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MILITARISING STATE, SOCIETY and CULTURE in ASIA

CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES



Militarising State, Society and Culture in Asia: Critical Perspectives

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Foreword

THIS SPECIAL ISSUE of *Asian Exchange* was at its final stage of editing when the monster tsunami of December 26, 2004 swept the coastlines of Southern Asia. Sitting in Hong Kong, it occurred to the ARENA Secretariat, for a split second, that production for this book would inevitably be delayed. But that was the least of our concerns. Most pressing was the tsunami's impact and what it might mean for the entire region. For in its wake, the tsunami claimed victims from at least forty (40) countries, left behind more than 150,000 people dead, thousands more missing or fighting for their lives in hospitals and make shift clinics, hundreds of thousands more without homes and livelihood, and millions all in all affected by the damages it wrought on food, water and health systems. The emotional shock the tsunami caused nearly equaled its physical impact. Its social, economic and political repercussions, particularly in terms of mobilizing assistance to its victims, trauma healing, and post-disaster reconstruction immediately became the focus of worldwide attention. Amid the images of horror, grief, pain and suffering, the watershed of solidarity gestures and donations that poured in from ordinary people from different parts of the world, especially from the disaster-hit countries themselves, was remarkable and heartwarming. However, there echoed a growing concern over the possible politicization of the international community's 'humanitarian' response, the prospects for a

stronger presence of the world's most powerful nations that this new emergency situation might bring to the region, and even more specifically, over the possibility of an increased role of the military in humanitarian assistance.

It was against this intense backdrop that Jayadeva Uyangoda managed to complete the editing of this book from Colombo, and to note in his introduction some of the new issues and sources of anxiety that arose from the emergency situation: "The deployment of the US marines in Asia's tsunami-hit countries for 'humanitarian tasks' places this dimension of militarisation in another new global context. As the American officials have openly admitted, this 'humanitarian assistance' is immediately prompted by the Bush administration's considerations of global security against terrorism." Indeed, reeling from the failures that were unraveling in its war on Iraq, the Bush administration soon saw in the tsunami crisis a golden opportunity for the US to demonstrate its 'humanitarian motives.' And yet no less than Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, hinted that US initiatives to assist tsunami-hit nations was part of its effort to win the 'war on terror', remarking that "it does give the Moslem world and the rest of the world, an opportunity to see American generosity, American values in action." Clearly, international humanitarian assistance could not escape its immediate political context of war and a militarized global climate. Or perhaps one might even say that the forces of war and militarism, if left unchecked, would surely find a way to manifest themselves in other forms, even in the gravest situation of natural calamity.

It should firstly be pointed out that worldwide mobilization for tsunami-related assistance has been taking place within a global setting of intense debates around the US-led war on terror and the effects and implications of US militarist designs and policies. And secondly, it must be remembered that many of the countries hit by the tsunami had been experiencing militarisation and politico-ethnic conflicts for some time, like Sri Lanka and Indonesia, where the Aceh province was the worst hit by the disaster. Others are sites of simmering conflicts such as Thailand and India. In Indonesia, civil society groups called attention to the fact that counterinsurgency and military operations continued in Aceh, even as its people struggled to survive the calamitous effects of the tsunami. There in Aceh, where the Indonesian military is said to have mimicked the language of the war on terror, soon arose the fear that relief efforts would be caught in the web of US-Indonesia

political agenda and thus be compromised at the expense of the people who needed assistance the most.

What happens when a natural disaster like this tsunami wreaks havoc on the lives of people and communities who for many years had already been suffering from the impact and consequences of militarisation or living through a protracted ethno-political civil war ? Will the urgent and immeasurable task of relief and reconstruction inspire all parties in conflict to advance efforts for peace, as many in Sri Lanka and Indonesia were hoping ? Will this new emergency situation provide another pretext for greater military activities and operations in local communities, or pave the way for greater intervention or presence of the US in the region, as many began to fear ? Any current discussion on emerging challenges to security, and more precisely human security in the region, cannot now proceed without perhaps including in its immediate agenda these new concerns.

This special issue of ARENA's *Asian Exchange* does not provide answers to such questions – indeed all these questions demand further research and discussion and will perhaps require an entirely separate volume. However, what “*Militarising State, Society and Culture*” does is call our attention to the processes of militarisation and the growing militarism that characterize the landscape of our countries, and which are part of the reality and larger social context within which current engagements of the international community with the region are framed.

For ARENA, the ‘9/11’ tragedy that hit the US in 2001, the ‘war on terror’ that was subsequently unveiled by the Bush administration in 2002, and the war on Iraq that was launched by the US and its allies in 2003, had all presented a new global context for further analyzing the militarisation of our societies and the resurgence of militarist ideology, culture and practices in the region. Believing that such analysis is not only timely but essential to the development of alternative paradigms of security, the ARENA programme team on War, Militarism and Peace initiated a book project whose final product is this special issue of the ARENA journal. This volume compiles studies of ten (10) countries in Asia – India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Philippines, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan and Thailand. It aims to contribute to a broad understanding of militarisation as a physical and ideological phenomenon, illustrate the extent of militarisation in state, government and civil society, and argue how militarised notions of security add to the insecurity of peoples and state. As do all ARENA publications, this volume seeks not only to

encourage debate and critical scholarship around Asian issues but also to inspire and generate responsible and creative responses such that they would open up what editor Uyangoda calls 'possibilities for transformative political practice.'

Analyzing the Asian context, the writers in this volume explored and sought to illustrate the linkages between militarisation and militarist nationalism, patriarchy, and right wing ideologies and fundamentalisms, looking at the role of both state and non-state actors. In many cases, they offered in-depth analyses of the relation between domestic policies and the US-led war on terror, along with arguments for de-linking internal politics from the global strategic agenda of the US. While the rhetoric of security and defense has often been deployed by state and non-state actors alike to justify the pursuit of militarist policies and practices, such policies and practices, as pointed out by this book's writers, have instead contributed to and often been the source of people's insecurity. All the chapter authors thus presented a strong case for demilitarization, with editor Uyangoda finally calling for the peaceful resolution of internal conflicts as an essential precondition for demilitarization and as a necessary step towards building foundations for democracy and human security.

The completion of this *Asian Exchange* at this special time brings to mind the writers' workshop that was organized at a picturesque seaside hotel just off Colombo in July 2004. Sri Lanka was chosen as the setting for the workshop on militarisation precisely because of our interest in the peace process and the political restructuring that was taking place there. For twenty years a protracted civil war had been raging in the island and that had not only created militarized conditions but had also limited the democratic imagination of the polity by ethnicising its political practice and visions. A significant shift soon occurred that led to peace negotiations in 2002, and, for the first time, as activists and intellectuals pointed out, both sides of the conflict agreed to explore new conceptual approaches toward finding a political solution to the conflict. At the Sri Lanka workshop, activists and intellectuals also noted how the international community came 'in a big way' when the negotiations process began, and this resulted to new complexities in the peace process. Nevertheless, at that moment, there was some degree of excitement about the progress in the peace process and its imagined positive effect on the country's politics and democratic culture. As writer Farzana Haniffa noted then, "Today the Sri Lankan polity is in the

process of shifting from a state of extreme militarism and militarisation to one that anticipates the end of armed conflict. From a confrontational politics amongst ethnic groups, extreme polarization amongst communities and the militarisation of the entire country, today we anticipate peace.” In that new anticipation of peace, however, she pointed out that what remained unclear was how soon militarism would diminish, and how long the people would continue to experience its social consequences. And it was with those words in their minds that the writers set forth to proceed with their investigation into the multi-faceted processes of militarisation and the state of ‘human insecurity’ in the different countries of Asia.

It was not so many moons after that writer’s workshop, when the preparations for the book was coming to an end, that the monster-tsunami struck Sri Lanka’s coastlines, sweeping off whatever or whoever came its way. The tsunami unleashed its full wrath, caring not whether it hit a Singahala or Tamil, a Buddhist or Hindu, a Muslim or Christian, but testing each one’s will to survive and to hope. Yet again, the poor, the women and the children – we were told – suffered the most. And thus along with the voices hopeful for peace that we carried with us from the writer’s workshop, what is now indelibly etched in our minds is the image of people in Sri Lanka struggling to survive and yet determined to recover from the tsunami’s destruction. We recall how the government of Sri Lanka and the international community were swift to respond with relief services and discussions on strategies for post-disaster reconstruction. And how many ARENA Fellows – Silan Kadirgamar, Nimalka Fernando and Vasudeva Nanayyakara, among others – were just as swift to join the massive effort of taking stock of the disaster’s damage on people’s lives, telling the world their stories, mobilizing their own resources to provide shelter for the displaced, food and medicine for the victims, coming up with more people-friendly strategies for disaster-response, declaring that all aid to Sri Lanka must reach the poor and must be fairly shared among the different ethnic communities. Jayadeva Uyangoda was also quick to point out that a connection must be made between the agendas for disaster response and peace building, and that strategies for reconstruction be more ‘conflict-sensitive.’ He sees in this situation of crisis and extreme human insecurity, a unique opportunity to carve out a new vision for a post-civil war, post-tsunami Sri Lanka. It is quite remarkable how often the voices of hope and peace persist in the face of calamity.

And so on the cusp of the New Year, like the rest of the world, the ARENA community was tuned in on the tsunami and the massive human and ecological drama of suffering and persistent hope that was unfolding before our very eyes. The magnitude of the drama caused only a small delay in the completion of this book, however. Imagining what the mind-set of the book's editor must have been like as he witnessed the destruction in his country, one can only marvel how he managed to complete the book at this time. It is perhaps something short of a miracle; for even within ARENA's own publishing experience, the relative 'speed' by which this volume has been completed is a record breaker of sorts, not even mentioning the natural disaster that provided the backdrop for its final editing stage. This book now joins the multitude of voices for peace and hope that echoes throughout the region.

It would be impossible to name all those who contributed one way or another to this book project, and to whom we are profoundly grateful. But we must begin by mentioning the following individuals and organizations:

- 1) ARENA's funding partners, notably, EED, ICCO, Oxfam Hong Kong, and Action aid who all support ARENA's core programmes, and especially Christian Aid, who specifically provides support for ARENA's War, Militarism and Peace programme. We also wish to make special mention of Ray Hassan from Christian Aid, whose comments and ideas in our conversations with him about ARENA's programmes have been most encouraging as well as useful.
- 2) The ARENA Fellows, staff colleagues and friends who provided creative, intellectual, editorial, coordinative, administrative and other forms of inputs, support and assistance in the various stages of conceptualization, writing, editing and production of the book:
 - Anuradha Chenoy, who, aside from contributing a chapter in the book, wrote the initial concept paper for the book project and encouraged ARENA's War, Militarism and Peace programme team to embark on it;
 - Anjani Abella of the ARENA Secretariat, who coordinated the entire project most efficiently and most lovingly, who tirelessly corresponded and worked with the book's writers, editors and artists, and who, mercilessly but thankfully, kept us all in track and engaged in the project. Recognition and commendation for the amazing time, talent and effort she poured on the project, amid challenges posed

by near-impossible deadlines and the demands of office relocation, are indeed due her;

- Law Wai King who once again responsibly attended to many tasks in finance administration and book production, as she has often done for ARENA publications in the past;
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- Sita Peiris, who served as our copyeditor, and Gayani Silva and Ishani Ranasinghe, who both provided editorial assistance in Sri Lanka;
- Nimalka Fernando who, along with other ARENA Fellows and friends in Sri Lanka, organized our roundtable discussion on Sri Lanka in July 2004 and who thus helped us to situate our discussions on militarisation within our most immediate social contexts; and
- Rasika Chandrasekara and the Sri Lanka Social Scientists Association (SSA), who hosted us warmly, generously and graciously, who organized with admirable efficiency the writers' workshop on militarisation last year, and made sure that our time in Sri Lanka, though brief, was enjoyable, productive and memorable.

- 3) The writers who contributed chapters to this book: Anuradha Chenoy, Ayesha Siddiqi, Fara Haniffa, Arjun Kumar Karki, Mukunda Kattel, Samira Gutoc, Insook Kwon, Francis K.W. Loh, Hilmar Farid, Kinhide Mushakoji, and Pravitt Rojanaphruk.

To them we are infinitely grateful not only for their analytical writings but also for the respect of deadlines, professionalism and dedication to the project they showed. The intellectual and collegial company they provided us throughout the process demonstrated the kind of spirit that reaffirms ARENA's vision of nurturing a community of intellectuals and activists who wish to contribute to meaningful and people-oriented social change.

- 4) And finally, Jayadeva Uyangoda, who generously accepted what turned out to be a most challenging responsibility of serving as chief editor and convenor of the book project team, and whose tasks included everything from helping us find writers, helping to organize and eventually

moderating the writers' workshop, working closely with the writers and copyeditors to sharpen the formulations and refine the manuscripts, coordinating the project along with the ARENA Secretariat, writing the introduction and then finally completing the editing amid the tsunami's thunderous roar and its chilling aftershock. Words are not enough to express our most heartfelt thanks and appreciation for his patience, his inspired and insightful editing, and his generous rendering of time and intellectual gifts, without which this book could not have been possible.

Given all the individual and collective effort that have been mobilized toward the publishing and production of this book, it is our hope that the book would be read, studied, reviewed and commented upon by a wide spectrum of people. We believe that the studies contained in this volume will be found useful by scholars, academics, researchers, activists, NGO-workers, grassroots organizers, field practitioners, journalists, policy makers, and many others. More than that, however, it is our desire that the book somehow will help galvanize effective, responsible and creative responses to the crises of our times. As Nimalka Fernando eloquently challenged us many moons ago at the writers' workshop under the Sri Lankan skies, "This project should not end by just producing a book. Rather, the book must mobilize us!"

Jeannie Manipon
ARENA Coordinator
January 11, 2005

Contents

Foreword	iii
Introduction	1

Militarism in National Security, Inter-State, and State-Society Relations

INDIA: National Security, Multiple Insurgencies, Inter-State Relations and Societal Militarisation	17
PAKISTAN: National Security, Democracy Failure and Continuing Militarisation of State and Society	61

Militarisation in the Context of Protracted Civil War

SRI LANKA: Ethnic Conflict, Post-Colonial Nation Building and Militarisation	97
NEPAL: Democratic Failure, National Insurgency and the Rise of a Bellicist Culture	125
PHILIPPINES: Militarisation, Moro Insurgency and the Challenges for Peace and Democracy	155

Militarisation by Other Means

MALAYSIA: National Security, the Police and the Rule by Law: Militarisation by other Means	179
JAPAN Militarisation of a Pacifist State	209
SOUTH KOREA: Social Militarisation and Gender	233

Militarism as National Ideology

INDONESIA: The Failure of Reformasi and Remilitarisation	261
THAILAND: Hidden Dimensions of 'Thainess': Violence and Militarism in the Culture and Politics	287
About the Contributors	301

Introduction

Jayadeva Uyangoda

ARENA's programme on War, Militarism and Peace launched in 2003 seeks to address the issues of global and regional insecurity as epitomised in the developments around the US 'war on terror.'

The 'war on terror' that began in Afghanistan after 9/11 and then extended to Iraq has an enduring impact on the countries in Asia with the simultaneous awakening of popular protests and movements against the war and the excesses committed by the US. In this project, ARENA focuses on a critical, alternative understanding of 'security' by searching for a people-friendly paradigm of security that is committed to people's rights, livelihoods and values of democracy, peace and social justice. The chapters in this volume are written from a perspective that promotes political interventions for democratisation, peace-building and humane governance. In re-conceptualising the idea of security, a conscious attempt has been made in this volume to bring to the centre of focus the interests and concerns of women, minorities, and marginalised communities.

Framework

The overall framework of this project treats militarism as the *ideology* that extends military influence in civilian life and militarisation as the *process* that establishes militarist values and practices in society. These include:

- The use of military power and force to solve political and social problems: Militarisation implies not just the deployment, threat or use of force, but also defining political and social conflicts as essentially law and order problems that can be put down by force. The use of force to 'resolve' political-social conflicts and contradictions it generates in turn militarises society itself when force and violence begin to dominate social relations.
- Militarisation privileges force as a principle of power. It enunciates the use of physical force to suppress dissent, opposition and alternatives. In this instance, the notion of power is not restricted to the state alone; it also determines the relations between people, between social and economic classes and between genders.
- Militarisation leads to the dominance of the military over civil institutions. While privileging military advice over civilian advice, it focuses on militarist traditions and masculinist notions of honour leading to a decline in democratic institutions and the rise in national security laws and ultimately leading to the erosion of human rights.
- Militarisation intersects with patriarchy, giving special value to masculinity and muscle power, and equating peace with femininity and weakness. It rests itself not on equality, but on a hierarchy of values, emphasising the values and practices of 'manhood' in the social hierarchy of power. In most militarised societies women are known to bear the brunt of the violence, suffering a range of adverse consequences. In societies with protracted armed conflicts, subjection of women and children to grave human rights abuses is a defining feature of militarisation at the social level.
- Militarism is present not only in the military, but also in the government, political parties, social movements and civil society. Similarly, there are contexts in which non-state actors have also become active agents of militarisation processes. The use of armed violence by counter-state movements in protracted conflicts, often legitimised by the ferocity of counter-insurgency war by the state, have brought violence to the public sphere as well as everyday life. Such militarisation has devastating consequences for the already marginalised and disempowered communities.

- Militarisation is also linked to nationalist traditions that are based on ethno-hegemonic ideologies. Such nationalist projects seek cultural homogenisation and political domination through the denial of multiculturalism, pluralism and democracy.
- Militarism operates in society at multiple levels, intersecting with other ideologies and concepts. Thus, while militarism is a necessary aspect of patriarchy and chauvinist ideologies, it is also promoted in right and left wing political ideologies and movements.
- Militarisation occurs at various levels – from the international, national, regional and the local. At the international level, the most pernicious use of militarism has been made in the relations between the states and in the assertion of hegemony by some states. States measure their success in the international political system by their military capability. The United States is the most militarist of all states, and much of international militarism comes from this source. The US maintains its global hegemony through global militarism. In its ‘war on terror’ the US has pushed the entire world into a new phase of militarisation that threatens world peace in a new historical context of global militarism.

When militarisation operates at the national level, the ruling elites use militarist policies to maintain themselves in power. They resort to ideologies of militarism as a mechanism for state-building while their ideologies are often buttressed by militarised nationalist myths that are inherently anti-democratic, sometimes bordering on fascism. At the regional level, militarisation of inter-state relations is a crucial dimension of regional power politics. Militarisation of regional inter-state relations in turn reinforces militarisation at the intra-state level.

Country Studies

In the first four chapters on the militarising processes in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal, there are more themes in common among these four countries than the fact that they are located in the single geo-political unit of South Asia. The militarising process is integrally linked with the presence of unresolved and protracted internal conflicts that have contributed to the militarisation of dominant as well as counter-hegemonic political movements.

Anuradha Chenoy in her chapter explores the multiple levels of militarisation that has occurred in India. She argues that the basic context of India's militarisation is characterised by the enduring failure of the Indian state to resolve through peaceful means and negotiations the external disputes as well as internal conflicts. From the early phase of post-colonial state formation, India has had intra-state and inter-state conflicts that were basically intertwined. Unresolved territorial conflicts with Pakistan, linked to the internal conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, and later secessionist conflicts in Punjab as well as the Northeast have led to a prolonged process of militarisation of the Indian state. A parallel process of Indian militarisation, as Chenoy notes, has been the shift made by the ruling elites to a foreign policy that rejected the tenets of non-alignment. This policy shift was accompanied by the ambition for India to become a regional great power. The ideological underpinning of this move was the adoption of a 'national security' doctrine, conceived within the Realist paradigm of inter-state relations. As Chenoy's account demonstrates, this has pushed the Indian state to a spiral of militarisation, both at inter-state and intra-state levels. At the inter-state level, while the relations with Pakistan has been acutely militarised, India's relations with the other countries in the region also have a strong militarist-interventionist dimension.

The most pernicious in this regard is the militarisation of the state-society relations. While the state has been responding to the essentially political problem of ethno-nationalist insurgency by military means, the insurgencies themselves have re-produced militarisation in counter-state politics. One crucial outcome of this process of double-militarisation, as evident in Chenoy's account, is the militarisation of social relations, the public sphere and gender relations. It produces its own victims, particularly among the marginalised communities. Ethnic and cultural minorities, women and the children are specifically vulnerable communities in such intense conditions of militarisation. Similarly, there is a clearly identifiable nexus between militarism, ethno-nationalist fundamentalism, communalism, and patriarchy in a framework of institutional reproduction of militarisation. This, in Chenoy's conceptualisation, is a process of 'deep' militarisation in which values and practices of militarism encompass the entire body politic.

In her account of militarisation in Pakistan, Ayesha Siddiqa provides the story of a new state that has been subjected to an irreversible process of militarisation from the early phase of its emergence as a modern nation-state. As Siddiqa points out, one of the crucial challenges in the state making and nation-formation in Pakistan has been the absence of a framework of national cohesion. In that context, the civilian and military elites deployed militarism as a source of political legitimacy. Pakistan's militarisation process culminated just after ten years of its creation as a modern state when the military took over state power in 1958 with the active collaboration of the country's bureaucracy. Ever since the military coup of 1958, the democratic space in Pakistan has been the exception rather than the rule in governance. As Siddiqa repeatedly suggests, a major drawback in the post-colonial state formation process in Pakistan has been the limitations of the political space that the democratic institutions and practices had for consolidation. Thus, in Pakistan, the process of militarisation is integrally linked to a parallel process of undemocratisation the leading agents of which have been the military, the civilian bureaucracy, and the political elite.

In certain crucial aspects of militarisation, Pakistan has parallels with India. Pakistan's ruling elite also developed a paradigm of 'national security' the clearest manifestations of which were the militarisation of society and the militarisation of state-society relations. However, one distinguishing dimension of militarisation in Pakistan is the military's sustained influence on power politics. To invoke a phrase used time ago, Pakistan's military has acquired a status of 'relative autonomy' vis à vis the civilian agencies of political power. A crucial point that Siddiqa makes is that in Pakistan, militarisation by the military commands much social support and that provides both legitimacy and sustainability to the process of militarisation. As Siddiqa forcefully argues, Pakistan's militarisation is also associated with the US political agenda in the region, first in the war in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation and then in the more recent war against terror. Siddiqa points out that while there are strong domestic reasons for Pakistan's militarisation process, equally important in explaining militarisation is the US politics in relation to Pakistan and the South Asian region.

Fara Haniffa discusses the militarisation process in Sri Lanka in a context of post-colonial nation building. Sri Lanka is at present in an

unstable phase of emerging out of a prolonged ethno-political civil war. An internationally facilitated peace process initiated in 2002 has led to negotiations between the government of Sri Lanka and Tamil secessionist rebels, yet there is still no possibility of a settlement agreement being reached by the two sides. While the negotiations remain suspended, the ceasefire agreement they signed before the formal negotiations began remains intact.

As Haniffa points out, Sri Lanka's militarisation process is closely linked to the development of the majority-minority ethnic conflict and its eventual transformation into a civil war in the early 1980s. It is also a significant consequence of the state's and the polity's investment in a prolonged war. The war has militarised inter-ethnic relations. Historical memories of ethnic communities are re-imagined in militaristic terms. Popular culture is both ethnicised and militarised. So are gender relations and society's perspectives on women and children. As Haniffa's account shows, a process of deep and social militarisation has set in Sri Lanka, with violence at both state and non-state level pervading everyday culture. The conclusion arising from Haniffa's analysis is that at the heart of an agenda of de-militarisation in Sri Lanka should be a negotiated political settlement to the ethnic conflict, accompanied with a project of re-building the state in a framework of multi-ethnicity, power sharing and democracy.

In Nepal, as Arjun Karki and Mukunda Kattel show, the militarisation process is paralleled with the chronic failure of democratisation and the rise of a counter-state insurgency. The democratic failure in Nepal is located in a fundamental paradox in political modernity – despite the presence of an active mass movement that inaugurated democracy, the political parties and leadership not only failed to institutionalise democracy, but also became agents of its quick decay. In the analysis developed by Karki and Kattel, the militarisation process in Nepal has been propelled forward by the rapid democratic decay as well as the Maoist insurgency. The insurgency, in turn, has been an immediate outcome of the overall failure of democratisation. Thus, militarism and undemocracy are intertwined processes in Nepal. At present, the Nepali polity has entered a phase of acute bipolarity between the State and the Maoist insurgency, characterised by the continuing civil war, generalised political violence, and intense political instability.

Karki and Kattel draw attention to two disturbing dimensions of the militarisation process in Nepal. The first is the emergence of a political culture of generalised violence among all actors in Nepali polity. Impunity enjoyed and exercised by the state and counter-state combatants against the civilian populace is a generalised dimension of what Karki and Kattel call the 'bellicist culture' of Nepal. The State and the Maoist rebel leadership are both unaccountable to the people in their bellicist decisions, actions and behaviour. Public resources are diverted to maintain the war and the nation's priorities are totally distorted with the State plundering public resources at will to sustain an essentially unwinnable civil war. The second is the involvement of external actors in the state's war against the Maoist insurgency, thereby enhancing the process of continuing militarisation. The US 'war on terror' has provided a new global context for the British and American forces to engage in Nepal's counter-insurgency war in providing economic and military assistance. Thus, the present phase of Nepal's militarisation is not one located in an isolated Himalayan hill nation, but one integrally linked to global militarisation.

The story of militarisation in the Philippines is somewhat similar to that of Sri Lanka, with some dimensions specific to the Philippines. Samira Gutoc begins her chapter with a general discussion on the militarisation process of the Philippines in the 1970s under the rule of President Ferdinand Marcos and then shifts the focus of discussion on the Muslim ethnic conflict in Mindanao. The end of the Martial Law regime of President Marcos and the return of the democratic civilian rule in Manila only marked a temporary setback to the overall process of militarisation. The conflict in Mindanao is at the centre of the Philippine's continuing process of militarisation. The ethno-political conflict between the Philippine state and the Moro people has not been resolved through negotiations. The peace process has suffered major setbacks.

As Gutoc's account clearly demonstrates, the global 'war on terror' launched by the Bush administration has provided a new global context to Philippine militarisation. The Arroyo regime's willing complicity with the American global strategy even threatened the Philippines with the possibility of becoming the next front after Iraq in the US global 'war on terror.' Gutoc makes a strong case for de-linking the Philippines from the global strategic designs of the US and resolving the conflict in Mindanao through non-military means that include negotiation, settlement

agreements, restoration of human rights, sustainable peace building and democratisation.

In his chapter on Malaysia, Francis K. W. Loh develops an analysis of what he calls 'militarisation by other means,' through 'coercive legalism.' In Malaysia, unlike in other Southeast Asian countries, the military has not been a visible actor in shaping the political process. In fact, the Malaysian military has remained in the barracks and taken a backseat in politics. Malaysia, as Loh points out, constitutes an enigma, compared with other countries in the region. It is a multi-ethnic society with no ethno-religious violence in recent decades. The ruling party has successfully managed the Malaysian economy, propelling it to the status of a second-generation Newly Industrialised Country (NIC). Beneath this enigma is the Malaysian national security state that has been based on what Loh calls 'coercive legalism.' It is the police, the bureaucracy and the legal system including the judicial process, and not the military, that the civilian regime has used as the main instruments of the Malaysian national security state.

The origins of the Malaysian national security state go back to the counter-insurgency war against the Communist Party of Malaya in the late 1940s and early 1950s, in the last phase of the British colonial rule. The development of a regime of coercive legalism began after the independence of 1957. The post-colonial Malaysian state continued with the national security framework of the state developed during the late British rule. The constitutional and legal framework adopted some of the key national security instruments developed by the colonial state in its counter-insurgency war against the Communists. The repeated use of the State of Emergency, bypassing and even suspending the parliament in the face of internal conflicts characterised the first phase of consolidation of the Malaysian national security state. As Loh's account demonstrates, a regime of coercive legalism strengthening the repressive capacity of the state emerged around the Emergency legislation and the National Security Act of 1960. These repressive laws were liberally used to suppress political dissent and opposition as well as the critics of the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) regime. Loh provides a chilling account of the process of repression practiced by the BN regime, using the law, the judiciary and the police. The distressing conclusion Loh arrives at is that in Malaysia, politics will remain in the hands of the civilians, but 'militarisation by other means' will

continue through the foreseeable future. There are no signs of it being turned back.

Japan, as Kinhide Mushakoji's account demonstrates, is faced with the threat of militarisation through constitutional reform. After the Second World War, Japan maintained a claim to be a pacifist nation, repentant of its history of militarism and military expansion. The post-war Japanese Constitution of 1947 was widely regarded as a 'peace' constitution, since it contained clauses renouncing the use of military force to resolve international conflicts and even the possession of a military force. Mushakoji shows how there has emerged in recent years a new ruling class consensus in Japan to abrogate this 'Peace' Constitution and make Japan a 'normal state' without constitutional obstacles to re-militarisation.

As Mushakoji's analysis shows, the emerging ruling class consensus for re-militarising Japan has a backdrop of 'informal and covert' militarisation that has proceeded under the cover of an officially 'pacifist' state. Covert militarisation has occurred when Japan accepted the American demand to shoulder its security burden in the region. Mushakoji argues that this policy of 'official pacifism' and 'unofficial militarisation' was carried out between 1955 and 1990 in an unusual combination of circumstances in which while the political process remained bipolarised between the Liberal Democratic Party and the Socialist Party, a regime of cooperation between politicians and bureaucrats had emerged to maintain stability. The covert militarisation was also supported by the corporate business community who stood to benefit from it.

Parallel to the official process of covert militarisation in Japan in this period was what Mushakoji calls 'social militarisation' in the sense that anti-systemic movements took a militarised character. However, there were active social movements for pacifism that challenged the official process of covert militarisation. Resistance to militarism mounted by the people in Okinawa is a notable popular movement for pacifism. But these movements could not sustain themselves because of the 'failure in social reproduction of pacifist principles' enshrined in the Peace Constitution of 1947.

The impact of the US-led global 'war on terror' has, as Mushakoji points out, had a direct impact on the process of militarisation in Japan. The phase of Japan's covert militarisation has come to an effective end. It is now official and open. Mushakoji concludes that Japan finds it profitable to

assert its role as a 'subaltern militarised state,' subservient to the militarist strategies and intentions of the US.

South Korea's intense militarisation has been an integral component of the historical process of modern state formation. The Korean War (1950-1953) provided the immediate conditions for the militarisation of the Korean state in a global situation that was characterised by the very early phase of the East-West conflict and the cold war. The division of Korea into two antagonistic states intensified a process of unlimited military competition and intense enmity and that resulted in extreme militarisation of the Korean Peninsula. As Insook Kwon describes in her chapter, intensification of South Korea's militarisation was based on a project of national defence and anti-Communism that has permeated to social relations.

The key element of militarisation in South Korea that Insook highlights in her chapter is what she terms 'social militarisation.' In this conceptualisation, militarisation is not merely about the build up of military institutions and establishing an oppressive rule. It is also a process in which a deep consensus is built among the citizens for national security and defence to define all dimensions of economic, political and social relations in terms of militarism. It is a process that has led to mass mobilisation for voluntary sacrifice for economic development and national prosperity, construction of a para-military system encompassing the entire society through militaristic education and ideological indoctrination for anti-Communism and a mass psychology of enmity towards North Korea as a source of threat and insecurity. Ideologically, South Korean militarism is a combination of nationalism, rapid economic growth, anti-Communism and it has been the instrument through which state-society linkages have been built. Linked with the notion of national defence, militarisation in South Korea has also had a dimension of coercion, which imposed militaristic values on the citizens with the threat of severe penalty for non-conformity.

Social militarisation has also had a dimension that is 'invisible.' The invisible militarisation in South Korea is in the sphere of gender. Gendered militarisation, as Insook argues, is not about women or the notions of womanhood. It is about the gendering process of social militarisation that is linked to the larger process of militarising social relations and the family. Military prostitutes, gender-divided economic structures that militarise

women workers and the military wives have been key issues in this process of gendered militarisation.

