refineries in Okinawa shortly before its reversion to Japan, these companies seek a springboard to Japan and a means to evade tight Japanese restrictions on foreign-controlled enterprises. At this writing the dance of the oil conglomerates is just beginning as each seeks to outmaneuver the Japanese government and its own business rivals by means of intricate mergers with Japanese business partners.

While ensuring the hegemony of its military interests and controlling investment rights to safeguard the primacy of American capital, the colonial administration has wantonly sacrificed the interests of the Okinawan people. The basic industrial infrastructure remains primitive (except from a logistic perspective), forming a primary obstacle to subsequent industrial development of the area. Meanwhile, the U.S. has already cut back its aid to Okinawa for fiscal 1971 by more than two-thirds to less than $7,000,000. As in the case of America's formative colonial experience in the Philippines, the officially heralded departure of the Stars and Stripes finds the local population locked in the grip of dependency, degredation and underdevelopment, the victim of unbridled American ambitions in the Pacific.

AN INTERVIEW WITH AKEHIRO AKITA:

NOTE

This issue contains our first articles on the Japanese student left. As our readers are no doubt aware, the student left is a complete structure composed of a large number of parties and sects, and many non-sect radicals. It is impossible to give adequte treatment to the student left in a single issue. So we had to begin somewhere. We hope there are no political detections among our readers who want to conclude that because Sekigun and the Fourth International are the first sects we have treated, that there exists any special relationship between Beheiren and these groups. We are sure that they would be as embarassed as would Beheiren by such an inference.

STUDENT REBELLION AT NIHON UNIVERSITY

AMPO: Well, first let's begin by asking about the Nichidai (Nihon university) battle itself...could you give a brief description of what the Nichidai struggle was all about, what some of the principal events were, how it fits into the wider perspective of the many student movements that have been going on in the country?

Akita: The Nichidai struggle actually broke out on May 23, 1968 when about 1000 students of the Economics Department engaged in a 200 meter demonstration...

AMPO: 200 meters was the length of the demonstration? Were you stopped after 200 meters?

Akita: No...you see at Nichidai the students had been under the complete control of the administration, there was no freedom there at all. In that situation the students didn't even know what a demonstration was. But on the 23rd we had a meeting in the Economics Department building, and we were attacked by the right wing. We had to express our anger by some means or another.... there hadn't been any plan for a demonstration, but the 200 meter demonstration was the expression of our anger. We had no particular goal in mind, we just walked the 200 meters and that was it. But the very fact that there had been a demonstration at all...there had been no such thing at Nichidai since the war...or for that matter in the 80 year history of the University. So the effect was to give new courage to the other students, who when they saw our demonstration felt that they should demonstrate also.

The special characteristic of Nichidai, as contrasted to Todai (Tokyo University), is that while the aim of Todai is to train high level bureaucrats and technicians, and also to produce the ideologues who will support the establishment, the purpose of Nichidai is the mass production of middle level technicians. And the system of domination at Nichidai was quite unusual. It had two elements... the first was a system of violent repression on the campus, mainly by the right wing athletic clubs. The second element was the system of censorship...the ordinary human rights of holding meetings, freedom of speech, freedom of publication, freedom to form organizations all of which are guaranteed by the constitution, were completely denied for the students at Nihon U.. So there was no freedom to organize and activists were not allowed to engage in any form of activity. Another shocking aspect of Nichidai was the commercialism of the administration. The fees paid by the students were used for a variety of purposes, which is best illustrated by the scandal which broke out on April 14 of this year, when it was discovered that two billion yen was unaccounted for, and had been embezzeled.

So the fierce repression of the students combined with the discovery of the embezzelment by the administration of these immense sums of money (which originally came from students tuition payments ...these were the sources of the struggle at Nichidai.

AMPO: So then, given the fact that this was the first struggle at this university and also at this kind of a university, then it should be understood that the Nichidai movement was not just another student struggle, but represents a whole new sort of student struggle

...a qualitative change in the radical scene in Japan.

Akita: It's a mistake to put it so simply, but in general the Nichidai struggle does represent a qualitative change as you say. But another thing which I should point out is the fact that it was about 1968 when the Zenkyoto movement began. Since about 1960 the New Left had been characterized by the multiplicity of the sects... Chukaku, Hantei Gappyo, M.L... political factions. The Zenkyoto movement, in common with Beheiren, is a political movement without a definite program. It emphasizes direct democracy, the individual, interpersonal relationships...its point of departure is with the individual. That is, according to the sects, the revolutionary theor comes first, and the movement is built on the basis of this preconceived theory. But in the Zenkyoto movement, the individual begins his struggle against the oppression which he himself feels, and against the people who are oppressing him, and theory is created during the process. This I think is a new element which was introduced into the new left around that time partly by the Nichidai struggle and partly by the Todai struggle.

AMPO: One more question about the special characteristics of Nichidai. In America there are also differences between the struggles at different universities. They began also with the struggles at the elite universities...radicalism was a kind of privilege of the children of the upper class. But when struggles opened at for example places like S.F. State College...it isn't completely true but its largely true that the people at S.F. State come from a different class. So there are many more black people, Mexicans, minority groups, and working class students there. So the effect of that was to build new contacts between radicalism and the lower classes in the society...the working class. I wonder if a similar thing could be said about Nichidai.

Akita: Well, I don't like that way of thinking. There is a kind of popular belief that some people have that the student movement is an elite activity, but I think that's wrong...in the fight itself, students aren't fighting because they are elites, but because they have been oppressed. Of course if you look at it socially Nichidai represents an elite, but it's nothing compared to Todai. So there were people who thought that way...after the movement began they thought, "So you can do that kind of thing even at Nichidai." But wherever there is oppression people will fight against it, and the most radical kind of fight is that in which people are staking their lives. For example at Nichidai on June 11, 1968, 300 members of the rightist groups...the athletic clubs and some university employees...came armed with both Japanese swords and wooden swords and attacked 6000 demonstrating students. It was after that that the barricades were built on the campus, the buildings were occupied and sealed up by the students. The reason they did this was to protect themselves from attack, because they knew that attack was very likely. And the barricades were very strong, because the students knew their lives were at stake.

As for the connection between us and the workers, and between our university and other universities, this became a real question after the riot police began to attack us, and after the intervention of the government. On September 30,1968 we won a victory in our collective bargaining session with the administration, but on the very next day, Prime Minister Sato publicly denounced this mass bargaining and said that it was unacceptable, saying that it was a kind of people's court. At this point our movement underwent a kind of qualitative change, and was deepened to where it attained a kind of universality. And on Nov. 22 we went to Tokyo University and we had a large rally there of students from various campuses and there was a movement towards the formation of a nationwide Zenkyoto; in other words an appeal was made at this rally bring the struggle to a universal level. We have had almost no actual joint actions with workers, except sometimes we take up collections together, but I think that if a struggle gets down to the essentials, if it begins to deal with the fundamental issues, it will of course have a great universality. And the Nichidai struggle was particularly important in that it involved a deepening of our personalities...it began with very personal issues and resulted in a deepening of our self-awareness. And for this reason the Nichidai struggle was actually rather popular...it was accepted quite widely by the public.

AMPO: I raised the question of elitism not to condemn anyone... far from it...anyone who's struggling...but because it's, in America anyhow, a real problem that people are debating about...the students themselves. For example within SDS there are in general two different views about the nature of the student and the student struggle. One view is that students in modern society is the same as proletarians, objectively. And therefore if they frame their issues correctly a student struggle is as revolutionary as a proletarian struggle...fundamentally they're just as exploited as workers, and if they struggle on the correct issues, then they're no less revolutionary or no less a vanguard. And there's another position, which is that students are objectively in a position of privilege, and if from that position they make demands then they are simply demanding privilege, and therefore they have to deny... abandon...their privileged position, and go to the workers, since the true struggle has to be proletarian. Sometimes they even argue that students should quit the university and go work in a factory, which is the only place where anything real can happen. It sounds as if you agree with the first position, but I wonder what you have to say about that.

Akita: In their basic existence I certainly don't think that you can say that students and workers are the same. What I do think is that workers and students can achieve a certain amount of solidarity in the midst of the struggle itself. With respect to the question of students entering factories, I suppose that such a thing could be done, I certainly can't deny that it could perhaps be done, and it seems that it would be a good idea if it could be done. But I have doubts about whether such a thing is practicable as a movement. And I don't think that the view that says university struggles are demands for privileges is entirely correct...the correct type of university struggle is one which aims specifically at destroying those privileges...the privileged aspects of the univerity.

AMPO: When you talk about destroying university privileges what concretely do you have in mind? While capitalism continues to exist in what sense can you say that you can destroy the privileged aura of the university?

Akita: I think this question relates to the actual process of the movement, the way it is carried out. During the Todai movement the expression jiko hitei (self negation) appeared. The point is that the privileged position of the student is negated in the process of the movement. In the case of the Nichidai struggle we had from the beginning four principal slogans and nine demands, and in the process of the movement of attempting to realize the demands, which we felt were quite justified and correct...very ordinary demands about democratization of the campus, free speech, rights of holding rallies...in the process of this movement we clashed with the authorities, and discovered that behind them state power was concealed, and revealed itself. So our fight changed from a fight for these demands into a fight against the established order itself. And I think that in the process of such a struggle one's elite consciousness is denied, and there is this process of self-negation which occurs during the struggle.

AMPO: So then you're saying that you begin from an objective position of privilege and then use the struggle to destroy it, is that it?

Akita: Of course there are special privileges that are enjoyed by students in all universities, but I think that as the student movement is carried forward it becomes necessary to discard this privileged consciousness. But of course if the fight is for certain demands only, if it is limited to a reform movement, then privileged consciousness is never denied, and the movement never becomes universal. So I think that a struggle must be raised from the level of reform slogans to the level of an anti-establishment struggle. Anyway the struggles are not over...the fight which began in 1968 have continued on a day to day basis ever since and won't be over for a very long time...maybe they will never end.

AMPO: So in other words what really matters is the way in which you carry on a struggle...the terms in which it is carried on.

Akita: I think so...you can't say it so simply, but...

Yoshioka (a reporter of Shukan Ampo present at the interview): I say something? Relating to the earlier discussion...I think is a difference between the new left movement before 1968 and t Zenkyoto movement which began then; in a sense the pre-1968 sec movement has been placed in the shadow of the Zenkyoto movement. This has a definite social meaning. Before 1968 the state power was somehow concealed from view, kept out of sight by for exampl the post-war reconstruction of Japan and such things as the 1964 Olympics. This condition existed until 1968 when the Zenkyoto movement erupted. The peculiarity of the Zenkyoto movement was that it began from a place that was very close to people, it beg in response to the repression and injustice that existed immedia surrounding the life of the individual, was built from a direct sense of outrage, and was a direct struggle against this immedia injustice. So I think it would be a mistake to call the Zenkyot movement reformist, I think it was a struggle which revealed the state power, evoked it to come forth and disclose its true natur So for example if Furuta, the head of Nihon U. had admitted the fact that the money had been embezzled, I don't think the strugg would have ended at that point. What was important was that fin ly the full violence of the state power was brought into full vi At the same time we came to see ourselves for the first time...o own essense. And also we came to see the people in the process. You could call it a struggle against the establishment, or you could call it the beginning of revolution.

So I think that if you call the sect-left the "New Left" the you should call the Zenkyoto and Beheiren left the "New-new left

AMPO: I understand, Mr. Akita, that you are non-sect. Could yo explain that position...what does it mean to you..?

Akita: Well...I don't like organizations, any kind of organizat I like the Zenkyoto organization because it contains no power of compulsion, you can enter it or leave it any time you feel like this is the kind of organization that appeals to me (laughing). I don't like any kind of restraint...that's why I've stayed non-sect.

AMPO: If the Zenkyoto mode of organization is so loose and free as you say, is it possible that such an organization can continue In other words, do you think that something like the Zenkyoto organization is only...is in its very nature something that can exist only temporarily, under very peculiar circumstances of very spontaneous action on the part of everyone? Or is it conceivable that such an organization could go on, and could be the organiz- ation that can carry through social change or revolution, and eve be the model for organizations of the future?