In Indonesia, militarisation of the state has been a continuing process in the post-colonial political change for a period about four decades. The military take over of the state power in an anti-Communist coup in 1965 and then the continuation of the military rule for almost three decades has some parallels with the way in which the state in Pakistan became militarised from the late 1950s onwards. In Indonesia, as in Pakistan, the state militarisation was externally supported by the US. The replacement of military rule by a civilian regime occurred in a combination of severe economic crisis and a pro-democracy mass movement. But the paradox of that change in Indonesia, as in Nepal, is that democratic change has not led to democratisation as such. Neither has it created a process for de-militarisation. As Hilmar Farid dramatically puts it, the key problem that impedes democratisation in Indonesia is the presence of an immense military power in all aspects of life.

Indonesia's challenge of democratisation is inter-twined with the complex challenge of de-militarisation. As Farid's analysis indicates, a project of de-militarisation is not only about replacing a military regime with civilian and democratically elected political class. It is about many things that include dismantling of militarised structures of the state as well as civilian structures that are linked to the military institutions, removal of the mechanisms through which the military has penetrated the non-military domains of the public life, and the non-militarist resolution of internal conflicts. In the absence of such a radical process of de-militarisation, democratic reforms in Indonesia have been superficial, leading to a new process of what Farid calls 're-militarisation.' This poses a new paradox: civilian politicians have now come to establish local and national level alliances with the military. Thus, re-militarisation in Indonesia is the other side of the story of democratic reform failure in the recent past and at present.

Militarism in Thailand, as Pravit Rojanaphruk shows, is a unique phenomenon which exists in a logic of denial. The official discourse of Thai culture enunciates a particular identity of the Thai people that projects 'Thainess' as a marker of a gentle and peace-loving nation. Yet in reality, the Thai culture, its social relations and the political process as well as the state's relations with society are acutely violent and highly militarised. This logic

of denial of violence and militarism has another pernicious dimension. The state controls Thai society's historical memory by means of an official ideology that glorifies state violence. Its result, as Rojanaphruk claims, is that most of the Thai people are ignorant of the militarised nature of their own society. It is a society that is blind to its own violence, past and present. In Rojanaphruk's analysis, the fundamental aspect of militarisation in Thailand is the combination of the state discourse of 'Thainess' and the social blindness to violence and militarism.

Thematic Links

While each country study brings out specific dimensions of the processes of militarisation in Asia, all chapters have a common analytical and prescriptive thread. There are five thematic links that run through the volume, suggesting possibilities for transformative political practice.

Firstly, all country studies suggest that militarisation in Asia has entered a qualitatively new phase, characterised by the militarist linkages with the US-led global 'war on terror.' It is significant to note that the US military attacks on the 'terrorists' in fact targeted two Asian states, Afghanistan and Iraq, and a few other Asian states, particularly Pakistan and Japan, have been directly implicated in it. The willingness of the Bush administration as well as the ruling elites in Nepal, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand to link internal armed insurgencies in those countries with 'terrorism' as defined by the right-wing of the American Republican Party poses the threat of renewed militarisation under new global conditions. The deployment of the US marines in Asia's tsunami-hit countries for 'humanitarian tasks' places this dimension of militarisation in another new global context. As the American officials have openly admitted, this 'humanitarian assistance' is immediately prompted by the Bush administration's considerations of global security against terrorism. The chapters on Indonesia, the Philippines and Nepal specifically argue that there is now a threat of re-militarisation under the post- September 2001 global conditions.

Secondly, all chapters make the recurrent argument for de-securitisation of the state. Militarisation in most cases has been historically linked to the emergence of the national security state in response to internal conflicts. The securitised state has initially relied heavily and exclusively on the strengthening of the repressive and interventionist capacity of the state.

Historically, securitisation of the state was accompanied by a parallel process of de-democratisation in some countries and open militarisation in others, thereby jeopardising both democracy and human security. This volume calls for an agenda for de-securitisation backed by a strong human security framework.

Thirdly, the crucial need for a strong human security framework, as argued in most of the chapters in this volume, is necessitated by the recognition that militarisation has deeply penetrated societies and cultures outside the narrow domain of the state. This volume brings to the centre stage two such areas of militarisation that the conventional academic literature on this theme is reluctant to address. The first is the militarisation of counter-state responses to state militarisation. Except in Japan, Malaysia and South Korea, in all the other countries discussed in this volume, there has been an enduring spiral of militarisation involving the state and counter-state insurgencies. The culpability of counter-state militarism in militarising the society is particularly discussed in detail in the chapters on Nepal, India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Thailand. The second aspect is the militarisation of civil society with the privileged role accorded to violence and arms as instruments of social as well as individual relations. De-militarising civil society is a key challenge that any democratisation project is immediately confronted with in all these societies. The social or societal militarisation as some authors of this volume call it needs to be addressed by a comprehensive human security framework that aims at two intertwined objectives: peaceful resolution of internal armed conflicts and de-militarisation of civil society.

Fourthly, the impact of militarisation on the marginalised sections in society is another important common theme that runs through all the chapters in this volume. In many cases, they are direct victims of war and violence. In some instances, as in South Korea, militarisation of women is often invisible. In civil war situations as in Nepal, Sri Lanka and India, women and children have been forced to be combatants in war. This volume makes a strong case for a de-militarisation programme in these countries with innovative political interventions to address the needs of women and children caught in the spiral of political and social violence.

Finally, all chapters in this volume separately and collectively argue for a comprehensive political reform programme that can effectively address the challenges of de-militarisation. In Nepal, India, the Philippines and Sri

Lanka, and to some extent in Indonesia and Thailand, peaceful resolution of internal conflicts is an essential precondition for de-militarisation with democracy and human security. Sustainable peace in these societies calls for radical political reforms coupled with economic reforms to ensure redistribution and social justice. Such reforms should in the short run be accompanied by comprehensive initiatives for the transition from civil war to peace with democracy. In the case of Pakistan and India, de-militarising the inter-state relations is of utmost importance for de-militarisation within. In South Korea and Japan, de-linking internal politics from the global strategic agenda of the US is a major pre-requisite to prevent re-militarisation.



Militarism in
National Security,
Inter-State,
and State-Society Relations

INDIA

National Security, Multiple Insurgencies, Inter-State Relations and Societal Militarisation

Anuradha M. Chenoy

DEMOCRATIC STATES become militarised when they use military force for regime maintenance and for extending their power and interests. When this process is couched in the terminology of 'national security,' militarisation is legitimised as protecting the national interest. When states allow threats and threat perceptions to determine their fundamental worldview and base their policies on the use of unilateral force for decision-making they can be classified as national security states. The internal aspects of such states focus on protecting the existing regime and balancing internal forces through the maintenance of law and order. Capitalist systems, especially those where inequality and impoverishment create dissent and social disharmony, require the use of force and militarist ideologies to maintain the equilibrium necessary for protecting and legitimising the ruling elite. They deal with dissent through centralised power and the use of armed force, and for this they rely increasingly on the military and militarist institutions. Similarly, the external relations of states get militarised when the states focus on increasing their power and protecting national interest by any means including force. Such states organise their relations with other states in order to extend their hegemony and power, and also to isolate potential enemy states. They upgrade their weaponry and keep the army on a constant alert. The presence of militarised neighbours in turn pressurises states to increase the strength of the armed forces to maintain a favourable regional balance

of power. International domination by a militarised super power sets on important precedence and an example for militarising other states. Realist arguments that present the international political system as anarchic, where each state looks after its interests through force rather than acceptable international law, has also encouraged militarisation. Meanwhile, militarised states often identify as internal enemies those groups and communities who do not conform to dominant perceptions. Individuals or groups who question the national security perceptions or challenge the kind of protection the state offers to the citizens are also perceived as internal enemies. These militarised internal and external relations of the state are in turn legitimised by the purported capacity of the state to protect its citizens, its sovereignty, its territory and the honour of its citizens.

States that privilege national security issues shift from developmental to security paradigms and mobilise and allocate resources on the basis of threat perceptions that usually tend to escalate. Such states need special laws to defend the national security that is perceived through the prism of threats and they invariably violate the normal civil and political rights of the citizens. They also tend to privilege statist and military opinions and options which include the use of force. The protection and security that these states offer their citizens is based on militaristic perceptions and values in which force is the basis of relations with others. The politics of the state get militarised as the army remains under the control of civil authority. India is a state that has acquired characteristics of such a national security identity.

This chapter first narrates the process of gradual militarisation of the Indian State, through its history. It then argues that it was a combination of external disputes and internal conflicts and the inability to resolve them through a negotiated settlement that initiated the process of militarisation. The chapter then moves on to showing how the construction of the national security discourse facilitated militarisation of civil society and culture. I will demonstrate how the politics of Right wing parties in India particularly when they were in power made militarisation an acceptable regime ideology. This chapter will also discuss how the nuclear experiments of 1998, followed by the Kargil war, were couched in a gendered and militarist discourse. Finally, the chapter examines the internal and external dimensions of militarisation and their impact on gender and civil society in India.

Militarisation in India: Key Dimensions

Militarisation is one aspect of the Indian State and it has been the result of multiple factors. These include unresolved regional and local conflicts and secessionist movements from within, especially in the North East, in Jammu and Kashmir, and earlier in Punjab. Protracted and unresolved territorial conflicts and wars with bordering countries and the presence of other militarised states in the region, Pakistan and China, have led to the massive arms acquisition programmes, the ambitions for the possession of nuclear weapons and the production of a national security ideology to legitimise such policies. For example, the militant movements in Punjab and Kashmir have received support from Pakistan. The Indian state has claimed that in the 1960s and 1970s, the Chinese had given assistance to militants in India's North East states, and in the 1990s to those based in Bangladesh. Indeed, the Indian State has shifted to a foreign policy that rejects the foundation principles of non-alignment and is replacing these with an ambition to become a regional great power based on a national security doctrine that enhances threat perceptions. This foreign policy, based on a Realist vision, has added to militarisation of external relations. India's contemporary processes of militarisation also have a linkage with the country's colonial experience. The continuity of colonial norms and traditions by Indian military forces, and the retention of many colonial laws in dealing with law and order in general and movements of dissent in particular, have ensured the continuity of several militarised colonial traditions by the Indian state long after independence.

The justification of militarist ideology by the state for protecting itself and its citizens as being central to national security has resulted in the militarisation of civil society as well as centralisation of state structures. Internal militarisation has been promoted by factors like the promulgation of laws that give the army extraordinary powers over civilians in conflict situations and the increasing deployment of the army to deal with civilian conflicts and anti-state movements. The repeated use of military and paramilitary forces in domestic crises and conflicts in areas of internal conflicts have brought in the notion of the 'superiority' of the armed forces as opposed to the police. There has also been the threat of civil society in India being militarised against a backdrop of right-wing Hindu nationalist parties emerging as a strong force. This is particularly seen with the election victory of the BJP-led Hindu nationalist coalition in 1998 and their regime

that governed India till 2004. These right wing political movements and militias have an ideology based on a narrow religion-cultural nationalism that sees minority communities as alien and threatening 'others.' Yet another factor that threatens civil society with militarisation is the presence of extreme left-wing militia who are committed to the physical annihilation of their 'class enemies.'

The indications of militarisation and the growing strength of the national security state are evident in rising military budgets that remain larger than social sector expenditures, and in the use of force by the state as well as anti-state insurgent movements. The defence budget that was 1.6 percent of the India's GDP for the period from 1947 to 1962 jumped to 3.8 percent after the Sino-Indian War of 1962. In the 1980s the defence budget stabilised to around 2.5 percent of the GDP. The defence budget has been significantly raised since 1998, when the defence allocation became 14 percent higher than the previous year. Every year since 2001-2002 the defence budget has been increased, even though it has remained around 2.5 percent of the GDP. In real terms the military expenditure of India has gone up by 60% in the past ten years. However, the figures given in India's defence budget are questionable, because it does not reflect all defence related expenditures and procurements. Supplementary budget requests are made from time to time. The nuclear weapons research and development programmes are budgeted under separate heads. The defence budgets remain higher than the allocations for education and health. This situation has seldom been questioned because of the 'sanctity' of so-called national security needs.

Constructing the National Security State

Militarisation in India has been uneven across time and space. Historically, it has been accelerated at certain junctures as part of state policy in response to specific events like the North East or the Khalistan movement in Punjab and other secessionist movements. Spatially, it has surfaced intermittently in some regions and in states like Kashmir, the North East, and even in Andhra Pradesh where there have been anti-state movements. But the roots of India's militarisation go back to the pre-independence phase of the state formation. Militarisation in India, as in all South Asian countries, has its roots in the colonial state where force was used to curb nationalist movements. Many of these colonial laws were retained by the Indian postcolonial state to regulate dissent and maintain hegemony. This is especially true of laws relating to the military and the Indian Penal Code.

The very formation of the Indian State was marked by the partition of the country. Partition resulted in unprecedented communal riots that were curbed with assistance from the army. This was the first time that issues of community, identity and nationhood were raised. The state responded by using its military force, instead of negotiating a settlement within the framework of the Constitution. During the transfer of power the Indian army was called upon to intervene in Punjab, Junagadh, Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir, where civilian processes had collapsed. When this 'action' was completed, the army retreated from the civilian space, allowing the political authority thereafter to negotiate the political outcome. After independence, the slogan of development and consolidation of the Indian State was given paramount importance. Despite its distortions and lags, development remained an agenda based on national consensus, and was not subsumed by national security considerations. Nevertheless, the military was used to suppress several anti-state movements. They ranged from threats from the communists (such as the Telengana movement in 1948), the Naxalbari movement (the Maoist movement in West Bengal, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and some other regions during the late 60s and 70s) to regional and ethnic secessionist movements in the North East, Kashmir, and Punjab. In curbing these insurgencies, the Indian State effectively used military power and violence while bringing national security perspectives to domestic issues. This was indeed a process of militarisation of security concerns.

Feminists have argued that the logic of masculine protection of the family that makes the male head the protector and superior can be extended to the role of the state as protectors over its citizens. This masculinist protectionism theorised by Iris Marion Young shows how state officials successfully mobilise fear in such a manner that they appropriate women's rights to question the state and thereby create a security state. This argument leaves out the fact that capitalist development and currently the neoliberal policies intersect and combine with national security, militarisation and patriarchy. Further, militarisation of the major states in the international system, such as the USA, propels militarisation in the Third World by way of example as well as fear. Militarisation in India is an illustration of such a combination.

The militarism of the state has been countered by the militarism of secessionist/regional movements and has been calamitous for the civilian population. While both the military and the militants suffered losses, it is

primarily the civilians and amongst them the women and children who suffer trauma from all sides. Institutions in states with armed conflict got militarised and as a result, the space for civilian activities became restricted. Since the 1950s, the Indian State has engaged with movements for self-determination in the North East primarily by military means. The growing phenomenon of a state primarily attuned to national security considerations became clear during the Indira Gandhi regime when the regional crises in Punjab, Kashmir, and Assam assumed magnified dimensions. An image of a 'Besieged Mother India' was created and the perceived national security threats were employed to legitimise militarist responses by the government in all these border states. By the 1980s, militarisation became an entrenched dimension of state policy on national security.

The Regional Aspects

In some Indian states where there have been ethnic secessionist armed conflicts, issues of regional identity, autonomy, economic development, and the alienation of local people have had the cumulative effect of giving rise to anti-state movements. Most states with armed violent conflicts – Punjab, Kashmir and the North East States – share borders with Pakistan and China. India has unresolved border disputes with both countries. Therefore, the Indian State views these border-states as vulnerable. The politics and nature of the conflict in Kashmir, Punjab and the North East states are different from one another in social and cultural terms. In the following pages, a brief account of these conflicts is given in order to highlight their specificities as well as common dimensions.

The North East

The North East region of India, comprising the seven states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Tripura, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland, has witnessed armed conflicts for decades. The anti-state movements in several of these states – Mizoram, Assam, Tripura, Nagaland and Manipur in particular – are called 'national liberation' movements within the region, while the Indian Government labels them as 'insurgencies' and their cadre 'extremists' or 'militants.' Those involved in the movement call themselves 'freedom fighters' as well as 'national liberators'. Others in the region refer to them as 'the underground.' In some regions of the North East, like Mizoram and Assam, there have been some positive developments towards peace after

peace agreements – the Shillong Accord of 1975 and the Bodo Accord of 2004. In Assam, several movements, like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), continue to be active in some areas. In the two states of Nagaland and Manipur the protracted and intense nature of the armed conflict remains unchanged, though in Nagaland a ‘cease-fire agreement’ has been signed between the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isaac-Muivah faction (NSCN-IM) and the Government of India.

The Nagas have had aspirations for independence since colonial times and believe that they constitute a separate nation and therefore did not accept their status as part of the Indian union in 1947. Since then they have argued for the right of self-determination and this has led to a protracted armed conflict between the Naga National Council (NNC) and the Union of India. The North East is the region that has been subjected to intense and continuous militarisation since independence. The common problems of economic under development, exploitation of natural resources by ‘outsiders,’ and environmental degradation in the seven states of the North East has led to a notion of perceived ‘backwardness’ amongst the severely alienated people in the region. Security forces and the Indian army were sent to the hills of Manipur and Nagaland in the 1950s to suppress these movements and militarisation of the region has continued ever since. This created a fertile ground for local militancy to grow into secessionist movements for self-determination.

The sustained militancy and violence have affected the civilian population in predictable ways. Highly mobile rebels take shelter with the people in villages, ambush security forces, and then move on. After each such attack, security forces descend on the place and engage in what is known as ‘counter-insurgency’ operations. The villagers, especially women who sheltered the rebels, in many cases because of fear and not because of the support for insurgents, are then subjected to violence, terror, harassment and abuse. The Indian Government and the Naga National Council (NNC) signed the Shillong Accord in 1975, which eventually divided the Nagas into factions. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), one of the factions, contested the Accord. This group also broke into two factions in 1988, one led by S.S.Khaplang (NSCN-K) and the other led by Isaac C. Swu and Th. Muivah (NSCN-IM). Both factions have run parallel governments in different parts of Nagaland. While there is an elected government, the parallel governments of the NSCN and the Naga underground struggle

continue. The factional feud caused heavy loss of life and inter-group bitterness, making it severely gendered as well, since women became victims of rival forces. In fact, women became subjected to three parallel patriarchies, those of the state, the underground and the community. This region is heavily militarised, quite literally with one security person to every ten civilians. Since April 1995, the whole of Nagaland has been under the Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA), which virtually placed the State under constant emergency provision and under Central rule. Despite the July 1997 cease-fire between the NSCN and the Government of India (GOI) national security legislation and the resultant sense of fear remain unchanged.

The state of Manipur faces multiple conflicts. The hill districts of Manipur like Ukhrul, Senapati, and Tamenlong are inhabited by Nagas who share the aspirations of greater Nagaland as well as the ideology and political commitments of the Nagas from Nagaland. They are in conflict with the Indian State and face opposition from the Meities of Manipur Valley regarding their aspirations for a greater Nagaland. The Meities who are primarily Hindu see themselves as culturally distinct (and superior) to the Nagas, and want to safeguard the integrity of the state of Manipur. The Meiti underground movement is opposed to the Indian State. The Naga demand for a greater Nagaland that includes the hill districts inhabited by Nagas has been vigorously rejected by the Meiteis. Rifts have also arisen between the Nagas and Kukis in the hill districts and this conflict peaked between 1992 and 1996. There have been rivalry and conflict between the Kukis and Paite tribes, resulting in the 1997-1998 killings. A number of Manipuri extremist groups in the valley like the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), the Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and others (almost 20) have been leading a resistance demanding secession from the Indian State. These groups draw their strength from the popular history of the Meithes (ethnic community of Manipur) and are hostile to the Manipur Agreement of 21 September 1949 under which the State acceded to the Indian Union. Manipur has been under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1972) for decades. With these developments, 38 million people residing in the North East of India live under military rule and an undeclared emergency. This has continued without a break for 46 years. This military-led emergency rule gives even junior army officers' unrestricted powers over ordinary people that cannot be questioned by a

court of law. Thus, the North East remains one of the most militarised regions in the country with unresolved conflicts. Tension continues despite the cease-fire between the NSCN-IM and the Indian Government.

Kashmir

Jammu and Kashmir acceded to the Indian union under very special circumstances when India became independent in 1947 with the local ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh's hands being forced by the Pakistani-backed invasion of tribal raiders. To fight these raiders the Maharaja needed the assistance of the Indian army. With the help of Sheikh Abdullah, the most popular leader in the State who rallied the Kashmiri people in supporting the accession to India, Kashmir was formally incorporated as a special part of the Indian Union, a fact which Pakistan has contested since then. Pakistan organised raids into the northern part of Kashmir. Eventually, Kashmir was divided into two parts, occupied by India and Pakistan and demarcated by the contentious Line of Control (LOC). This division of Kashmir has led to unending hostilities between India and Pakistan ranging from low-level conflict to war. The division of Kashmir has also meant that families and communities have been divided along this border for decades with little or no communication.

The Indian government guaranteed special status and greater autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir through Article 370 of the Indian Constitution in 1952. Relations with Kashmir were complicated after the late Sheikh Abdullah was incarcerated for a long period between 1953 and 1975 on grounds of suspicion of pro-Pakistani sentiments. However, an agreement was reached when the Indira Gandhi-Sheikh Abdullah Accord was signed in 1975. In the interim period, making use of pliable governments the elections generally believed to have been rigged in favour of the ruling party, successive union governments systematically took away the greater part of the autonomy given to the State. This has deepened the popular alienation in the Valley and increased anti-Indian sentiments. Though Pakistan continued to support secessionist forces in Kashmir from 1947 onwards, the critical event that led to a major insurgency in the Valley from 1989 is widely believed to be the rigged elections of 1987, which increased alienation in the Valley. This, and a demand for self-determination backed by Pakistan became the basis of conflict and terrorist methods against the state.

Militarism in the Kashmir Valley has arisen from a commitment to *jihad* (or holy war) and to the formation of an Islamic state by militants who do not accept both the Indian Constitution and the international law. Reports on human rights violations show large numbers of violent incidents in which militants were responsible for both civilian and army casualties. Militants were also engaged in the destruction of public and private property. According to official sources, as many as 129 schools, 172 bridges and 802 public buildings were among the public property destroyed in 1990. The burden of rebuilding these infrastructure facilities is not with the state alone.

The mass of the people including women and children live in a situation akin to a permanent war zone. There are large numbers of internally displaced people. An entire community of 150,000 Kashmiri Pundits (upper caste Hindus) was forced out of the Kashmir Valley into camps in the Jammu region. While health care and education in the camps is very limited, shortage of materials and the lack of basic amenities hamper educational development amongst children. Militants have attacked moderate Kashmir politicians, and ruthlessly quashed dissent or pluralism within their ranks. Their ideology is based on a communal understanding of their proposed vision of the state of Kashmir, based on the Sharia, and therefore having the potential to alienate other minority communities.

Pakistan has supported militancy in Kashmir in various ways. Ideologically the frequent statements by its leadership and religious bodies equate the secessionist movement in Kashmir with *jihad* which has only given an impetus to militancy and created the ambience for counter militarism. Fundamentalism from within the movements in Kashmir tends to merge with fundamentalist movements emanating from Pakistan. The Kashmiri militants do not deny the Pakistan link. Kashmir has become a classic case of militarism being a consequence of militancy, fundamentalism, and extra-territorial support, to which the state responds with counter-militarism.

The Indian Government has responded by clamping down the militants and others, by declaring the area as 'disturbed,' and by resorting to laws designed to give the police and paramilitary extra judicial powers which in turn have violated civil and political rights. The civilians have been caught in the crossfire between the extremists and the army. Thus there have been many recorded human rights abuses, including rape, custodial death, and missing of people throughout the Valley. Women have been victims of terror

of both the Army and of the militants in this highly gendered conflict. These conflicts have been gendered because the roles of men and women are socially demarcated. Women have been deliberately subjected to such sexual violations and crimes as rape because they are designed to humiliate the entire community. Similarly, gender stereotypes become re-enforced and women are forced to play derogatory roles, since the emphasis in such situations is on force and masculinity. Such deep militarisation erodes basic civil rights when all parties in Kashmir violate international humanitarian law. Conditions such as these that have led to a spiral of violence are important reasons for the continuation of the disturbed situation in Kashmir. Militarisation in a protracted conflict like in Kashmir has multiple levels, the most obvious one being the presence of military and the police with wide ranging powers under exceptional national security legislation. The methods of insurgency used by the non-state insurgent forces under the cover of *jihad* and their disregard for international, humanitarian and domestic law is used to justify exceedingly repressive state actions. Mainstream political parties like the National Conference, the Congress Party and People's Democratic Party support state action. Other parties like the Hurriyat Conference oppose such state action while supporting the militancy. The response of each group is linked to the use of force in a continuing spiral of violence. Thus the political space as well as public culture get deeply militarised with little room for pacifist movements.

The Kashmir conflict has impacted all aspects of civilian life in the region. Since 1989 when the insurgency began, government services, the administration and the legal system have barely functioned. The rule of law has been eroded and democratic institutions do not function. Several thousand civilians have been detained under the Public Safety Act and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act. Data vary on the numbers and the instances of human rights abuse. These are perpetuated both by the state and militant groups. As in other conflicts, civil rights activists and those who oppose the militants are also eliminated.

Punjab

The conflict that shook Punjab in the 1980s is another experience which reveals how the politics of militancy and the militarist responses of the state have contributed to a recurrent process of militarisation. This conflict arose because of the demand made by the Sikh community for a separate ethnic

state. The Congress government in power at that time did not accede to this demand since it was believed that the creation of a new state would lead to a communal division of the Hindus and the Sikhs in the state. When Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister in 1966, she appointed the Shah Commission to divide Punjab and the borders were demarcated to form Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh. The Akali Dal (a political party based on the Sikh religion) was unhappy with the nature of the demarcation and their politics confined themselves to Sikh identity politics. The lack of industrialisation and growing unemployment among the Sikh youth made them easy instruments for fundamentalist and militant movements.

The Akali Dal resolution demanded greater autonomy for Punjab, making Chandigarh the sole capital of Punjab, seeking the readjustment of state boundaries and better allocation of river waters. By the late 1970s the Sikh demand for separatism in the form of a state of Khalistan increased and local *gurdwaras* (Sikh temples) started intervening in politics, while the local priests started exercising political leverage. Sant Bhindranwala, a local priest who emerged as the leader of this movement, advocated communal politics, proposed an independent state of Khalistan and practised militant politics. Bhindranwala called the Sikhs to arm themselves, saying that to be armed was "the birthright of every Sikh." He built up armies of armed youth. His extremist followers levied taxes on villagers. Sant Bhindranwala, took over the leadership of the golden Temple in Amritsar (the capital of Punjab State). As militant organisations tend to do, groups under Bhindranwala combined public morality with militancy. For example, the All India Sikh Federation banned the use of tobacco and the sale of liquor in Amritsar in 1981. They gave a call for *Dharam Yudh* or religious war and organised themselves militarily.

The Khalistan movement typifies a militarist movement in its ideology, organisation and methodology. The agenda was to drive Hindus from Punjab and create a communal situation that would bring Sikhs living outside Punjab back to the 'home' state. As violence and terrorist activism increased, the Union government closed all available political options for a peaceful, negotiated settlement by resorting to a strategy of using force. The government plan was to develop a counter militarism to fight the militants by means of intensive military operations. Soon, Punjab's civilian government was suspended and the President's rule (direct control from the

Centre) imposed. The army operation in Punjab in 1984 was the largest military campaign against civilians since 1947.

Counter-insurgency military operations would rarely remain confined to the combatants of warring sides. Village vendettas, property disputes, local animosities get mixed up in these operations. The abuse of human rights came to light when investigations by human rights groups revealed that the Punjab police during their operations against the militants had apprehended civilians, tortured and often killed them in the process. The police then secretly cremated these people, some of whom might have been militants and some innocent civilians. In December 1996, the Supreme Court received the Central Bureau of Investigation's (CBI) Report that confirmed the enforced disappearances and the secret cremations carried out by Punjab security forces from 1984 to 1994. The Court instructed the Human Rights Commission to examine and determine all the issues that arose from what the Court termed as 'flagrant violations of human rights on a mass scale.' The Indian Government forcefully put down the armed conflict in Punjab, but the wounds of militarisation in this region have taken years to heal.

The unresolved conflicts in the regions of Jammu and Kashmir and the North East have multiple dimensions and variations. There are factional conflicts between underground groups; for example, ethnic clashes in Manipur between Nagas and Meities, and Nagas and Kukis. There are killings among factions of Kashmiri militants, 'encounter killings', and inter-communal violence. Each of these conflicts entails illegal killing, kidnapping, rape and sexual abuse, and extortion. These state and anti-state conflicts then generate their own dynamics of death, deceit and destruction. Underground groups develop relations with legitimate political parties and groups which blur the real relationship between them. This is especially so as the State pours in resources for counter intelligence. Many 'former insurgents' are on the pay role of the Government. The real picture of what these movements actually stand for is often lost in this process.

Moreover, the easy availability of small arms has further contributed to wide scale militarisation. In each of these armed conflict situations, it is quite possible that hundreds and thousands of arms circulate. Army depots are often looted for weapons and there is an underground black economy of weapons, leading to militarist tendencies in the economic sphere as well. This deeply affects relations in civilian life, particularly in the case of women and children. Meanwhile the development process gets distorted. All groups

involved in the conflicts are militarised in such a manner that they use militarist methods and tactics to deal with essentially civilian issues.

National Security Legislation and Counter Insurgency Methods

The Government of India (GOI) passed national security legislation to fight anti-state movements and activities in most regions where insurgent movements had emerged. Among the National Security laws were the Assam Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous District) Act, 1953; the Assam Disturbed Area Act of 1955; and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) in 1958 and 1972. The GOI also used the Terrorist and Anti-Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) and later enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). All these National Security acts have highly draconian features that give the military and paramilitary wide ranging powers with little accountability, severely restricting civil liberties. With these powers, the military and police operate independently and often without the knowledge of the civilian authority. These Acts have been a major cause of militarisation of these regions and deeply felt alienation among the people.

The main piece of legislation that governs military action in the North East and in Jammu and Kashmir is the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) 1958, as amended in 1972. The Act provides no precise definition of a 'disturbed area.' It also gives much arbitrary power to the military. For example, even a non-commissioned officer can order his men to shoot to kill if he thinks it necessary to do so for maintaining the public order. This gives very wide discretion to even very junior officers. Similarly, the Act allows military personnel to destroy any shelter from which, in their opinion, armed attacks can be made or are utilised as hideouts by insurgents. This latitude has permitted the destruction of large numbers of dwellings and other buildings in these States, including collateral damage when buildings adjoining the targeted one have been damaged or destroyed.

The AFSPA permits the arrest without warrants with whatever force necessary, of any person against whom suspicion exists. This has provided a legal basis for indiscriminate arrests, and the use of brutal force including firing against innocent civilians. It authorises the entry and search, without warrant, of any premises to make arrests or to apprehend any person or confiscate any property. For military personnel operating in a culturally alien terrain, 'beliefs' and 'reasonable suspicions' are often wholly unfounded

leading to human rights abuses, as documented by many human rights reports. Acts like TADA, POTA and others further supplement this Act. The State legislatures have absolutely no jurisdiction in the matter and the AFSPA thus bypasses the civil authority. Officers guilty of rights violation often escape with impunity because of the protection provided by this Act. When military perpetrators of crimes against the civilian populace get legal protection, it causes an acute sense of grievance within the community.

There is extensive documentation to show that this Act has continuously led to grave abuses of human rights including torture and rape and has been instrumental in the militarisation of state policies in vast areas like the North East in India. Parallel to these developments, a security perspective has emerged along with the repeated deployment and use of the security forces in the North East. In the 1990s, the deployment of security personnel in the North East had reached such a high level that there was one security person for every ten civilians in some parts of the region. All seven states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura report similar experiences. There are many widely known incidents of army excesses in the region, for example the torture and violence against the villagers of Oinam (Manipur) in 1987. The gang rape of women in Ujanmaidan (Tripura) in 1988, terrorising of civilians during Operation Rhino in 1991, shelling of Ukhrul (Manipur) in May 1994, firing on the civilians in Kohima, (Nagaland) in 1995 and the rape of women in Manipur in July 2004.

States including India follow military methods of counter insurgency, which are based on ruthless militarist and gendered traditions. They are designed to destroy the will of the people through 'psychological operations.' Among the tactics widely used by the Indian armed forces are unauthorised killings, disappearance, rape and destruction of the livelihood of the ordinary people. The Army views the entire area as a conflict region, without sparing the market, the farm, the work place, homes, churches, or schools. All people living in the 'disturbed area' are suspected of having links with the underground; from the military's perspective, no one is above suspicion. Movement of all local people is restricted. Mobility of the ordinary people is particularly limited because they do not have identity cards. Body and house searches are common. Certain areas are demarcated as restricted areas and 'inner line permits' are required to go to those regions. They are even totally inaccessible to journalists or human rights activists. Obtaining special

permits issued by the army is the only way to gain entry to these demarcated regions.

In situations of low intensity conflict, the Army uses counter-insurgency tactics designed to destroy economic and social infrastructure. Army officers argue that insurgents use women as shields to avoid security personnel. In such circumstances, where the war has shifted from the borders to the homelands, all civilians including women are seen by the Army as a security risk. The distinction between the home and the war zone gets erased when security personnel conduct searches, entering homes at any hour, even in the night, to look for insurgents who use ordinary homes to shield themselves against the army. Soldiers often body-search women who are suspected to be supporting the militants and hiding arms. They also sexually abuse women in order to humiliate the 'enemy.' As privacy is lost in the private sphere, the community life gets militarised. In such situations, the army's anger is turned against women as well as those left behind when the attackers have escaped. As repeatedly reported in the local press, a widespread 'habit' of the Security Forces is to target innocent villagers after every attack of militants to compensate for the setbacks they suffer. The goal is to destroy the self-esteem, especially of women. Thus for women their homes are now the battleground.

Social and Economic Implications

Years of conflict, violence, lack of economic opportunities, breakdown of the rule of law and military presence has militarised society in Nagaland as well as Manipur, contributing to much alienation and despair among the people. The restrictions imposed by the national security legislation, frequent cross firing, low intensity conflict in army-held areas, especially outside the state capitals and imposition of curfews have adversely affected the economy of these regions under conflict. For example, the town of Mokokchung in Nagaland where firing at civilians by the army occurred in December 1984 lost its commercial value as commercial buildings were destroyed. Though the central government has poured in money in grants-in-aid, local people say that it has hardly led to people-oriented development projects. Instead, it has corrupted local officials of regional governments and the bureaucracy. Local people complain that the 'official' regional government and administration have a 'nexus' with underground groups. It is common knowledge that 'underground' groups have penetrated the local

administration in many areas in both Nagaland and Manipur. Money is made through civil contracts and the contractors are linked to the underground. Underground groups extract taxes and non-payment can be fatal. These regions have also become heavily dependent on central government funding instead of developing income generating initiatives.

Economic life and movement in these areas of conflict is disrupted due to emergency orders, curfews, and restrictions. Women already unequal are unequally affected. Most women feel that there are constraints that hamper economic activities. These, they strongly feel, include payment of double taxes, extortion on highways, confiscation of goods and money by state commandos and other paramilitary forces, *bandhs* (shop and office closures) and curfews. Many women believe that they are compelled to carry out their struggle to eke out a livelihood at tremendous personal risks. Meanwhile, unemployment is very high in all regions of conflict. Surveys confirm that while high literacy and school enrolment is widespread in these states compared to the national average, low per capita income, low consumption levels and inadequate health care systems prevail. Women's role in the decision making process is minimal. In fact, in modern sectors of the economy, participation of women in productive work has been falling when compared with their participation in traditional productive activities. The reasons are that the scope for employment of men in traditional productive activities has narrowed and the burden of maintaining the family through engagement in traditional activities is on women. Ecological degradation has added to their burden. A depleted forest cover and a sinking water table have increased the burden on women who walk miles to collect water and firewood.

It is common place in Manipur to read within one week, many newspaper reports of murders, kidnappings and disappearances by both the underground militants and the army. Rape, molestation, child abuse, strikes, *bandhs* (closures) by student and women organisations are so regular that they are seen as everyday events. In militarised societies, all institutions get gendered and male privilege dominates as women become confined to their homes because of the atmosphere of insecurity. Women are seen as a security risk and burden since they have to be protected from rape and their roles are de-valued. Despite the multiple roles that women play in conflict situations, their role is always below that of men and male preference is evident in the private and public spheres.

Intense military conflicts have also aggravated social problems. Alcoholism and drug abuse is very common in areas of armed conflict. Women have identified it as a cause of sexual abuse and violence against women, even destroying family structures, and impacting negatively on children. When the region is in a state of siege causing regular human rights violations and trauma, women are compelled to take up new roles in the absence of their men folk. Even when they find work outside the home, the new roles do not empower them. As a group of young women stated at an interview, this has only added to their responsibilities and the traditional ideal of a 'good woman' has been reinforced. Though women participate in resistance and peace movements, their multiple roles do not get recognised. Society continues to insist on the chastity of women while giving value to women primarily in their role as homemakers.

The consequences of conflict and militarisation in Kashmir are great in terms of human and social costs and their gender implications. The area is literally militarised with some 500,000 Indian soldiers, paramilitary and the police, fighting an estimated 3,000 militants. Reports show that there have been over 50,000 deaths, around 30-40,000 young women have become widows and about the same number orphaned. An atmosphere of fear and despair stalks the state. Civil life is so disturbed that minimum basic needs of the people, especially women and children, are not met while none has time to look into these matters seriously. Children constitute about 38 percent of Jammu and Kashmir's population and of these over 3 percent are orphaned, destitute or neglected. They do not get basic needs for protection, healthcare, food, education, or love and affection, security, socialisation or a safe environment. Rough estimates of the number of orphans due to the activities of the militants are said to be between 10,000 and 20,000. Kashmir has only a handful of private orphanages to deal with a calamity of this scale. There is also an atmosphere of fear among the intellectuals. Journalists and the staff of the University of Kashmir are scared of speaking openly, critical of the militants as well as the Army. Any specific comment construed as adverse might bring about serious, even deadly, consequences.

Reports of Amnesty International and other inquiries on human rights in Kashmir reveal flagrant abuses of human rights by security forces that enjoy immunity from arrest and prosecution under the AFSPA. Several thousand civilians have been detained under the Public Safety Act and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act. This has led to the phenomenon of

missing persons and 'half widows,' women whose husbands are missing and presumed dead without any proof. The state government claims that about 3,000 are missing, but human rights groups showed the figure to be 8,000. There are thousands of abductions and victims are often found dead. The people in the area, especially women and children, live in a situation that resembles a permanent war zone. Women headed families remain the poorest. It is for this reason that the region has come to be known as the valley of fear. Meanwhile, the killing of Hindus by Muslim Kashmiri militants led to their silent exodus from the hilly tracts of Rajouri and Poonch districts of Jammu and Kashmir. Amongst Muslims, it is usually the tribal communities like the Gujjar tribes who are targeted since they are suspected of being loyal to India.

Militarisation in the Kashmir has also meant the imposition by the militants of extremist positions on the people, as opposed to liberal ideas and plural cultural values. They have shut down cinema halls and liquor stores. Thus, there has been an enforced change in the traditions and culture of the Valley, along with a shift from the liberal syncretism of Islam to a narrow version of Islam that imposes the rigors of a *jihad* influenced by sects that founded the Taliban. Such change impacts on women severely. Militants have argued that in the Kashmir case, the special concept of *jihad* applies, superseding all international humanitarian law as well as the Indian law. Such a culture of enforced *jihad* has negative consequences for the minorities as well as women in the Kashmir Valley.

The exact economic cost of the conflict and militarisation in Jammu and Kashmir is difficult to calculate, because the data is based mostly on speculative estimates and qualitative accounts. Since the conflict is ongoing, the costs keep changing. The cost on human lives, infrastructure, education, and health is great. In addition, agriculture, trade, tourism, and the cottage industry on which the economy of the state was based have all been severely affected. Lack of electricity, breakdown of infrastructure, and decrease in credit facilities has all adversely affected the crafts industry and consequently the unemployment in the state is very high. Thousands of shops and factories have been destroyed in the crossfire in arson and grenade attacks. Daily wage earners have been badly affected. The Kashmir Council for Human Rights reports that 15 percent of the people have had to migrate out of the state in search of work. This encourages recruitment of the youth into the militancy as well as counter-militancy operations.

The economy and environment of the area bear the impact of the structural violence engendered by the conflict. The tourist industry has suffered greatly and as we have already noted, handicraft artisans and skilled craft persons languish without work or take to other occupations. Therefore, women are particularly vulnerable not to the daily overt violence of both the militancy and counter-militancy of the state, but also to the structural violence associated with poverty and unemployment. Meanwhile, there has been a rise in the cases of extortion and 'protection' money demanded by groups linked to *jihadi* forces. This is despite the Indian intelligence reports that indicate that from 2003 to 2004, the number of armed looting of banks and other robberies has declined. Government offices have also reported a decline in the instances of looting during this period. However, newspapers have interviewed tour operators and small traders who all admit to making such payments for their security. Thus, the Kashmiri militancy has degenerated into a predatory insurgency.

In such situations of near anarchy, it is easy for the governments to suggest 'privatisation' security. While the armed forces receive more money to 'counter' the insurgency, they have not been unable to safeguard the citizens of the state, particularly women. Similarly, they have failed to protect public as well as private property. In such circumstances of state failure to ensure the safety and security of its own citizens, the option is either to pay 'protection' money to insurgent groups or to hire private security, which has become a fast growing business in these conflict regions. Thus, in all regions of armed conflict, a 'conflict economy' has emerged. The local economy gets itself integrated with this conflict economy. Gun running, illegal import of small arms, foreign exchange rackets, drug smuggling becomes a part of profit making ventures of the unemployed youth. Besides, in the absence of legitimate means of livelihood, participating in insurgency or counter insurgency operations is the only means of income generation for many young men.

Militarisation and Women

During armed conflicts institutional structures that have functioned during peacetime tend to break down. When new militarised institutions overtake them, patriarchal controls also tend to increase and gender differences become essentialised. The public language, the practice of politics, and the media become weapons used in the conflict. Terms such as 'manhood,'

'brotherhood,' 'martyrdom,' 'honour,' and 'sacrifice for motherland' come to dominate the discourse, marginalising feminine values. In such circumstances women's identities are constructed to intersect with the needs of militarised nationalism.

In the case of all armed conflicts, in Nagaland, Manipur, Punjab and Kashmir, women have been constructed as cultural symbols in conflict. They are signifiers of the 'honour' of their community, family, and the nation and stereotyped as the feminine 'other.' Accordingly, women are either seen as subjects to be protected and confined to the private sphere (as in Kashmir), or violated as symbols of the enemy 'other.' Women's roles get bracketed in identity politics that is linked to the nation ('mother of the nation') or the relatives ('martyr's mother', 'half widow' or 'war widow'), symbolising a shared sense of victimisation as well as solidarity. These are necessary symbols for nationalism since they bring out the deepest emotions inherent in the concept of the grieving mother. Then, such painful emotions are transformed into heroism and sacrifice. While compensating for the women's personal loss and grief, it in turn justifies militarisation of women 'for the nation.' Even then, women get very little independent status within the movement. Women's agency is undervalued as their identity is held hostage to militarist values and they become subjected to greater control than at normal times. Women are symbolic and easy victims of violence perpetrated by state agencies, factional groups and domestic violence that intersect and sustain each other.

In all regions of militarised conflict, men, as in the case of the Kashmiri Muslims and Hindus, the Hindu Meities and Naga Christians, and Punjabi Sikhs, see themselves as 'protectors' of women whom they honour as long as women conform to the existing patriarchal patterns. In the same breath, they see women as being 'dishonoured' by 'other' men. This ideology and the practice of 'protecting' women by men in situations of armed conflict in fact entails continuing control of women's lives. All nationalist/secessionist movements in India have sought to control the autonomy of women by dictating dress codes and behaviour patterns. Furthermore, when women become symbols of conflict, their identity becomes a target of opposing nationalism. The Hizbul Mujahideen in Kashmir decreed that women must not visit restaurants, hotels or public parks. The Lashkar i-Toiba ordered that Kashmiri women either "wear *burkhas* (veils) or face bullets." The Manipur and Sikh militants declared that women wear their traditional attire

to show their nationalism. In all these conflicts, women are signifiers of the nation and its culture and are forced to demonstrate it on their bodies. The gender stereotypes have increased as national movements employ local myths to construct a 'nation' that needs the heroism and masculinity of its men to take up arms, and women to give up their sons and husbands, or reproduce them, for the 'greater' cause of the nation.

Women and children have also absorbed the values of militarisation. In many instances, despite their grief, women continue to prepare their children to be 'martyrs' as the testimony of Saira indicates, "The child of a freedom fighter will be a freedom fighter." Women in these conflict zones are caught up in an inescapable contradiction. As grieving wives, they have to look after their children and at the same time, as mothers they have to prepare their children for militancy. This reveals women's unusual difficulties that are also location specific. Women committed to *jihad* propagate militarist values; one such supporter of the insurgency, Asiya, stated: "We thank the forces for their excesses." Reports from Kashmir show how children build bunkers instead of snowmen, play with guns with great familiarity, and identify the types of guns being used in the Valley. Women get militarised and transmit these values to children. In the process, violence becomes an acceptable norm.

The phenomenon of women combatants has increased in the armed conflicts of Nagaland and Manipur, where women find this to be a means for empowerment, retribution, and fulfilling nationalism. The structures of power and hierarchy remains similar in all organisations engaged in conflict. While men occupy dominant positions, women combatants maintain the myth of male supremacy and work on the belief that power is associated with force and leadership synonymous with masculinity. During the Punjab conflict women were actively engaged in the Khalistan movement as combatants. The two main underground organisations of women militants were the Mai Bhago Regiment headed by Bhag Kaur and The Khalistan Commando Force's women's wing headed by Gurwinder Kaur. These groups functioned in a militarist manner and the women themselves addressed their leaders as Generals. Despite the presence of some women leaders, testimonies from women militants show that they played roles fixed for them by the male leadership. An official intelligence report on women militants said that most of them had either transported guns or carried messages for the

organisation. Clearly, militant roles did not give women special powers or leadership positions.

Cultural traditions influence women's agency. Thus the North East has many vibrant women's groups and movements intervening in civil society issues despite difficulties and limitations. Similarly, in Kashmir, women have increasingly been part of public protests against human rights violations. However, they do not have the range of independent women's organisation and movements as the North East does. As a consequence women's groups have not been able to intervene in civil society independent of men. It is true that women, in the absence of men in their families, take on new roles and get work outside the homes. Yet, these roles do not empower them as their responsibilities increase and gender structures superimpose the concept of a 'good woman' who continues to perform traditional as well as new roles.

There is also a new role for women as political activists in these conflict zones raising questions about the limits of their empowerment. Women as activists combine questions of peace with social justice and rights, as well as problems facing children and youth, because women's experience has shown that security means human security and peace includes justice, rights and equity. Women come to challenge patriarchal structures through their experiences of war as in the case of the Naga Mothers and *Meira Paibis* ('torch bearers', a vigilante mother's groups in Manipur) shows. However, these women's groups are not identified either with the state or the opposition since they are not considered a 'party' to the conflict. Their role therefore gets restricted to the 'soft option' of nurturing and working in the family, community, and civil society. Women are asked to work on issues of drug abuse, trauma counselling etc, while the 'hard' issues and decisions of cease-fire, political or public policy, arms, and peace are taken on by men with little consultation with women. For example, the chairperson of the National Socialist Women's Organisation of Nagaland stated that household chores traditionally are women's tasks and "when one does things which do not belong to 'his' or 'her' normal task, the balance of tradition is broken. You will always be who you are though you want to deny it." Patriarchal ideologies account for the acceptance of traditional roles by women even when they play non-traditional roles.

Women are not essentially peacemakers and can be combatants or have neutral roles. The concept of 'Motherhood' is used as a symbol to generate nationalism, martyrdom, and militarism. Women employ their status as

mothers to intervene in conflict situations and when this is combined with victim status it gives them power. This status gives them agency, but it has limitations because motherhood is seen to be a part of the nurturing role of the woman restricted to the domain of the family.

However, despite their limitations women have been able to play symbolic and real roles in maintaining peace in the community. In view of their experience of war, conflict and pain, they are more prone to vote for peace at elections. Similarly, since women have to negotiate for survival, negotiating peace at the grassroots level is natural to them. However, the ideology of militarism and its gendered practices are all-pervasive and both men and women are equally susceptible to them. It remains then the task of feminists and those interested in peace to mobilise women as a resource, not just a symbol but as an agency for peace.

The External Face of Indian Militarisation

Militarisation of external relations has had various dimensions in the history of independent India. India's size and the elite's perception that India is a regional great power in South Asia have justified a greater role for the country's armed forces as well as the nuclear weapons programme in foreign policy.

In the early decades of independence, India opted for a path of self-reliance and used the policy of non-alignment to remain independent and equidistant from the super powers. This policy served as an ideological shield in international relations and helped steer India away from overt militarisation. At a time when super powers intervened in regional disputes, and Third World countries continued to struggle for their independence, India did not align itself with either of the two military blocs led by the USA and the Soviet Union. The dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir since independence, the raid by Pakistan tribal forces that led to the division of Kashmir, and a contested border were the early inputs for strengthening the military component of India's national security.

The rejection of super power politics was a major feature of the Gandhi-Nehru paradigm of India's external relations in the early phase of independence. This paradigm was gradually abandoned after the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965. The Indian ruling class popularised militarist politics with slogans like *Jai Jawan Jai Kisan* ('Hail to our soldiers; Hail to our farmers') that valorised the military. Meanwhile,

the realist perspective of national security began to contest the moral precepts of non-alignment and later Indira Gandhi integrated it with India's foreign policy. The non-alignment of the first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, that was designed to keep India away from the military alliances of the Cold War, were substantially shifted by Mrs Gandhi's regime as India signed strategic security agreements with the Soviet Union. Defence expenditures were increased and the first nuclear tests were conducted in 1971 as India sought to assert her position through military power. The notion of threats from 'anti-national forces' working in collaboration with 'the foreign hand', a euphemism used by Indian governments to link external support especially from Pakistan to domestic conflicts, established the need to connect internal security to national security. India's nuclear programme was carried out through a deliberate policy of ambiguity in which the government did not acknowledge the development of a weapons program and thereby refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty although nuclear tests had been conducted since the 1970s. This policy of 'nuclear ambiguity' eventually led to nuclear experiments, crossing the so-called nuclear threshold.

The Rajiv Gandhi regime in the mid-1980s strengthened the strategy of making India a regional hegemonic power, equating India's national interest with India's position of pre-eminence in South Asia. India saw herself as the guardian of her own interests in South Asia. In fact, the Indian ruling elite did not want to see any super power intervention in the region. This position became visible in the interventions in Sri Lanka and the Maldives during this time. The Sri Lanka operation involved the presence of an Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka (1987-1989) to disarm secessionist Tamil militants. The inconclusive nature of this mission and the exacerbation of the Sri Lankan civil war proved to be a bitter lesson for India's hegemonic ambitions and the policy of military intervention in the internal affairs of the neighbouring states. Rajiv Gandhi's subsequent assassination by a woman suicide killer from Sri Lanka, believed to be a direct victim of IPKF atrocities, symbolised the tragic failure of this policy. The Indian military intervention in the Maldives in 1988 to protect the government from a coup attempt was yet another instance of military interventionism in the region.

The former Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, rode a nationalist wave in the 1980s by focusing on the linkages of internal and external threat perceptions. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1989, bureaucrats, academics, policy-makers and the military elite reformulated the Indian national

security policy suggesting that the primary threat to India was from Pakistan, China and the USA. They advocated that defence security needs should be privileged to maintain an adequate military preparedness in view of threat perceptions from Pakistan and China. In the light of China and Pakistan's nuclear policy, an elite group of security analysts advocated a domestic nuclear strategy to counter these threats. India could either remain one step ahead of Pakistan in a nuclear weapons program so that it was "not caught in a disadvantageous position" or keep its nuclear weapons capability "in complete readiness." With this new security doctrine, peace lobbyists and supporters of the non-alignment were satisfied with the status quo while the 'hawks' and those interested in pushing India towards a more aggressive foreign policy could use nuclear ambiguity to continue with the nuclear programme. This ambiguity was based on the secret and unknown status of India's nuclear programme, where India was critical of the international nuclear regime and carried on its own undeclared nuclear programme which at any necessary juncture could catapult India to cross the nuclear threshold.

The internal and external security policies followed in the 1980s and 1990s slowly laid the foundation for a national security state. During this period, the use of force and the military response came to be viewed as a normal means to resolve political conflicts. Against this backdrop, the Indian State dealt with the ethnic and communal/sectarian movements in a manner that often violated the human rights of the entire ethnic community. Instead of isolating the terrorist or sectarian groups and their ideology, the state apparatus, the police, and the military tended to treat the entire ethnic community with suspicion.

Militarisation affects foreign policy in two ways. Firstly, the military arm can usurp the functions of, or supersede the foreign policy establishment in matters of policy making. Secondly, the foreign policy establishment itself might become highly prone to making policies that depend less on diplomacy and more on jingoism or aggression. A third effect may also be seen in how the government's successes or failures in foreign policy reflect on its domestic policies. This argument however is incomplete. We may add that internal politics, like the adoption of neo liberal policies that result in greater inequality between people and social unrest, would lead to militarisation both internally and globally.

In India when the BJP-led coalition was in power (1988-2004), there was an increase in both internal and external militarisation. This regime was

firm in its attempt to direct Indian foreign policy into the 'us camp.' This was evident in the string of secret negotiations that the Foreign Minister had with Secretary Strobe Talbot and the new relations that India attempted to develop with Israel while distancing itself away from its traditional friends in West Asia.

Beginning with the nuclear tests of 1998, the BJP government consistently pursued a militaristic path with regard to the nation's foreign policy. The justification for the Tests was that these would deter Pakistan from waging war. This thesis was falsified when Pakistan carried out its own nuclear tests a month later and Pakistan Army made an incursion into India's border area of Kargil in the Himalayas, leading to the Kargil war in which South Asia's two nuclear powers faced each other in a possible war. The Lahore and Agra summits between the Indian and Pakistani leaders were the only events that attempted to restore peace between the two countries through negotiations.

India's foreign policy was radically shifted by the BJP-led government that sought to make India into a nuclear weapon power, that engaged with the USA and had ambitions as a South Asian great power. This policy was evident after 9/11/2001 when the BJP leadership established close relations with the US and Israel in the name of 'strategic partnership' and the 'war on terror.' In the process, many traditionally held tenets of India's foreign policy, such as those of not aligning with global military powers and supporting the Palestinian people in the Middle-East conflict, suffered reversals

The Militarist Reconstruction 1998-2004

In militarist ideologies, privileging of male identity and its linkages with physical strength and power builds a macho and militarist consciousness. It views the feminine identity as weak, ineffectual or powerless. States take over these values, and especially during the times of intense conflict such values permeate civil society as well.

Right-wing parties tend to play a key role in militarising civil society. Their economic ideology entwines itself with global capitalist structures, especially those linked to the USA. At the core of Indian right wing groups and parties is an exclusivist Hindu nationalism that constructs a Hindu nation by excluding all other religions and cultures of the Indian people. These parties see all ideas outside this paradigm as anti-national and as a

threat to national security, as has been evident in the policies and practices of the nationalist Right-wing regime (1998-2004).

Since 1998, the most direct use of militarisation of both state and society by a government occurred when the BJP came to power. Members of the BJP's mass organisations like the *Rashtriya Sevak Sangh* (RSS) and the *Vishva Hindu Parishad* (VHP) function in society as cultural groups, claiming to represent and safeguard the interests of the majority Hindu community. By doing so, they also threaten the minority communities, particularly Muslims and Christians. The *Sangh Parivar* and *Shiv Sena* are leading Hindu extremist organizations with a strong anti-minority orientation. They are active in civil society mobilisation. There are other communal forces that share the extreme Hindu nationalist ideology of *Sangh Parivar* and *Shiv Sena*. The *Parivar* plays a leading role in pushing its ideology among its allies. *Shiv Sena* is an ally of the *Sangh Parivar* and emerged as a powerful force in the state of Maharashtra with a more militaristic and chauvinist ideology. These formations have long functioned in Indian society and have been part of the opposition political alliance. This has enabled them to create spaces in civil society for their ideology and politics.

The BJP has ideological affinities with the RSS and *Hindutwa*. The *Hindutwa* is an ideology for a majoritarian Hindu state in India. It portrays the Hindu polity as a civilisation engaged in a struggle with 'other' civilisations. In this idea of Hindu cultural struggle, there is a distinct military component. It advocates that the Hindu society must strengthen itself by going back to the basic principles of the Hindu polity and organising itself for militant struggles. In this approach, a balance of cultural and military power between civilisations is an essential precondition for peace. This notion of *Hindutwa* is at the core of the BJP's security concept. It envisages the majority Hindu community to be the authentic nation. The other ethnic and cultural communities are viewed as 'outsiders.' Guru Golwalker, founder of the RSS, made such an assertion by claiming that the "foreign nations in India" should "adopt the Hindu culture and language" and even "lose their separate existence to merge in the Hindu race." If they wanted to stay in India, they could do so "wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing....not even citizen's rights." For the *Sangh Parivar*, nationhood is primarily a religious notion and the concept of political power is a patriarchal one, full of machismo

components of a martial tradition. The Hindu right and the BJP have always had a clear plan for reshaping the security policies of the Indian State in such a militarist Hindu nationalist framework.

The security policy of the BJP was formulated and documented before it came to power in a coalition with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Some of these tenets included notions like 'give India nuclear teeth,' 'develop a blue water navy,' and 'set up a national Security Council.' In keeping with this ideology, the BJP-led NDA government attempted to push the country into a militarist national security structure. Jaswant Singh, Minister for External Affairs in the BJP-led government, advocated an approach to national security that was inspired by the RSS ideology. According to Singh, "India's nationhood being essentially civilisational, a strategic thought to protect its territory has not emerged." He also argued that the earlier flaws of India's foreign policy lay in its non-militarised nature. Instances have been cited to show the whipping up of nationalist passion to build a national security state along militarist lines with exclusionary politics. This nationalism essentially views the state as having a strong, physical prowess identified with the male and sees compromise as a sign of weakness and femininity.

The Nuclear Tests

Within 40 days of their coming to power, the BJP chose to carry out a series of nuclear tests in the country, without carrying out the promised strategic review or consulting the Cabinet, or their alliance partners, or even the military. The stated intent of these tests was nuclear deterrence. Apart from a threat perception, the government was unable to explain several questions. How had the security situation changed for India in the 40 days since it took over power or what provoked the tests? How would these tests assist in countering foreign-backed insurgency or terrorism, which by the Indian government's own account are their real security problems? How does the government plan to bear the cost of its nuclear programme? The policy of testing was clearly based on domestic political compulsions and the jingoist ideology of the BJP government rather than on any well-conceived change in strategic interest. The possession of nuclear weapons had become part of Indian foreign policy doctrine.

Statements by the *Parivar* leaders that focused on militarist positions followed the nuclear tests. *Vishwa Hindu Parishad* leaders like Ashok

Singhal termed the tests a symbol of 'Hindu revivalism.' Statements about the need for war and that 'war would not last for long' accompanied the tests. The Pokhran nuclear experiment were presented as an essential life saving potion for an 'endangered Mother India.' It also provided the *Sangh Parivar* a means to correlate national chauvinism with patriarchal and religious symbols by proposing a 'Hindu Bomb'. The Draft Nuclear Doctrine proposes a massive nuclear weapons programme of building and making operational a triangular system of the aircraft, land-based missiles and nuclear-powered submarines. This would come under a common command of the three units of Indian Armed Forces. The level of civilian control, safety measures, and the risks and costs in the nuclear programme are not delineated adequately in this draft. No explanation is provided of how India with its current fissile materials reserves, missile and military capabilities, and uncertain economic situation would build such an elaborate and ambitious nuclear system.

The Kargil Conflict and the Militarist Discourse

Within a few months of the nuclear tests in 1998, India and Pakistan were engaged in a military confrontation when Pakistan crossed the Line of Control (LOC) and ventured into Indian Territory. The Kargil episode exploded several myths routinely offered for security by the policy-making elite of both countries. These myths were that nuclear powers would shy away from actively engaging in a conflict and that nuclear weapons are a deterrent to wars. The Kargil episode demonstrated a serious political failure on the part of both India and Pakistan to engage in dialogue as two nuclear weapons possessing states.

The BJP used the Kargil war as a key mobilisational issue during the 1999 election campaign. Statements of leaders and supporters of the caretaker BJP led coalition government used the language of war in the local campaigns. Some slogans that used evocative militaristic language were *Yaad karo kurbani* ('remember the martyrdom) and *Pakistan ko khatam karo* ('finish Pakistan'). The media choreographed the images of war and death showing soldier martyrdom, and women crying over the irreparable loss of husbands and sons. Women cheered the soldiers and repeated the slogans of war that were beamed into millions of homes by television. The Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) organised 7,500 Kargil *Yagyas* (religious ceremonies). In Himachal Pradesh, the state government formed

a special panel of three ministers who renamed 67 educational institutions, including a degree college, 13 senior secondary schools, and 16 middle schools, after those killed in the Kargil crisis. Over 50 link roads across the state were given names associated with Kargil. Long after the military episode, the state continued to be interested in associating nationalism with militarism. It was important for the state to legitimise militarist methods, justify military expenditure, and keep the military machine going. It also diverted attention from many real issues of border conflict.

In the past, both India and Pakistan appeared to be interested in keeping up military tensions. Pakistan continued to support the insurgency in Kashmir. India's Defence Minister, George Fernandes, once proclaimed that, India could "fight and win a limited war, at a time and place chosen by the aggressor." This statement echoed sentiments expressed immediately after the nuclear tests that a nuclear war could be possible. For example, Nawaz Sharif, former Prime Minister of Pakistan, advocated nuclear use if the Kargil war opened up new fronts. Pakistan has consistently refused to accept the doctrine of no first use of nuclear weapons and the concept of 'threat' remains vague. Thus, even a limited war with such an adversary could be nothing short of resorting to nuclear militarism. A former Indian Army Chief signalled the trend in military thinking when he stated: "There is no point talking to Pakistan. No truce or peace is possible as long as its military and national agenda remains violent against India by all means. Ready force is the only option." Civilians and politicians also echoed this sentiment. It is only after much international pressure that the two countries have agreed to have peace talks.

Enforcing Identity, Masculinity and Militarism

The *Sangh Parivar* uses every avenue to assert its politics of identity, militarism and masculinity. It effectively combined the dynamics of external security with internal dimensions of security. Every instance has been used to show internal security 'threats' and their link to the 'foreign.' The militarist position of the RSS is reflected in the official RSS newspaper, *Organizer*, that uses any security threat to urge 'Hindu society' to become 'manly.' The link between identity and communal politics, patriarchy, fundamentalism, and militarism was made clear. BJP leaders associated 'anti-national activities', rackets in fake currency, narcotic smuggling and

illegal arms in border areas of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, which has a large population of Indian Muslims.

The RSS runs schools like the *Vidhya Bharati Akhil Bharatiya Sansthans* and *Sarawati Shishu Mandirs*. These schools have many thousands of students countrywide and they are being trained in militant Hindu ideals. Indeed, the BJP during its regime succeeded in hastening the process of militarising youth and injecting militarism into civil society through its education network. Women's training camps called *Durga Vahini*, include lessons in judo, firearms and sword practice, and an outdoor hurdle course. Militarist patriarchal values are disseminated through women who are thought to be incapable of 'dealing' with the world unless they imbibe militarist and 'male aggressiveness'. Women can become equal citizens only when they acquire some facets of masculinity.