Akita: On the question of whether the Zenkyoto organization is "loose"...what I meant was that it contains no coercive force... there was no one telling you that you had to do this or that you couldn't do that. People in it are autonomous, and have the power of making their own decisions...this is what I meant. And anyone who is in opposition to the Zenkyoto is free to leave it at any time. There is a specific content to the movement, a basis upon which you can decide whether to participate in it or not. But of course in the process of confronting state power you must create definite patterns of organization. In our case there is a struggle committee in each department of the university... and for example inside the barricades we had to have an organiz- ation to cook the meals, and there were action committees which organized independent lectures...like a free university...and there has to be a committee to give legal aid to people who are arrested. When you spoke of spontaneity...in the case of the sects there is a definite revolutionary theory which is created in advance, and the movement is derived from this; we had nothing like this, but we did have...apart from the question of whether they were right or wrong...a definite set of principles and patterns by which we carried on the fight. We had a very goal-conscious pattern of action. But we were able to do this without distorting the emotions...without emotional dishonesty. So if a revolution ever does occur someday in Japan, I think the Zenkyoto

movement will have had a definite influence...the people who engaged in the struggle in 1968-69 are having an influence on Japanese society. Probably the future mode of organization will not be the same as the Zenkyoto pattern of 1968-69; we have come to a point where we must change certain things, we are going through a transitional period right now. I personally have no idea what the future pattern of development will be in the movement.

AMPO: Yeah, when I said "loose" organization, that was a bad choice of words; I didn't simply mean disorganized organization, or bad organization...I should have said non-repressive organization, I think that's perhaps the accurate way of putting it.

This is just a comment. I suppose it's true that once any large group of people has had the experience of organizing both effectively and non-repressively they are very unlikely to forget that, and other people are very unlikely to forget that, and it makes people much less willing after that to enter into repressive organizational contexts, once you know that it can be done non-repressively. Perhaps that's what you mean by future influence.

Akita: (nods)

AMPO: This may be a rather rude question, and you don't have to answer it, but if you feel any affinity for any of the presently existing sects, what sect would that be?

Akita: I feel no particular affinity towards any of the sects, and this follows from my own ideological position. Because you see I am not trying to make a revolution, I am not struggling for the purpose of making a revolution. However the sects are also fighting against the same oppression as I am, and I have no intention at all of opposing them or of clashing with them so long as that is true. But my affinity is towards a kind of non-organizational organization, and so I incline towards Zenkyoto and also towards Beheiren.

AMPO: When we interviewed Oda (Oda Makoto, the Beheiren Chairman) one of his comments was that he was not revolutionary but that he didn't think it mattered because if he decided to be revolutionary he wouldn't do anything different from what he is doing already... he would continue to do just the same things, and the people who he knew who said they were revolutionary were doing just what he was doing. I wonder if that's your position.

Akita: (laughing) Exactly...well, about the same.

AMPO: Since none of our readers know anything about the Nichidai struggle, can I ask you what your personal role was in it, and is in it now.

Akita: Well, I entered Nichidai in 1965. During the first year I spent most of my time in sports...I was on the swimming team, and the training was very intense. But it was a very carefree time. In my second year I transferred from Mishima (Shizuoka Pref.) to the Economics Department in Misaki (Tokyo), where for the first time I could see the realities of Nichidai and the realities of Tokyo. It's been almost four years now that I have been engaged in the student movement as an activist; at the beginning I was not much engaged in political struggles...in my second year I participated in demonstrations against the war in Vietnam, but I was very busy both with my studies and with the campus problems. In December 1967 I was elected the Student Self-government Association of the Economi Department, and became exposed to the extremely repressive atmospher in the campus. I was threatened frequently by the rightists, threatened by the school authorities, we were not allowed to hand out leaflets or publish our own paper. This situation reached the exploding point on April 23, 1968 with the 200 meter demonstration which we staged in the Economics Department. In late May I became the head of the Nichidai Zenkyoto. On September 4 and 5 the barricades in the Law and Economics Departments were removed by the riot police and 132 students stayed to fight it out to the finish with the police. Then on Sept. 12 we succeeded in recapturing the Law and Economics buildings and reoccupied. Then around late October a warrent was issued for my arrest, for breaking the

Tokyo Public Safety Ordinance and for obstructing police in their duties. But I stayed in the struggle until March 12 1969 even though I was on the police "wanted" list and they were searching for me all over Japan. I was able to keep from being caught because we still had the barricades until January, but after the barricades were removed I had to go underground, and I was hidden in houses of workers and citizens. But I was finally arrested on March 12 and was kept in Jail until December 26 last year...in the Tokyo Detention House.

AMPO: I understand that you were hidden in the house of a lady journalist when you were arrested, a Mrs. Togawa. Could you tell us about the persecution which she suffered after you were arrested?

Akita: Yes, after I was arrested Mrs. Togawa was also arrested and charged with "harboring a criminal", and kept in jail for ten days. This crime of "harboring a criminal" is one that has practically never been applied in the past, certainly never in cases involving the student movement. Mrs. Togawa was sentenced by the district court in early September to six months' imprisonment, with the sentence suspended for two years. At the beginning she and her lawyers were convinced that the punishment would be simply a fine...the amazingly heavy sentence shows how severe is the repression that is being carried on through the legal system today. For example a few years ago the bail for students was usually set at 20 or 30 thousand yen, but today it is usually set at 60 or 70 thousand, or 100 thousand. And up to about three years ago a student who was arrested could expect to stay in jail for three nights and four days, but starting around 1968 anyone who was arrested was detained from three months to ten months, or even a year. This is a good evidence that the movement has been really damaging to the power structure, and the power structure is trying hard to destroy the movement.

AMPO: What is the nature of the charges against you, and what are the maximum punishments you could get? In particular, have you been singled out for special punishment, have special charges been leveled against you that haven't against others?

Akita: The crimes that I was charged with had to do with the struggles at Nichidai beginning on September 4 1968 and extending through October. But I was kept in jail for nearly ten months without bail... The reason they gave for this long period of detention...actually they gave two reasons. One reason the court gave was that they were afraid that if I were released I would be able to hide evidence. The second reason was that they said I had no fixed residence. In fact I had a place to live all along in Asagaya, but they claimed that I didn't return there very often. And as for the danger of destroying or hiding evidence, I had been free for nearly six months after the warrent had been sworn out for my arrest, and if I had wanted to destroy evidence I could have done it easily during that time. So this was only a pretext. And at the time that I applied for release on bail, the court changed its reason for refusal from the fact that I "had no fixed residence" to the fact that I "might hide evidence." It seemed suspicious to me that they could suddenly change their reasons... it was obvious that what they really wanted was to keep me confined as long as possible to keep me from rejoining the movement, that's the reason I was held for nearly ten months. I should add that the trial is still continuing...there are five of us who are defendents ...the trial will probably go on for a long time.

AMPO: What are the maximum punishments for the crimes you are charged with?

Akita: Well, I have the feeling that in the old days its the kind of thing they would have held you three days for without indictment and released.

AMPO: But what...on the statute books...could they legally give? (There follows a slightly confused discussion. It seems that Akita does not know the maximum possible punishment. In the past almost everyone who has been found guilty of such charges had been given a suspended sentence.)

Akita: Actually at first, on the arrest warrant, there were four charges...in addition to violating the public safety act and interfering with police was the charge of assembling with dangerous weapons, and then another one...what was it?...I can't remember... anyway they tried to stick four charges on me, but the prosecutors themselves realized that two of them wouldn't hold up, and so they were dropped.

AMPO: This may be rather rude, but...going again from American experiences, there have been a number of cases in which, in the middle of university struggles in some way a single person emerged as leader. For example during the FSM at Berkeley, Mario Savio; at the Columbia struggle, Mark Rudd, and in both of these cases that position of leader proved to be extremely painful to those individuals. Mark Rudd wrote afterwards that he thought that while there had been some advantages to him having been leader, on the whole it was a disadvantage to the movement. And Mario Savio, after the FSM was over, retired for a very long time to private life, in order just to recover. On the other hand in the SF State strike it was considered a great advantage that there was no single leader, either in the mass media or in the students views, which meant there was no one who could be arrested and cut the head off of the movement, and no one was forced to go through that painful experience, and, well, this may be an impolite question, but I wonder if you have any comments on the experience of being a leader in that kind of position...the advantages and disadvantages both for oneself and for the movement.

Akita. Well, let me ask you first...when you talk about the experience of being leader as painful, what concretely do you mean by that?

AMPO: Ahhh. In the case of Savio which is the case I know most directly because I was there at the time, first of all he carried, he felt a terrific responsibility. Secondly, I think, speaking frankly, I think he felt, since he had a great deal of power... I think anyone who is in a position with that much power has to watch himself with extreme care to make sure that he uses it honestly and always in accordance with the principles of the movement and so on. There are a lot of temptations, there are a lot of easy ways to do things, shortcuts that someone could take who has a lot of power focused in his own person. And there's always the fear, I suppose, of possible contradiction between having power focused in yourself and the principles in which that power is to be used, namely, a kind of autonomy and freedom for each individual. My point is not that such a position, being in such a position is necessarily contradictory to the movement, I don't mean that at all, but the responsibility for keeping it out of that contradiction must be very heavy on that person.

Akita: Yes, it's true that many people are effected by moves that I make...I am in the sort of position in which I am able to, and I am forced to, influence many people. However even though this is true, I still wish to maintain my autonomy as an individual. And the struggle to maintain my autonomy under these circumstances, that is my own personal struggle. Being the chairman of the Nichidai Zenkyoto I am exposed to a tremendous mass press campaign by the bourgeois mass media which tends to equate me with the movement: "The Nichidai struggle is Akita, Akita is doing it." But actually it's not that way, I'm only one of the people engaged in the struggle, and I still want to maintain my autonomy as a single human being. And I want to continue fighting to overcome the contradictions involved in my being in such a position.

And as to the advantages and disadvantages of a position of leadership...it seems to me that there should never be any advantages to being a leader. Of course I am a sort of a symbol, the power involved is a sort of symbolic power. There is in the Nichidai Zenkyoto a sort of atmosphere where people feel that things will begin to move if I am present. And it's true that the things that I desire are carried out in practice. And the contradiction in my present position has to do with this contradiction between leadership and autonomy as an individual.

AMPO: You say that there is a kind of atmosphere at Nichidai of waiting for you to tell them to do...something like that. And when I was talking about advantages and disadvantages of leadership I wasn't talking about for the leader himself, but for the movement, and precisely that mood in some way counts as a disadvantage...or does it, that's what I'm asking. It's a kind of mentality that clearly has to be abolished. Mayhe it's a question of using the leadership position to abolish the need for a leadership position. ...By the way I think these questions are a little presumptions... sorry.

Akita: Well, I don't know whether it can be done or not, but anyway it has to be tried. It seems to me that that is the way to look at the problem of my position and other problems like that.

AMPO: I understand that you spent ten months in jail and I imagine that you were in solitary all this time, and during that ten months what kind of sufferings did you go through, what kind of experiences did you go through in this atmosphere that was so insulated from the outside world?

Akita: Yes, I was in a solitary cell, which is about, I don't know, about the size of a three tatami room (about six square yards) as you know, and except for Sundays and holidays one is allowed only one visit per day for five minutes, and a thirty minute exercise period. The most painful thing was being unable to speak, this was especially true for about the first six months, being unable to have anyone to talk to. I was unable to objectify myself, that is, since there was no one there to discuss anything with I wasn't able to make clear my own existence. And it also bothered me that I couldn't write anything. At first I was allowed to write letters only three times a week, and so there was the struggle against loneliness, the struggle against the blank wall. And another thing was that for the past year or so I had been so totally engaged in the mass struggles that I had been unable to think things out clearly in my own mind, and I had felt that I would be able to clarify my thoughts in jail and so wanted very much to write. It wasn't easy to organize myself mentally in jail, thinking itself was a struggle...in fighting against the inhuman aspects of jail organizing my mind was my struggle.

However...rather strangely,..toward the end I began to read very well...at the beginning it had not been easy to read, I was allowed only three books in my cell at one time and it wasn't easy to read them, but towards the end of my term in jail I was calmer and I was able to read books one after another, and around October and November I even began to think that it would be good if I could stay in jail a little longer, just another six months and I could get in some real reading...I knew that when I got out I would be too busy.

AMPO: What kind of books did you read?

Akita: What kind of books....

AMPO: Literature? Philosophy? Sociology?...comic books?

Akita: (laughing) Comic books, and novels. Novels...by Yamamoto Shugoro...very popular, mass novels, they were given to me in the jail by my uncle, who is also a student and is a lot like me... he likes them, and so did I...I hadn't read them before. Also I read a book about the history of postwar Japan and I read some of the Marxist-Leninist classics...I had read a few of them before but I went through them again. I read a book called "Philosophy and man" by Takeuchi Yoshitomo. The Marxist works were Anti-Duhring, Wage, Labor, and Capital, and Lenin's Imperialism. A lot of different people brought me books...one person was in charge of bringing me all kinds of books but there was very little organization in the manner in which books were brought to me...I did read the Asahi Journal every week.

AMPO: I assume that when you began studying economics that you wanted to be an economist or have some position relating to economics. You've had some very powerful experiences in the last couple of years, and I wonder to what degree they've changed your life plans... maybe

this isn't the time to ask about your life plans because things are so much in flux, but if you do have any thoughts in that direction I wonder what they are?

Akita: Well, at this time I have no concrete plans about my future life. In my student days I was a kind of carefree person and was borne along with the stream of things...it's as if I was brought to the university on a conveyer belt. My thinking was characteristically bourgeois, I didn't particularly want to be rich, but of course I didn't went to be poor either...I wanted to be satisfied with an average, run of the mill existence. The only outstanding characteristic I had was an interest in society; in high school I was the most interested in sociology, which is why I entered the economics department. I first began engaging in movement activities in about October 1966, when I invited Professor Shibata Shingo of Hosei University, to address the students at our festival, and this was not permitted by the school authorities, and the anger that I felt then was the thing that first got me involved in the struggle. Of course from about April 1966 I was involved in a sociology study group, and I was very concerned about the Vietnam war. In the last four years that I have engaged in the struggle I have changed, and I think that the fundamental change is that I realize that I am no longer governed by the bourgeois value system...it is no longer dominant in me. I'm no longer afraid to be disciplined by the school authorities, I no longer feel it would be a disgrace to be expelled or dismissed from the university, and I feel that it is entirely justified to do the things I believe correct. How I will change in the future I have no idea...I have no concrete plans about my future life, but I've been in the university six years now ...this is my sixth year, and I think I am going through a transitional stage. I know I must leave the university eventually and I'll have to find out what my task will be in the future. My principle for the future is to live in such a way as not to deceive myself and to find a kind of life of which I will not have to be ashamed...that is enough.

AMPO: Did life in jail change you in any way...especially psychologically?

Akita: First of all, when I got out of jail for the first time I felt that...although during the ten months I had been in jail I had received information, and that information was not wrong, still when I came out and saw the actual situation, I saw that I had not been able to grasp the situation as a whole while I was in jail, the changes had been so vast; I felt dismayed, and understood what it means to be cut off for ten months. The isolation into which you are put in jail is very much to the advantage of the authorities.

Another thing I felt was that being in jail enables you to examine and to deepen your own thoughts, since there are no stimuli in jail, there is no relationship with others. Of course there is the relationship with the authorities, but there is no one else present to stimulate you and you are able to deepen your thoughts. My thinking didn't <u>change</u> at all in jail, but I had the feeling that I was able to deepen what I already had, I find that people's thinking, when it is brought down to the essense, is very simple...pure. This is what I discovered...that when you reduce your thinking to the bare essentials it turns out to be something quite simple and pure.

(There follows a rather confused discussion. AMPO wants to pose a closing question but can't think of one that isn't a little artificial...like "Do you have any message for the American movement". After talking it over for a while, Akita volunteers the following:)

Akita: About two years ago when the university struggles began in America, about the same time as the May Revolution in France, information about these events came to us through the mass media, and of course I don't know exactly what position these events occupy in the whole picture, but it seems that in the mechanized society young people are trying to find out about society. So we could see that these were not problems just concerning Nichidai or Japan, but problems of contemporary society as a whole. And I think it is necessary to ask questions about the whole...this is why these

events were very meaningful to me, especially the May revolution. And starting in 1968 Zenkyoto began street fighting, just like Paris in May. In our case tens of thousands of students filled Hakusan-dori (a street in Kanda district, Tokyo) and built barricades and stopped traffic for hours. And a similar kind of fight broke out on January 18 in connection with the Tokyo U. struggle. The only thing missing was that there was no connection with the workers as there was in France in May. Of course I don't know what will happen in the future, but if we succeed in creating an alliance between students and workers and citizens we will be able to build up a struggle which could be even greater than the one in Paris.

I know the American student movement only through the mass media so it's hard for me to formulate any definite appeals to it, but it seems to me that America is a kind of liberal-democratic country, but because of the question of the Black population this liberalism is very deceptive...And also I am very critical of America's policy toward Asia; there are 500,000 or so American soldiers in Vietnam and it seems to me that the American student movement must deal with these problems...but I guess that's obvious.

And I think that Japan's position in Asia is similar to that of America, I hear that in Southeast Asian countries people are first attacking the U.S. embassy, and then the Japanese embassy... it seems that Japan is coming to represent just what America represents in Southeast Asia. Someone mentioned this the other day in connection with Japan's economic aggression in Asia.

In the Asahi Shimbun (newspaper) there was a series of articles recently about the black population in America, and I was amazed to find out that there are areas in the U.S. where it is considered a disgrace for a white person to associate with black people and even to visit a black district, and that there are organizations whose sole purpose is the preservation of discrimination and who attack people...the Japanese reporter for the Asahi was attacked by one of these groups for associating with black people.

It seems that the American democracy exists side by side with a state of chaotic lawlessness, and if you look beneath the surface you find that American democracy is a white man's democracy only.

Note

This article was written before Expo 70 opened, and is based on the advance literature. Since Expo has opened it has proved to be more a tragi-comedy of errors than a pattern of bureaucratic and technological efficiency. It seems that Expo is a kind of overcrowded and badly managed penny arcade. Visitors stand in line two hours to enter pavillions. Multimedia electronic productions are strident, noisy, and brief. The young staff members are in rebellion because the authorities closed downago-go club in the Quebec Pavillion, which it seems was the only place where you could have any fun. Forty-three persons were injured when a moving sidewalk suddenly slammed to a halt knocking the riders down "like tenpins" as the newspaper put it. (It seems that when a loaded moving sidewalk stops, it becomes a long claustrophobic tunnel with no exit save at the ends). It Expo was built as an object of worship, it is increasingly becoming an object of popular derision. Nevertheless, the accompanying article may still be interesting as an expression of the intentions of the builders of Expo, if not of their capacity to carry out those intentions in practice.

AN INTERVIEW WITH KEN ABE

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST REPRESSION

"Abe-san, what kind of work do you do?"

My work has to do with exploring ways of struggling against the repression of the mass movement by the Japanese government and police which began in earnest in 1967. This work is what has been called Kyūtai activities -- kyūtai meaning "rescue countermeasures."

"What is the name of the political organization to which you belong?"

The Japan Revolutionary Communist League (Japanese Section of the Fourth International). Its students' organization is called the Student International.

"How many members of your organization are now imprisoned, and what is the number of political prisoners in Japan as a whole?"

I have no detailed information, but the number of people from our organization is 32 now. This includes persons arrested in connection with the Tokyo University struggle, persons who were arrested when they entered the South Korean Embassy in Tokyo on October 20, 1969, as well as those who were arrested during November, 1969. One of them is a worker. As for the overall picture, probably there are more than a thousand imprisoned in Japan today for political offenses. Almost all of them have been detained for prolonged periods of six months to one year, and in almost all cases they have been unable to obtain release on bail.

"The word Kyūtai itself has pronounced Old Left, JCP connotations. It gives the impression of trying to rescue or save people. In your work do you adopt a Red Cross type approach, a sort of 'angels of mercy' approach, or do you feel that your work is that of people who are struggling together and helping each other on that common basis?"

Of course the second approach is closer to the truth. However, we have stopped using the expression "rescue activities." Until 1967, the repression was not as severe as it is today. The Kyūtai people used to go to the actual scene of struggles wearing helmets with a Red Cross symbol. Their main field of activity was to move about with medical supplies. In that sense, it really was a sort of "rescue" operation. Ever since the Shinjuku struggle of October 21, 1968, the situation has changed, and the police repression now consists of mass arrests and prolonged terms of detention. Today our work has a different character; we are now concerned with how to fight against repression.

"Could you tell me about the general categories into which your Kyūtai activities are divided?"

The first category would be the work at the actual scene of struggles. This involves rescuing persons who have been injured by "lynching" or by beatings with clubs administered by the riot police.

"This means medical work?"

Yes; first aid work. The second category is the work of investigating the whereabouts of persons who have been arrested. We try to find out the police stations where they are being held. We make these investigations together with the lawyers. At the same time, we take foodstuffs, daily necessities, and clothing to persons who have been arrested. The third category is our work with those who have been indicted after the 23 days of detention. At this stage, it is possible for us to go and visit them. We visit them and inquire about their situation. We also unify our views with those of the lawyers and decide about how to struggle. The fourth category deals with the trials, which follow after indictment. Kyūtai activities also include making decisions about what our arguments will be in the trials and how we will fight the trials. The fifth category has to do with the movement

demanding that indicted defendants be released on bail; one aspect of this is to collect bail money. We also issue pamphlets to explain the significance of the struggles. In other words, publication activities. During the Tokyo University trials, we have been publishing an organ for imprisoned fighters called Resistance. This is not a mere collection of letters from prison, in which letters are simply printed side by side without any inner connection. The objective is to have debates by letter under a definite political program. People who are in jail are isolated from each other, and this publication plays the role of increasing the sense of solidarity of our imprisoned members and of encouraging them.

"Each political sect, I understand, has its own Kyūtai organization. What is the relationship between the sect Kyūtai and the Unified Kyūtai or other types of Kyūtai organizations?"

When a number of different sects have participated together in a particular street struggle or campus struggle, they naturally are subjected to the same sort of repression. No matter what differences there may be in their political standpoints, they all subscribe to the fundamental principle of joining together to protect themselves from the repression of the enemy. In this way, they band together to form a Unified Kyūtai.

"Does this mean for each separate incident?"

Yes, recently the unified organizations have been confined to work on separate incidents. Within this Unified Kyūtai we will have debates about the viewpoints of each member sect, and we make every attempt to reach a unified policy. But sometimes splits do occur. As for the question of a broad, general rescue organization, the New Left, the revolutionary Left, has not yet been able to organize anything comparable to the Japan Communist Party's lawyers' association, called the Jiyū Hōsō Dan, or the rescue organization called the Kokumin Kyūenkai. However, last year an organization called the Kyūen Renraku Center (Rescue Liaison Center) was formed. Its purpose is to collect money and to provide food and daily necessities to arrestees during the stage of criminal investigation. Its work is aimed at the repression against the New Left as a whole, and it transcends the various sects.

"In other words, the Kyūen Renraku Center is in charge of a person during the first 23 days after he has been arrested?"

Yes. We have more or less agreed that when a student has been arrested he can notify this Center and tell it where he is being held. However, this Center is not a very powerful organization. It is more or less a citizens' group for rescue operations. Recently, there has been a movement to organize local rescue groups in all localities, centering around this Center. These groups have been organized spontaneously. Right now we must decide about the relationships between the Kyūtai organizations of the various political sects and these local rescue groups. We as yet have not found any concrete answer to this question.

"I would like to find out more about the techniques of Kyūtai activities. How many members are there in the Kyūtai organization of your sect?"