Right-wing women work for re-enforcing the symbols of 'mother as nation' and demonstrate the importance of the patriarchal nature of the 'national cause.' Girls and women are also trained in RSS ideology. Women have a fixed status in the RSS hierarchy. In recent times, women's roles have been redefined to give them a more aggressive and militant slant. The RSS thus called upon women to take up the 'war cry' on the disputed sixteenth century mosque the Babri Masjid that was claimed by the RSS. Even after its defeat in the 2004 elections, the leaders of the BJP see many policies of the new Congress-led coalition as threats to national security.

Militarism also draws strength from other violent movements in civil society. Political groups of the extreme Left which the media generally describes as Naxalites and armed groups like the Marxist Co-ordination Centre and the Peoples' War Group (PWG) believes in armed resistance against the state. They train a body of cadre for armed guerrilla warfare and replicate structures of military regimes at times of war. Women cadres follow similar rules and are taught to live by the gun. These groups have used 'terrorist' methods and justify the use of violence. The State has responded to these groups by equally violent and repressive methods leading to years of conflict in regions where they have their bases such as parts of Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. The Naxalite groups are known to keep up a spate of relentless attacks on institutions that represent the state. These groups also promote a culture of militarism that undermines the democratic culture of debate and dialogue.

State Institutions

Besides having the fourth largest army in the world, paramilitary forces have been often used rather extensively in India to curb internal unrest. Governments have defended such use of force on the grounds of 'internal security.' The police forces and public order are the responsibility of state governments, but the central government can intercede by using paramilitary forces to reinforce the police and restore law and order. The paramilitary include the Assam Rifles, in charge of security, counter insurgency and internal security of the North East sector, and the Border Security Force, in charge of security in border areas and maintenance of public order. The Central Reserve Police Force and National Security Guards are often used to tackle insurgency and terrorism besides the Indo-Tibetan Border Force and the Central Industrial Security Force. These forces have expanded four times since the 1980s. The numbers and expenditures on these forces have increased manifold in the last few years. Unfortunately, these forces, in cases of domestic conflict, are given to excesses and their role has been often found to be gender insensitive and communally inclined.

Despite this increase in the paramilitary forces controlled directly by the Home Ministry, the Centre increased the deployment of the army in the 1980s. There have been times when a third of the entire army was employed in internal security duties. The acts by the armed forces are not under the purview of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). Experts from this Commission have recommended that the definition of the 'armed forces' should not include the paramilitary so that they can be included under the purview of the NHRC.

Defence and Development

Militarist and national security regimes are known for high defence expenditures that are disproportionate to expenditure on the social sectors. India still ranks amongst the lowest on the Human Development scale calculated by the UNDP, but it continues to have high defence expenditure. The government and security analysts justify India's defence budget as necessary for national security. The region is dependent on military doctrines that propagate increases in armed forces arsenal. India's doctrine of deterrence through its nuclear policy has led to an increased military expenditure in both India and Pakistan.

In 1950, Nehru stated that to economise on defence spending (i.e. 1.9 percent of GDP) he wanted to reduce the size of the army — 280,000 then, and make it highly mechanised and mobile. However, the size of the Indian army grew to 550,000 in 1961. After the Chinese war, the Indian army gradually grew to 825,000 by 1967. In 1950, the percentage of the GDP spent on the army was 1.3 percent. This went up to 2.7 percent during the 1960s without any substantive modernisation of the army. During the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan, defence expenditure was 3.3 percent of the GDP. With the Shimla Accord between Pakistan and India, the 1970s defence expenditure stabilised. In the 1980s with the increase in Pakistan's defence expenditure, the Indian defence expenditure was also pushed upwards. In the budget of 1995-96, the estimate for defence was about 2.4 percent of the GDP. However, Defence expenditures have increased by 60 percent in the last ten years.

A significant increase in the defence budget came in the 1998 budget when allocation for defence of Rs41,2000 million, was increased by 14.13 percent over the 1997 revised budget estimate. The government stated that part of the increase was because of salary hikes. The defence budget of 1997-99 was higher than the total outlay for the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, and was more than twice the central expenditure on health, education and social security. The defence expenditure is placed under different heads of the Indian budget. Part of the costs of the nuclear programme of the 1998-99 budget were reflected in the steep increase of 59 percent in the planned allocation for the strategic Department of Atomic Energy, which went up from Rs9,870 million to Rs1,5690 million. Despite this, strategic thinkers have made a strong case for increasing defence expenditure to 3 percent of the GDP.

The cost of making and maintaining nuclear weapons has not been made public by the government. The actual expenditure, which has been incurred and is planned by the government, is not easy to calculate unless the parameters of the nuclear force, which are planned, are known. A study undertaken by the Ministry of Defence in 1985 placed the estimated cost of creating nuclear weapons at Rs70,000 million. Other economists have estimated that the cost of building and maintaining a nuclear weapons programme would be at least Rs30,000 million a year for the next 10 years. This cost relates to the total stock cost of a nuclear weaponry programme, of which half of the cost of deployment of nuclear arms would be accounted

for by non-nuclear components, like the Command Control Communication Intelligence Systems, which is now essential. Nuclear weapons cannot counter terrorism, low intensity warfare, or protect borders in conventional warfare. Thus the cost of nuclear weapons would not in any way lower the expenditure on conventional weapons. As a result, the overall defence expenditure will rise many times over.

Nuclear weapons cannot substitute for conventional weapons, since the latter, unlike the former, can be used for 'limited' military and political purposes, and because, as pointed out earlier, nuclear weapons cannot prevent the outbreak or the persistence of conventional warfare or conflict of various kinds. Historical evidence confirms that in the case of all nuclear weapons states (NWS) such expenditure has always complemented their defence expenditure on conventional weapons, systems and preparations. Besides, the economic and environmental costs of becoming nuclear are substantial, even staggering, and merit consideration. In addition to these material costs, nuclear militarisation leads to an increase in the centralised control, the secrecy in governance and national security fears, ultimately creating continuous tension in a democratic society.

Calculations by the Directorate of Military Operations showed that the direct cost of the military operations in the Kargil war was estimated in the range of US\$6.9 million a day. The Kargil war initiated military demands for upgrading of defence equipment and the army demanded around Rs6000 million from the government for military hardware. The task of manning the 'Line of Control' (the border that divides India and Pakistan in Kashmir) incurs a daily expenditure of one million US\$ with about 8000-10,000 soldiers constantly deployed on the border. In contrast, the expenditure on the social sector for drinking water and education remains lower than defence expenditure. Further, the nexus between the army and defence contractor nexus use national security as an alibi for constant upgrading and procurement of military hardware. International surveys confirm that in terms of bribery and corruption among government officials, the defence industry ranks among the highest in developing countries, and India and Pakistan rank among the most corrupt in the world.

Currently India with an annual defence outlay of \$16.8 billion, has emerged as the third highest defence spender on defence, lower than only the global militarised powers like the US and China, if compared on the basis of purchasing power parity. Whilst defence expenditure increases with

militarisation, the government argues that it cannot afford to make education a fundamental right. The impact of militarisation on the security thinking is evident in defence expenditure being a priority over education of children or provision of safe water.

Governments are required to exercise discretion when allocating public funds. Defence spending that had levelled off in India is now registering an increase, with little questioning from political parties and opposition groups because national security is sacrosanct and inextricably tied with sovereignty, nationalism, and patriotism so that it becomes difficult for the opposition to protest. Defence establishments are public institutions that are protected from public scrutiny, because of national interest.

Conclusion

The experience of India reveals that militarisation can take place in democratic systems in the name of civil supremacy. Valorising national security and enlarging national security threats help mobilise fear and insecurity. When the armed forces are repeatedly called upon to intervene in essentially civil conflicts, militarisation without direct military rule occurs by other means and in covert ways. India's ambition to become a regional power and the presence of other militarised regional states like Pakistan and China and regional conflicts in Nepal and Sri Lanka have encouraged the growth of the Indian military operations. India's belief that it should become the major power in this region has led to a justification of military expenditures. Thus politics in India has been militarised while the Indian military remains non-political.

Militarisation in India has grown under the shadow of a developing national security state. Its growth has been unnoticeable primarily because of its size, diverse population, and the gradual expansion of the state that effectively mobilised on the basis of threats that enabled it to make the use of force easy and justifiable. India remained a non-violent and non-militaristic nation in its foreign policy vision during the early years of its independence. However, with wars with Pakistan and China and secessionist armed conflicts, India opted for using military force as an effective weapon to deal with domestic unrest and protest-political, religious, violent or even non-violent.

In anti-insurgency operations in India, the engagement of the army and paramilitary forces has become commonplace, while territorial conflicts and

wars with neighbouring countries have given ready justification to the ruling elite for enormous defence expenditure. Conflict situations have been used to mobilise national sentiments in the form of militarist attitudes and they have now become extremely difficult to challenge. In the international context of US imperialism and the war against terrorism in a globalised world, states like India now have new justification for militarism. In India, the major issues that need to be focused on are education, unemployment, health, poverty alleviation rather than defence expenditure, but militarisation focuses on the security rather than the development needs.

Militarism in India is not confined to the conflict regions like the North East and Kashmir where millions of citizens remain under virtual military rule. It has also spread to seemingly peaceful parts of the country manifesting itself in different ways and forms. Right-wing organisations and militia have been aggressive advocates of a militant Hindu nationalism hostile towards minorities and women. Violence is an integral part of their religious-militarist ideology because violence is an effective, if not the only, means of ideological enforcement. The rule by Right wing Hindu nationalist forces in India has increased the level of militarisation in India. The defeat of these forces at parliamentary elections in 2004 has facilitated the emergence of a centre-left coalition. With this regime change, government policies have a chance to change and return to the development paradigm and prevent national security policies from becoming a method of harassing the minorities or collaborating with US ambitions of hegemony and empire. The nuclear experiments of 1998 led to a similar response from Pakistan and nuclear weapons came into South Asia.

As the Indian case study demonstrates, militarism reinforces patriarchy, accentuates gender stereotypes and confines women to traditional roles. It restricts the gains made by peace and labour movements as well as women's movements. It exacerbates gender violence, linking social violence to state violence. Against such a backdrop, fundamentalist doctrines operate on virtually the same plane as militarism. Both are unmistakably patriarchal and oppressive of women. The Indian experience also shows how the ideology of militarism combines with patriarchy and xenophobic nationalism linking itself easily with neo-liberal capitalism. In India, this combination has led to an increase in the community level conflict, personal insecurity, and domestic violence. Exploitation and violence against women has become all pervasive, be it in the workplace, in the community or in the

home. It is thus only with the acceptance of development, social equity and feminism that militarisation can be countered.

The India case study also demonstrates that the militarism of the Indian State and that of militant non-state actors and of the fundamentalist organisations in India has not gone uncontested. Secular and progressive movements, the labour and peace movements, as well as women's movements have continuously exposed the ideological nexus between militarism, fundamentalism, communalism, and patriarchy. These movements have focused on the needs of negotiated settlements for all conflicts and an inclusive and people oriented security vision. Civil society and people's movements will have to ensure that traditional security paradigms are replaced with human security in order to counter militarisation of both state and civil society.

NOTES:

- 1 The Indian elite since the 1990s has been pushing for constructing India as a great regional power. The Indian nuclear and military programme is justified on this count. India wants to become a permanent member of an expanded Security Council and claim to be mediators in South Asia. They have recently negotiated a military base in Tajikistan as part of this goal.
- 2 SIPRI Yearbook. *Armaments, disarmament and International Security*. (London: Oxford University Press, 2003), 38.
- 3 Iris Marion Young, "The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflectio on the Current Security State," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* vol. 29, no. 1 (2003): 1-25.
- 4 Ram Narayan Kumar and Laxmi Murthy, eds. *Four Years of the Cease Fire Agreement Between the Government of India and the Naga Socialist Council of Nagalim: Promises and Pitfalls, A Report* (New Delhi: Civil Society Initiative on the Naga Peace Process and The Other Media, 2002).
- 5 Interviews with women from the Underground in Nagaland and Manipur, by the author, and her students. (March 2004).
- 6 Kamal Mitra Chenoy, "Human Rights Violations in Jammu and Kashmir – A Report," *Social Action* vol. 51, (April-June 2001): 192-209.
- 7 *The Green of the Valley is Khaki: Women's Testimonies from Kashmir, A Report* (1994).
- 8 *Amnesty International*, (May 2000). The reports of the Amnesty International and the Commission on Human Rights on Kashmir bear evidence of the excesses by the armed personnel. "Hundreds of people have over the past decade been arbitrarily detained in

Jammu and Kashmir. Those arbitrarily arrested under the preventive detention law include political activists of all political hues." *Amnesty International Report, India* (5 April 2000). Also, "The authorities continued to use the lapsed TADA to detain people in Jammu and Kashmir by linking them to ongoing cases filed before 1995." "The arbitrary arrest and detention of those peacefully voicing dissent appears to have become more widespread in Jammu and Kashmir with the Public Safety Act increasingly being used to punish those who speak out against the government".

- 9 S Gupta, "India-Pakistan Relations: On A Short Fuse," *India Today*, 15 March 1994.
- 10 Michael Cranna, *The True Cost of Conflict: Seven Recent Wars and their effects on Society*, edited (New York: The New Press, 1994), 61.
- 11 Kuldeep Nayar and Khushwant Singh, *Tragedy of Punjab: Operation Blue Star and After* (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1981), 25.
- 12 Apurba Kundu, *Militarism in India, The Army and Civil Society in Consensus* (New Delhi: Viva Books, 1998), 173.
- 13 J M Pettigrew, *The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence* (London: Zed Books, 1995).
- 14 *Committee for Coordination on Disappearances in Punjab: Documents*, (2000).
- 15 'Encounter killings' are a horrendous practice used by the police very often against suspects, particularly those linked to insurgent movements, in police-custody. The police explanation of such a killing is that they had no option but to use force when a suspect in custody attempted to attack them.
- 16 Kamal Mitra Chenoy, (2001):192-209.
- 17 Kamal Mitra Chenoy, "Armed Forces in North East India," in *Cannons into Ploughshares, Militarization and Prospects of Peace in South Asia*, ed. Ranabir Samadar (New Delhi: ASBAE/Lancers, 1995), 57-71.
- 18 *Where 'Peacekeeper' have Declared War: Report on Violations of democratic rights by security forces and the impact of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act on Civilian Life in the Seven States of the North-East*, (1997):3 and Amnesty International (January 2000).
- 19 "Where Peacekeepers..." (1973):3.
- 20 General K.V. Krishna Rao, PVSM, (1997:22).
- 21 Statement by Army personnel in a seminar organized by the Army, Imphal, on 23 February, 2000, *The Sangai Express*, (Imphal, Manipur) 24 February, 2000.
- 22 Editorial, *The Sangai Express*, 26 January 2000, 1.
- 23 Khatoli Khala, *The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act and its Impact on Women in Nagaland* (New Delhi: Wiscomp Perspectives, 2003), 33.
- 24 Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (banned) claimed responsibility for the killed chief engineer of Loktak project in January 2000, for refusing to pay those taxes.
- 25 Interviews conducted by the author and her students in Nagaland and Manipur, December 2003.
- 26 National Council of Applied Economic Research. *East India Human Development Report*. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 111.
- 27 Headlines from the *Sangai Express* (Imphal, Manipur) of 2003: October 10: "Meira Paibis stage Dharna"; Oct 23, "Naga bodies condemn rape of girl by NSCK (K) cadre;

Nov 5 and 6, "Election Minister's 12 year old daughter kidnapped" Nov 7: "Kuki Mothers appeal for child's release"; Nov 13, "Cold blooded murder of kidnapped child; Curfew imposed indefinitely"; November 8: 10 cadres of PREPAK killed in underground clashes; Nov 22: "Women's bodies decry underground clashes, calls for unity"Students sit in, Roads blocked....

- 28 Interviews conducted by author and her students in Nagaland and Manipur, December 2003.
- 29 Kamal Mitra Chenoy, (2001):192-209; also Sushobha Barve, "Kashmir: The moral dimension," *Communalism Combat* (Jan-Feb 2002): 24, Indian sources cite 40,000 dead, and Hurriyat cites 100,000. In 2003, alone 3,000 people were killed, *The Economist*, (14-20 February 2004), 21.
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- 31 Yasmin Ali, "Victims of Violence," *Hope (Srinagar)* vol. 1, no. 2 (March-April 2000): 3.
- 32 Kamal Mitra Chenoy, (2001): 192-209.
- 33 Michael Cranna, (1994):61.
- 34 *The Economist*, 14-20 February 2004, 2.
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PAKISTAN

National Security, Democracy Failure and Continuing Militarisation of State and Society

Ayesha Siddiqa

Introduction

Over the years after its independence in 1947, Pakistan has emerged as a highly militarised state and society. The public display of military symbols and the primacy of a military culture are indications of the state's mindset that has for many years prioritised military security at the cost of socio-economic and human resource development. The over-emphasis on military security has also allowed the armed forces to expand its role politically, economically and socially.

Militarisation in Pakistan cannot be analysed without understanding the dynamics of decision-making or the historical perspective on this phenomenon. Why did the state and society become militarised? How did state policies affect society in making it militarised or accepting military images so readily? What are the indicators of militarisation and what is the cost that society has continued to pay for becoming increasingly militarised? More important, what is the nature of militarisation? These are some of the issues that this paper aims to analyse.

Nature of Militarisation

Before attempting at any measurement of the extent of militarisation in Pakistan, it is important to understand its nature. Militarisation can also be termed as the essential interplay of relations at the inter-state and intra-state

levels. It is consensus and cohesion at the inter-state level that creates the political space for a state to negotiate its position at the intra-state level through the use of force or other methods. This requires a certain but necessary level of militarisation in society supporting 'national' objectives for militarisation. This process is interactive. Domestic political and civil society stakeholders are able to contribute towards national security and the fulfilment of national objectives once these are sufficiently developed and share the benefits of militarisation. Here, the prerequisite is that the various political and civil society players agree to the overall objective of the state and the government and see benefits for themselves, the state and the military institution in challenging other states. Developments in the defence sector and a process of positive militarisation have its spin-offs in terms of socio-economic modernisation. The development of the infrastructure such as roads, bridges and other similar facilities, education and training of personnel, and defence industrialisation may be considered elements of positive modernisation. However, if the process is restricted to a select community, as in the case of Pakistan, it tends to result in negative militarisation. The correlation is indirect but sensitive. If growth or modernisation is selective and militarisation is used as a variable for political legitimisation, the result is a lack of consensus. This means that if the military or any other institution uses militarisation mainly to legitimise its own existence then militarisation becomes a tool of coercion rather than catapulting the state and society towards socio-economic progress.

Given the structure of the state and problems of national cohesion in Pakistan, both civilian and military governments have resorted to militarisation for political legitimacy. The founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, created the nation-state of Pakistan on an ideological basis, but the ideology of common religious identity could not provide to the numerous nationalities that lived in the territory a sense of national cohesion. The grip of civil and military bureaucracies of Punjab (the largest province in Pakistan with the highest population) over the functioning of the state resulted in the disenchantment of smaller provinces. Moreover, the imbalance in the development of political institutions and the growth of the defence sector created a political credibility gap for the civilian political elite. The military exploited and filled this gap. The military justified its continuing hold through the power of security it provided not only in terms of territorial security, but also of safeguarding ideological principles of the state. In turn, the primacy

of external threat contributed towards deepening the imbalance between the defence sector and other institutions of the state. The homogeneity of the armed forces (about eighty percent of the military is from a few districts of the largest province, Punjab) resulted in the creation of a separate class, the military. Instead of acting as a force which created national cohesion, the military added to the socio-political and socio-economic divide by monopolising most of the economic benefits. This naturally resulted in negative militarisation, limiting the benefits of modernisation as well as economic growth and development to the military class at the expense of the rest of the population. Since military service was voluntary and not conscripted on a nationwide basis representing all the provinces equally, it intensified the existing divide between Punjab and other regions. The bulk of Pakistan's armed forces come from two provinces, Punjab and the North West Frontier. Almost 75 percent of the military is from Punjab. This inter-province disparity has led to the perception that the smaller provinces had little share of state power.

The armed forces have not allowed for major spin-offs even in case of defence industrialisation. Confining the production of indigenous weapons to the public sector and under military control with a deliberate effort to keep the civil/private sector out of the loop did not allow domestic capabilities to grow. This means that defence industrialisation has hardly any impact on the overall industrialisation of the country. The inclusion of the private sector and the involvement of multiple layers of the defence vendor-base, which would allow for spin-offs, are almost non-existent in Pakistan's case. The lack of growth in indigenous weapons production has led to continued dependence on foreign sources of procurement sapping financial resources and also raising many questions about the military-centred modernisation model. Imported technology, without a structured effort for its anchorage assimilation, adds to the division in society with technological knowledge being the preserve of a small number of people in military uniform. This has created a 'technology class' that has come to dominate the political discourse. Defence production is one of the many examples of how manipulation of defence resources by a small class of people in the military has caused negative militarisation in Pakistan. Further, militarisation has in fact been used by the armed forces as a tool for political legitimisation and control. Subsequently, this has enabled the military to maintain a monopolistic control state's resources.

Cost of Militarisation

Military expenditure and other opportunity costs of military security denote one of the tools for evaluating a state's commitment towards militarisation. In Pakistan's case, the relationship between defence and development has always been negative. The kind of investment that a country makes in its military posture and build-up also denotes the priority it gives to military, as opposed to social and economic security. Such prioritisation, in turn, has an impact on the basic character of society.

One of the prominent features of Pakistan's national budget is the high concentration on debt servicing and defence expenditure. The national budget has always indicated the government's bias for national security. This situation existed since the country's birth in 1947. Policymakers, who favoured concentrating on military security, were always nervous about the military capability gap between Pakistan and India. This resulted in their decision to invest funds in strengthening military security. The priority attached to territorial security has screened insulated defence expenditure from all other needs.¹ Furthermore, Islamabad has always aspired for parity in military capabilities so as to maintain a 1:3 ratio required for effective defence. A strong defensive capability is necessary to ward off the threat of a major military initiative by India. This logic holds true despite the fact that not all of the defence budget can be justified on the basis of strategic needs. The proportion of wastage is considerable. The fact remains that the India-centricity of its strategic perception allows Pakistan to make a strong case for sustaining military expenditure at a reasonably high level (see tables 1 & 2).

There was also the belief that military expenditure was an important contributory factor towards socio-economic growth and industrial development. In the 1970s and 1980s the growth in GDP was linked to the increase in investment on services such as defence and public administration. Moreover, the armed forces were viewed as a major source of employment in the country. This is the official notion, which is partially correct. Employment of about a million people working in various capacities in the defence sector or in holding jobs that provide direct support to the military amounts to a major share of Pakistan's job market. Against the backdrop of high unemployment, the perks and privileges which are part of the job makes the military service an attractive and prestigious employment. Although most of the perks are restricted to the upper echelons, any linkage with the armed

Table 1: Pakistan's Official Defence Budget (FY 1958-59 to 2001-02)

Year	Budget	Year	Budget	Year	Budget
1958-59	996.60	1973-74	4,948.60	1988-89	51,053.00
1959-60	1,043.50	1974-75	6,914.20	1989-90	58,708.00
1960-61	1,112.40	1975-76	8,103.00	1990-91	64,623.00
1961-62	1,108.60	1976-77	8,120.00	1991-92	75,751.00
1962-63	954.30	1977-78	9,674.00	1992-93	87,461.00
1963-64	1,156.50	1978-79	10,302.00	1993-94	91,776.00
1964-65	1,262.30	1979-80	12,655.00	1994-95	104,512.00
1965-66	2,855.00	1980-81	15,300.00	1995-96	119,658.00
1966-67	2,293.50	1981-82	18,631.00	1996-97	127,441.00
1967-68	2,168.50	1982-83	23,224.00	1997-98	136,164.00
1968-69	2,426.80	1983-84	26,798.00	1998-99	143,471.00
1969-70	2,749.10	1984-85	31,866.00	1999-00	152,794.00
1970-71	3,201.50	1985-86	35,606.00	2000-01	131,200.00
1971-72	3,725.50	1986-87	41,335.00	2001-02	149,600.00
1972-73	4,439.60	1987-88	47,015.00		

All figures are in Rs. Millions Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan

Table 2: Pakistan's Defence Burden

Year	MILEX (Current)	ME/GNP	ME/CGE	MILEX (Per Capita)
1987	2220	8.10%	29.30%	28
1988	2320	7.50%	29.20%	27
1989	2400	7.10%	25.40%	26
1990	2810	7.60%	29.10%	29
1991	2880	7.10%	27.50%	28
1992	3350	7.40%	27.90%	20
1993	3330	7.00%	25.90%	30
1994	3470	6.80%	26.50%	30
1995	3310	6.10%	25.30%	27
1996	3440	5.90%	23.70%	27
1997	3380	5.70%	24.20%	26

MILEX is given in US\$ million Source: US Department of State

forces even at the junior level adds social value to the military employment. However, these opportunities in reality are restricted to a certain geographical area, since a vast segment of the personnel in the armed forces belong to a few districts of Punjab and the Frontier province.

The one-line budget figure given in Table 1 is not the only expenditure incurred by the military. There are two developments that need attention. First, Islamabad appears to have engaged in a major restructuring of the budget; pushing a number of things under other heads, to create an impression that the defence budget was capped in the last three to four years. For instance, the defence budgetary figures do not contain about Rs. 30 billion worth of military pension payments that have been put under the civil administration account. Nor does the budget comprise expenditure incurred on personnel and projects paid from other heads. When these figures are also added, the share of the defence budget in the GDP will exceed five percent, more than the official data indicate.

Second, military expenditure does not take into account the range of resources that are being used by the military corporate sector. Pakistani military business activities revolve around four major Foundations: *Fauji* Foundation (FF), Army Welfare Trust (AWT), *Shaheen* Foundation (SF) and *Bahria* Foundation (BF). The mandate of these organisations is to ensure the welfare of retired personnel and their families, and to re-integrate retired military personnel into civilian life. This pattern was inherited from the British and is pursued not only in Pakistan, but also in India. For instance, about ten percent of all the public sector jobs in India are set aside for retired military personnel. The Indian government also operates housing schemes and other welfare projects as well. Islamabad has a similar provision for providing about 10 percent of public sector jobs to retired armed forces personnel. Nonetheless, this is not strictly followed. According to one estimate, about 2.5 percent of the jobs are given to military personnel. Some retired officers who were interviewed for this study were bitter about the fact that some sectors of civil society grudged the jobs given to military personnel in the civil service despite the fact that the armed forces did not get their total share of the jobs.

It should be noted, however, that it is not the share of jobs that bothers civil society. It is rather the manner in which political influence is used by the defence forces to monopolise a greater number of the available opportunities. The military not only gets public sector jobs, but has also

expanded into the commercial sector and claims a greater portion of the total resources of the state. The most problematic is the presence of the military in the corporate sector. The Pakistani model of 'soldiers in business,' in fact, represents a cross between the Turkish model where resources from the armed forces are utilised for investment and the Chinese-Indonesian model where military personnel are directly involved in commercial ventures. The military in Pakistan seems to have adopted a two-pronged approach. The first is turning public sector ventures into private sector ventures, using state capital. This pertains to operations like the National Logistic Cell (NLC) and the Frontier Works Organization (FWO) or even the military farms. These activities use state capital but are later turned into private ventures. The second approach is running commercial ventures by making use of welfare funds. It is through a combination of both approaches that the military has arrived at a point where its businesses today control about 23 percent of the assets of the corporate sector through two Foundations, the Fauji Foundation (FF) and the Army Welfare Trust (AWT) representing two of the largest conglomerates in the country. This quantification, however, does not include the reach of the intricate network linked to the economic/commercial empire of the military.

To gauge the depth of the network, it is necessary to look at three distinct levels.

- Small and medium enterprises run independently by units and divisions. Their businesses range from bakeries to more intensive ventures;
- Large public sector enterprises. These are organisations like the nlc and fwo that are run under a formal public sector set up; and
- Large-scale private sector ventures. In these some or all of the capital has been drawn from the public sector.

The control of these enterprises is in the hands of the armed forces. For instance, the management of the Foundations is connected with the Service Headquarters. The size of the private ventures can be gauged by the number of projects they control. The Fauji Foundation has 21 projects, the AWT 41, Bahria Foundation 23 and Shaheen Foundation has 11. These range from bakeries, petrol pumps, international airlines to real estate, financial services and banks.

Over the years, especially during the 1980s and the 1990s, the military has expanded into direct control of the corporate sector as well. Like in Indonesia, Thailand or a number of Latin American countries, the military operates at all levels of the economy. It runs its own airline, bank, universities, insurance agencies, manufacturing concerns and others. The military in Pakistan today is one of the biggest land developers and two of its organisations represent the largest conglomerates in the corporate sector. The net worth of the four welfare Foundations, which are used as the front for business ventures, is about Rs. 136 billion. The military's political clout helps these Foundations to claim resources and business opportunities in the private sector.

Pakistan's peculiar model of military corporatism is extremely complicated. This is due to the command and control structure. On the one hand, businesses are operated by welfare Foundations. These are clearly registered as private sector ventures. However, many of these companies are not listed companies and therefore data is not readily available. On the other hand, there are business operations functioning entirely in the public sector or directly use public sector resources including land. These ventures are difficult to quantify. Such businesses are operated by almost every unit and division of the Army spread throughout the country. These were allowed to operate during the rule of General Ziaul Haq (1977-1988). General Zia had authorised every corps commander (there are nine corps commanders) to operate slush funds that would not be audited. This ruling allowed army units to establish bakeries and gas stations to lease out military land to private businesses, to impose taxes on national highways and to engage in other moneymaking ventures.

The size of this military economy is difficult to quantify because of the lack of records as well, data. In instances where some data is available, it is difficult to establish their validity. In any case, there is no transparency in the defence sector. The bureaucracy is the only other group that comes closer to the army in terms of such privileges.

Reduction of military expenditure is a difficult task because the defence budget does not fall under the purview of Parliament. Since the decision-making on military expenditure is almost completely controlled by the armed forces even under Parliamentary governments, there has not been any reduction in the budgetary allocation for defence compared with the expenditure on development. When the parliament under Prime Minister

Mohammad Khan Junejo in 1984-1985 tried to debate the issue with the objective of freezing the defence budget, General Ziaul Haq, the President, vehemently resisted that initiative. General Zia was quoted to say: "How can you fight a nuclear submarine or an aircraft carrier with a bamboo stick? We have to match sword with sword, tank with tank, and destroyer with destroyer. The situation demands that national defence be bolstered but Pakistan cannot afford any cut or freeze in defence expenditure, since you cannot freeze the threat to Pakistan's security." As mentioned earlier, defence expenditure cannot be reduced drastically because of the size of the armed forces. Although the Army has recently announced a reduction of 50,000 non-combatants, the fact is that the overall size and the related bill for the cost of personnel remain high. Moreover, the allowance for wastage in the defence budget is quite high which results in the state paying more for military security with dividends that are not commensurate with expenditure.

Social Cost

The overall impact of Pakistan's borrowings and defence expenditure is quite wide. The negative effects could be observed in the form of growth retardation in social and other sectors. Indeed, in Pakistan's case, the traditional guns-for-butter approach has not been respected. Allocations for the military have been made without considering the financial capacity of the economy or the need for social development. Traditionally, the defence sector has received maximum priority on the assumption that territorial security was essential for the country from the standpoint of economic progress as well. People advocating this approach have believed that it is only when the frontiers are secure that people and nations can begin to have the confidence which, in turn, brings greater economic prosperity. This traditional security paradigm has not taken into account the fact that it is a combination of territorial, economic and social security that allows for economic growth. In Pakistan's case, a demarcation between the various priorities or the determination of what should come first has never been made. Part of the reason is that the military, which has always controlled politics, considers its own interests better served if military security remains a priority. Thus, it is the armed forces or the establishment alone that can alter sector-wise budgetary allocations.