We are all kept very busy in everyday activities, and a Kyūtai member who is a student must leave the campus and go around on his own all day long. Therefore, this is extremely difficult and tiresome work. Thus, there are very few who are able to keep it up for a long time, and there is a constant turnover in our membership. As a whole, we have operated with five to ten members. I think in the future when repression becomes more and more intensified, it will be impossible to carry on with people who are motivated merely by a passing interest in the work -- for

instance, because someone whom they knew had been arrested. I feel that Kyūtai activities cannot be continued successfully on a long-term basis unless persons who are positively engaged in the revolutionary movement have a strong awareness and will to defend the movement and the organization.

"I imagine this costs a great deal of money. How do you collect this money?"

We are always asked many questions about this by people who are interested in finding out how students are able to raise struggle funds on their own. Our sect has hundreds of activists all over the country. These activists all do different kinds of part-time jobs and are required to donate a certain percentage of their incomes. We also collect contributions on the street. These are our chief sources of funds, and we have almost no sources but these. When we meet the relatives we request them to give donations, and we pool these funds. Our most difficult problem in fund-raising is the question of the bail money. Last year, the bail required for one person was about ¥100,000 to ¥150,000. However, this year, this has increased to about ¥200,000 to ¥250,000. The New Left is at the present time too weak to do anything to combat this unilateral raising of the bail money, and we are forced to provide bail money unconditionally. For instance, if the court permits release on bail of ¥250,000, we cannot refuse to pay it because it is too expensive. If we did this, our members would have to stay in jail. In order to reverse this trend, we think that the only possible method is to organize a broad-based movement of protest against the courts. As I said, we have about five or ten activists who are engaged in the Kyūtai work. Each one of them visits several jails or detention houses a day, or visits the courthouses or the lawyers' offices. Their carfare alone amounts to an immense sum. These expenses are met almost entirely by the individual himself, and the organization is able to pay out hardly any money for such purposes. In this sense, everything depends on the devotion and the patience of the individual Kyūtai members.

"I think that only a very devoted person would be able to do such work."

Precisely because of these conditions, there is a very rapid turnover, and our activists do not last long in the work.

"In connection with the Tokyo University trials, there were various struggles in opposition to separate trials and demanding a unified trial. What was the position of your sect in this matter?"

To put it simply, we are convinced even now that the policy demanding a unified trial should not be changed. Even in May and June of last year, it was obvious that there was almost no possibility that the Tokyo District Court would relent and permit a unified trial. Despite this, all sorts of special tactics were utilized in the demand for a unified trial. For instance, the defendants would refuse to appear in court and would refuse bail even when it was offered. The most fundamental reason why this struggle was continued was this. We were concerned with how to defend ourselves against the repression aimed against the Yasuda Auditorium struggle in January, 1969. As many as 600 were arrested and indicted. This was the biggest number of arrests at any time since 1960. If all of these persons were to be put on trial and sentenced separately, it would be quite impossible to make clear the reason why they shut themselves up inside the Yasuda Auditorium and resisted adamantly even though they were certain that they would be unable to win out against the strength of the riot police. The only way by which this meaning could be made clear would be for these 600 or 700 students to gather together in one courtroom and argue their case. This was the foundation, the point of departure in our concept of a

unified trial. We attempted from the beginning to reject egoistic reasoning such as: "I alone want to be released quickly," or "I alone wish to receive a lighter sentence." Therefore, we adopted a unified reasoning, arguing that the single individual would not accept bail until all were given bail, and that the individual would continue to struggle until all of them were sentenced. The separate trials were begun for the purpose of dividing the defendants and overcoming this unified reasoning. This must be rejected and crushed. I believe that this is a correct policy and that this is the only possible way to overcome the sectarianism in the New Left, the great variety of sectarian theories and arguments. I also attached great importance to the demand for a unified trial as the central pivot by which it would be possible to overcome sectarianism in the very midst of a confrontation against authority. At the present time, there are some groups which have accepted separate trials. This is because some defendants have been sentenced to actual terms in prison at hard labor. They appear to be reacting in fear against the severity of the repression, and now they seem to have lost sight of the fundamental significance of the things they have been arguing up to now. If this is so, then it would have been better not to have demanded a unified trial in the beginning. Therefore, we are opposed to it. 400 of the defendants actually demanded a unified trial and were prepared to see it through to the end. Of these, 300 to 350 were able to fight very powerfully while they were in prolonged detention and refused to appear in court. But in August and September they were allowed bail separately, and most of them accepted it. Therefore, at the present time, less than 50 still remain in detention. In view of this change in the situation, we plan in the future to adopt a flexible attitude. But this absolutely does not mean that we have abandoned the concept of a unified trial and are accepting the separate trials, as some have done.

"Recently the courts have begun sentencing the Tokyo University struggle defendants to actual terms at hard labor in prison. How many members of your sect have been sentenced to hard labor?"

We have thirteen Tokyo University defendants. One of them became seriously ill from neurosis resulting from the confinement syndrome. In other words, the long period of detention resulted in mental illness, and he is now hospitalized. The other twelve were sentenced. Five of them were given suspended sentences, and the other seven were sentenced to hard labor.

"How long are their sentences?"

Two were sentenced to two years and eight months. One was sentenced to two years and six months. The others were one year and eight months, and one year and six months.

"You mentioned that one member had been hospitalized because of neurosis. Did he become mentally unbalanced because he was suddenly put into isolation from other human beings?"

One reason was that he was kept confined in a small room for more than ten months. Naturally, a certain physical reaction occurs in such cases.

"Yes, there is lack of exercise and a feeling of fatigue."

Another thing is that even slight, unimportant pieces of information are greatly exaggerated. When an item of the utmost interest to the individual develops in a way unexpected to him, he is unable to intervene because he is kept in a solitary cell. Thus the fact seems to escape his control completely. This sort of thing greatly unsettles the nerves. The main problems are questions about one's girl-friend or one's family. There have been a number of cases of neurosis caused by this situation.

"In America also there was recently a trial for inciting to riot in Chicago. One of the defendants was sentenced to four years in prison for contempt of court. In Japanese courtrooms similar scenes occur all the time, but it would be unthinkable for a defendant to be sentenced to prison merely for creating a disturbance in the courtroom. It seems to me that the Chicago trial was an extremely unusual, abnormal trial. When we compare the Japanese and the American courtroom procedures, the methods of maintaining order in the courtroom, there seems to be a very big difference. In this and in many other respects, such as the training of the riot police, the Japanese appear to be much more sophisticated in their handling of these situations. The Japanese courts and judges are no exception. They have a very cold, hard, businesslike, relentless way of operating. I was present when the judge handed down the verdict in absentia for your group of defendants. He said that the defendants had persisted in their refusal to admit their guilt, had obstinately refused to attend their trial, and had in fact abandoned their own defense. He mentioned this as part of the reasons for his sentence. He also said that it was doubtful whether the defendants had boycotted the trial of their own free will; it was probable, he said, that the Unified Kyūtai had applied pressure on the defendants to induce them to boycott the trial. I was shocked when I saw how skillfully they attempt to utilize all sorts of divisive, splitting tactics and even engage in a sort of psychological warfare agsinst the defendants. Their aim is to force the defendants to admit their guilt and to apologize for what they had done."

I have no clear understanding about ths differences between Japan and America. In Japan, the new Constitution wss adopted after the defeat in World War II, and the so-called postwar democracy came into being. The courts are charged with the duty of defending the Constitution. Superficially at least, the courts must defend democracy, altbough we don't know what really goes on behind our backs. But the courts are making some effort to preserve their neutrality or independence, at least formally. However, in this case, the court unilatersllv ignored the demand for a unified trial and attsmpted to force the defendants to accept something which has unacceptable to them. As a result, the defendants boycotted the trials, and they were sentenced in absentia without being granted bail, and the sentences were prison terms at hard labor. As a subterfuge to evade their own responsibility, the judges say thst the defendants themselves are not so much to blame, but that the fault is with the leadership of the sect to which the defendants belong, or that the defendants had besn instigated by the lawyers or the Kyūtai. They created these falsehoods in order to conceal the fact that the court itself in the final analysis is a part of the state power and has acted in unison with ths police.

"Another point which I have noticed is that the authorities are making all sorts of attempts to influence the relatives, especially the psrents, of the defendants. Thsy cast doubt on the Kyūtai and even openly ask the parents to discharge the lawyers and hire different lawyers. It seems to me that they are trying to introduce splits and dissonsion in this way."

Yes, they are doing this in a very big way. The detectives make frequent visits to the homes of the defendants and tsll the parents that their children will be released aooner if they hire another lawyer. They threaten them and try to win them over by saying that it will be to their advantage if their children obey the courts and the police. But in the final analysis, the will of the defendants themselves is what counts. If the parents act contrary to their ohildren's will, the psrentsl relationship will be broken. The parents usually are not extremely interested in the political views of their children, but if their children believe that these views are correct, the parents wish at all costs to avoid doing anything which would interfere with the desires of the children. This is the

attitude which has recently been built up among the parents and relatives of our defendants. The parents wish to have their children released as soon as possible, and they are thinking seriously of what they can do to realize this. However, it is still doubtful whether the parents immediately draw the conclusion from this that the authorities are wrong, or that the government is to blame. To prevent them from seeing matters in this light, the courts and the prosecutors visit the families or send them written documents and letters. They insist that the entire blame rests with the political organization and with the Kyūtai.

"In America recently, unusually intense protest demonstrations against the Chicago trial have broken out repeatedly, and there have been assaults on police stations and office buildings. Undoubtedly this will elicit much stronger repression than has been seen in the past. I suppose you and your group have been faced with exactly the same situations many times in the past. Do you have any advice for Americans about Kyūtai activities or about how to protect themselves and their organizations from repression?"

We are quite familiar with the repression mounted against the Black Panthers. As far as this is concerned, I can say the following. Even though different political groups have widely differing viewpoints, when the repression of the American government is applied in concentrated form against the Black Panthers, I think the central issue is to organize a struggle which will not leave the Black Panthers isolated. If there tactics were ultra-leftist, adventuristic, or mistaken, I think that the only way to express criticism would be in the form of comradely criticism during the actions in solidarity with them to defend them from repression. If one dissociates himself completely from them and says that one has nothing whatsoever to do with "extremist" actions, then one submits facilely to the frame-ups and the divisive tactics launched by the American government and backed up by public opinion as a whole. On the other hand, I think that in America there is a tendency for all sorts of frame-ups to be staged in connection with violence. But even greater violence is being used against the Vietnamese or in Cuba, and without denouncing the government, which is spreading this network of violence all over the world, one can hardly denounce the everyday, small acts of violence. It is an extremely big mistake to dissociate oneself from these incidents. In the final analysis, one assumes a standpoint of defending the established order. There are many different kinds of positive acts in opposition to the government; even though they may differ in their tactics, it is necessary to form a broad movement of joint defense against repression. Whenever an act of violent protest occurs, one's initial reaction must not be to dissociate oneself from it. One must first make clear the contents and the significance of the political viewpoint being expressed; then one ought to try to evaluate the act within its context.

"In both America and Japan, the ordinary citizens desire most of all that their own lives should be peaceful and undisturbed. People want to live in a different milieu from that where violence, murders, killings, and injuries occur. They regard repression as something very extraordinary and for this reason tend to be horrified by murders, fighting and 'extremist' demonstrations."

From the common-sense point of view I understand this quite well. However, when we carry this viewpoint to its extreme conclusion, we end up with this sort of reasoning: "We have no responsibility for what the Government does. If we express opinions about what the Government is saying, various problems will arise. Therefore we will refrain from saying anything, and will be satisfied with our lot as long as we can live in peace." However, if a person is even slightly interested in the lives of others or in what is going on in the world, it is quite obvious to him what the

American government is doing and has done in the past. Why have the American people been silent in the past to the point where incidents like the Songmy mass killings could occur? In this frame of reference, it seems that excesses in demonstrations or so-called violence pales into insignificance. When immense violence still continues to be employed, the accusation ought to be aimed rather at oneself, if one has been silent about all of this in the past.

"In America many view the anti-war movement in terms of expanding a peaceful, orderly movement in which anybody and everybody can participate. For instance, they want to have demonstrations in which not hundreds, but millions of people can participate. They seem to be aiming at a broad-based, all-embracing united front organization. It seems to me that a truly effective anti-government movement or an anti-imperialist movement cannot come about, without a qualitative shift, by merely expanding this sort of a broad-based mass movement dedicated to orderly, peaceful demonstrations. What do you think about this?"

Of course, it would be pointless to advise the American movement to become just like the Japanese movement. Can an immense mass action force the American government to change its policies? If it can, then this is fine. If it cannot, then what ought to be done next? Would it be sufficient to call for mobilization of ever larger numbers of people, or would it be better to adopt a more positive, more aggressive pattern in the movement? I suppose opinions will differ at this point. However, I think that the American people ought to put themselves in the position of the Vietnamese, of the peoples or the forces which the American government is determined to suppress. I think that a real movement cannot be born from humanism or pacifism. Therefore, if conscientious Americans want to get the American government to stop its warlike actions against Vietnam, they ought to start out by trying to understand what the National Liberation Front is demanding and advocating and what it has been doing in the past. They ought to criticize the American government from the NLF standpoint. The Americans ought first to be won over by the Vietnamese, and then to return once again to being Americans. The whites ought to be won over by the blacks and then to join them in joint actions as human beings, as Americans. It is impossible to unite on the premise of what already exists, of the differences that already exist. The antagonisms and breaches created by history are deep. They cannot be overcome by sermonizing or by reading books. The only way is through effort and practical action.

"And when they try to engage in practical action of this sort, the repression of the American authorities will be sure to be greater and more severe than it has been in the past. Therefore, the different varieties of Kyūtai activities that you have mentioned will become more and more necessary."

When the American movement comes to the point of grappling with essential problems, the American government and state mechanisms will absolutely go into action to stop it. At this point, real repression will begin. When repression starts, it is senseless to call off all your activities. It would have been better not to begin in the first place. When you are sure that repression will inevitably come your way, you must consider how to protect yourself from repression and how to create your organization for this purpose. In our so-called Kyūtai activities, we understand how these things have actually happened in the past, and our activities have been created by necessity. Therefore, the strength and resilience of the Kyūtai activities is, I think, one of the indicators of how strong an organization is.

"Have you ever been arrested?"

No, not even once.

"Have you ever wanted to be arrested yourself?"

Yes. Rather than doing Kyūtai, I would much prefer to be in jail, where I could read books all the time. If I wanted to see anyone, I could write them a letter and tell them to come and visit me. They would probably come sooner or later. I would be fed three meals a day. If I think in these terms, it means defeat, but there are times when I can't help thinking these things. When I have no job, no work, and no money....

"How do you support yourself? Do you earn money?"

Not recently. I haven't been able to work at all lately.

"You are working full time at Kyūtai?"

Yes, I am working full time, but I receive no money at all. My income is zero. So I have money sent to me from home and receive donations of money from friends. Using various tricks and artifices, I somehow manage to keep body and soul together.

"How many hours a day do you do Kyūtai work?"

There are no definite hours, but I usually begin at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, and if there is a lot to do I keep it up until about 12:00 at night.

"This includes not only visits to prisons, but also going to confer with the lawyers..."

Yes, conferring with the lawyers, writing leaflets and pamphlets, working the mimeograph machine, preparing the pamphlets, and so on. In this sense, I am always working at full capacity.

"I have never heard of any organization like this in America, but I imagine that it will be necessary to create them in the future."

Of course, a Kyūtai organization cannot be created in itself before anything else. It is only created after repression. If people try to avoid repression, they will not need any Kyūtai organization. It will come into being only when repression is inevitable, when people realize that repression is inevitable if they continue their movement, and when they decide to protect their movement, their organization, and their activists.

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JAPAN'S FIRST HIJACKING

On March 31, Japan's first hijacking incident occurred when the Yodo, a passenger plane of the Japan Air Lines headed from Tokyo's Haneda Airport towards Fukuoka, was captured by nine members of the Sekigun-ha or Red Army faction, a student group. (See article below: THE SEKIGUN-HA) The incident was finally brought to a conclusion 122 hours later when the plane and crew returned from North Korea. Lasting an unprecedented 122 hours, the incident was the longest in the history of airplane hijackings. Unexpectedly, the incident cast much new light on hitherto unknown aspects of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security System.

The Yodo hijacking was unusual in that the officials departed significantly from the internationally recognized practice of proceeding directly to the destination specified by the hijackers. Rather than flying immediately to Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, the Yodo made a stop at Fukuoka and then landed at the Kimpo airport near Seoul, South Korea. As a result, much more time than necessary was required to solve the incident. Why was it necessary to land the plane at Kimpo? Who ordered the camouflaging of the Kimpo airport to resemble Pyongyang? These questions are still enshrouded in mystery, but it is clear that behind the scenes there was close co-operation between the American Fifth Air Force, the South Korean Air Force, the Japan Air Lines, and Japan's own Self-Defense Force. AMPO cites below some concrete facts pointing to behind-the-scenes collaboration.

(1) Late in 1969, JAL distributed Operation Manual No. 8 to its crew members. In section 1, article 5, we read the following instructions: "In case a crime should be committed aboard the plane, the crew must not resort to petty tricks. Every possible effort must be paid to comply with the desires of the criminals." When it left Haneda Airport, the Yodo had 32,000 pounds of fuel aboard. This was more than enough fuel to fly to Pyongyang, even if the plane detoured around the air defense warning area of South Korea. Despite this, captain Ishida landed the plane at the Itazuke airport of Fukuoka under the pretext that "there was not enough fuel." It is supposed that the pilot resorted to this "petty trick," not because of his own personal judgment, but because there was a pre-existing agreement between the government and the JAL about how to handle hijackings with North Korea as the destination.

(2) The plane was hijacked by the Sekigun-ha members 20 minutes after the take-off at a place 28 miles south of Zama, Kanagawa prefecture. The emergency call made by captain Ishida was received by the control tower at the American base at Yokota, which then relayed the call to the flight control center of the Japanese Ministry of Transportation. The message from the Yodo was also intercepted by the radar site at Otakino in Fukuoka prefecture. The BADGE system (a semi-automatic airraid warning control system) went into operation at the Air Self-Defense Force headquarters at Fuchu in Tokyo, and a "scramble" alert was issued at all the bases in Japan by the strategic air defense command, which is used by both Japan and the U.S.

(3) Zama is located within the Yokota Area, a region controlled by the American Forces where Japanese air sovereignty does not apply.

The Itazuke airport, where the Yodo landed, ostensibly for refueling, is in the Itazuke Area, also under the control of the U.S. Air Force. The U.S. Air Force at Itazuke is connected by a Hot Line to the U.S. Air Force in Korea and the South Korean Air Force. It is directly connected to the Kimpo Airport, which is controlled by the U.S. Air Force in South Korea.

(4) Two planes of the Air Self-Defence Force were parked on the main runway of the Itazuke Airport to prevent the Yodo from taking off from Fukuoka, and five companies of Ground Self-Defense Forces went into action fully armed.

(5) During the "refueling" at Fukuoka, the following message was passed to captain Ishida through the plane window: "Set the radio at the wavelength of 121.5 megacycles for emergency messages and make contact with the U.S. Air Force." Yasuhiro Nakasone, director of the Defense Agency, announced 30 minutes after the Yodo had landed at Fukuoka that Japan had requested the U.S. Forces in Japan to give "protection" to the Yodo.

(6) After the Yodo took off from Itazuke, it was followed by four F86F planes belonging to the Air Self-Defense Force. They escorted the Yodo to the limit of Japan's air defense warning area (129°30' east longitude, 35°40' north latitude). Three minutes later, after it had entered the air defense warning area of South Korea, the escort was continued by F5A fighter planes belonging to the South Korean Air Force.

(7) During its flight over the Korean peninsula, the course of the Yodo was tracked by radar at the Wusan Air Base, the biggest air field of the U.S. Fifth Air Force in South Korea. Its movements were reported continuously to the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Air Force at Fuchu in Tokyo. These messages were then relayed to the headquarters of the Air Self-Defense Forces, which are in the next room of the same building. The messages were then sent immediately to the Operation Room on the sixth floor of the Defense Agency in Roppongi, and also to the office of the head of the Air Self-Defense Force general staff, which is on the fifth floor of the same building.

(8) When the Yodo approached the 38th parallel, it was intercepted by two American planes which appeared to belong to the South Korean Air Force. It was guided to a landing at Kimpo airport by faked landing messages in which the flight control officer announced themselves as being Pyongyang.

(9) The Defense Agency released, as "unconfirmed reports from the U.S. Forces," the news that when it was about to enter the North Korean air space, the Yodo was attacked by eight MIG fighters and was strafed with about 50 rounds of antiaircraft gunfire. However, this was denied later by captain Ishida at a press conference after his return to Japan. It is also a fact that JAL bigwigs announced that they requested both the U.S. and the South Korean Air Forces to stage a mock air attack, firing blank ammunition, to prevent the Yodo from going to North Korea.

Thus, it is clear that the attempts to prevent the Yodo from proceeding to North Korea were carried out by means of closely coordinated teamwork between the military forces of the U.S., Japan, and South Korea on the basis of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the U.S.-R.O.K. Security Treaty, and the Japan-R.O.K. Treaty. The Japanese Foreign Ministry was kept in the dark throughout, and the Defense Agency made all the decisions by itself. This fact proved conclusively that the armed forces of the three countries are prepared to take joint military action immediately whenever an "emergency" develops in the Far East.

During the interpellations in the Diet later, attempts were made to find out exactly what had happened, but the Japanese government emphatically denied this close military collaboration between Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. It made repeated attempts to shift the responsibility for the Japanese side onto the shoulders of the Japan Air Lines.

* * *

The Japanese government and ruling Liberal Democratic Party are now making hasty efforts to enact legislation to prevent future incidents of airplane hijacking. Government leaders announced that they will concentrate their efforts on passing anti-hijacking legislation during the current Diet session. The opposition parties, while admitting in principle the desirability of such legislation, point out the necessity of studying the civil rights aspects of any such proposed legislation. Should searches of the persons and baggage of ordinary airplane passengers become obligatory under the pretext of prevention of hijacking, this might be an infringement of the fundamental human rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and there is danger that this may be utilized for political ends. The strengthening of the powers of the police, the opposition parties point out, might result in further erosion of civil rights.

* * *

The Sekigun-ha (Red Army faction) is a splinter group formed in May-July, 1969 when the Communist League (Bund) split because of divergences in opinion about tactical policies.

The disagreements mainly concerned the evaluation of the April 28 (Okinawa Day) struggle of 1969 and the October 21 (International Anti-War Day) struggle of 1968. In May, 1969, the Communist League split into two groups; a moderate faction and a more extremist faction. The "extremists," who developed into the Sekigun-ha, argued that these two struggles had been military defeats and that it was necessary to create an army and stage an armed insurrection as part of the strategy of world-wide simultaneous revolution. The "extremist" faction, which was centered in the Kansai Bund, was led by Shiomi Takaya, (now in detention).

The Sekigun-ha was officially inaugurated as a separate sect at a meeting held in Tokyo on September 4, 1969. It established its Red Army (Sekigun), a regular army which had approximately 150 members late in 1969. However, many of the members were arrested in various incidents and energetic efforts are currently being made to rebuild the organization. The total strength of the faction is estimated variously at 400 or 500. The military leader is Tamiya Takamaro, who reportedly led the hijackers on March 31.