Since the last military takeover in 1999, Pakistan's present military-led government seems to be changing the extremely negative relationship between defence and development expenditure by bringing down military expenditure.

The claim is that the budget has been reduced in real terms as it had been capped and not been allowed to grow. This statement, however, denotes cosmetic changes rather than anything real. In fact, the new government has resorted to the strategy of hiding military related expenditure under civilian heads of accounts in order to give a better impression to the international donor community. The reason for the net military expenditure to remain static is that the government has not made any major arms procurement in the last five years.

This peculiar prioritisation of budgetary allocations has resulted in a defence-development imbalance. Factors like mismanagement of resources and corruption have also contributed to poor social and human development indicators. According to the Human Development Report on South Asia, at least 28 million people in Pakistan live below the poverty line. Two-thirds of the country's adult population is illiterate. Basic health facilities are available to only half the population. The maternal mortality rate is very high (340 per 100,000) while one-fourth of new-born babies are underweight and malnourished. In addition, Pakistan has the highest population growth rate in the South Asian region (3.6 percent). In human development, Pakistan lagged behind other countries in the region such as India and Sri Lanka. The number of Pakistan's poor people increased from 19 million in 1960 to 42 million in 1995. According to a recent report, nearly eight million children in Pakistan suffer from malnutrition and about 23 million have never been to school. This was despite the per capita increase in income by 231 percent from 1970 to 1993. This was claimed to be the highest rate of increase in South Asia's per capita income. But it has not helped in alleviating the country's poverty, as indicated in Table 3.

Meanwhile, there are other costs of militarisation that are quite difficult to quantify. These relate to the impact of militarisation on linkages and relationships among diverse social actors. How do different social groups interact with each other? Has militarisation led to emergence of new ideological conflicts? How do groups manage their bilateral or multilateral differences and disputes? An examination of these issues would highlight the manner in which militarisation has added to its overall social cost. There are three areas that need to be considered in this regard: (i) treatment of women, (ii) treatment of religious minorities, and (iii) rise in sectarian and ethnic violence.

Table 3: State of Poverty in Pakistan

Year	Population (million)	Pop. below poverty line (million)	Pop. below poverty line (%)	Growth rate of pop. below poverty line (%)
1988	102.7	17.8	17.3	-11.3
1989	105.4	20.3	19.3	14.3
1990	108.0	23.4	21.7	15.2
1991	110.8	24.1	21.7	2.8
1992	113.6	25.0	22	3.8
1993	116.5	26.2	22.5	4.9
1994	119.4	27.8	23.3	6.1
1995	122.4	29.8	24.4	7.4
1996	125.4	32.5	25.9	8.8
1997	128.4	35.8	27.9	10.3
1998	131.5	38.8	29.5	8.2
1999	134.5	40.9	30.4	5.5
2000	137.5	48.5	35.3	18.7
2001	140.5	56.3	40.1	16.0

Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan

Over the years, Pakistan has gained negative attention because of the ill treatment of women and minorities. It is more than a socio-cultural problem. Rather, it is a question of laws that are discriminatory of both women and the minorities. In both cases, the discriminatory attitudes were a spin-off of the policies of a military government that sought to achieve a military-strategic objective through such legislation. The military government of General Zia-ul Haq (1977-1988) introduced the *Hudood Laws* (Islamic laws) bringing about major changes in the status of Pakistani women. For instance, one of the laws pertaining to evidence in a court of law stipulated that an adult female witness would be equal to half of an adult male witness. Another provision demanded that a female rape victim should produce four adult Muslim male witnesses to prove her claim. Failure to do so would be treated by the court as adultery punishable by stoning. Although the ordinance did not become a law because it was not passed by any Parliament, its draft stands as a dark shadow over liberty and rights of women. Currently, it stands as a Presidential decree that needs to be passed by the Parliament to have the force of law. Such potential laws, nonetheless, reinforced the existing discriminatory ideologies and practices against women in the feudal/tribal society of Pakistan. Politically backward provinces like Sindh, Balochistan

and the NWFP have outdated traditions of honour-killing (*karo-kari*) and prohibiting the marriage of young girls. The latter custom is meant to prevent the transfer of property from one household to another.

The Islamic *sharia* that the Zia regime wanted to implement had a component on blasphemy. It envisaged death sentence to a non-Muslim if he/she was found desecrating the Holy Koran or using inappropriate language in making references to the Prophet or the holy book. This law was invoked on several occasions to pass death sentence on individuals. However, due to the intervention of human rights lawyers, the death sentences were not carried out. A repressive legal system like this makes people extremely vulnerable, because it is difficult to fight against it. There was no provision to protect individuals from the arbitrary application of such draconian laws or its use by influential people to harass members of minority communities.

These repressive laws were the legacy of the Zia era of the 1980s. General Zia empowered religious clerics and re-activated archaic traditions of law that served no purpose other than strengthening the military's agenda for power. Furthermore, as measures to advance the military regime's Afghan policy, General Zia inaugurated Islamic religious schools that taught children intolerance in a narrowly-framed world view. The objective was to indoctrinate and train people to fight religious wars, since it was believed that religiously motivated people were necessary to fight political wars. It was also a part of the Zia regime's strategy to maintain good relations with the US in order to secure political support and legitimacy.

Although the *jihadis* were produced in Pakistan to be deployed against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, it eventually changed the face of Pakistani civil society. The proliferation of narcotics, small arms and light weapons inside Pakistan was one of the negative consequences of the Afghan war. The other was the increase in religious intolerance and the greater militarisation of society. The entire society was consumed by the war and conflict in Afghanistan for more than two decades. The end of the Afghan war did not end Pakistan's problems created by it. Instead, new fronts were opened up. The Islamic militants engaged in the war in Afghanistan were religiously motivated roving warriors who fought their battles on different fronts in Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya and other places as well. Since the military benefited from the presence of these militants in Pakistan, they did not object to their larger objective since it suited the military's tactical

objective of 'increasing the cost of conflict' for India and making New Delhi bleed in Kashmir.

The ultimate cost of this policy was extraordinary. With the rise in sectarian and ethnic violence, thousands of followers of Sunni and Shiite sects were killed every year in sectarian violence. Bombing of mosques and indiscriminate firing at prayer congregations became quite regular. Other than this sectarian violence, there was the spread of ethnic violence. Starting with the bloodshed in East Pakistan in 1971 and the massacre of thousands of Baluch people in the mid 1970s, ethnic politics in Pakistan has been particularly violent. The conflict between the Pathans, a migrant community in Sindh, and ethnic Sindhis in the province of Sindh during the 1980s underscored the violent dimension in inter-ethnic relations.

Explaining Militarisation

A regression analysis of Pakistan's defence budget might not necessarily present a negative relationship between military expenditure and economic development. However, there is an identifiable opportunity cost of high defence spending. Military personnel often argue that the reason for defence-development gap is the lack of resource absorption capacity in other sectors. This argument has some validity. However, the deficient absorption capacity in other sectors is because the state's investment priority has in national security and not in non-military sectors. Actually, the problem of high defence expenditure is rooted in the state's peculiar sense of priorities. The political establishment views development through the prism of national security. For instance, military governments in Pakistan have considered economic progress a priority because it offers financial dividends to the defence sector. Surprisingly, there has not been systematic protest against this tendency by the civilian political leadership or from civil society, except when some critical voices were heard in Parliament in 1985. These voices were eventually silenced after Parliament was dissolved.

There are three major reasons for this complacency regarding high defence expenditure in Pakistan. First, the political instability, which can be attributed to the military and its ability to destabilise governments, has generated a deep sense of insecurity that does not encourage political leaders to challenge the core interests of the military. Second, the coercive power of the military prevents any discussion on military issues in the broader civil society. Third, the primacy attached to military security and the relatively

positive image of the armed forces, especially in parts of the country where the overall power of the country lies, allows the armed forces to mobilise support for high cost of defence. The establishment has very systematically inculcated the fear of a belligerent India in the minds of the people. This is not to say that India has behaved in a non-threatening manner towards its neighbours. India's 'sub-normal' relations with all the neighbour states and its interference with internal matters in Sri Lanka (1987), Maldives (1988), and Nepal (1989) have reinforced Pakistani sentiments of security.

The Pakistani fear of India has deep roots. It has its genesis in the independence of the two countries from British colonial rule in 1947. The bloodshed and carnage experienced at the time of the partition of India and the rhetoric of the Indian leadership regarding the unacceptability of the creation of an independent state for the Muslims of India are historical facts on which Pakistan's establishment leans on for strengthening its case for the need for military preparedness. Over the past fifty-six years, Pakistan's security perception and agenda have been dominated by an extreme sense of threat perceived from India, the big neighbour. It is noteworthy that despite claiming an extra-regional identity (greater cultural and religious affiliation with the Middle East), Pakistan has not ventured into extending its security vision beyond India. In fact, Islamabad's view of the entire world is a simplistic one in which the world is divided into two classes of states. In the first are states that are considered important because of their perceived ability to provide direct or indirect help to strengthen Pakistan against India. The second class of states includes those not relevant to the above framework of thinking. The nature and direction of India's domestic politics and the aggressive political statements of its leadership concerning Pakistan have only reinforced this perception. Any hostile statement from across the border arouses in the minds of the Pakistani people and policymakers of the deep fear of India seeking to physically eliminate Pakistan. The various conflicts Pakistan had with India, particularly the 1971 war that eventually led to the dismemberment of Pakistan, have left deep scars in Pakistan that are not easy to erase.

Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan's security perception has remained India-centric. The interminable rivalry between the two South Asian neighbours has produced three-and-a-half wars during the past fifty-seven years. The last war in 1971 cost Islamabad the country's Eastern wing. The perception of India that is quite widespread among the decision-making

elite portrays the rivalry between the two states as a battle between the 'good' and 'evil' in which the Indian 'Goliath' is forever trying to vanquish the Pakistani 'David.' Despite that perception, the overtones of the conflict are territorial and geo-political. However, the key players who shape Pakistan's political discourse link the hostile relations with India to religious ideology, depicting Pakistan as an Islamic state's struggling to survive with honour amidst the hegemonic designs of a predominantly Hindu neighbour. Some in Pakistan believe that this divisive ideology will never allow the establishment of normal neighbourly relations between the two countries.

Decision-Making & Power Politics

This insecurity concerning India stems from the general sense of fear ingrained in the political psychology of the Pakistani establishment. Some analysts view this as a psychology of a 'homeland' state. Since such a state is created for a certain minority against the will of a majority, the former would always feel insecure. Like Israel, a deep sense of insecurity is endemic in Pakistan. The presence of India as a big and ambitious neighbour only provides a certain direction or purpose to this insecurity. It is important to note, however, that given this mindset, no amount of military build up would enable the Pakistani establishment to feel secure from the threat of being the target of Indian military attack. The imbalance in the conventional military capability of Pakistan vis a vis India has heightened this fear. There has never been a debate in Pakistan on this structural anomaly with the objective of addressing this fear and resultant the urge to permanently compete with India. The view shared by many in Pakistan is that India should not treat Pakistan the way it has been treating the smaller neighbours in the region. Even then, there is no benchmark to assess how much security is adequate for Pakistan. Furthermore, there has never been a dialogue between the two sides as to how the bigger neighbour could provide confidence to its smaller but competitive neighbour. This gives primacy to the perception that the insecurity vis-à-vis India is actually a tool that allows the military to dominate the country.

At best, Pakistan's strategic perception and the definition of security follow a linear course. This linearity is not a coincidence. It can be attributed to the influence of the military and civil bureaucracy in policy-making, especially the armed force's influence on the power politics of the state.

Mohammad Waseem, a prominent Pakistani political analyst, has explained this as insecurity inherent in the psychology of an 'administrative state.' In such a state, the bureaucratic establishment suffers from insecurity and a constant identity crisis. Pakistan's military has found the heightened threat perception as instrumental for its interest and survival as an organisation. In fact, the inclusion of threat as part of the nation-building exercise has allowed the armed forces a key position in the politics of the country. The function of defending the territory and the ideology of the state, which is supposed to be the *raison d'être* of the Pakistani military, builds an environment that supports the military establishment to stay in control of politics and of the governance of the state. The military conflict with India adds to this environment of militarism. Given the weak political structures, the political stakeholders also conform to this peculiar definition of national security as military security.

The continuation of the traditional security paradigm has two clear manifestations, the militarisation of society, and the enhanced influence of the military in the country's power politics. The second factor has fed into the first. The enhanced significance of the armed forces and its relatively positive image generates even more support in civil society for militarisation and for sustaining the control wielded by the military over politics. The nature of the influence of the military will be discussed in the following sub-section.

Influence of the Military in the Socio-politics of the State

Pakistan's military has always dominated civil institutions. The imbalance in the growth between democracy and the armed forces from the very beginning was due to the fact that the military was the only organised public institution existed at the time of independence. Structurally, it was a small military that was inherited from the British in 1947. At that time it comprised six armoured corps, eight artillery regiments, eight infantry regiments, sixteen naval vessels, three air squadrons, four military training institutions, 23,225 tons of ammunition ordnance stores, and 1,128 tons of ammunition in engineering stores. The officer corps was limited and consisted of four lieutenant colonels, 42 majors and 114 captains. This was the military that eventually grew into the world's eighth largest defence force consisting of 800,000-900,000 personnel and acted as the key player in the power politics of the State. The gap between the military and civilian institutions and its overall influence on policy-making can be attributed to three factors.

1. The armed forces were allowed to grow independent of effective control by the civilian authorities. The peculiar command and control system that continued until 1971 permeated the inward looking approach of the military top brass. It replicated the colonial system, whereby each service chief was designated as Commander-in-Chief having total control of planning and operations in his sector.
2. The incompetence of the political leadership not only strengthened the military, particularly the army, but also encouraged the armed forces to take control of the reigns of government on several occasions. At a very early stage the army began to be dragged into politics. Martial law was imposed in Lahore in 1954 for the first time. From then onwards, the involvement increased to a point that a full-fledged Martial Law was imposed in 1958. It continued until 1962 followed by another in 1969-70 after an interlude of seven to eight years. Yet another Martial Law regime was imposed in 1977, which remained in force until 1985. Cohen explains this phenomenon: "There are armies that guard their nation's borders, there are those that are concerned with protecting their own position in society, and there are those that defend a cause or an idea. The Pakistan Army does all three." The officer corps of the army became increasingly conscious not only of the political leadership's inability to control the armed forces and the country, but also its dependence on the army for survival. For instance, Prime Minister Bhutto's weakness and nervousness in handling the opposition, and the criticism that became very obvious during meetings with his Chief-of-Army Staff and the Corps Commanders, inspired (late) General Zia-ul-Haq to topple the government in 1977. The army top brass realised the benefits of directly controlling the government.
3. The armed forces represent the largest organised force of any kind in Pakistan. The military's tendency has been to strengthen its organisational power. To achieve this goal, the military elite has successfully manipulated the political system and environment in a fashion that allowed them to claim the country's top political and decision making positions. It was no surprise when the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto stressed the need of a national government in which the military, especially its intelligence agencies, would have due representation.

The pace at which the armed forces grew was not in parallel with the growth of democratic institutions. The two distinctive features in the growth of the political system are authoritarianism and the self-serving attitude of the leadership. These persisted since the country's independence, and were even encouraged by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Father of the Nation. His alleged insistence on the inclusion of schedule 9 in the Independence Act, 1947 was aimed at acquiring for himself extensive powers to control the government as the first Governor-General of Pakistan. This gave him power to dismiss governments and over-ride decisions made by the cabinet, enabled him to exercise firm control of the policy-making process and tailor the political system to his own wishes. Jinnah as Governor-General exercised this power when he dismissed in 1948 the government of the Frontier Province headed by Dr. Khan Sahib. Jinnah's successors repeatedly used this power after his death in 1948. This was one reason for delaying the constitution making process for nine years after independence. These conditions persisted even after the first constitution was promulgated in 1956. For almost the three years in which the constitution functioned, seven Prime Ministers came to power, but not one of them was elected. Instead, they manoeuvred their nominations through 'palace intrigue.' It was also in this period that the slow but gradual involvement of the military in the political system became visible when General Ayub Khan, who was then the Commander-in-Chief of the army, was inducted into the cabinet.

Field Marshal Ayub Khan abrogated the country's Constitution in 1958, and ruled as the Chief Martial Law Administrator until 1962 when a new political system was formally introduced through a new constitution. Unlike the old parliamentary system, this new system was presidential and made to serve the military general's personal political ambitions. This was affected by the introduction of the concept of indirect election of the President by a limited number of 'Basic Democrats.' Moreover, these were to be held on a non-party basis. The strategy helped General Ayub Khan to become the President. Manipulation of the election contributed to his success.

The new system of 'Basic Democracy,' which was totalitarian in nature, also denoted Ayub Khan's vision of attaining economic progress without any political interruptions. The idea of progress that he put into practice was dictated by the development theories in vogue and did not take into account the significance of equitable distribution of resources. This was one of the flaws that caused the system's collapse in 1969-1970. The army, backed

by the majority of West Pakistani politicians adopted its preferred tactic to control the domestic turbulence that ensued. General Yahya Khan imposed the second martial law. This strategy backfired in the eastern wing of the country, as by then the political situation there had reached a crisis point due to the atrocities of the West Pakistani military. The break up of united Pakistan in 1971 was an inevitable outcome of Islamabad's policies, particularly the prejudice of West Pakistani politicians towards the Bengali population of East Pakistan, and their self-serving approach in politics. The attitude of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had by then emerged as the most popular leader of Pakistan's western wing, was a case in point. His slogan of *idhar hum, udhar tum* ('Here we rule; there you rule') was a clear signal to the East Bengali leadership that the politicians of the Western wing would not allow East Pakistani politicians to rule the entire country, although they had obtained a parliamentary majority in the 1970 elections. Hence, the best option was to part. Bhutto was aided in his designs by some of his friends who served as senior officers in the military. The opportunity to bring this drama to its logical conclusion was provided by the Indian declaration of war in 1971. The military was unable to defend the eastern wing which, in any case, was logistically difficult to secure.

The civil war in East Pakistan, the war with India, the military's humiliating defeat at the hands of the Indians, and the surrender of 90,000 troops caused chaos in the western wing as well. The political conditions paved the way for Bhutto's take over in 1971 as Chief Martial Law Administrator. The fact that one of the most popular leaders in the country's history would take over the reigns of the government wearing a dictatorial garb, however ironic, was indicative of the attitude of the political leadership and Bhutto's dominant trait of authoritarianism. This attitude was repeatedly exhibited during his almost seven year rule. This behaviour, strengthened by his feudal background, played a major role in gradually building his dependence on the army.

Undoubtedly, Bhutto was the architect of certain important systemic changes in post-1971 Pakistan aimed at correcting the civil-military imbalance. His policy enlisted in the 1973 White Paper on Higher Defence Organisation established a new command and control system for the armed forces. The commanders of the three services were re-designated and the Prime Minister was declared the supreme commander of the armed forces. This amendment in the system was formally incorporated in Article 17 of

the 1973 Constitution. A Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) was formulated to ensure central planning and better control of the use of scarce resources by the defence sector. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) was given more powers and the Cabinet Committee for Defence (CCD) was made the focal point of defence decision-making. There were new developments on the political front as well. For example, the new constitution declared its abrogation to be an act of high treason (Article 6) punishable by death as interpreted by the substantive law on treason. These legal modifications, nonetheless, were loaded with Bhutto's self-serving interests. With this particular law he intended to downsize the army's influence and to ensure continuity of his political rule. A law that supposedly made it difficult to abrogate the constitution was also meant to contain manipulations of the opposition who, as Bhutto might have feared, would try to instigate the army to take over. Unfortunately, the strategy could not work without a positive commitment to the new system by the Prime Minister himself. His personal political insecurities that increased with time paved the way for the army's increased influence in the political arena. Bhutto himself brought the Frankenstein monster that was suffering from a low morale (due to a humiliating defeat by India) back to life by politicising it. In the province of Baluchistan, he used the military in physically crushing the rebellion, in which a large number of people were killed. Furthermore, Bhutto is known for having tried to politicise the armed forces. Once unleashed, the army could not be controlled again from exerting its political influence and in exercising its opinion regarding the system. Finally, in the wake of the chaos of the general elections in 1977 and Bhutto's alleged involvement in rigging the results, the military dismissed his government. Bhutto was hanged in 1979 for his alleged involvement in the murder of one of his political rivals.

General Zia, who took over in 1977, did not abrogate the Constitution but suspended it for ninety days and prolonged the suspension for nine years, until 1985. Although using a slightly different approach from Ayub Khan in re-introducing democracy, Zia's system also aimed at ensuring his personal safety and interests, as well as that of the military. The first assembly was elected on a non-party basis headed by a nominated Prime Minister who was handpicked by the Army General. These elections followed a national referendum in which the choice of Zia as President was conveniently linked to public support for an Islamic system in the country. At the referendum, voters were asked to make a choice between supporting Islamic rule by electing

Zia or not supporting the system by voting against him. The results of the referendum, which was a blatant effort at emotionally blackmailing the public, were manipulated. He further strengthened his control by forcing the Parliament to pass the Eighth Amendment in the 1973 constitution empowering him as the President to invite an individual or a party to form a government, and to dismiss it if it was deemed necessary. In addition, it made him the supreme commander of the armed forces. The new system was not backed by any sub-system to control the President's will. He used the power of dismissal to dismiss Prime Minister Junejo's government in 1987. Even after Zia's death in 1988, this power to dismiss governments was used three times.

Zia's eleven years of rule fundamentally changed the chemistry of Pakistan's power politics. According to the norms set by him, the army's ambition to maintain control of the policy-making process for organisational and personal interests was fulfilled through destabilising the political process on a permanent basis. He had educated the top rung of the military to mistrust the political leadership and to keep them constantly on their knees. The military intelligence agencies, especially the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), were frequently used to destabilise non-military regimes. General Mirza Aslam Beg, who became the Army Chief after Zia's death, admitted having used the ISI to destabilize Benazir Bhutto's regime that was eventually sacked in 1990. The extraordinary power of the President was used as the ultimate tool. The army's capability to control the political system to its advantage has not diminished even after the nullification of the Eighth Amendment by the newly formed government in 1997 as Nawaz Sharif's government continues to depend on the army for its survival.

There are four major factors that have contributed significantly towards this peculiar political environment and civil-military relations. The first pertains to the leadership's rather confused perception of a national ideology. In the last fifty years, the question as to whether Pakistan should become an Islamic theocracy or a secular state has not been resolved. Although successive regimes have used religious ideology to secure political legitimacy, the idea has not yet been anchored formally in the political system. The use of religious ideology as a political device was initiated by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with his slogan of 'Islamic Socialism. General Zia ul Huq carried it further with his promise to make Pakistan a pure Muslim state on a model similar to that of Saudi Arabia. During Zia's tenure, an Islamic economic

system was introduced and the *sharia* law was promulgated. This law, particularly the section dealing with evidence and family law, was inherently and cruelly prejudiced against women. The repeated use of religion as a ploy to control public emotions and behaviour has damaged the political system and added to a process of recurring instability.

The second factor relates to the feudal nature of Pakistani society. People from the land owning class, who have been instrumental in persisting with socio-economic underdevelopment, have always dominated the democratically elected Parliament. There is a visible collusion of interests between the landowners and the military. The situation did not change with the inclusion of a handful of private entrepreneurs in the Parliament. To date, Parliament continues to be dominated by the land owning class. There is an average of 36 percent Parliamentarians who represent the traditional political power base in the National Assemblies elected in the 1980s and the 1990s. This system has visibly affected the socio-cultural environment.

The third factor is linked to the lack of clarity regarding the choice of a political system. The fluctuation between Parliamentary and Presidential rule has contributed significantly to weakening the foundations for a stable democracy in the country and the functioning of the policy-making system.

The fourth relates to the flaws in the design of the command and control system of the armed forces by civilian governments. The system was inaugurated in 1973 to establish civilian control and a system of checks-and-balances. In its design, this system introduced a hierarchical 'decision making tree' developed on a multi-divisional and pluralistic approach. However, the decision-making process was based on a linear model with Parliament in a commanding position. The elected representatives were supposed to exercise control through the Cabinet Committee for Defence (CCD). According to this system, the military was placed at the bottom of the hierarchy. The bureaucratic control was to be exercised by the Ministry of Defence that would play the role of a buffer between the political leadership and the armed forces. The fundamental idea was to hedge the military by instituting greater control by civilians at the top and middle management levels. However, the system did not function as envisioned.

One major problem that makes decision-making ineffective is the quality of policy-making; especially at the top and middle management levels. A major component of decision-making relates to the quality of information or the access to all relevant information of the decision-making management.

In Pakistan this is a weak area. The people who process information at the MoD are not exposed to the current concepts in decision-making management. There is no systems analysis of weapons or of other demands made by the armed forces. The bureaucrats normally push a file up the policy-making ladder on the basis of comments received from the military. In any case, the top officials at the Ministry who control the team of civil bureaucrats are from the armed forces. Serving or retired military officers fill the five top slots of Additional Secretaries at the MoD. Currently, the two top positions of Secretary Defence and Defence Production were also given to retiring military officers. Masood Hassan, who served as Secretary Defence in the 1970s, claimed that it was during the 1980s that involvement of the military in the MoD increased. The official explanation is that that this involvement was to build better understanding within the Ministry of Defence requirements. In reality, this understanding was generated through the imposition of military views via the senior executives who are ex-military. The input, therefore, provided in the form of information to the top level was highly biased and did not take into account a variety of other serious considerations. Furthermore, the civilian management has always been discouraged from asserting itself in matters related to the military. The top policy-makers, in turn, were unable to produce a cohesive security policy based on its sub-components of defence, foreign and economic policies. Presently, Pakistan's security policy consists mainly of matters related to defence. This in itself has resulted in substantial wastage of resources especially in the case of capital investment on the purchase of major weapon systems. The fact is that the CCD has remained as weak as the MoD. The Cabinet Committee for Defence does not have an independent source of information to verify intelligence reports regarding threat perceptions provided by the military. This inadequacy adds to the general ineptitude of Parliament to exercise influence in defence decision-making. The CCD has always been permitted only the marginal role of rubber-stamping decisions made by the armed forces.

The situation did not change during the 1970s when the military was in setback. This was also the period when the elected Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had tried to introduce major structural changes in the command and control system of the armed forces. The modifications in the system did not bring about parallel changes in the political environment that would have determined the course of civil-military relations. Bhutto's insecurities

regarding his political future accompanied with his personal ambitions to project himself as the leader of the Third World and the Islamic world inspired him to re-build the armed forces. Again, the needs of the military were given priority over other needs.

Over the years the military has learnt to manipulate the system to its own advantage. While it is a fact that the political leadership suffers from major inadequacies, the fact also remains that the military has deliberately weakened the civilian leadership. The use of military intelligence agencies to manipulate election results or destabilise elected governments during the 1990s is no secret. Moreover, this behaviour has resulted in generating insecurity amongst the political leadership, which further weakens the political system. Consequently, the defence sector dominates all spheres of public life.

The Military Decision-Making Environment

However, it would not be fair to consider the armed forces as a monolith. Of the three services of the military, it is the Army that is politically the strongest and has been at the helm of affairs. The Army has also enjoyed immense political influence due to its size. It is the largest service with the other two depending on the Army's support for their acquisitions or fulfilling other objectives.

The military environment in Pakistan is also known for its single-gender bias, dominated almost completely by males. The roles for women are restricted to certain fields such as education and medicine. A very small number of women are in non-traditional jobs such as accounts and engineering, especially in the Air Force. Apart from this, women are not involved in military operations or in working at the decision-making level. The closest that any service ever came to inducting women into non-traditional roles was the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) that inducted a limited number of women as pilots or had a few flight engineers. The induction of female pilots, however, was discontinued within two years of the initial intake in 2000-2001. A source from the PAF claimed that the decision was made on the recommendation of the personnel branch of the service. The branch had argued that women were not fit for operational duties. Such views reflect the prevailing attitude in the top management of the armed forces. It is rare for female aeronautical engineers in the PAF to be assigned to operational

jobs such as flight lines. Most female officers in the engineering branch are assigned to staff duties.

The Influence of the Military and External Factors

Over the fifty-seven year history of the Pakistani nation, the military has emerged as the dominant player. Its overwhelming influence in the political process is not an accident. There are two factors that have clearly strengthened the armed forces: weakness of domestic political actors; and the support the armed forces obtained from external actors such as the US.

Pakistan military's dependence upon Washington for support is strategic. On the one hand, there has been the need for a pretext for the military to look up to the US for assistance. On the other hand, the internal political compulsions have bound the GHQ (General Headquarters) with Washington. The Pakistan Army's search for a stronger ally is purely need-oriented. The need varies from procuring major weapon systems that could bolster Islamabad's position versus New Delhi to providing a necessary cushion to stave off the threat of a conflict with India. Being a reactionary power in the region that tends to challenge India's hegemony, Pakistan has always needed a powerful equaliser to ensure that the strategic balance was not completely tipped against Pakistan in times of crisis. The inability to force India to the negotiation table or to find a solution to the crisis that would be favourable to Pakistan as well, has led the latter to engage in military adventurism. However, the inability to force a military solution has always forced Islamabad to find recourse to international diplomatic intervention, primarily to find a safe passage out of the conflict. This pragmatism has resulted in strengthening the hands of the pro-US lobby in Pakistan who Samina Yasmeen identifies as the 'surrender' group. One cannot ignore America's significance for Pakistan as a potential source for the acquisition of superior quality conventional weapons which, in turn, are necessary for strengthening the country's defence and for giving the armed forces the ability to launch offensive operations. Weapons procured from America during the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1980s had considerably strengthened the military's position in not only standing up to the perceived threat from India, but also challenging it. This was apparent in the 1965's limited conflict in Sir Creek and later during 'operation Gibraltar.'

The continued dependency on the United States has another dimension as well. It is linked to entrenched interests that have been developed from a

bureaucratic-organisational standpoint. Since the end of the 1950s when Pakistan joined the military pacts of SEATO and CENTO, Islamabad's bureaucracy was attracted to the financial and other resources provided by Washington. The military establishment has developed a strong bias in favour of America as a source of weapons acquisitions. Politically, the dependence of the military on the US to gain legitimacy is a bureaucratic-organisational imperative. The support and acknowledgement rendered by the US to military regimes provides for a strong bonding between the two countries. In the post 9/11 geo-political context, the bond between the US and Pakistan's military regime is noticeable as was the linkage between the Reagan administration and General Ziaul Haq's military regime during the 1980s.

It is no accident that the US-Pakistan relations have been friendlier during military rule in Pakistan. While military rulers in Pakistan, in the absence of domestic popular legitimacy, find it convenient to seek legitimacy and support from outside, the resultant alignment has a price as well. Providing basing facilities and other military assistance to one super power, the US, is one such consequence. The basing facility the Pakistan provided to the US during the 1960s as part of the formal military alignment had made the country vulnerable to attack. The Soviet Union had threatened Islamabad of dire consequences after the American spy plane that had taken off from the base near Peshawar, Pakistan, on a spy mission over Soviet territory was shot down. The strategy of taking a risk for the partner was, nonetheless, continued by other military regimes as well. General Ziaul Haq, the military dictator during the 1980s, was not only involved in fighting Washington's war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan but had taken risks that had grave consequences for the nation. Drug trafficking, proliferation of small arms and light weapons and Talibaanisation of the society are some of the disastrous consequences of the policy that General Zia had pursued to assist the US. The setting up of *madrissahs* (religious schools) for training militants who could fight in Afghanistan against the Soviet forces was a part of General Zia's military plans. His military operation in Afghanistan was financed by the US and partly by the drug money. The overall policy resulted in bringing greater violence to Pakistan's society in terms of an increase in sectarian and ethnic violence. Another consequence was the general increase in religious extremism and xenophobia, a problem that the regime of the present military ruler is trying to grapple with.

The military regime of President Pervez Musharraf has been forced by the US to 'clean-up' the country of religious zealots turned militants. The problem, however, is that this battle being fought in the name of 'war against terrorism' would lead to further fragmentation of Pakistani society. Because of the Bush administration's dependence on an individual, Pervez Musharraf, and his small coterie of advisors, the option adopted jointly by Washington and Islamabad is to use military rather than political means to fight militancy in and around Pakistan. The military operations conducted in the North West Frontier province has started a domestic battle that would have deep consequences for Pakistan more than for the US or any other external force. The issue for the US is not about curbing militancy, but about its short-term objectives. This will produce major long-term costs for its South Asian ally. It needs to be recalled that the US left the region after it achieved short-term objective of forcing the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan without any demobilisation or disarmament programme. The Afghan militants and religious extremists who were left to their own devices along with Pakistan's military intelligence agencies tried to mould the strategic environment to their advantage. It took 9/11 for the US to realise its blunder. However, the problem is far too complex to be dealt with through military means alone.

Impact of Militarisation

Military commanders find it less problematic to use military means because they have used it since the birth of Pakistan in 1947. Military security has been the underlying logic and justification for all aspects of national security. The basic framework of national security is linear and very limited. In this approach, the causes of domestic insecurity or issues of internal security are seen as an extension of the external threat.

This worldview has had a direct impact on the psychological growth of the Pakistani nation. In Pakistan, the armed forces are popular because of the weakness of other institutions, the projection of armed forces in a positive light, and the propaganda of the state. In the case of propaganda, it is a matter of no surprise for Pakistanis to be attracted to military service when images of war and war machines are exhibited in public spaces. There are models of ballistic missiles, tanks and aircraft in every city. The campaign for strengthening the image of the military penetrates deeper. It is directed at influencing the mind of the people and is carried out more systematically through school textbooks. A fact disclosed in an independent report by the

Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad is the manner in which the minds of children at the primary and secondary levels of education are influenced through negative images of the adversary. In this case, adversary obviously refers to India. Such propaganda breeds negative attitudes and hostility towards Pakistan's neighbour as an ideological strand. It is also both the cause and effect of enduring militarisation.

Images & Inter-State Relations

Central to India-Pakistan bilateral relations with India is the negative image that the establishments and, in some cases, people have of each other. In the case of the latter, the predominant image of India in Pakistan is that of a hostile nation and of being the primary threat to Pakistan's security. The policy-making elite of the country tends to define the threat to national security mainly in terms of the peril from New Delhi. India's hegemonic policies and attitude is considered to be the most imposing danger to Pakistan's survival. In fact, the greatest concern is the survival of the state. Over the past fifty years and more, the dominant school of thought that has influenced policy-making believes that the Indian leadership has never been comfortable with an independent homeland for the Muslims and would not lose any opportunity to destroy or invade Pakistan. Policymakers are equally uncomfortable with India's urge to gain regional or global prominence. Any reference to India acquiring a prominent role, especially due to comparatively greater military capacity, is seen as a potential threat and as inherently antithetical to Pakistan's security interests. A popular belief amongst the elites is that any increase in India's military capacity would eventually be used to dominate other smaller South Asian states, a situation that would be totally unacceptable. There is little room for New Delhi's aspirations for becoming a significant force in Asia. Hence, restoring peace between the two neighbours is viewed as a responsibility that must be shared squarely by New Delhi. There are those who also believe that internal political developments in Pakistan such as correcting the imbalance in civil-military relations depend on the restoration of peace in the region which, in turn, depends on India. Such perceptions have remained constant since the country's independence. Moreover, the feeling of insecurity emanating from India was the hallmark of all regimes irrespective of whether these were military, military dominated or civilian. The absence of other opinions is

due to the internal dynamics of policy-making in the country, an issue that will be discussed in some detail below.

Notwithstanding the fact that public opinion does not necessarily have an impact on policies in both India and Pakistan, image formation is essential for framing state policies, thus, making images cardinal to the national security discourse. Pakistan's image of India is rather limited and bleak. Despite the shared cultures, the dominant image of India is that of a hostile country. The limited people-to-people contact, in fact, has not allowed people on both sides of the divide to develop better understanding of each other or of the richness of their cultures. In such a situation it is natural for people in Pakistan not to appreciate the variations in Indian culture or politics. In addition, the years of negative indoctrination makes it even harder to acknowledge the cultural variations. In some regions, the anti-India sentiment seems to be less due to the difference in political perceptions. For instance, a number of people interviewed in the provinces of Sindh or Baluchistan did not attach a similar significance to the Indian threat as those interviewed in Punjab or parts of the Frontier province. However, there is a consensus amongst people regarding India's image as a hostile neighbour. The image tends to sharpen particularly in Punjab and near the seat of power of Pakistan's establishment. India's hegemonic designs in South Asia and its bid to dominate the region diplomatically and politically is an issue entirely unacceptable and constantly referred to by the political and military elite of the country. The media, particularly the state electronic media and the Urdu language print media, plays a crucial role in furthering the negative image of the adversary. This image seems to have strengthened after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US. The Indian government's propaganda for Pakistan's categorisation as a terrorist state that should be punished, especially after the attack on the US, was seen as the Indian leadership's bid to destabilise Pakistan. Furthermore, New Delhi's effort to offer its services to Washington as an ally in a war against terrorism, that in India's view, would have to target Pakistan as well appeared an effort to destroy Pakistan. In fact, the post-September 11 developments seem to have converted more people to the idea of India's aggressive military-political designs. Such images contribute towards not only keeping conflict alive, but also sensitising the common people in a particularly negative manner. The picture of dancing crowds seen during the nuclear tests in 1998 on both sides of the divide is a case in point.

Conflict and Intra-State Relations

The constant reference to war and conflict has had an impact on intra-state relations as well. This effect is not really about how people living in various parts of the country view each other. It is about the relations between the establishment and the federating units which later influence relations between these units negatively. This specific problem refers to the overbearing influence on Pakistani politics of the largest province of Punjab due to greater representation it has had in the military and the civil bureaucracy. A fair amount of resentment towards Punjab has developed in the other three smaller provinces mainly because they see the largest province dominating policy-making and sharing of resources. Punjab has the greatest share in the Pakistani bureaucracy and the military budget. Most of the development work is concentrated in Punjab Province. The entire defence industry and military establishment are stationed in Punjab.

Intra-state relations tend to become even more problematic when the army is Praetorian in character. An absolutist defence establishment tends to antagonise people in the political and civil society. A glance at the country's 57-year history shows that the military has used arms and terror against its own people twice. The atrocities of the military against the civilian population of East Pakistanis that finally resulted in the break up of the country in 1971, followed by the military operation in the mid-1970s against the Baluchis are two such examples. Smaller operations in Sindh took place during the 1980s when people were killed and met brutal treatment as part of the enforcement of martial law during this period. These operations have contributed greatly in fuelling resentment in the smaller provinces against Punjab. The Army is again poised to launch an operation in Baluchistan in the name of protecting key national interests. There are other factors and interests as well, such as the politics of local tribal chiefs. However, the dominance of the military over policy-making has not allowed for political options. It is this closed environment of the Punjabi domination that has bred resentment among smaller and less powerful federating units.

Conclusion

Fifty-seven years of Pakistan's history bears witness to the gradual and systematic militarisation of society. The military's control of politics is linked to multiple roles that it has acquired since the very inception of Pakistan as a nation-state. Like in India, Pakistan spends a major proportion of its central

government expenditure on defence. In fact, it spends more on military security as a percentage of GDP than India. However, the fact is that the numbers portray the peculiar priorities of the state. The domination of the policy-making process by the establishment, especially the military, has resulted in linear thinking that does not accommodate broader issues of development, national economic growth or the strengthening of institutions of governance. The position of dominance acquired by the military establishment over policy-making has led the country to adopt a tunnel-vision in which the military solution remains the key approach to solving disputes. Conflicts have been used to strengthen the military's control over the country.

It is the positive image of the armed forces, linked to its ability to challenge India and sort out political problems at home that has allowed it to muster political strength. This political strength has proved crucial in allowing the armed forces to dominate all sectors of social life and economic activity in the country. Today, Pakistan's military is not only a 'political party,' but it is also the country's top entrepreneur. The military controls about 23 percent of the private sector's net assets and has an almost absolute control over governance. This is considered by armed forces personnel as a right that they have earned due to better discipline and organisational skills. Armed forces personnel consider themselves superior to the civilian population. Meanwhile, the military has also systematically worked towards weakening all institutions of civil society. The use of intelligence agencies to destabilise civilian governments, the role played in creating new parties, or even influencing of the judiciary is not a secret. These direct interventions in the political and judicial processes have allowed the armed forces to stay in power.

The combination of sustained power and influence and positive image building has had its impact in consolidating the army hold over Pakistan's society and politics as well as institutions. The prolonged influence of the military has changed the face of country's politics, militarised the society and intensified inter-state and intra-state conflict. The conflict with India over Kashmir supports the role of the military and enables it to stay in control of the reigns of government. In terms of this logic, it is difficult to see a major shift in policy that would reduce the tension with India.

It is not domestic factors only that have propelled the military to power or strengthened its position vis-à-vis other institutions. The support rendered by the US has provided both strength and legitimacy to military regimes. In

fact, military commanders tend to look outwards to the US and not to the people at home for moral strength. Is the friendship and cooperation between the US, especially of Republican governments, and military regimes in Pakistan, a mere coincidence? Although Washington is considered as having a considerable influence in Pakistan's domestic politics with political governments equally keen to have good relations with the US, nothing matches the cordiality between the two states under a military regime in Pakistan. This is mainly due to the fact that military governments in Pakistan have found it convenient to follow American policy agenda to ensure Washington's political support. Indeed, in Pakistan, preoccupation with war and conflict has not only militarised the society, but also strengthened forces in the society that benefit from conflict and militarisation.

NOTES:

- 1 Saadet Deger and Somnath Sen, "Military Security and the Economy: Defense Expenditure in India and Pakistan," in *The Economics of Defense Spending. An International Survey*, eds. Keith Hartly and Todd Sandler (London, Routledge, 1990), 198-219.
- 2 Omar Noman, *Pakistan: Political and Economic History Since 1947* (New York: Kegan Paul, 1988), 84.
- 3 Note the meaning of the different terms. Fauji: Soldier; Shaheen: Eagle (an emblem used by the PAF); Bahria: Navy
- 4 Interview, (no date).
- 5 Jane's Defence Weekly, vol. 10, no. 2, (16 July 1988): 70.
- 6 Mahbub ul Haq, *Human Development in South Asia, 1997* (Islamabad: Oxford, 1997).
- 7 Ibid., 18.
- 8 Dailytimes, 29 March 2004.
- 9 This relates to a custom where a woman is sacrificed in return for a wrong committed by a male member of her family against the women of another family. The local assembly agrees to surrender a woman as a sacrificial object.
- 10 The assumption in this instance is that a women would take her share of property to another household she is married into. According to the feudal tradition this would minimise the influence of one family against another.
- 11 Abbas Hassan, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004).
- 12 K. M. Ariff, "Military Balance and National Security," *Defence Journal* vol.15, no.7 (Karachi: July 1989).

- 13 Devin T. Hagarty, "India's Regional Security Doctrine," *Asian Survey*, vol. 31, no:4 (April 1991): 359-361.
- 14 Such an idea was pursued especially under the Musharraf regime. The concept that the problem between the two countries was ideological rather than territorial was vehemently presented by the military.
- 15 This is based on a discussion with an Indian academic, Varun Sahni (New Delhi: February 2004).
- 16 Interview with Hafeez Pirzada, (Islamabad, 01 May 2004).
- 17 Interview with Dr. Mohammad Waseem, (Islamabad, 09 August 2004).
- 18 Stephen P. Covey, *The Pakistan Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
- 19 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, *Pakistan's Defense Policy, 1947-57* (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), 77-79.
- 20 Stephen Cohen, (1984):105.
- 21 Interview with the former Army Chief, General (Retd) Gull Hassan Khan. Rawalpindi: 07 November 1993.
- 22 Golam W. Choudhury, *Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule* (England: Scorpion Publishing Ltd, 1988):162-164.
- 23 Ibid., 153.
- 24 Interview with the former army chief General (Retd) Gul Hassan Khan. 07 November 1993.
- 25 Interview, 29 September 1997.
- 26 Interview with former Chairman Public Accounts Committee, Sardarazada Mohammad Shah, 31 September 1997.
- 27 Interview, February 2004.
- 28 Samina Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Cautious Foreign Policy," in *Survival* (IISS, Summer 1994): 121-126.
- 29 In early 1965, Pakistan Army launched a military operation in the marshy lands of Sir Creek. This is an area that borders on the Indian province of Gujrat and leads into the Indian Ocean. The boundary remains un-demarcated. The operation had aimed at dislodging Indian troops stationed there. The operation was a success. This was followed by Operation Gibraltar in which the Pakistan Army landed paratroops in the Indian-held-Kashmir. The idea was to land troops behind enemy lines that would then get support from within the valley by the local population. The operation not only failed but it resulted in the war in 1965.
- 30 Robert E. Harkavy, *Bases Abroad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 178.
- 31 Louis Dupree, "Pakistan and the Afghan Problem," in *Pakistan: Authoritarianism in the 1980s*, eds. Craig Baxter and Syed Raza Wast, 59 (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991).
- 32 Alexander Cockburn, and Jeffrey ST. Clair, *Whiteout* (London, 1988): 255-272.
- 33 A.H. Nayyar and Ahmed Salim, eds., *The Subtle Subversion. The State of Textbooks in Pakistan* (Islamabad: SDPI, 2004).
- 34 Air Marshal Zulfikar Ali Khan, *Pakistan's Security: The Challenge and the Response* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), 8-9.

- 35 This was certainly the view presented by Pakistan's former foreign secretary, Shehryar Khan during a conference in Birmingham, 7-8 April 2003.
- 36 These comments were made by a former diplomat and member of the Pakistan Muslim League, Mr. Akram Zaki in a recently held seminar on democracy in Pakistan. (Islamabad: 12 December 2002).
- 37 Interviews with academics and political activists.
- 38 Discussion with various political leaders from Sindh and Baluchistan. Most spoke about the need for a national army.
- 39 The Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002).

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Militarisation in the Context of Protracted Civil War

SRI LANKA

Ethnic Conflict, Post-Colonial Nation Building and Militarisation

Farzana Haniffa

Introduction

Sri Lanka is emerging from twenty years of protracted ethno-political civil war. At the heart of this conflict has been the campaign carried out by militant Tamil nationalist forces for the creation of a separate ethnic state in the island's Northern and Eastern provinces. This secessionist insurgency, which began in 1983, is the culmination of the politics of Sri Lanka's minority Tamil nationalism, which in the immediate post-independence years campaigned for a federalist framework of power sharing. The simmering Sinhalese majoritarianism that prevailed after independence and indeed defined the policies of the state repeatedly failed to accommodate Tamil minority demands for linguistic equality as well as regional power sharing. The growing tension between Sinhalese and Tamil nationalisms eventually flared into sporadic events of post-colonial violence in 1956, 1958, and 1977-1981. The conflict came to a decisive head at the anti-Tamil pogrom of July 1983 that was partly orchestrated by members of the then ruling party, United National Party (UNP). During these July 1983 communal 'riots,' there were massive organized attacks on Tamil lives and property by gangs that were mobilized by Sinhalese nationalist elements throughout the country. The regime complicity with this anti-Tamil violence was so transparent that it also marked the total breakdown of the Tamil people's trust in the Sri Lankan state and its ruling

elite. After July 1983, support for fledgling Tamil militancy increased among the Sri Lankan Tamils as well as internationally, and a war between the Sri Lankan state and the Tamil rebels started in earnest.

After two decades of an intense internal war between the armed forces of the State and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and several failed attempts at peace negotiations between 1987 and 1995, Sri Lanka entered a new phase of negotiations for settling the conflict in December 2001. Since February 2002, there has been a Norwegian monitored ceasefire that has held so far, despite continuous violations of some of its terms, the majority of which are attributed to the LTTE. It has survived continuous human rights violations in the form of child recruitment, and assassinations of opponents by the LTTE, incidents of ethnic violence in the multi-ethnic and volatile Eastern region, the reemergence of factionalism within the LTTE and a highly unstable political configuration in the South that resulted in a regime change in April 2004.

Important among reasons that are cited to explain why the present peace process began in December 2001 is the military – strategic parity that emerged between the LTTE rebels and the Sri Lankan state resulting in a stalemate on the ground in which neither party could move forward in terms of military advantage. The Norwegian brokered Cease-fire agreement (CFA), or the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed in February 2002, signifies the emergence of Sri Lanka from a protracted period of civil war in to prolonged phase of peacemaking. However, during the present phase of ‘peace’ too, the state as well as the LTTE have continued to engage in an ‘arms race’ in order to safeguard and entrench the military parity. Paradoxically, this condition of military-strategic parity is based on the logic of each party’s capacity for potential violence which is a key characteristic of the stalemate that brought about the ceasefire in the first place.

In this chapter I discuss militarisation as a process that normalises the use of coercive structures and practices in all forms of social interaction and institutions. I consider it an ideology that values the management of society and the resolution of conflict through hierarchical and masculinised practices that privilege confrontation rather than discussion, accommodation or negotiation. Militarisation, while not reducible to military rule, is a significant consequence of a state and a polity’s investment in war, and is especially pertinent to an understanding of

contemporary Sri Lanka. Militarisation is an ideology that privileges coercion, glorifies military power in the name of state security, institutionalises methods of overlooking the due process of law, and criminalises dissent in the interest of national security. I will also discuss the manner in which nationalism and militarisation have brought about and sustained a protracted war between the Sinhala state and Tamil insurgents with dire consequences that endangered the well-being of the citizens and heightened their insecurity.

Sri Lanka in the 1960s and 1970s was considered emblematic of a successful post-colonial polity. Several commentators attributed Sri Lanka's exemplary social welfare policies and high social indicators in those times to its lack of militarisation in the early post colonial period. Until the 1970s, the Sri Lankan military was small in numbers and served a largely ceremonial function. While cause and effect connection may no longer be clear – Rajasingham has argued that militarisation and the conflict helped sustain economic growth – the escalation of the armed conflict has seen a concomitant deterioration in health, nutrition and education indicators. During the war of two decades, most part of the Northern and Eastern provinces where the military conflict was concentrated, the civilian life has been reduced to one characterised by all dimensions of a war-torn society. The repeated destruction of economic and social infrastructure, mass displacement of the populations, devastation of communities and their economic and social foundations were most common social and human cost of the war in these two provinces.

The war has also made deep inroads into the welfare foundations of Sri Lankan society, undermining its commendable gains in terms of human development. While at one time Sri Lanka boasted one of the highest literacy rates in the region – second only to Singapore and Japan – today it is ranked 21st. Between 1998-2002, State sector investment in education has been below 3 percent even though World Bank standards call for at least 5 percent expenditure on education. Health expenditure has not reached 2 percent. Armed services spending in 2000 was 40 percent of total government expenditure. There are high levels of malnutrition among children and pregnant women, problems with communicable diseases such as malaria and dengue, high instances of non-communicable diseases such as heart ailments and diabetes. Preventive health services are inadequate

and curative services are under resourced. This indeed is in addition to the utter devastation of civilian life in the two war-torn provinces.

Although the conflict and the related investment in militarisation did not show significant impact on the economy until quite recently, it seems clear that the escalation of the war saw a de-linking with social welfare expenditure. The current emphasis on accelerated growth, conquest of markets, and the forward march of the economy speaks to the manner in which the logic of global capital seems to fit so well within a country only just emerging from war. Rajasingham-Senenayake argues that economic growth has been quiet in keeping with militarisation as well, and that the continuation of war has in fact been in the interest of the multiple underground economies of the war zones. Uyangoda has made the connection between the shrinking state as dictated by the Brettonwoods Institutions in the pursuit of economic growth, the lack of accountability of the part of the state to its citizens, and the consequent heightened insecurity of the lives of most South Asian citizens. This insecurity is compounded, Uyangoda argues, by the manner in which South Asian states have become increasingly preoccupied with questions of national security.

Given the past decades of protracted conflict and the highly militaristic détente today, militarisation – the investment in the accoutrements of war – and the prevalence of militarism – the ideology that supports confrontation as the preferred mode of action – comes as no surprise. Today militarisation and militarism are an essential part of the national imagination in Sri Lanka, in both the North and the South. A whole generation enters maturity never knowing a time without war. The ceasefire, the peace process, the anticipation of a solution, and the forward march of the economy are all conducted within the logic of militarism and confrontational power.

The History of the Military

In Colonial Sri Lanka, there was no regular large armed force except for the Ceylon Defence Force consisting of regulars from the British Army stationed for service in Ceylon (as Sri Lanka was then known), together with a local volunteer force which was trained and called upon for duty when necessary. The colonial army was called to serve in a show of force by the British Government during the anti-British rebellions of 1818, 1848,

and after the declaration of martial law during the Sinhala-Muslim riots of 1915.

The post-independence military was established by the Army Act No. 17 of 1949, passed on 11 April 1949. Its first operational role was in 1952 when it was deployed in the north of Sri Lanka to prevent the influx of 'illicit' immigrants from India. It was also called upon to control the *hartal* (mass protest) of 1953 organized by the Left parties against the then government's lifting of the rice subsidy and the agitation in Gal Oya following the passing of the Sinhala Only Bill of 1956. The emergency of 1958 that was declared in response to Sinhala-Tamil communal clashes saw a high level of activity for the fledgling military. Troops were airlifted to Jaffna, Trincomalee and Amparai. Army units were mobilised in Maradana, Wellawatte and some Colombo suburbs. Members of the Army's Sinha regiment were sent to the coastal town Batticaloa in the Eastern province and there was a call for volunteers to sign up for active service. This was also the first and to date the only time in post-colonial Sri Lanka, where army officers were gazetted as coordinating officers of provinces superseding government agents.

Sri Lanka's armed forces have mostly been under effective civilian control. The only exception to this general pattern is the two instances of aborted military coup in 1962 and 1966. In 1962, less than two decades of independence, high-ranking military officials staged a coup against the then government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). According to Rajasingham-Senanayake, this coup was staged against (among other things) the politicisation and the incipient Sinhalese-Buddhist ethnicisation of the army in the post-colonial era. The second coup attempt was in 1966 and some Sinhalese-Buddhist officers in the army were involved in organising it. After the 1962 failed coup attempt, the army was given a particularly Sinhala ethnic character. Subsequently, after the failed youth insurgency of 1971, led by the *Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna* (JVP- People's Liberation Front) there were immediate attempts at rapidly modernising the armed forces. As De Mel has pointed out, the Sinhalising of the military was further entrenched through the creation of regiments under the names of Sinha (1956), Wijayabahu (1980), Gajaba (1983) and Gamunu Watch (1962). The names are all extremely evocative of ancient Sinhala history as chronicled in the *Mahavamsa*, a 6th century

Buddhist temple chronicle that is considered the definitive, rational, documented history of the Sinhalese.

The scale of the violence which the military faced during the initial phase of the Tamil separatist insurgency was different from any that it had previously encountered. The demand for militarisation urged at this juncture surpassed any that the Sri Lankan army had hitherto experienced. The first military casualties of the northern insurrection occurred on 15 October 1981 where two army officers were killed in the town of Jaffna. The northern insurgency escalated in the aftermath of July 1983 with the insurgents adopting methods of indiscriminate civilian massacres as acceptable to the furtherance of their struggle. This period also witnessed the emergence of the highly militaristic LTTE as the dominant Tamil guerrilla group. The LTTE consolidated its military supremacy over all other Tamil militant groups and began to expand itself after the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) left the Northern and Eastern provinces in early 1990. The brief period of peace talks with the government of President Premadasa in 1989-1990 and the unofficial cessation of hostilities during this period further enabled the LTTE to consolidate and expand its military organisation and capabilities. During this time, the Sri Lankan military too saw an increase in terms of equipment and personnel. In 1978 the annual expenditure on defence was only 1.5 percent of the gross national product (GNP) at Rs. 40 million. By 1985, expenditure on armed forces had risen to Rs. 215 million, or 3.5 percent of the GNP. In 2000 armed services spending stood at 5.3 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 40 percent of total government expenditure.

In the history of militarisation of Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan military's two engagements with the Marxist youth movement of the JVP in 1971 and 1998-90 were crucial. The first JVP insurrection took place in 1971 and was crushed by the military within a few weeks. The JVP's main offensive strategy in April 1971 was to attack police stations, and not military installations. A combined counter-insurgency operation involving the red forces and the police was able to suppress the rebellion by June the same year. During this time Sri Lanka received assistance from China, India, and Russia in the form of troops and military hardware. With the April 1971 insurgency, Sri Lanka also began to have, for the first time, over 18,000 'political prisoners' the vast majority of them young men. The 1971 insurgency was also the first occasion after independence where the state

was accused of large-scale human rights violations that included arbitrary and extra-judicial killing of suspected JVP rebels, detention without trial, burial of dead bodies without judicial inquiry, the abuse of emergency powers, and the suspension of civil and political rights.

The second JVP insurrection in 1987-1989 was larger in scale, duration, and intensity and was emblematic in its brutality. This insurrection was primarily instigated in opposition to the Indian-brokered Peace Accord of 1987 that sought to resolve Sri Lanka's civil war by offering a package of regional autonomy to the Tamils. The direct Indian involvement in Sri Lanka's conflict, particularly because of the fact that the Accord enabled the Indian armed forces to intervene in Sri Lanka, generated much anger among Sinhalese nationalist forces. The Indian political and diplomatic pressure on the then UNP government brought about the 13th amendment to the Constitution establishing provincial councils for regional administration. Part of the package agreed on in the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987 consisted of the arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces to hold the Tamil guerrilla groups, particularly the LTTE, in check and force them to go along with the inter-governmental peace deal. The JVP viewed this move as a sell out and took on the state in a violent confrontation that led to a three-year long bloody civil war. The JVP instigated killings and disappearances of government officials, sympathizers of the state and their families. Those that went against their *hartal* or strike proclamations were often gunned down as exemplary punishment. The government too adopted severe counterterrorist measures. Sections of the military were involved in 'illegitimate' or 'illegal' forms of violence that included the maintaining of torture houses, kidnapping and summary executions. During that time disappearances were commonplace as was the visible killing of civilians. Residents of certain Southern towns still speak of the manner in which the military indiscriminately arrested those that had first names that were similar to suspected JVP activists, who disappeared later. The Presidential Commissions on Disappearances that were appointed by the subsequent People's Alliance government of 1994 documents the manner in which the impunity evident everywhere was supported and manipulated by politicians in power. The violence unleashed by the state organs clearly and visibly exceeded their limits of legitimacy during this time. Jani de Silva working on issues of masculinity has argued that the clash between the

army and the JVP in the south was a confrontation between two different kinds of Sinhala nationalist imaginations, and speaks to the fact that the cleavages in Sri Lankan society cannot be understood merely in terms of ethnicity. The silent sanctioning of state action against the JVP that the middle class in the country engaged in is a troubling instance of the collusion between class and state violence and the class-based support for militarisation is an area that is under researched in the country.

According to Rajasingham-Senenayake the dirty war tactics that the military adopted in the South were continued in the northern arena. The case of Kryshanthi Kumaraswami, a 19 year old Advanced Level (grade 12) student who was raped and murdered by soldiers at a checkpoint in Jaffna, and the revelation of mass graves at Chemmani and at the Duraiyappa stadium by the soldiers who were accused of the rape are the most famous instances of military excess.

Rajasingham-Senenayake has argued that the deterioration of civil military relations in the country and the emergence of dirty war tactics have firstly to do with the failure of the ruling elite to institute democratic political institutions, and the manner in which corrupt politics entered the annals of the military. While this may very well be the case, Rajasingham's analysis does not contain a critique of militarism or of militarisation as an ideology, but instead critiques politicisation of the military as causal in its deterioration. I want to suggest that the legitimacy of military logic itself that has gained such wide social acceptance needs to be questioned in any attempt to introduce an ethical element to the discussion of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. It is not merely illegitimate politics that brought about the Sri Lankan crisis but the coupling of bad politics with the readily available logic of violence, conquest and hierarchy, and the consequent brutalisation of society that militarism offers. Militarism bolstered by the logic of state security in consonance with financial gain and ethnic polarization overcame the need for human security. Rajasingham therefore does not see the corruption and lack of discipline within politics as perhaps finding a suitable partner in progress with the confrontational, arms-first logic of militarisation itself. Further, the abuses of the military could also be seen as an inevitability of militarism, the "real politick" of military practice on the ground. It must be noted however that even in a context of multiple insurgencies and a protracted secessionist war, the armed forces have continued to be under effective civilian control. Unlike in many other

locales in the global south there was never a threat of military take over and rule in Sri Lanka during the past twenty years of heightened militarisation. Further the incidents of military excess, the reported rates of rape for instance are relatively fewer than other contemporary conflicts.

Nationalism and Militarisation

The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the most virulently jingoistic Sinhala nationalism under the United National Party (UNP) regime. The Dutugemunu Elara story of the *Mahavamsa* was the principle trope through which the ethnic conflict found its justification amongst the Sinhalese during this time. *Mahavamsa*, written in the 6th century as a chronicle of the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, is the modular text of contemporary Sinhalese nationalist historiography that makes the claim that the island of Sri Lanka exclusively belongs to the Sinhalese-Buddhist 'nation.' Dutugemunu is the paradigmatic 'national' hero in the Sinhalese nationalist imagination of the past. In the *Mahavamsa* story Dutugemunu, a Southern Prince, makes an epic journey from the deep South to the North of the country to defeat the northern "Tamil" enemy King Elara in order to unify the country. In many versions of the story Buddhist monks travel at the head of the king's retinue leading the army to the North. Interestingly, history books state that Elara was a pious and just king – he was simply not a Sinhala Buddhist. This story that every Sinhala educated child is aware of, captures the extent to which a particular Sinhala Buddhist militarism – that celebrated armed confrontation in the name of the nation and of religion – was naturalised in relation to the country's ethnic conflict. The identification of the Sinhala nation with the Buddhist history chronicled in the *Mahavamsa* saw its apogee in President J. R. Jayewardene during his rule in 1977-1988. Jayewardene, who became an all powerful President in 1978 after a constitutional change, claimed to be one ruler in a long unbroken line of Sinhalese kings extending to Vijaya, its mythic founder, in the 6th century B.C. This line included many warrior heroes, like Dutugemunu, who had fought a host of 'invaders' from neighbouring India (all generally glossed as Tamil) to unify the Sinhalese land. Jayewardene's invocation of the legacy of ancient kings who unified the Sinhalese polity occurred in a backdrop of escalating war between the state and Tamil nationalist rebels whose insurgency was

directed at creating a separate Tamil state in the Northern and Eastern regions of Sri Lanka.

Later, some Sinhalese politicians who continued the war with Tamil secessionist insurgency began to replace the Dutugemunu-Elara episode with other heroic epics of the pre-colonial Sri Lankan history. For instance, when the state armed forces wrested control of the Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE in early 1996, Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte who led that particular military campaign, saw himself as the modern re-incarnation of Prince Sapumal of the 16th Century. According to Sinhalese historical chronicles, Prince Sapumal led an army from the South to march to the North that was under a Tamil regional king and conquered the Jaffna kingdom in battle on behalf of the Sinhalese king. In fact, when Ratwatte returned to Colombo after the conquest of Jaffna from the LTTE, the then President Chandrika Kumaratunga welcomed him in a state function that had been organised almost like a medieval martial ceremony and promoted him to the rank of a General!

The identification of the counter-insurgency war with past military glories of Sinhalese nationalism is also meant to ensure young men's participation in a war through a highly ethicised nationalist symbolism. For instance in 1998, army recruitment drives made a reference to the foundational myth of Sinhaleanness — the story of the arrival of Prince Vijaya from Eastern India in the 6th century B.C. Briefly, Vijaya was the progeny of Sinhabahu and Sinha Sivali, the children of a Lion. Therefore Sinhaleanness has long associated itself with the symbol of Lion. The *Sinha Patau* or 'Lion Cubs' was the slogan used in the army's recruitment drive of 1998. The army's close involvement with the nation-state, imagined essentially as a Sinhalese ethnic state, was palpable almost from its inception. Given also that many of its regiments created subsequently had clear Sinhala names, made the army and militarisation within the country very much in keeping with the continued Sinhalisation processes as well. During the riots of July 1983, the army was considered culpable in that there were many reports of where soldiers present at the scene did nothing to stop the burning and looting of Tamil shops and residences and sometimes the killing of Tamil persons.