The Sekigun-ha defines the class crisis in the contemporary world in the following terms. The objective conditions have matured for the preliminary stage armed insurrection which will precede a world-wide revolutionary war. However, in order to perpetuate this preliminary stage armed insurrection, it must be linked with the creation of international base areas and the building of armies of insurrection. A world-wide Red Army, a world-wide party, and a world-wide underground political organization must be created. The Sekigun-ha writes: "The preliminary stage armed insurrection in Japan in 1970 will be the breakthrough for bringing about a series of preliminary stage insurrections in the heartlands of the advanced countries and for the conversion of North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania, and Cuba into base countries of the world revolution. After this breakthrough, the revolutionary Third Force will be consolidated by us into the world party. The true world Red Army will be born, and the preliminary stage armed insurrection in Japan will be perpetuated aiming at the next, total armed insurrection." (Sekigun, no. 7, Jan. 30, 1970, p.19)

The Sekigun-ha is convinced that North Korea will invade South Korea within the near future, perhaps in 1972. They believe that the intensification of the world-wide revolutionary war will inevitably bring a "leftward swing" in some of the "workers' states" (North Korea, China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Albania), which will be turned into bases of the revolutionary war. However, Soviet Stalinism will play a counterrevolutionary role.

Of course, the hijacking of the airplane was closely connected with this far-reaching vision of world-wide revolutionary warfare. The Sekigun-ha leaders had no intention of seeking "political asylum" in North Korea. Their deed was obviously the first step towards the establishment of a "base area" for revolutionary warfare in North Korea.

Different groups of the Japanese New Left have various interpretations of the hijacking of the airplane by the Sekigun-ha. Some groups are critical of the actions and theories of the Sekigun-ha, saying that they are motivated by "insane, paranoid delusions of grandeur." The more circumspect groups point out that the North Korean leaders are Stalinist bureaucrats and would be completely uninterested in any scheme of "world revolutionary warfare" of the Sekigun type. However, probably the most prevalent view is one which regards the hijacking as an important breakthrough by the New Left, which has suffered a series of defeats under increasingly fierce police repression. It also represents the first serious attempt by the Japanese New Left to reach out onto the world arena. For years the New Left sects have discussed "world revolution." Now at last one concrete step has been taken in that direction.

At any rate, the incident revealed clearly that Japan's leftist forces now contain at least one group of steeled, determined revolutionaries who have rejected the conventional tactics of militant street demonstrations and student strikes. Very probably, this incident will be followed by other attempts at applying imaginatively the unconventional tactics elaborated by guerrilla fighters all over the world. The New Left as a whole will be forced to re-examine its attitudes about military insurrection and about the creation of revolutionary fighting contingents which are not limited by the confines of the traditional borderlines.

Sanrizuka fight continues

FORCED SURVEY STOPPED BY NON-VIOLENT SIT-IN

In our last issue we reported in some detail about the bitter battle that has been developing in the last four years against the construction of a new international airport at Sanrizuka. To date the farmers show no sign of wavering from their determination to fight to the end against the great steel and concrete mass which threatens to level and smother their traditional lands and shatter their lives and culture. On Feb. 19 the Airport Public Corporation attempted to force entry into the area in which the 4000 meter airstrip is to be built in order to begin surveying. However the Opposition League of local farmers, aided by workers and students, prevented their entry with a non-violent sit-in. The survey team gave up and withdrew after 3 1/2 hours.

This forced-entry survey was a preliminary step to forced evacuation by the public orporation, which is to say, by the government. What must be grasped about the opposition farmers' league is that it is not a group of individuals gathered to meet ad hoc situation, but is made up of entire family units. As an example which illustrates the spirit of what is going on, Mr. Ishibashi, the vice chairman of the League, invested ¥3,000,000 ($8330) onaa new residence inside the airstrip area, and on Feb. 18, the day before the forced survey was scheduled, the munaageshiki (the ceremony after the raising of the ridgepole) was celebrated with great festivity. In the ceremony, following Japanese custom, red and white mochi (rice cakes) were thrown down from the rafters, and everyone drank and sang in a genial atmosphere. The entire affair demonstrated the farmers' solid will not to retreat a single step from their land.

In addition, the farmerseof the Opposition League decided unanimously to keep their children out of school on the 19th and the 20th, the days of the forced survey. This decision was accompanied by a declaration addressed to the principals of the primary and secondary schools:

> In meeting the forthcoming forced survey, we areddetermined to carry out literally our policy of fighting as family units. With our children on our shoulders, holding our grandchildrens' hands, we will make a fortress on this battlefield called "farmland", one which must be defended to the end. The farmers and residents of Sanrizuka are certain that only by fighting now can we lay the cornerstone for a future which will give true nurture to our children...

On Feb. 19 after 6:00 AM several thousand people, many from distant parts of the country, completed preparations at five points for the sit-in. The Opposition League addressed them as follows:

> Do not let the enemy even one step into the fortress. Do not let yourself be provoked by the Public Corporation. If for example you throw rocks at them, they will use that as an excuse to bring in the Riot Police, drag us out and arrest us. Their hope is to find such an opportunity by means of which they can carry out the survey.

At 7:00 AM, guarded at a distance by 3000 riot police and plainclothesmen, the public corporation survey team began the entry survey. When the first stakes went into the ground, the chant was raised, "go home land robbers," to the rhythm of oil drums beaten in unison. The schoolchildren who had been kept out of school and formed into the Youth Action Corps, chanted, "Mr. Public Corporation, go home!" (Kodan ojisan, kaette!). The surveyors quickly finished what little surveying there was to do outside the fortresses and searched for some way of entry, but found none.

At 10:30 they gave up the survey and made the following announcement: "We cannot make a survey under these conditions. We have no choice but to initiate an application for Article 37 Clause 2 ("Abbreviated Survey") of the Land Evacuation Law. We hereby end the survey." With that they went trooping off.

Immediately a victory meeting was held on the site. Non-violent action had worked. The farmers pledged themselves to strengthen their movement for the bigger battles ahead. At least for now,

In writing the article for the last issue, we balked at the phrase "4000 meter"runway." Surely a mistake, we thought...after all, that's almost 2 1/2 miles long...so we rendered it "4000 meters of runway." We were too modest. The government plans to build a 4000 meter runway at Saurizuka, plus of course other shorter runways.

NOAM CHOMSKY AND MAKOTO ODA

Oda: Japanese intellectuals are facing a very grave problem now. American intellectuals, especially young radical intellectuals, are likely to face the same problem very soon. The problem is that the movement began with opposition to the war in Vietnam. At first they participated in mass demonstrations and made various analyses of Japanese society in connection with the Vietnam War. But finally they decided to go back to the university and to fight against the university authorities because they thought that the university itself was part of the establishment.

For example, radicals in the city planning department of Tokyo University revolted against the university authorities, and that faculty consists primarily of progressive people, professors for example and former student leaders. But at the same time the students have gone beyond that already. They think for example that city planning itself is part of the establishment, part of the social system of Japanese capitalist society. So they began to think that if you work in this line, if you do very good city planning, directly or indirectly you are contributing to the existence of the capitalist system. They began to feel that they have to fight this system. So in this case if you are a professor and if you are more progressive, you could easily become the target of the Japanese students' attack. This is the case for example of political scientist Maruyama Masao and many others. Of course I can understand it. At the same time sometimes I feel quite afraid of the future of these student groups.

Chomsky: Well, I obviously can't comment on the situation in Japan. We have an analogous thing here. My own feeling is that at the moment at least, the American universities are sufficiently open so that instead of attacking the universities it's possible to take them over or turn them into centers of objective scholarship which, I take it, will therefore be radical scholarship--and even centers of activism for establishing a nucleus of some potentially revolutionary movement, at least one rooted among the college going population which is about half the population. I think there have been some real successes in this. I mean for example, revisionist history in the last half a dozen years. It is just completely dominating the field; the whole ideological structure of the Cold War is crumbling at the intellectual level under the purely scholarly attack of serious historians. Now, of course this is connected with the student movement. You see, people like William Appleman Williams have been writing this sort of thing for years and nobody has been paying any attention to them. But when this kind of scholarly work coincides with a wave of militant activism, it is much more difficult to disregard. And I think it is important because there is a whole structure that in part is rooted in scholarship. For example consider the case of Japanese specialists like Scalapino and Reischauer. If their scholarship is shown to be misleading and ideologically biased, a lot of other things give too. There is an effect on the mass media and an effect on the general consciousness. It gradually spreads. That seems to me one point of attack which the society can only restrain by force ultimately. Now, if the force comes, then that will be the time to resist by force.

.....

Oda: I think it is quite easy for us to point out the fact that Japanese young radicals, young radical intellectuals lack "realism". But at the same time if we want drastic social change sometimes we have to go to extremes. In some cases, I think Japanese young radicals have gone to such extreme positions they don't think that they can come back any more. For example, Yamamoto, the leader of the Joint Struggle Committee of the University of Tokyo, was a physicist and a very brilliant one. But his theory is that now we have to stop all scientific research because even if our work has no immediate connection with the military it can be used for such purposes. Such theories are now very popular among young Japanese radicals. One young biologist for instance declares that he is going to stop all scientific research. The present situation needs struggle not research. Since we have to come across with drastic change we have to fight for this and forget about "stupid" studies and so on. Any kind of scientific research is stupid from this

standpoint. I can understand and appreciate this kind of feeling. What do you think about it?

Chomsky: I think that there are really two questions here. One is the question of time scale, that is, in what kind of time scale does one expect a revolutionary change to take place. And the other is a serious question which I don't think has been faced by the left really since Marx, and that is what would a revolution be like in an advanced industrial society. The revolutions which have been taking place during this century have been in very backward societies. And to a certain extent, I think one can regard these revolutions, particularly the Bolshevik Revolution, as almost like the last stage of the bourgeois revolutions. I believe it really belongs to the series of events that included the French Revolution, rather than to the series of events that includes the revolutions of the future. The development of a state capitalist or state socialist society in the Soviet Union is I think connected very closely with the process of industrialization and modernization, not with the process of social transformation of an industrial society of the kind that Marx was talking about.

Now as far as the time scale is concerned, maybe I'm pessimistic, but I think the students in general have much too short a time scale, because I don't think there is going to be a social revolution, let's say in the United States, for some time to come. I think there will be one, very likely, but that the time scale is rather far off which means that people have to think, in my opinion, not in terms of armed struggle today--I think that's suicidal and ridiculous--but in terms of building the basis for a potential mass movement which will have to be rooted in many many different parts of the society and will have to incorporate in itself the kinds of skills and understanding and level of culture that are necessary to achieve a revolution that will in fact advance social development to some new stage.

At this point the second question arises. I think to be seriously thinking about social revolution in advanced industrial countries, one has to regard it as a historical advance in exactly the same way in which the bourgeois revolutions were historical advances. Now, that means that if such a revolutions were historical advances. Now, that means that if such a revolution is going to be successful or even desirable, it will have to incorporate within itself the major cultural contributions which have come to a limit perhaps because of the irrelevance and stagnation of the present social order and which can, in fact, be advanced only by a revolutionary change. And for this reason I think it is a great error for such revolutionaries to separate themselves from the most advanced aspects of modern culture, for example the sciences. It seems to me natural to expect that at the most advanced levels of modern culture one will also find the social revolutionaries. Because I think these things are related, that is, I don't feel opposed to cultural development and cultural progress. I would like to see it advance further and to have much greater participation by masses of people who could find fulfillment, spiritual fulfillment which is not a thing to be laughed at, by participating in what is now open only to an elite.

It is perfectly accurate as you say, that science and technology will be used by the forces of repression, but there is nothing intrinsic in science or technology which says it is repressive or reactionary. It will be used by whoever can use it and that means that it can also be used by revolutionaries. For example, I think that current technology makes possible kinds of industrial democracy which were really quite unthinkable in earlier periods of development. For example, it makes possible direct participation by the entire work force in the factory, in the management of the factory. It makes it possible to overcome the kind of specialized labor which turns people into imbeciles, as Adam Smith for example pointed out. It is possible to overcome these facts, these defects, these monstrous factors in modern industrial society precisely by the development and advance of technology, but of course that particular utilization of technology will never be made by Robert McNamara who will use the same technology to increase the centralization of decision making.