Criminalising Minority Dissent

Sri Lanka's transition to self-rule was marred by incipient majoritarianism. In 1929, the Donoughmore Commission appointed by the Colonial Government arrived in Ceylon to investigate possibilities for constitutional change and the transfer of power. Regardless of several communities agitating for it, communal representation was rejected by the Commission on the grounds that "communal representation in Ceylon has no great antiquity to commend it and its introduction into the constitution with good intentions has had unfortunate results." It further stated that "...only by its abolition will it be possible for the diverse communities to develop together a true national unity..." The innocence of the statement is poignant today. The same commission legalised universal suffrage, (that too was not welcome by a majority of Ceylonese at that time) thereby simultaneously entrenching both representative "democracy" and majoritarianism in the country. Making Sinhala the only State language in 1956, and constitutionalising Buddhism as the state religion in the country's first autochthonous constitution of 1972, was the result of the coming together of representative democracy and majoritarianism, the consequences of which we still face today. The manner in which representative democracy makes imagining community a process of getting electoral success has meant that post colonial politics in Sri Lanka has taken on distinctly ethnic majoritarian lines. In the process, claims by minority communities with respect to language rights and access to state resources has either had to take the form of back door cronyism or violent dissent. Further, the criminalising of dissent other than through accomodationist means has meant that resorting to violence was inevitable.

Uyangoda has stated that the experience of modern nation-state formations across the world has shown that the emergence of diverse and multiple nationalist projects in multi-ethnic nation-states is a clear indication that the conventional single-nation building model has lost its historical validation. On the other hand, whenever state elites responded to these aspirations of regional movements by according them greater autonomy and recognition of their distinctiveness, the result was a strengthening and enriching of a pluralist sense of nationality. In Sri Lanka unfortunately, the single nation model was virulently pursued since independence with drastic consequences. For instance, from the change of government in 1977, there was an attempt to legislate against dissent.

In 1976, the Tamil United Liberation Front was the main Tamil political party in power. The Vaddukodai Resolution calling for a struggle for a separate state of Tamil Eelam was passed at its first national convention that year. The move was in consonance with the ideology of emerging militant Tamil youth movements. In response to the emergence of armed Tamil groups, the Jayewardene government instigated the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act. The Prevention of Terrorism Temporary Provisions Act no. 49 of 1979 reads in section (2)(1)(h):

(Any person who) by words either spoken or intended to be read or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise causes or intends to cause commission of acts of violence or religious, racial or communal disharmony or feelings of ill-will or hostility among different communities or racial or religious groups (shall be guilty of an offence under this act)

Further to the above, the 6th amendment to the constitution was presented in parliament on the 4th of August 1983. This was in the immediate aftermath of the anti Tamil pogrom of 1983 and speaks to the nature of the government's response to what amounted to the organized destruction of Tamil lives and property. The 6th amendment specifically states: "No person shall directly or indirectly, in or outside Sri Lanka, support, espouse, promote, finance, encourage or advocate the establishment of a separate State within the territory of Sri Lanka." Any person who contravened that provision became liable to the imposition of civic disability for up to seven years, the forfeiture of his/her movable and immovable property, the confiscation of the passport and loss of the right to engage in any trade or profession. In addition if that person was a Member of Parliament, s/he will lose the parliamentary seat. By refusing to take an oath of affirmation under this constitutional amendment, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) – that was the largest opposition party in parliament with more seats than even the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP, the second largest Sinhalese political party which had the majority in the previous parliament) – lost its right to participate in the democratic, electoral process. Thus, Tamil nationalist aspirations lost the main legitimate avenue for expression.

The introduction of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1979 together with the 6th amendment to the constitution criminalised discussions on Tamil Nationalism, legalised draconian arrest and detention

measures that contravened the standards of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and introduced the possibility of arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture in the name of national security. These measures criminalised dissent and gave way to many abuses by the security forces, thereby inculcating a culture of excessive use of force with impunity within the security establishment. These measures, together with the emergency regulations that were in place periodically for the past several years, impinged on the freedom of expression, freedom of the media and erased the option of legitimate political protest within the Tamil community.

The current peace process that began in December 2001 and the ceasefire agreement (CFA) between the government and the LTTE brought about some de-militarisation of the public space. A notable development is the dismantling of the security apparatus – check points and cordoned off areas – that spread throughout Colombo city and other towns. With the signing of the CFA, these visible manifestations of militarism that the civil war had made ‘normal’ disappeared almost over night. Then the travel restrictions between the northern war zones and the rest of the country were lifted, making travel and exchange of goods across the regions again possible. The necessity for passes for those travelling from towns close to the Forward Defence Line and the registration requirement for visiting Tamils was suspended under the CFA. Arrest and search operations under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) were also brought to a halt. Agreement was reached that prisoners will be allowed visits from members of their families within 30 days of the signing of the MOU. At this point a great majority of those detained under the PTA have been released. However, though emergency regulations have been lifted and no more arrests and detentions have been undertaken under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the governments in power made no moves to repeal the PTA or to amend the Public Security Ordinance to prevent a recurrence of such excesses. Within the prevailing logic of military parity that underpins the ceasefire agreement, it is unlikely that they will be lifted too quickly.

In the conflict that is depicted primarily as a Sinhala-Tamil problem, the Muslim community in Sri Lanka has become an irritant that refuses to go away. Because of their traitorous refusal, as the story goes, to be considered part of the Tamil speaking nation and due to Muslim collusion with security forces, the sizeable Muslim community of the Jaffna and

Vanni districts were forcibly evicted by the LTTE in October 1990. Further, in the current conflict, the Eastern Province, unlike the North, is not a Tamil majority area, and therefore it promises to be the most contentious. The presence of a substantial Muslim population, and a Sinhalese population bolstered by state colonisation schemes aimed at shifting demographics, have to be accommodated in any settlement. Within the majoritarian logic that is operating in the country, the Muslims currently consider themselves to be a majority in the Eastern Province and as such, entitled to the status that has long gone with that definition.

However, the manner in which the question of Muslims and the minority Sinhalese in the Eastern Province will be decided in any power sharing arrangement between the state and the LTTE is still to be worked out. Moreover, the permanent merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces as an essential pre-condition for a settlement as passionately demanded by the LTTE is not palatable to a majority of Muslims. Their fear is that unless their aspirations are ensured in an arrangement of regional autonomy, perhaps establishing a separate Muslim autonomous unit, the Muslim community will be reduced to a permanent and disempowered minority with no guarantees of representation and security. Even on this issue, there is little consensus among Muslim political actors when it comes to the details of a tripartite settlement involving Sinhalese-Tamil and Muslim communities, except that they all want a separate administrative area in the Eastern province with substantial autonomy.

While there is perhaps some acceptance of the need for such an arrangement at the level of the leaders of all stakeholder parties, at the popular level there is great resentment towards Muslim claims. The Tamil nationalists find it unforgivable that the Muslims have rejected a grand alliance between Tamil and Muslim communities along linguistic identity since both communities speak the Tamil language. However, the Tamil militant violence directed against the Muslim community during the war, that included massacre of civilians and ethnic-cleansing, there is no likelihood for such commonality of political goals between the two ethnic groups. Muslim nationalist mobilisation in Sri Lanka is now firmly grounded on the idea of a separate ethnic identity based on religion, culture and region. Meanwhile, any substantive power sharing arrangements for the Muslims would be seen by Tamils as an unfair gain

by the Muslims from their (Tamil) struggle. In this backdrop, there is a growing sentiment among the Muslims that the politics of power sharing in Sri Lanka is unfairly framed in terms of the armed struggle which the Sri Lankan Muslims have so far excluded as a strategy.

Many radical Muslim political activists complain that the Muslim community is currently being faulted both by Sinhala and Tamil nationalist elements for not taking up arms. Southern Muslim politicians who are constantly in an accommodationist relationship with Sinhalese-led governments claim that the Muslims remained loyal to the Sinhala state in that they never sought to take up arms against it. On the other hand, both Sinhalese and Tamil nationalists argue that Muslims stand to gain from the suffering and sacrifices of both the Tamils and the Sinhalas. This emerging discourse constitutes another dangerous celebration of militarisation within the country. It is not yet being realised that such a statement is an involuntary invocation that it is in fact violence or the threat of it that will finally win the day. In the backdrop of recurring volatile conditions in the Eastern province where there were several Muslim Tamil clashes after the ceasefire, there is a growing opinion in Sri Lanka that Muslims are becoming armed and likely to establish linkages with external Muslim radical movements.

Gender and Militarisation

In keeping with countless examples worldwide, in Sri Lanka too the trope of a valorised masculinity and a supportive femininity were evident in nationalist mobilisation of popular sentiment. During the course of the conflict, the militaristic logic of heroism was often used to bolster a state policy of confrontational violence. In these times the role of the mother was openly and frequently called upon to save the respective nations. The nationalist mother that produced brave sons for the military was a trope common to both the Sinhala and Tamil nationalist myth-making. Managuru cites Federal Party newspaper captions from the sixties that referred to Tamil women within the liberation struggle: "Tamil mothers of the past sent their sons to war against injustice; mothers of today have gathered their sons to wage a similar war."

De Alwis looks at the manner in which the figure of Vihara Maha Devi, the mother of the aforementioned Dutugemunu, was mobilised in the Sinhala South in favour of military conquest of the North. In Sinhalese

nationalist legend, Vihara Maha Devi is famous for encouraging her son to march with an army to the North and fight to unify the country in the face of her husband's 'cowardly' pacifism. She was featured in school texts as an example of authentic Sinhalese womanhood and motherhood. Then in Tamil nationalism too, the mother's protests against the discrimination of their children were highlighted and women were encouraged to join the struggle in a supportive capacity. What both writers allude to in these works and as de Alwis has explored elsewhere, is the manner in which motherhood also becomes mobilised within the context of militarisation as the safest and most compelling space of protest. The military engaged in a variety of excesses in the North as an occupying army and in the South as an extremely violent counter insurgency force. As many writers have pointed out with regards to Sri Lanka as well as other contexts, the kind of masculinity adopted by the military often sees women as either sex objects or as mothers and wives. It is the latter valorisation of the family that becomes most powerfully mobilised in mothers' protests against military excess. The trope of motherhood resonates most strongly against an institution that purports to protect families as part of its *raison d'être*.

During the repressive UNP regime of the late 1980s there was little or no political space to protest the government's excessive use of violence against anti-state elements in the South. During this time the Southern Mothers Front, an organisation of women who had lost their sons during the repression came together to register their protest. While the organisation was allied with party politics—representatives SLFP, a mainstream political party, for Matara and Hambantota districts founded the organisation — it was an important phenomenon and a register of the historical breakdown of due process mechanisms during that time. According to de Alwis, the most important development of the Mothers' Front was the manner in which they brought sorcery rituals into the public realm in protests against the country's President and undefined elements who conspired in the loss of their sons. Although the organisation was formed by the opposition and most of its activities were directly connected to party propaganda, the force of the mothers' engagement with ritualistic means of supplication was a shock even to the SLFP. De Alwis persuasively argues that it represented a mobilising of a variety of cultural registers to protest excesses that could not then be done in any other way. However, the call of the mother's front was unclear, and there were no direct invocations

of a return to democratic processes or a demand for accountability as a part of the process. It can only be seen as the creation of a space for protest where none was forthcoming from a repressive regime, and cannot be reduced to feminist pacifism.

During the conflict there also emerged gender roles that were a departure from the traditional. The most famous of these was the emergence of the female LTTE cadre exemplified by Dhanu the suicide bomber who was responsible for the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India. There has been a brief debate within Sri Lankan academic circles as to how one should view the emergence of the LTTE woman cadre in relation to traditionally defined roles for Tamil women. Radhika Coomaraswamy has critiqued any attempt at celebrating this militarised femininity as a positive step in the direction of women's emancipation by drawing attention to the fact that they represent a disavowal of the basic humanistic values that are and should be the foundation of any feminist claim for liberation. According to Coomaraswamy, not only are the women cadres a mere stop gap measure to address the lack of manpower within the organisation, the ethos that these cadres occupy, that values violence and celebrates a negative androgyny in the form of the armed virgin, has little to offer any model of liberation. In addition to the emergence of this controversial and demonised figure, feminists have also grappled with understanding the changing roles of women as a result of war related displacement. Rajasingham-Senanayake and more recently Zackariah and Shanmugaratnam have explored displacement and the consequent challenge to traditional gender roles and spatial determinants of gender. Both articles have proposed that the special arrangements and the institutional challenges that were faced by women affected by war were such that there has been a radical transformation in the way in which women of these communities relate to the world. For instance in the case of the forcibly evicted Muslim women in Puttlam, the proximity of the mosque to the houses of the displaced meant that the exchanges between the mosque committees were readily accessible to the women, and they could report directly to the committees without the necessity of male mediation. Such access was not possible in the strict demarcation of space according to gender in their places of origin. Further, the greater availability of work for women meant that women were often the

breadwinners, challenging yet another important traditional male preserve. Also the necessity to engage with a variety of actors both military and civilian, in order to proceed with day to day life in both cases changed women's relationships with society in general. However, it must be noted that valorising such change as a triumph for the women's movement and women's emancipation in general, loses sight of the larger goals of the quality of life and human dignity free from suffering, and the consequences to society from the militarisation that pervades everyday life that should also be cornerstones of any feminist claim to liberation. The loss faced by these women must be adequately mourned before any rejoicing (if at all) in their 'gains' can be made.

Militarisation and Children

The consequences of militarism for children and the lessons that such practices teach in terms of their own social relations require analysis. In Sri Lanka, the question becomes even more urgent given the large incidences of child recruitment by the LTTE. Child soldier recruitment of the LTTE is an issue that has been widely publicised and politicised to the detriment of those affected. During the PA government, the state set in motion an extensive international propaganda campaign that featured the LTTE's recruitment and training of children. As a result, the issue of child soldiers tends to eclipse all other relevant issues in any discussion of children and conflict in this country. For instance the effect of low social indicators, health and malnutrition issues, lack of educational facilities, school drop out rates and children's exposure to a celebration of violence have taken a back seat. 'Save the Children' in Sri Lanka attempted a campaign to highlight this fact some years ago but it was at the height of the PA government's strategy of war for peace and did not go down too well. Further incidents of lax recruitment practices by the Sri Lankan army, children recruited by other Tamil militias and reports of underage armed home guards have not received adequate press/media coverage.

The us War on Terror and the Sri Lankan Context

Today Sri Lanka is in the unique position of seeing the US war on terror transform the security situation in the country to a de-escalation of violence. Currently Sri Lanka-US relations are at their most cordial. The US policy in South Asia underwent some changes due to the nuclearisation of

India and Pakistan, the deteriorating relations between the two countries and the increasing importance of the war on terror. Today the US has a much greater interest in the region. The LTTE's unilateral cessation of hostilities in December 2001 was seen by many as influenced by US foreign policy in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attack on New York and Washington DC. Although LTTE leader Velupillai Pirabakaran is on record as looking for a political settlement to the conflict prior to 9/11, the global crackdown on terrorism has no doubt impacted on the need for such a solution. Potential US intervention is often touted by politicians as the safety net of the peace process. The former United National Front (UNF) government actively pursued a policy of international alliances, of which the US was a central part in their peace strategy. Former UNF Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe even stated on his return from the much publicised visit to the US that "the security net of International Cooperation will protect us."

The Bush administration showed an inordinate interest in the UNF government's peace bid, and the consequent internationalisation of the Sri Lankan Peace process bears witness to this engagement. For instance, the US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage visited Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the ceasefire agreement, and was present at the Donor Conference in Oslo in November 2002. He is the highest ranking US official to visit the country and his presence at the Donor Conference was seen as signifying heightened US interest in the Sri Lankan peace process. Armitage repeatedly stressed that the United States supported a negotiated settlement within the parameters of Sri Lanka's territorial integrity and was quoted as saying that his government would "forcefully push" for a peaceful settlement to the country's ethnic problem. From the early days of the conflict the US has maintained a consistent policy on the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. It has insisted that the Sri Lankan state come to a negotiated settlement with the LTTE and not go for a military solution. The maintenance of this policy within the context of the global war on terror is considered by some to be hypocritical and is resented by Sinhala nationalist forces that support the military defeat of the LTTE. It seems clear, however that the US military intervention in combating terrorism has been confined to those organisations and persons that are considered an immediate threat to the US interests. So far no linkages have been established between the LTTE and anti-US Islamic militants. Therefore the

US lack of interest in wiping out the LTTE by military means is not surprising. However, the US does consider a peaceful solution to the Sri Lankan crisis to be in its best interests as well. In the early days of the conflict the possibility that the rebels would establish a Marxist state was an issue. And today the LTTE's extensive linkages with other terrorist organisations makes it a major threat to the stability within the South Asian region. This could also be why the US support for the Sri Lankan peace process remains strong. The US has consistently criticised the LTTE's violations of the CEA and human rights abuses and urged the rebels to give up its commitment to arms.

The Sri Lankan state, more specifically the UNP has long anticipated the eventual US involvement in the conflict, or at least US assistance to the Sri Lankan military. President J.R. Jayewardene's 1980 visit to the US was undertaken with the hope of gaining US military support for the war in the north. Although the involvement anticipated by the UNP never materialised, currently there are significant military and diplomatic links between the two countries. For instance the US has recently increased defence collaboration with the Sri Lankan government. Under the Extended Relations Program (ERP) the Sri Lankan armed forces have received specialised military training by US Navy SEALs and the Green Berets, and the Police has received training in enhancing VIP security capabilities and counter narcotics operations. There have also been several arms deals. In June 2002, negotiations were conducted to sign an Acquisition and Cross Service Agreement (ACSA) between the two governments. By such an agreement, the US military air craft and air ships would be allowed to refuel and be serviced in the country and Sri Lanka will be able to receive increased military assistance in the form of training facilities and equipment. However, as Jayawardena has argued, US interest in the Sri Lankan context does not necessarily indicate an interest in armed intervention in the country.

The economic cronyism that the country is maintaining with the US (Sri Lanka was the only southern nation that supported the big players at the failed WTO talks in Cancun) and former Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe's controversial statement supporting Bush's war in Iraq are both indicative of the links that the UNP government seem to think are natural to Sri Lanka and the United States. US relations with Sri Lanka are at their most cordial in years. However, intellectuals in the country have

partly attributed the stalling of the peace process to the over-involvement of the international community and especially the US in the internal affairs of the country. (LTTE withdrawal from the donor conference in Tokyo was directly linked to the US refusing them visas to attend aid talks in Washington.) There is a sense also that powerful international actors, particularly the US and Japan, have an interest in influencing the peace agenda for Sri Lanka. Then, as Darini Rajasinham has pointed out, the global post conflict reconstruction industry's bureaucracy and lack of local accountability has also been a part of the problem in the internationalisation of the peace process. In spite of sustained international pressure on the LTTE to resume talks they have been steadfast in their refusal to do so prior to establishing mechanisms to improve the normalisation process in the North and East. The LTTE's strength in the face of international pressure is perhaps due to the LTTE's non-involvement within the global neo-liberal economic agenda as promoted by the donor nations as well as the multi-lateral agencies. As Uyangoda has discussed, the ultra nationalist LTTE does not tolerate such an internationalisation of their mostly homegrown agenda. Therefore, the consequences of the war on terror in Sri Lanka are still to be gauged.

Sri Lanka: The Evolving Processes

Arguably the biggest shock if not the most serious threat to the current peace process occurred when President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga (who was not of the ruling party) took over three ministries including the crucial portfolio of defence, from the UNF government on the 3rd of November 2003. Since then parliament was dissolved, general elections were held on April 2004. The UNF government was thoroughly defeated at the polls. Meanwhile, the LTTE is also facing internal dissent and split. Colonel Karuna, the LTTE's Military Commander in the Eastern province defected early 2004, with a large number of his cadres. Politically, he raised the issue of separate identity of the Eastern Tamils, thereby undermining the LTTE's claim to a unified Tamil nation, living in a region that should be viewed as a unified political unit, or a territorially united homeland. The initial fighting between the LTTE and its breakaway faction was brief and went almost uncommented upon due to the speed with which the main LTTE organisation brought the situation under its control. However, the uncertainty in the East continues with low intensity violence

and periodic reports of the LTTE cadres assassinating the remaining members of the Karuna faction. And the LTTE pistol gangs continue to claim the lives of their political and military opponents in all corners of the island. The violence has escalated with the explosion of a suicide bomber at the Colombo's Colpetty Police Station, and the massacre of eight cadres of the Karuna faction in Kottawa, a Colombo suburb. The active members of the Karuna faction have also resorted to retaliatory killings of mainstream LTTE cadres in the Eastern province. This internecine violence is the greatest and most immediate threat to the stability of the ceasefire agreement.

Meanwhile, the new government of the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA), which won the parliamentary election in April 2004 has initiated steps to resume negotiations with the LTTE. The Norwegian facilitators as well as other international actors have also been busy in bringing the two parties back to the negotiation table, yet these efforts have not been successful. Currently the LTTE's proposals for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) have been tabled and the LTTE insists that they should be the primary focus of the next phase of negotiations. Of the many suggestions within this maximalist approach to a settlement adopted by the LTTE is the call to maintain their own military and weapons until a final settlement is reached and its terms are fully implemented. Even in an interim settlement as envisaged by the LTTE, dismantling of the state military structures in the North will be an equally intractable challenge. Key among these military installations are the so-called High Security Zones (HSZs), established by the Sri Lankan armed forces in the North around their camps. In most cases, these HSZs cover formerly populated fertile agricultural land as well as the beach fronts of the Jaffna peninsula, that have been made out of bound to the civilian population, particularly farmers and fishermen. Security experts consider these areas crucial to the maintenance of military parity and currently no resettlement of these completely decimated areas has been allowed to the thousands of displaced to whom this place was home. The extreme militarism that was true of both sides continues with the ongoing recruitment of soldiers and rebel cadres and the investment in arms. One of the unfortunate consequences of the peace process has been the arms race between the government and the LTTE, designed to maintain the strategic balance between the two sides. Further, a major sticking point in the ISGA proposals is also sure to be the

LTTE's demand to maintain its own military force. The fundamental logic that is currently in operation within the uneasy but determined peace that prevails in Sri Lanka is one of opposition and military aggression. It is the threat of a parity in the violence that each party is able to unleash that sustains this current stalemate.

Conclusion: The Human Security Paradigm

In this paper I have argued that militarisation in Sri Lanka was intricately bound up with post-colonial nation building process. The electoral system left behind by the British spawned a Sinhala majoritarianism that vilified legitimate minority claims to collective rights. Such vilification was bolstered both by an ideology of Sinhala Buddhist millitarism as well as the building of a mostly ethnic Sinhalese military. Resistance to the militarised majoritarian state was equally millitarised and for the past several decades the consequences of military action as well as the pervasive logic of millitarism has been significant. The consequences of militarisation and militarism in Sri Lanka are felt and visible everywhere. The raised walls around houses in the Colombo suburbs to the proliferating security firms are the most benign. The high crime rate, the underworld that is populated by army deserters, the proliferation of small arms, election violence that has been repeatedly unleashed during election times are all a fall-out of the high investment in violence and confrontation that Sri Lanka as a society has engaged in. However, the challenge that any future polity faces will be to deal with the twenty years of conflict and the consequent militarisation, both in terms of taking care of the soldier cadre, deserters, the disabled young, as well as the internalised ethnic cleavages, the tendency to use violence to solve problems, the proliferation of small arms and the culture of impunity amongst the police and armed forces. These are not problems that can be easily dealt with. The social consequences of millitarism and the militarisation of society will be felt for many years to come. Outside of the long-term challenges that the past years of intense militarisation pose, the immediate needs of the peace process/peace talks to institutionalise the end of the conflict, and the transition from civil war to a post conflict situation call for the demilitarisation of ethnic relations. Regardless of the ceasefire it is clear that the LTTE is yet to give up violence as its preferred mode of action. The stalled peace talks and the increasing assassinations of

those against the LTTE is chilling and does not argue well for the demilitarisation of the conflict anytime in the near future.

The traditional security paradigm takes on the nation-state and its boundaries, its markets, its traditions and its histories as enormously consequential entities that have to be protected within a paradigm when the military plays the role of state protector with its ideals of conduct based on a particular definition of masculinity, hierarchy and discipline and the right to legitimate violence. In the logic of the military as well as the logic of the territorially defined nation-state, state security becomes an end in itself towards which people become instrumentalised or dismissed as collateral damage. As Uyangoda has argued, state security preoccupations in South Asia in collusion with the diminishing role of the state in this era of globalisation have brought about immense insecurity to people's lives. The individual right to live a life of dignity and achieve their full potential are abrogated in the quest for this military mediated chimera of national/state security. The excesses and abuses that the militaries – especially of third world war zones – are accused of, could be considered the regrettable endpoint of a system that demonises the enemy, the other, and brutalizes the self in the defence of an abstracted nation state. It is in the realisation of this and in response to the exigencies of this condition that we have the emergence of the human security paradigm and the realisation of the need to expand the term “security” to include within its focus interests of persons as well as the interests of the state. The suffering that Sri Lanka has experienced during twenty years of protracted conflict and the manner in which the current debate is conducted on the proposed peace process speak to the necessity of rethinking the concept of security. In such a rethinking, the primacy of military method and the entrenching of militarism itself should be transcended in favour of a more humane understanding of security. Further, the destabilising consequences of globalisation where the market has become the arbiter and regulator of society to the detriment of the state too should be taken into account in any analysis that considers human security.

NOTES:

- 1 Interestingly, these post ceasefire incidents have all been Tamil – Muslim clashes and none of them have involved the Sinhalese.
- 2 Darini Rajasingham-Senenayake, “Transformation in legitimate Violence and Civil Military Relations, in *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in South Asia*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa. California: Standard University Press, 2001.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 “Drastic Drop in Literacy Rates in Sri Lanka,” *The Sunday Observer*, September 1996,
- 5 Cited in D. Rajasingham Senenayake, (2001): 311.
- 6 See, Central Bank Report, (2002):120.
- 7 Jayadeva Uyangoda, “Democracy and the State in Multiethnic Societies in Conflict: Perspectives from Sri Lanka,” in *Security in the New Millenium: Views from South Asia*, eds. Norman Dorsen and Prosser Gifford. Washington DC: CQ Press, 2001.
- 8 Within Sri Lanka, the North is generally considered Tamil speaking and the heartland of Tamil Nationalism. The South on the other hand is Sinhala nationalism’s heartland. Within this peculiar configuration, North and South have come to stand for linguistic division, political ideology and as the geographical embodiment of ethnic polarisation in the country.
- 9 Neloufer de Mel., “Marketing War, Marketing Peace,” Paper presented at Sussex University, November 2003, Hyderabad, Asian Social Forum, January 2003, 4.
- 10 Ibid., 4.
- 11 Ibid., 5
- 12 As will be explored further in a later section of this chapter part of the package agreed on in the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord consisted of the arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces to hold the Tamil guerrilla groups, particularly the LTTE, in check and force them to go along with the inter-governmental peace deal. The IPKF fought a long guerrilla war with the LTTE and was responsible for massive human rights abuses in the north and east.
- 13 See, Darini Rajasingham-Senenayake, (2001): 311.
- 14 The USSR donated several MiG aircrafts, China donated light arms and the Port of Colombo and the Airport were guarded by Indian troops. Ibid., 302.
- 15 President, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, appointed in November 1994 three Commissions of Inquiry into the Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of Persons. These Commissions operated on a zonal basis: one covered the Northern and Eastern Provinces; the other covered the Western, Southern and Sabaragamuwa Provinces; while the third covered the Central, North Western, North Central and Uva Province. These Commissions were mandated to inquire into and report on disappearances that took place after 1 January 1988. In 1998 the Sri Lankan government made public the reports of the three regional commissions of inquiry into 16,742 reported “disappearances” dating back to 1988. A new commission with island wide jurisdiction was later appointed to investigate and report on about 11,000 complaints left uninvestigated by these earlier commissions. In July 1998, the Civil Rights Movement of Sri Lanka criticised the government’s failure to appoint a similar commission to investigate the 600 or more reported “disappearances” in the Jaffna area after government forces took control of the former LTTE stronghold in mid-1996 or to address the many “disappearances” of

- Tamils in eastern Sri Lanka from 1984-1988. See, Human Rights Watch World Report, (1999). Also available from, http://www.disappearances.org/mainfile.php/disapp_sl/91/
- 16 Jani De Silva, 2002.
 - 17 Darini Rajasingham-Senenaake, (2001): 314.
 - 18 Ibid.
 - 19 Many non-Sri Lankan readers of an earlier version of this paper commented at the apparent contradiction between the non-violence preached by Buddhism and the militarism of the Sri Lankan brand of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. For a clarification of this apparent contradiction, see, Gananath Obeyesekere, "Meditations on Conscience," occasional paper no. 1, (Colombo: Social Scientists Association, 1988).
 - 20 Neloufer de Mel, (2003): 4.
 - 21 "The Donoughmore Report," quoted in K.M. De Silva, *A History of Sri Lanka* (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1981), 99-100.
 - 22 See, Jayadeva Uyangoda, (2001): 130.
 - 23 Rajan Hoole, *Sri Lanka: The Arrogance of Power. Myths Decadence and Murder* (Jaffna: UTHR, 2001), 47.
 - 24 Available online from, http://www.eelam.com/tamil_eelam.html.
 - 25 See, Sri Lanka State of Human Rights Report 2003, (Colombo: Law and Society Trust): 12.
 - 26 Ibid., 4.
 - 27 The Muslim claim is based on the census of 2000. The results of this census however are disputed given that the process was not carried out in areas under LTTE control.
 - 28 The slogans are taken from a caption for a photograph of a women's procession to attend an annual conference of the Federal Party. Maunagurn also points out the manner in which the Federal Party – although claiming to look for a non violent solution embraced extremely militaristic slogans in their pursuit of non violence. See, Sitralega Mounaguru, "Gendering Tamil Nationalism" in *Unmaking the Nation*, eds. Pradeep Jeganathan and Qnadri Ismail, 162. Colombo: Social Scientists' Association, 1995.
 - 29 Malathi de Alwis, "Ambivalent Maternalism: Cursing as Public Protest in Sri Lanka," in *The Aftermath: Women in Post Conflict Transformation*, eds. Sheila Meintjes, Ann Pillay and Meredith Turshen (London: Zed Books, 2001).
 - 30 Malathi de Alwis, "Motherhood as a Space of Protest: Women's political participation in contemporary Sri Lanka," *Nivedini – A Journal on Gender Studies* vol. 9, no. 1 (June 2001a).
 - 31 Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas Beaches and Bases* (London: Pandora, 1989).
 - 32 Malathi de Alwis, (2001b).
 - 33 Ibid.
 - 34 Radhika Coomaraswamy, "Tiger Women and the Question of Women's Emancipation," *Pravada* vol. 4, no. 9 (1996): 8-10.
 - 35 F. Zackariah and N. Shanmugaratnam, *Stepping Out: Women Surviving Amidst Displacement and Deprivation* (Colombo: Muslim Women's Research and Action Forum, 2002). Also, Darini. Rajasingham-Senenayake, (2001b).