Now if one wants to develop what some people call a liberatory technology or a technology for human purposes, then again you are going to have to be at the forward edge of understanding technology

and what it can be used for. And again it seems to me utterly self defeating to leave all these weapons in the hands of the enemy. It is as if somebody who believes in armed struggle said "Well, look, you know guns are used to repress people, so therefore we are not going to be interested in guns." I mean, for a person who believes in armed struggle, that would be a very suicidal idea. Now, it seems to me that the real guns, I mean the weapons that are important today, are cultural, intellectual, scientific weapons, and to leave them in the hands of the enemy seems to me totally suicidal and ridiculous.

Oda: Yes, it is ridiculous, but at the same time, what you say sounds somewhat optimistic because the young radicals in Japan, including somewhat myself, recognize that the counterrevolutionary side is so powerful. What you say sounds somewhat like old left wing thinking about science. Under the Japan Communist Party many scientists accept such a theory. But young people now believe that counterrevolutionary side is so big it has the power to use everything. But we don't have that power.

Chomsky: But you see, counterrevolution of course is powerful. But the question is how to overcome that power. Obviously radical scientists shouldn't work on counter insurgency, that goes without saying. And what they should try to do in fact is to subvert the work force. I think of this as being in a sense rather like GI resistance. You know, the army is a terrifically important thing, it's terrifically powerful, it is used for repression and counterrevolution all over the place. Still I think there is a good argument for radicals to go into the army. Probably the most threatening thing to the U.S. Army at the moment is the GI resistance going on within it. Often at a very low political level, but nevertheless tremendously frightening.

Oda: Yes, I agree with you. But still young Japanese radicals think that any kind of rebellion, even inside the army can't smash the American military completely. Still some framework will remain. They think that this framework is most important; you have to attack this framework itself. So in this sense, in daily life matters, not only in science, the two bywords of the Japanese students are "the refusal of self" and "the refusal of daily life matters, daily life principles". We human beings have two extremes, I think. One extreme is that you have to live in any case. For example if you have no money you might take a job in a weapons factory or an American base in Okinawa. Then you might say to the students "we denounce you; we need the money to survive." This is one extreme, another extreme is being faithful to the principles of human beings. So if you cannot live unless you get the money from the weapons factory you better die, you better kill yourself. This is a kind of refusal of self, refusal of daily life. The Japanese students may have gone to this point, you see.

Chomsky: I would agree that nobody ought to work at a weapons factory, but I don't think it follows from that that we shouldn't start working in universities even though the universities are obviously connected in some sort of seamless web ultimately with the weapons factory. These are really tactical questions and the question you have to ask yourself is which tactic is an effective way of attacking this framework which we all agree is the thing that has to be attacked.

Oda: Back to the tactical point. If we want to carry out a reform within the framework, for example inside the university, Japanese students have concluded from their experience that militant actions are absolutely necessary. Even if you want some small reforms inside the framework, not destroy the framework, you have to take very strong militant action. This is taking place in Japan.

Chomsky: I think there is something to that. Very often a militant action sets the stage within which it is possible to raise fundemental questions which you would never be able to raise otherwise. Militant actions can be very useful in setting the stage for pursuing really serious fundamental issues. Of course, militant actions sometimes can also tend to isolate and destroy the possibility for achieving the kind of change of consciousness and understanding which in my opinion is really the most necessary thing at the moment.

If there really was a mass based movement that had a conception of how to carry out social change and was committed to it and willing to do it, well, then it seems to me militant actions might have a very different purpose. Namely they might have the purpose of setting this social revolution in motion. But I just think that's a fantasy right now. At least in the United States, there is no concept of the possibility of social revolution, nobody would know how to run the society. And in fact it will be a little bit like what happened in France in May. You know, the masses of people were in a sense mobilized, but didn't have the slightest idea of what to do. The only thing they could think of doing was asking for higher wages. Now there was no organization, no structure, no party, no thing that was ready to take the next step towards the construction of a socialist society. When that kind of awareness and understanding is not present there will never be any successful social revolution. One has to adjust one's militancy to the social reality and distinguish very sharply between the kind of militancy that would set off a social revolution for which the tinder is dry essentially, and the kind of militancy which has a very different purpose, namely the one you mentioned before, making it possible to pursue either reformist or consciousness changing actions of another sort.

Oda: What do you think is the role of intellectuals, broadly speaking, in such a context?

Chomsky: Well, I don't think that their role is terribly different from that of other people. They have to, within the kind of work that they do, intellectual work, try to help create the kind of understanding of contemporary society under the present historical process, that will make it possible to move forward towards revolutionary change. Now, you know, concretely that means a lot of different things. For example, for an Asian scholar, it may mean writing on Japanese-American relations, let's say, which expose a lot of the contemporary mythology. But always corresponding with that, I think it ought to be direct involvement in whatever kind of radical movement exists.

Oda: In America I think there is some kind of separation between intellectuals and movement people. The intellectuals can say they are studying Japan-U.S. relations and so on, but the movement people are not satisfied with this. There is such a separation it seems to me. In Japan in the past there was--and there still is--but at the same time the young student radicals are not satisfied with such separations. For example, I was moved by the writing of a young physicist at Tokyo University, one of the leaders of the Joint Struggle Committee. Now, he went to the demonstration one day and he came back to the laboratory and began to study physics. He found peace in the laboratory. Now in the street they are fighting, and here there is peace. The separation was very strange, and he thought that this laboratory must become a battle field. There must be a movement, not only studying, not only analyzing the present situation. We have to fight here in the laboratory too, he thought.

The situation of intellectuals in America is somewhat different from that in Japan. Japanese intellectuals have been left wing, in comparison with American intellectuals, since the end of the War. Many Communists and Marxists, many people who are quite radical. Well for twenty five years they have analyzed the world situation and the case of Japan. But nothing happened, at least from the standpoint of the students, so they are frustrated with such good analysis. As a result a cleavage exists in Japan between the intellectuals and the young radicals. In America opinions such as yours are somewhat new and have a very important meaning to American society and American students. But in our country, already talk, talk, talk--the explanations have been given, given, given, but nothing has happened.

Chomsky: Well, you see, I don't think that talk and explanation is enough, for example, I have thought for years that one ought to be involved in, let's say, active resistance. And as I say, I think that the right stance to take for an intellectual today, is to have one foot in political activism and another foot in radical scholarship. I would quite agree with the criticism that if a person does nothing but write articles on class struggle in the French Revolution let's say, he's probably not contributing an enormous amount but he may be contributing something to the revolutionary movement.

But on the other hand, I also think that anyone who is seriously thinking about a revolution in an advanced industrial society, has got to immediately face the fact that there are a lot of very hard questions to be asked, to which nobody knows the answers, as to how this will be done, not only tactically but how it could be organized and so on. And my own feeling is that unless those answers are provided, there is no reason why anybody should join that group. We are not in the kind of situation here where we can just get up and yell "bread and land" and everybody joins your movement. This isn't Russia in October. Here, if you are ever going to reach the masses of people you will have to show them. There is after all a potential loss to many people, most people, in fact, if there is a social change. After all, they have something to lose besides their chains, mush to lose in fact, and there is no reason why they should ever get involved in a revolutionary movement unless they are quite certainly convinced that the gains they can achieve, both cultural and material and everything else, are very plausible. And this means that the hard questions are going to have to be answered and not just answered in technical monographs but also answered at the level where the mass of the population has its direct experience.

Now that's going to be a lot of hard work. And I don't think you will achieve this by pure militancy; I don't think you can achieve it without militancy either, but if the militancy is going to be divorced from trying to deal with these hard problems, then it is a certainty that no revolution will be achieved except maybe under some catastrophe. Now the kind of leftist thinking that says "well, there is going to be a catastrophe anyway, let's be ready to take over," can be completely mindless. Maybe that will happen. If the nuclear weapons drop I don't know what will happen, it could be that some group, maybe the Weathermen, will take over because they are the only ones who can think of anything to do. But I don't see any point in belonging to that kind of a left. It seems to me that if we are serious, what we have to think about is how to carry out radical social change without a catastrophe, or maybe be ready to do it in the proper manner when the catastrophe takes place and so on. But that does require, it seems to me, that one strong part, not the only part, but one strong part of the radical movement which ought to involve everyone to some degree, is really giving some hard thought to the problems of modern society and how to change it and other techniques of social organization and the nature of international politics and all the rest.

EXPO'70: LIFE IN THE "NEW CAVE AGE"

"The visitors...will be allowed to operate control columns and push buttons..."

from EXPO'70 News

If EXPO'70 even comes close to living up to its advance literature and publicity it promises to be a totally fascinating event. I must confess that I had to overcome a considerable prejudice in arriving at this view, since my initial reaction was limited that of simple revulsion against the crude political motivations behind the exposition at Osaka. It is an open secret that the entire show was conceived by the government as a great distraction to draw energy and attention away from the national political crisis in 1970 centering around the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and Japan's reemergence as a major military power in Asia. But even if EXPO is a classic instance of bread-and-circus politics, the remarkable content of this circus is well worth the attention of those who have some curiosity about the future which the masters of technology are planning for our civilization.

There is no doubt that EXPO will be a dazzling and overwhelming show. Together with masses of others the visitor will be carried by monorail, electric car, aerial tramway, and conveyer belt (I only recently realized that a "moving sidewalk" is a conveyer belt for human cargo) into a great city of pavilions built by the governments and industries of the world. After tagging one's children at the gate to ensure against loss, one will move at precalculated and controlled speeds through buildings as strange and exotic as their names...the Takara Beautilion, the Furukawa Computopia, the Suntory Fantasia, the Mandarama, the Astrorama, the Electrium, the Fuji-Fan Robot Pavilion, the Electropia, the Sumitomo Fairy Tale Pavilion. Not only the pavilion names, but the prose of the EXPO newsletter reflects the bizarre quality of this micro-universe; one finds sentences such as the following: "Visitors emerging from the arms of the Tower of the Sun will step into a world of progress and uncharted future from a circular moving deck, revolving at 1.6 kilometers (1 mile) per hour." (The newsletter is filled with detailed statistics of heights, breadths, diameters, seating capacities, visitors per hour; next to the romantic prose about "uncharted future" lies a driving compulsion to chart and measure everything.)

EXPO will surely be bizarre, but in this the Late Modern Age it is nothing to be bizarre. What is interesting about EXPO is that it is so clearly a religious event...that what is being built in the Senri Hills is not a mere playground or a theater, but a temple. True, there will be moments of gaiety, laughter, and play, but the principal experience being prepared for the pilgrims is that which appropriately follows from sensing a Presence of unspeakable power...the experience of awe.

I grant that the worship of technology is somewhat nihilistic, as worships go, but the nihilistic worship of limitless power is certainly not unprecedented. The archetype for such worship, at least in the West, is the Book of Job. If you remember the story, Jehovah, on a bet with Satan, allows the latter to visit plagues and disasters upon the guiltless man Job, in order to determine to which of the two he is ultimately loyal. Destroyed are his rich flocks, his property, his servants, his sons and daughters, and he himself is left sitting in ashes covered with boils "from the sole of his foot unto his crown." Jehovah wins the bet, because even reduced to this Job keeps his faith, though he does permit himself to question why such a one as God should have brought gratuitous disasters upon him. Even this is enough to provoke Jehovah to anger, and he speaks to Job from a whirlwind, saying "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?" and then proceeding to give a list of his powers and accomplishments that fills a full five columns in the Good Book. The message is clear: This whirlwind is not just one power among many, it is infinite power. It is not for man to question or attempt to understand such a power, but only to worship it. Job answers: "Behold, I am vile: what shall I answer thee? I lay my hand over my mouth."

As a metaphor, the Book of Job reveals much. It is often observed that Japan...or at least Establishment Japan...has a belief in technology that is special in its urgency. At Expo it is mainly the Japanese industrial pavilions which are built to inspire a sense of religious awe. Government sponsored pavilions focus mainly on the specific cultures and products of the various countries, rather than on the achievements of technology itself. It is the industries of Japan that are sponsoring the Beautilion, the Astrorama, the Computopia...the great Temples of Technique.

I am convinced that there is a powerful reason behind this, and that





WITH PRETTY FANTASIES LIKE THIS, WHO NEEDS REALITY?
(SUMITOMO PAVILION)



EXPO 70--- THE SHADOW SHOW IN PLATO'S CAVE STREAMLINED TO MODERN TASTE.(FUJI GROUP PAVILION).

that reason is Hiroshima. In Hiroshima the Japanese experienced something never before known or imagined by man, and that experience has become a special place in history. The power encountered there was [illegible] defy interpretation, yet in order to act men must interpret their experiences. The whirlwind of August 6 is usually interpreted as the supreme manifestation of the full, unleashed forces of War. While this cannot be denied, yet it is in a sense misleading. Throughout history man has experienced war. War is an unmitigated evil, but it is a human evil; however much it may be hated, it is something which can somehow be contained in men's understanding. What was experienced at Hiroshima was an inhuman and incomprehensible Force.

In a single flash houses, properties, wives and children were destroyed, and the survivors were left, like Job, covered with sores and mourning in the ashes.

What the Japanese experienced at Hiroshima was the limitless and irresistible Force of technology.



Job was advised by his wife: "Curse God, and die." This he did not do, but rather clung steadfastly to his faith in the Force which had ruined him, and for this was eventually rewarded richly. In return for his laying his hand over his mouth, "the LORD gave Job twice as much as he had before." He was even given new sons and daughters (though nothing further is said about the old ones).

Similarly Japan, by keeping faith in the Force that lay behind the whirlwind, has also been richly rewarded, in what is appropriately called an economic "miracle". Expo 70 is a festival to celebrate and honor this Force, and to reveal something of its limitlessness to the faithful.

This in itself is of course nothing new; the exposition form was from the beginning designed as such a festival. It is worthwhile to recall Henry Adams' account of his visit to the Great Exposition of Chicago in 1900. It was there that Adams discovered the dynamo, which, as he put it, he "began to feel...as a moral force, much as the early Christians felt the Cross. The planet itself seemed less impressive, in its old-fashioned, deliberate, annual or daily revolution, than this huge wheel....Before the end one began to pray to it; inherited instinct taught the natural expression of man before silent and infinite force."

The religion, in other words, is by no means of Japanese origin. As perceptive a man as Adams could detect infinitely in the dynamo as easily as in Hiroshima. The fervency of belief in Japan is to be accounted for only by the fact that final conversion was both recent and accompanied by unspeakable violence. It should be remembered that until 1945 the country had not fully rid itself of the foolish and reactionary myth that the human spirit could conquer machines, a myth that many historians count as an important cause in the outcome of the war. In a sense, the B-29 Enola Gay can be thought of as a sort of missionary, sent to destroy archaic and outdated superstitions with its load of modern technological truth.

The Osaka Exposition is not, however, merely the Chicago Exposition raised to a higher power. Force became in principle infinite with the dynamo, and in this jaded age one could not draw much of a crowd by exhibiting the dynamo's successor, the nuclear reactor. Jehovah himself did not seek to awe Job merely with a display of sheer force, but rather spent some time with him listing in detail the great variety of his powers.

One of the first things that is remarkable about Expo 70 is the number of items on that list which are being approached and challenged by technology.

Thus Jehovah demanded; "Hast thou entered into the springs of the sea? or hast thou walked in the search of the depth?" EXPO answers with its model bathyscaphe which takes you "several thousand meters below sea level...where lies an unknown world waiting for development by mankind."

Jehovah demands again: "Canst thou lift thy voice to the clouds, that abundance of waters may cover thee?" EXPO answers with its model weather control station, where "On the screen you will witness the drama of man's effort to tame a typhoon...This is indeed the ideal future toward which weather control is progressing."

"Who hath put wisdom in the inward parts? or who hath given understanding to the heart?" This difficult challenge is simplified by IBM's helpful redefinition of the nature of man's mental activity ("Man the Problem-Solver") which enables EXPO to answer with its battery of computers.

"Canst thou send forth lightenings, that they may go, and say unto thee, here we are?" EXPO answers with the "Hori Mirror", which, we are told, produces "raging tempests, floods, and volcanic eruptions" through a "multi-phased screen and a magic mirror."

"Hast thou perceived the breadth of the earth?" In the Mitsubishi Pavilion "you will see a panorsmic view of the universe in perspective..."

"Canst thou bind the sweet influences of Pleiades, or loose the bands of Orion?" Binding Pleiades is still a little ways off, but there will be at EXPO a stone loosed from the moon.

But these things, remarkable as they are, are not what will inspire our awe at EXPO. We live in an age in which the expression "technological miracle" has long been common parlance, and once the principle of the miracle is admitted, the specific nature of a particular miracle is not especially astonishing. The whole idea of the miracle is, after all, that it can be anything. It was not that Jehovah could shoot lightning or make rain that was overwhelming; his fundamental power was expressed in his very first words: "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?" Can you, puny man, make a world?

I have beside me on my desk a colorful four page pamphlet, in which EXPO's answer is announced in bold, black letters: "ON MARCH 15, 1970 A NEW WORLD COMES TO LIFE IN THE HEART OF OLD JAPAN."

Of course this is advertising rhetoric. But even rhetoric must be selected, and selections are revealing. Especially when the same selection keeps recurring so often: The Fuji Pavilion offers "different worlds," the Iron and Steel Pavilion takes you to "a world which is completely new and strange," the Astrorama claims to be a place "where the world revolves around you" (i.e. inside the Astrorama), etc.

The Creation Myth is of course the foundation of all religions, and if a religion of technology is to be established, a similar Creation is required. In the Mitsui Pavilion the Myth is enacted quite directly; the "Space Revue" takes you first to outer space, then through "fire, the growth of microbes, the explosions of volcanoes...the process of creation in the ancient ages is relived."

But it must be emphasized that we are not dealing here with only myth and rhetoric. Behind all the flashy tricks, the real key to EXPO, in the sense of being a Portent of the future, is the attempt...however primitive at this stage...to artificially produce a total environment; to create, technologically, a "world". In this sense EXPO presents a version of the future quite different from that envisioned by Marshall McLuhan. McLuhan perceived that the proliferation of electronic communications would be an important key to the future, but fundamental to his thought is the assumption that "All media are extensions of some human faculty." This belief that media are extensions, and that what they extend is something human, leads him to the idea that the proliferation of media will have the effect of shrinking the world, making it into a "global village...a simultaneous happening." It is also this belief that leads him to the view that media will bring about a widening and intensification of participation: "Participation via television in Freedom Marches, in war, revolution, pollution, and other events is changing everything."

McLuhan assumes, in other words, that the artificial element, media, exists strictly as media, that is, as something in between which serves to connect two things which are real...a man with another man, or a man with a real historical event. Thus as media improve, men would come closer and closer together until they are almost face to face, as in a village. Moreover, they would come closer and closer to historical events until they become like actual participants. In either case it is reality, it is the world, that is transmitted through the media.

Granting that such a trend may actually be taking place, EXPO represents a different and conflicting trend. In one of the guidebooks appears the following interesting comment: "While EXPO 67 in Montreal was given credit for being the catalyst in the communications revolution, EXPO 70's claim seems to lie in showing how man can shut out the mess he has made of the natural world he inherited and live under a controlled environment." One would only wish to add to this, "and the mess he has made of the historical world." If EXPO 67 opened the "Information Age," with all

of its dangers that the oppressed, manipulated, and managed peoples of the world will learn too much, it would seem that in the three years since then the masters of technology have made a very rapid decision about just what kind of information will be conveyed in the "Information Age," and, more importantly, just who will be in control of that information.

Thus EXPO 70, far from offering to take you closer to the natural and historical world, follows the tradition of America's Disneyland and seeks to create a wholly new and different "world". In exhibit after exhibit you enter a space within which, to select one proud announcement from the advance publicity, you are "completely separated from the outer world...This is the independent world of the Telecommunications Pavilion." On walls, ceilings, floors, statues, smoke screens and multiple screens are projected movies, slides and light displays from scores of projectors; these are supported by music, sound effects, laser, robots, and countless other wonders. The word "happening" is used again and again, in disregard of the fact that the word "happening" refers to a theatrical event created largely by the activity of the audience. In these rooms flooded with filmed images and taped sound, nothing is happening at all. "The Astrorama," we are told, "is not a movie to see, but a movie to participate in." Here another noble word in the English language is threatened with destruction: no doubt the Managers of society would be quite pleased if the word "participation" could come to mean a certain way of watching a movie. Moreover, the EXPO writings make it clear that there will never be any confusion over the identity and role of the audience, and there is no danger that any of these "happenings" will spill out beyond their alloted compartment in space and time. "The performance," one reads again and again, "lasts (7, 12, 22½) minutes, after which the visitors will be led to..."

The visitor is thus enveloped in media, but what these media thrust at him from all sides is neither the natural nor the historical world, but a new, artificially induced world, a world conceived, created and controlled by the engineers and their employers, the business and government officials who sponsor the pavilions.

This urge of the sponsors, to create a space within which visitors are totally cut off from the world outside and totally enveloped in communications originated by the sponsors themselves, is particularly poignant when one remembers what the historical world is going to look like in Japan in the Spring and Summer of 1970. The Sato Government, not content with merely renewing the Security Treaty, is intent on extending it by redefining Japan's sphere of "self-defense" to include South Korea and Taiwan. Rearmament is being stepped up. Student opposition is being systematically crushed by riot police. An airport is being built at Narita over the blood and tears of the farmers who are driven from their land. A frighteningly oppressive new Immigration Bill is to be rammed through the Diet. In short, this summer the government expects to face its greatest political crisis since the war, and the streets will be filled with people by no means ready to lay their hands over their mouths in awe of EXPO's artificial miracle. One can be sure that the sponsors of EXPO wish that all those people would stay inside their homes and watch color TV instead of pouring out into the streets and messing up the neat history which had been planned for them. They do not yet have the power to keep history off the streets, but they do have the power to creat small spaces from which it can be shut out. Thus EXPO-70 is a kind of strategic hamlet of the future. It is not a liberated zone, but just the reverse...a de-liberated zone, a zone of total management. And if the cause of history is the movement and action of the people, and if that movement and action require at least some minimal amount of freedom and spontaneity, then it can be said that EXPO 70 provides an image of the future from which the cause of history has been rooted out, a future which will have no history but only data files.

There is a great deal of confusion over what to call the coming age... is it to be the Jet Age, the Nuclear Age, the Space Age, the Post-Industrial Age, the Information Age, or what? My personal favorite is the Post-Modern Age; but the Sanyo Electropia has its own interesting proposal: according to EXPO'70 News, the Electropia is going to depict "life in the 'New Cave Age'". I pondered awhile before deciding to use this in the article, thinking there might be some kind of misprint or mistake. Then I found exactly the same image in an ad for the Mitsubishi Pavilion: "You tour a city made of caves." So there you have it: The New Cave Age. Each man back in his cave, with electrical equipment to care for his body* and electronic equipment to occupy his mind.

It seems that the question of our future is a question of which science

fiction fantasy is to come true. The visitor to EXPO might be interested in knowing that the image of the New Cave Age and the "city made of cores" is taken quite directly from one of the most terrifying science fiction stories ever written, E.M. Forster's 1928 classic, The Machine Stops. In that remarkably prescient tale, in which the only error seems to be that was set much farther into the future then necessary, men have built for themselves a colossal mechanical beehive, within each cell of which there lives, surrounded by unimaginable conveniences, "a swaddled lump of flesh," raising the instruction book to its lips and muttering "O Machine! O Machine!"

One of the Matsushita ads features the time capsule which the company is going to bury during EXPO. Beneath the picture of two of the great products of our culture which Matsushita has chosen to include in its gift to the future ...a miniature TV set and lipstick...is written the provocative question: "When it (the time capsule) reappears who knows what brave new world people will be living in?"

"Brave New World?" Is there an ironist hiding out in the Matsushita advertising department?

D.L.

Quotations are from: EXPO'70 News, Seeing EXPO'70 (Mainichi Newspapers); and EXPO'70 (Special issue of The East)