- 36 Zackariah, F. and Shanmugaratnam, N, 2002.
- 37 Rajasingham-Senenayake, Darini. 2001 b.
- 38 While Rajasingham-Senenayake flirts with the possibility of celebrating this change it must be stated that Zackariah and Shanmugaratnam do not frame their argument in those terms.
- 39 The Island, 29 July 2002.
- 40 The Daily Mirror, 23 August 2002.
- 41 Amal Jayawardane, "The United States and the Negotiation Process in Sri Lanka 2002," in *Emerging from Conflict: The Challenges of Transition in Sri Lanka*, ed. Jayadeva Uyangoda (Colombo: Social Scientists Association, Forthcoming).
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 Darini Rajasingham Senenayake, *International Post Conflict Industry Myths, Market Imperfections and the need for a New Reconstruction Paradigm*. Also available online from, Sri Lanka Archive, <http://www.lines-magazine.org>. (no date).
- 44 Jayadeva Uyangoda, "Peace Watch," *Polity* vol.1 no.3. (no date): 4-8.
- 45 Both incidents occurred within weeks of one another during July 2004.
- 46 Jayadeva Uyangoda, (2001): 115-164.
- 47 Sadako Ogata, From State Security to Human Security, *Ogden Lecture*, Brown University, 26 May 2002.
- 48 Jayadeva Uyangoda, (2001): 115-164.

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- "Peace Watch," *Polity* Vol.1 No.3 (16 May 2004), 4-8.
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NEPAL

Democratic Failure, National Insurgency and the Rise of a *Bellicist* Culture

Arjun Karki and Mukunda Kattel

ON 9 APRIL 1990 – 30 years after the late King Mahendra ended Nepal's short-lived democracy with a royal coup d'état – his son, the late King Birendra, lifted the ban on political parties. King Birendra was conceding to the democracy movement, popularly known as the People's Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (PMRD), which was launched by an alliance between the centre-right Nepali Congress Party, and the newly constituted United Left Front (ULF) that consisted of seven moderate left parties. With the unbanning of political parties, Nepal inaugurated a democratic polity after centuries of authoritarian and repressive regimes. An interim government headed by a leader of the Nepali Congress replaced the one that the King led. The new government deleted from the 1962 Constitution those repressive clauses that had banned the multiparty system of governance and established a commission to draft a new constitution.

Later in November, the new constitution – the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 was brought into effect. Although it was a compromise between the palace and the architects of the democracy movement (the Congress and the ULF in particular), the new Constitution vested sovereignty in the Nepali people, provided for multi-party democracy with a bi-cameral form of parliament, enshrined fundamental human rights and, most importantly, brought the institution of monarchy within the

bounds of the Constitution. The document was hailed as being basically fair although there were some reservations and even voices of rejection.

It was thought that the 1990 democracy movement dispatched the era of closed polity to history, and ended the era of regimes drawing their legality from militarist doctrines of the use of force for discipline and conformity. But these hopes were dashed within a short span of just six years when the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) called for an armed uprising — the People's War, against the state which had just begun to emerge out of a repressive past.

Set against such a background, this chapter looks at militarisation in Nepal in the context of the Maoist uprising, which draws its strength from the institutional fault-lines of Nepali state and society — asymmetrical caste/ethnic composition, economic deprivation, authoritarian legacy, and external dependency. This chapter is organised under three sections. The first section briefly analyses these fault-lines in order to place the discussion in a socio-political perspective. The second section looks at the genesis of militarisation and its implications for civil governance, national economy and militarism. In the third section, external dimension of militarisation is discussed.

The term *militarisation* has figured in the political discourse of Nepal only recently and it is in a backdrop of the Maoist insurgency's entry into a phase of deadly conflict. Therefore, the body of knowledge on militarisation in Nepal has also been sparse. The existing literature mainly focuses on the physical aspects of militarisation such as the units and strength of the military forces, military expenditure, weaponry, and the military-public relationship. The literature available with regard to the social, political and psychological implications of this physical militarisation is quite negligible. Roka's work is perhaps the only exception. His argument is that the burgeoning militarisation has shattered the civil authority and democratic order which had just begun to take shape in Nepal's politics. He holds the Maoist violence and autocratic responses it engendered as the combined bases of militarisation and being responsible for "crippling the institutions of parliamentary democracy by giving primacy to military means over the political." His observation suggests that the use of force for obedience and conformity is becoming a norm of everyday life, and that a growing authoritarianism has replaced the democratic value system. This chapter too explores mainly the *physical*, rather than *ideological*, attributes of militarisation.

Nepali State and Society: A Profile

Nepal is a landlocked country sandwiched between two neighbouring giants, China and India. One of the 50 Least Developed Countries in the world, with an annual per capita income of US\$236, Nepal is ranked 143rd (out of 175 countries) in the Human Development Index of UNDP, and falls under the category of 'low human development' countries in the human development aggregates (UNDP 2003).

Nepal is a land of great geographical diversity and is divided into three distinct ecological zones: the plains (*terai*) in the south, hills and the mountains in the middle and the Himalayas in the north. Thousands of rivers and streams that flow north-south bisect the landscape into hundreds of small hills and hillocks isolating the residents from each other and from the rapidly evolving world of information and development because of the lack of infrastructure (transport and communication) to link them. These three regions also display an immense diversity of human settlement patterns, population, land distribution, productive resources, and levels of economic development.

The Hindu religion provides an overarching cultural ideology to the nation. Hinduism is the state religion and therefore influential in shaping state policies as well. Nearly 81 percent of the total population professes Hinduism as their religion. Buddhism, the second main religion, is followed by around 11 percent of the population. Other main religions practiced in Nepal are Islam, Kirat, Christianity, Sikhism, Jain and Bahai. The faiths other than Hinduism feel alienated and discriminated against by the state as they do not have constitutional recognition as state religions. Linguistically, Nepal is similarly divided. The Nepali language (spoken as mother tongue by around 49 percent of Nepalis) receives the accolade as the state language, while other languages do not.

As many as 57 percent of Nepali adults (aged 15 and above) lives with the burden of illiteracy and the striking majority of them are women. According to government estimates, around 9 million people (some 38 percent) fall below the poverty line defined by the 'US\$1/day earning' criteria. The landless and land-poor, recently liberated *Kamaiyas* (bonded labourers) and *dalits* constitute the poorest of the poor. Socio-cultural exclusion, discrimination on the grounds of gender, caste/ethnicity and faith/ideology weighs heavily on these already victimised groups of people.

Caste, class and ethnic imbalance

Home to nearly 23 million people, Nepal is a mosaic of over 61 ethnic groups who have their own distinct languages, cultures and life styles. Officially, however, it is a Hindu State with an exclusionist caste system that compartmentalises the people into a four-tier hierarchy. The caste framework has historically enjoyed a close nexus with the system of governance, thus having a direct impact on the class formation and class divide in Nepalese society. A few upper caste groups, the *brahmins* and *chhetris* in particular, have always held the positions of power and privilege while the groups in the lower tiers are organically discriminated against in political, economic, social and cultural processes. This has had direct consequences for their social, educational, health, and nutritional opportunities, which in turn create a condition for life chances.

By its very nature, the caste system leaves the people belonging to the lower levels of social hierarchy socio-economically dependent on higher castes, making the higher castes higher classes as well. There is hardly any possibility of changing this relationship as long as the caste system continues to be engrained in the system of governance. In a noted study, NESAC established that poverty is correlated with caste and ethnic attributes, and that the *dalits* and some of ethnic groups constitute the poorest of the poor.

That the system and the structures of governance are highly caste-influenced is evident when one looks at the participation of certain caste groups in policymaking and policy enforcing structures. The *brahmins* and *chhetris*, who occupy the first and second positions at the top of the caste ladder, constitute 29 percent of the total population but control 77 percent of the bureaucracy, and senior positions in the army and the police, 67 percent of state and constitutional bodies; and 63 percent of the current legislature. The *dalits* who, according to the 2001 census, constitute around 13 percent of the total population do not hold a single position of policymaking in the bureaucracy, the army or the police. Similarly the ethnic groups who constitute 31 percent of the total population have only negligible participation in state and constitutional policymaking bodies (Table 1 and 2). The only group that enjoys state privileges besides *brahmins* and *chhetris* are the Newars, constituting some five percent of the total population. The Newars are predominantly residents of the Kathmandu valley. They are descendants of the rulers who ruled the principalities that existed in the Valley before 1769. Nepal presents a case where a minority governs as well as

Table 1: People of Nepal

Groups	Population	Percent
Brahmin	2,896,477	13
Chhetri	3,593,496	16
Other caste groups	3,850,999	17
Newar	1,245,232	5
Ethnic Communities	7,027,319	31
Dalits	2,902,907	13
Religious-linguistic groups	988,863	4
Unidentified groups	231,641	1
Total	22,736,934	100

Source: CBS 2002

Table 2: Participation of caste and ethnic groups in policymaking and policy enforcing bodies (in %)

Rank	Brahmin & Chhetri	Ethnic peoples	Madhise [*]	Dalit	Newar ^{**}
Bureaucracy, army and police,	77	1	4	0	18
Judiciary, constitutional bodies, cabinet and parliament	67	8	13	1	11

^{*} The inhabitants of the Terai (*madesh*) are called *Madhise*. The term has more a geo-ecological connotation than a caste and ethnic one. The data are useful to focus on regional disparities.

^{**} Newars are predominantly inhabitants of the Kathmandu Valley.

Source: Extracted from ESP 2001:13, 184-185

controls a vast majority of the population through an unjust and inhumane system of social division (caste system), furthering the gap between the rich and the poor.

Economic Deprivation

Agriculture is the mainspring of Nepal's economy. It provides livelihoods for the vast majority of the nation's population, and employment for four fifths of the total labour force, "possibly the highest ratio in the world." Nepali agriculture operates in a semi-feudal framework. Arable land is very scarce in Nepal. It is fragmented and unevenly distributed. Only 20 percent of the total land area is cultivable, and of the total cultivable land, 69 percent of the landholdings are less than one hectare in size. The bottom 40 percent of agricultural households owns only nine percent of the total agricultural land, while the top six percent occupies more than 33 percent. Some 24.4 percent

households do not own any land, which means over 5.5 million Nepali people are landless.

As they have no land of their own, the landless (*sukumbasis*) and the land-poor are left at the mercy of big farmers and landlords, often forced to sell their labour for a negligible wage. The fact that a minority residing in urban centres is appropriating the surplus from the majority in the rural is the main reason for widening the gap between the rich and the poor. Economic deprivation widens inequality and adds to frustration and human insecurity. These are causes that have led to conditions for violent expression of social discontent.

External Dependency

The sluggish performance in agriculture has led to the nation's increasing dependency on external sources to finance regular as well as development expenses. Foreign aid has formed an integral part of Nepal's economy ever since the door to foreign aid was opened in 1952. Meanwhile, foreign aid is said to have added significantly to Nepal's foreign debt. In the ESP 2001, the ratio of total outstanding foreign loan to Nepal's GDP increased from about 19 percent in 1984/85 to approximately 50 percent in 1998/99. The figures in the Financial Years of 2000 and 2003 show that some 30 percent of the annual budget is dependent on external reliance with the loan component being higher than the grant. In the annual budget of 2003/2004, as much as 70 percent of the development expenditure is expected to be covered by foreign assistance. Annually, over 16 percent of the regular expenditure goes towards foreign debt servicing, eating up the resources that could otherwise be allocated for social spending.

Authoritarian Legacy

In 1769, Prithvi Narayan Shah, the king of the then Gorkha principality, some 100 kms northwest of Kathmandu, established the modern Nepali state by conquering dozens of petty hill states. It was King Prithvi who founded the ruling Shah dynasty. As a modern state, Nepal is thus 235 years old. As much as 93.4 percent of the modern Nepal's life span (219.5 years) has been characterised by autocracy and government repression. Of the remaining 6.6 percent – just 15.5 years, an intermittent democracy was put in place for 18 months from 1959-1960, until it was toppled by the King Mahendra. From 1990 to the present, Nepal has formally remained a multiparty

democracy, although the present King Gyanendra, Mahendra's second son, has taken over much of the executive power after deposing an elected Prime Minister on November 4, 2002. Trapped in the grips of a handful of aristocratic elites, Nepal's political history has been one of conspiracy, secrecy and infighting amongst the rulers. The rulers have repeatedly considered the rule of law, human rights and democracy as alien concepts. Those who called for these concepts experienced severe state repression.

For 104 years (1846-1950), the country was ruled by the hereditary Rana regime. The next 10 years (1950-1960) were a period of transition from the Rana regime to one in which the monarchy, which had been reduced to the status of titular head of the state during the Rana regime, consolidated its position as an absolute ruler. The people who fought the Rana regime in favour of democracy were effectively reduced to mere passive subjects. In 1990, democracy was introduced as a result of a two-month peaceful mass movement, which toppled the authoritarian polity – the Panchayat system – that ruled Nepal for 30 years from 1960-1990, with the King as the absolute ruler.

The interim government, formed after the success of the People's Movement, promulgated the 1990 Constitution, and as required by the new Constitution, conducted national elections in 1992 for a bicameral parliament. The Nepali Congress (NC) obtained a majority of seats in the House of Representatives while the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist and Leninist) – the CPN (UML) – received the second highest number of seats, becoming the main opposition party. No sooner than it came to power, the Nepali Congress adopted a policy of repression against the opposition. Instead of reforming the state machinery trained in an authoritarian past, the Congress government mobilised it to silence the opposition from the centre to the grassroots. 'Congressisation' of the administration made the system of governance worse than the one it replaced.

In 1994, the Prime Minister dissolved the House of Representatives, defying the instructions from his own party. In the mid-term polls held thereafter, the CPN (UML) emerged as the largest party in parliament. The NC took second position, while the members of the erstwhile Panchayat system (grouped under the *Rastriya Prajatantra* Party [RPP], following the inauguration of democracy) consolidated their position reducing significantly the presence of other left parties in the House. The UML formed a minority government since it was the largest party in parliament and initiated some

significant social reform programmes within a framework of decentralised development. But, nine months later, an alliance of the NC and RPP brought down the UML government. Even the Supreme Court denied the Prime Minister's recommendation for mid-term polls. It is argued that from this point on, Nepali politics entered a path in which 'revenge' rather than 'principles' became the prime motive.

Thereafter, the politics of Nepal came to be driven by the making and breaking of opportunistic alliances, with the sole objective of grabbing political power. Corruption with impunity and horse-trading by MPs and Ministers became a regular feature in the political life. In the economic front, inflation continued to soar beyond control, dashing people's hopes for better days. All this gave democracy a bad name. Watching the unfolding crisis from a political corner, the fledgling CPN (Maoist) announced their project of armed struggle. The continuing crisis of democratic governance in which all mainstream political parties flouted at will the democratic values and practices provided the Maoists an opportune moment to launch their armed insurgency.

Between then and now, democracy in Nepal exists merely by name. King Gyanendra has taken over executive powers after deposing an elected government on 2 October 2004. The Parliament no longer exists neither have national elections been held for the past two years. This grave deficit in democracy creates conditions for the country being dragged further towards a full-scale armed conflict. Nepal is in deep crisis, both politically and economically. This dual crisis provides the background for the militarisation of the state and society.

The Political Chronicle of Militarisation

Although Nepal maintains a two-century long tradition of supplying its male-youths, popularly known as the Gurkha soldiers, to the Indian and British regiments, this has had no direct links with militarisation at home, at least in the popular discourse. Of late, concern has been expressed in some intellectual-political circles that foreign military institutions should not be allowed to recruit Nepali youth, on the grounds that such recruitment as mercenaries violates their freedom, liberty and self-respect. However, foreign military service is still an easy source of employment for the youth of certain communities, who rank low in terms of overall national human development

and have had no access to the power or ruling structures. Without the military service abroad, these youth could only remain unemployed at home.

Back home, upon completion of their overseas military service, the Gurkha soldiers have by and large enjoyed a fairly respectable social position, both as *learned* – because of their exposure and interactions with outsiders – and *earned* – whereby in some respects, they receive and enjoy more perks and benefits better than most of Nepal's government officers. Some of the ex-Gurkhas have also earned fame for their role in the democracy movements of 1951 and to some extent in 1990. No studies that examine the psycho-social dimensions of Gurkha soldering are available. Nor are there any complaints recorded of social violence or deviations attributable to the insidious influence of external militarism.

The doctrinaire principle of Maoism that “political power comes through the barrel of the gun” has become the real precursor to the process of militarisation in Nepal. The Maoist rebellion formally started on 13 February 1996 when the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) called the Nepali people to “march along the path of people's war to smash the reactionary state and establish a new democratic state.” The call was accompanied by military action such as capturing police posts and agricultural development banks and the destruction of bank loan documents and records. The initial actions – “people's actions” as they were termed – were limited to a couple of districts in western, mid-western and the centre-east of Nepal. The government of the day swiftly labelled the Maoist actions as ‘terrorist’ and vowed to “finish them within 5 or 6 days.” Labelling the Maoists ‘terrorists’ became a license for the state to ‘finish’ them. Similarly, the term ‘people's enemy’ became a Maoist justification to ‘finish’ anyone they thought dangerous. The state and the Maoists thus established an environment for ‘the continuation of politics by other means.’

In the crossfire between the state and the Maoists, the institution of parliamentary democracy became the first victim. On 4 October 2002, King Gyanendra, taking advantage of the doubtful political scenario, went to the extreme by dismissing an elected Prime Minister, in sheer violation of the 1990 Constitution. The parliament was already dissolved because of internal feuds within the ruling Nepali Congress Party, which split into two soon afterwards, leaving the splinter group to run a caretaker government until elections could be held for parliament. Because of the fear of Maoist obstruction, the Prime Minister did not see it possible to hold elections on

the day he had specified and recommended to the King that his tenure be extended. Instead, the King sacked him, branding him 'incompetent.' The Maoist People's War that aimed to 'overthrow the current state and system' in favour of a 'new democratic system' has achieved its goal, but only partially. It has sufficiently crippled the current state (parliamentary democracy) and helped the institution of monarchy regain its strength. The parliamentary parties have been reduced to irrelevance, as are the ordinary people.

The tiny Himalayan kingdom of Nepal has been divided into two virtual states. The King reigns over the 'old regime' as the Maoists call it, and conversely, the 'new regime' is under their grip. The strength of the 'old regime' is limited to the Kathmandu valley and the district headquarters that are heavily guarded by the Royal Nepal Army (RNA). The 'new regime' is seen outside the capital and in district headquarters, in the ruined infrastructure, barren land and abandoned villages within the cordon of the 'People's Liberation Army' (PLA). Ordinary life is trapped between these two military institutions with civilian politics being pushed into oblivion, as pro-democracy political parties are unable to marshal their energy for non-violent political action.

Since the start of the People's War, military values have superseded the civilian and political norms and values. The CPN (Maoists) have clearly articulated that the people without an army have nothing of their own and that it is through 'just war' (of their kind) that the 'unjust war' (state repression, want and deprivation) can be done away with. The Maoist strategy of 'just war' includes acts of terror such as bombing public infrastructure (telephone repeater towers, VDC/DDC offices and police posts), sabotaging public life through strikes and sanctions, and ambushing security personnel in order to destabilise the state. Intimidation and individual killings of civilians who are perceived to be the 'people's enemy' is their other noted method. The Maoist 'just war' method gives the state a pretext for 'encounter killings,' holding people incommunicado, torturing and some, leading to disappearances. The use of force for discipline and conformity has become pervasive in all walks of Nepali life. Any perceived breach of discipline or a failure to conform to their orders warrant an immediate 'action,' killing being that action in most cases. The *Kathmandu Post*, one of a few respected English dailies, detailed in an editorial the increasing number of cases of excesses at the hands of the RNA:

The death of car driver Rajeev Shrestha, who was shot dead the other day by army personnel in the capital, illustrates the intensity of atrocity unleashed by the armed forces in recent months. This is apparently the third incident in which the security personnel were involved in the killings of the innocent people in two-month time. Earlier, 19-unarmed Maoists, who had gathered for a meeting, were killed by the security personnel after dragging them a few kilometres away from their village in Doramba. Similarly, the Doti incident brought to light a gruesome killing of four students of a secondary school.

In the crossfire between these two gun-wielding forces, the Nepali society is made to move along a path of militarism. The bellicose mantra that 'might is right' has begun to prevail over all spheres of civil, political and cultural values in Nepal. 'Obey without even a verbal protest what a gun wielding man in uniform says. Attention! Show him your bag, wallet, pocket, notepads and books, particularly those having red-covers. Open the door of your bedrooms as soon as you hear midnight knocks. Be quick or else you will be assaulted verbally as well as physically.' In a military culture, there is nothing such as patience, conscience, trust, humility or respect. It is the culture of arms, order and obeying, a '*bellicist* culture', as British historian Michael Howard says referring to the scenario in which armed manifestation is regarded not only as natural but also as inevitable.

The pace of killing, looting, arrests, torture, disappearances, destruction and psycho-social decimation that has accompanied the insurgency and the counterinsurgency has institutionalised a psychology of violence, hatred, and fear in Nepali society. After the RNA was mobilised to fight against the Maoists, constitutional provisions safeguarding human rights and civil liberties have been buried in the camouflage of 'internal security.' On 22 June 2004, *Kantipur Online* reported that the Supreme Court "in its strongest ever order issued to the RNA" had warned the Chief of Army Staff "not to disobey the court orders" with regard to the protection and promotion of human rights. But the RNA has repeatedly claimed that the court orders cannot be obeyed. This clearly indicates that the security forces have often chosen to ignore national and international laws governing human rights obligations while engaging in counter-insurgency actions.

The culture of violence and culture of impunity have thus become a norm of present-day Nepali life where the use of force is regarded as a tool to handle differences and conflict.

Consequences of Militarisation

The Maoist insurgency is not the only armed rebellion experienced by Nepal. But, unlike other uprisings which were either suppressed or settled through negotiations, it has presented the state with an unprecedented challenge and has become overwhelming in its consequences.

Erosion of civil authority

Right from the start, the Maoists targeted local politicians in order to dismantle the local political hold of opposition parties. Elected representatives, who did not agree with their terms, were terrorised until they quit their posts. Any rejection or delay was met with harsh punishment, including death. The Maoists deliberately did this to assert their ideology that no creation was possible without destruction. For their kind of creation, they had to destroy the civil governance that had begun to take shape only recently in rural Nepal. And they did this by opposing the democratic polity and strengthening themselves militarily.

The erosion of authority from above started as soon as the Nepal Police was forced to retreat at the beginning of the year 2000, compelling the government authorities to think of a new paramilitary force, the Armed Police Force. Although poorly trained and lightly armed, Nepali Police was on the winning side until the end of April 1999, during which "a police reign of terror" prevailed and a large number of people, mostly civilians, were killed. From then on, the situation ceased to favour the police. In March 1999, the Maoists were able to attack a police post in Dang in West Nepal killing seven policemen. This was the first group killing of police officers by the Maoists since the start of the People's War. From then on, the Maoists continued to hit the police force hard, thereby contributing to the establishment of the new paramilitary institution, only adding a new burden to the ailing Nepalese economy. The new institution failed to withstand the Maoists, but succeeded in terrorising the Nepali people and curtailing their rights and freedoms, as it was mandated to 'quell any kind of armed struggle in any part of the country, contain any kind of armed rebellion or secessionist movement or acts of terrorism and to control religious or communal conflicts.' These provisions were a mere pretext for encroaching on civilian freedoms. Even amidst the erosion of the human rights situation, parliament and elected

local bodies were still functioning and they were able to point out the police excesses.

In November 2001, the Maoist insurgents made a shift in their military strategy by attacking an army barrack situated in the west of Nepal, killing 14 army men. Until then, the Maoists had refrained from touching the RNA. This Maoist action, which some observers called suicidal, provoked the RNA, which until that point had not engaged with the Maoists. King Gyanendra responded to this new wave of violence by declaring a state of emergency, naming the Maoists as 'terrorists,' suspending civil and political rights and giving the RNA sweeping powers to conduct searches, make arrests without warrant and kill the suspected Maoists. Curfew was declared in the cities, and barricades were placed along highways and road intersections. The army was given full immunity to hunt down the Maoists, which the civilian governments had denied for a long time. Soon a draconian law, the Terrorist and Destructive Activities (Control and Punishment) Act, was enacted, empowering the RNA to detain suspects without charge for up to 60 days and to hold them in preventive detention for up to 90 days. Military harassment became a norm from then on. Citizens were called on to cooperate with the military, that is, to refrain from criticising military excesses. Empowered by the Act, the armed forces unleashed a new wave of terror with indiscriminate arrests, attacks, rape, disappearances and killings.

In May 2002, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, viewed by many as a pro-monarchy democrat, dissolved parliament after failing to garner his party's support for the extension of the state of emergency. The majority of his party colleagues and other opposition parties were convinced that re-imposition of the emergency would strengthen the palace and the military. In defiance, Deuba dissolved parliament and called for a new election two years ahead of schedule, although the deteriorating political scenario was not in favour of elections. This dissolution of parliament amounted to doing away with the last vestiges of civil authority in governance. On 4 October, King Gyanendra dismissed Prime Minister Deuba accusing him of being 'incompetent' to hold elections and assumed all executive powers. With that move by the King, the Nepali state relapsed into the monarchical grip tightened with the backing of the military. In the absence of parliament and the elected local institutions, key constitutional bodies such as the Office of the Attorney General, the Public Service Commission, and the Commission

for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority, all of which were accountable to parliament, have been left orphaned with no parent body to report to.

After the dissolution of parliament, there was absolutely no impediment for the King to carry out his political whims and fancies at will. Accordingly, King Gyanendra, defying the bounds imposed on him by the 1990 Constitution, which limited the absolute power of the monarch, nominated prime ministers of his liking from among stalwarts of the erstwhile *panchayat* regime. This he did totally disregarding the recommendations made by political parties represented in the dissolved parliament. He encouraged the cabinet of his men to bring about changes in the state's Work Performance Regulations, making it mandatory for the cabinet to acquire royal consent for important appointments and transfers, including the staff of joint secretaries and senior superintendents of police. As in the *panchayat* era, he encouraged the cabinet to host regional felicitations in his honour, prop up anti-multiparty messages, entertain manufactured pro-king opinions and publicly accused the party leaders of being responsible for all the chaos and anarchy facing the nation. The King, backed by a marching army, simply conveyed the message that he would be quite happy if the nation returned to authoritarianism.

As the conflict intensified, civilian values and authority were suppressed both from above and below. From above by the militarised state headed by the King, and from below, by the Maoists who were determined to destroy the remnants of parliamentary democracy as a part of their political strategy.

Unnatural growth in defence spending

Nepal at present is burdened with three institutions responsible for defence, security and policing: the Royal Nepal Army (RNA), the Armed Police Force (APF), a paramilitary institution constituted in 2001, and the Nepal Police (NP). It is estimated that the RNA, in its new structure developed to contain the Maoist insurgency, now has 83,000 persons, an increase from 50,000 before it was called upon to fight the insurgency. The APF, solely established to contain the Maoist threat, has the strength of 17,000 personnel, and the NP 47,000. This pattern of growth of defence and security, which requires arms, communication and transport equipment to commensurate with the number of personnel, does not bode well at all for an aid-dependent country like Nepal.

Militarisation is a parasitic burden on the civilian economy. It feeds on resources, which would otherwise go towards social spending on health, education, drinking water supply and rural electrification. The comparison of budget allocations between 1995/96 – the base year when the Maoist insurgency started and 2003/04, when the conflict reached its highest intensity and mortality levels, shows that there has been a 226 percent rise in the defence budget and a 224 percent rise in the police budget. In the same period, the budget allocation for health has been reduced by 14 percent and for drinking water and rural development by 99 percent each. The reduction of social spending in favour of defence adds to the plight of the people who live in the capital city, and, who suffer from lack of clean drinking water. Nationwide, as much as 18 percent of the population is deprived of potable water services, 72 percent deprived of sanitation needs, 91 children per 1000 live births die before the age of five and the reported maternal mortality ratio is 540 per 100,000 live births. Today, Nepal provides one soldier for every 277 people whereas it has merely one doctor available for 25,000 Nepalis.

In the fiscal year 2002/03, the comparative per capita cost expenditure on the army with 50,000 soldiers was US\$1,853 and on the police with 40,000 personnel was US\$2,020, while the expenditure on General Administration comprising some 113,000 civil servants was a mere US\$389. When this year's (2003/04) allocation is compared with the previous year, the figures show a decline in the total budget allocation. But it is not convincing given the increasing rate of inflation, the intensification of the conflict and the rapidly upgraded size of the RNA. This is rather indicative of the fact that the state is planning to cover additional defence costs from other sources, which it wants to keep hidden. It is obvious that the axe would fall on the nominal allocation made for the social sector, and that there would be a diversion from development expenditure as has happened in the past. The money available under any other heading would readily go toward defence. For example, of Rs.1,680 million allocated for the elections of parliament last year, Rs.1,200 million (over 71 percent) was used for non-budgetary expenses, of which Rs.910 million (75 percent) was diverted to the RNA, to modernise it by "improving its aerial surveillance" and "for the purchase of a Sky Truck – a Poland made transport truck." Of the remaining, 12 percent (142 million) went to the royal palace, in addition to the allocations already made in the budget. It is a tall order for a resource poor country to maintain this expensive

defence and security structure, which consumes 22 percent of the visible regular expenditure, quite apart from the 'friendly assistance' and the funds sneaked through other sources.

The military strength of the Maoists in terms of numbers is largely speculative. Various estimates suggest the number to be between 10,000 and 25,000 including guerrillas and militias. Despite the news reports and military briefings that have been presenting increasing casualty figures on the side of the Maoists, their numbers do not seem to have decreased at all. They are attacking security personnel causing colossal damages. This suggests that the number of hardcore Maoist guerrillas is significant. Whatever the number, the cost on the people is very high. Extortion, looting, bank robberies and taxation are their known sources of income, which, culled together, earn them "between US\$64 million-US\$124 million."

Shocking rise in royal expenses

As the conflict contributes to the gradual demise of civil authority and the consolidation of militarisation, the royal institution continues to be a burden on the shrinking economy. In 1990/91, the allocation for the royal palace was Rs.42.29 million. In 1995/96, it rose by 52 percent to Rs.64.16 million. With the conflict taking its heaviest toll, and the King maintaining direct rule, royal expenses grew alarmingly to Rs.619 million in 2002/03 (including 231.1 million development expenses), nearly 10 times of the 1995/96 budget. In 2003/04, the budget for the royal palace appears to have fallen at least on paper, as given in the document that is publicly available. But this is only one side of the story. The other side is that the palace carefully diverts funds from other sources, like the military, and these diversions rarely become public. For example, the budget allocated for the parliamentary election (as discussed above) was diverted to the purchase of luxury cars for the palace since elections could not be held. The palace needed Rs. 142 million to buy 'one Rolls-Royce limousine, one Jaguar and one yet unnamed luxury car' for the comforts of the royal family in a country whose 9 million people do not get two meals a day. Also two years ago, Rs.87 million was released from non-budgeted funds to import cars for the palace.

There is yet another alarming diversion of funds that has taken place in the first half of the fiscal year 2003/04, from emergency relief funds (under the Ministry of Finance, Account No. 95-3-901) allocated to provide relief to the victims of natural disasters. As a respected weekly paper has revealed,

220 million rupees was diverted from this fund for the palace to expend on 'marriage, gold purchase, travel, generator purchases etc.' whereas the fire victims of the district headquarters of Tehrathum, one of the hill districts in Eastern Nepal, were denied their loan applications to construct small huts, let alone relief assistance. These victims of fire, who were in Kathmandu to manage funding for reconstruction of the city, were not only denied an appointment with the Finance Minister but were also told that there was no money to help them. They returned home empty-handed.

"The days of royalty being seen and not heard are over," said King Gyanendra recently, emphasising that he wished to play a 'constructive role.' While it is difficult to gauge exactly what the King wanted to convey, political analysts in Nepal take it as an indication that he wanted to continue engaging actively in the political and economic affairs of the country as he has been doing for nearly two years. The King's desire not only violates the mandate of the 1990 Constitution, but also indicates that there will be more confrontation with pro-democracy parties who have been protesting through street demonstrations for months demanding that the king rectify the regressive moves he had made when he dismissed an elected Prime Minister two years ago. The King's 'constructive' role in the political and economic affairs of the country during the past two years does not seem positive at all.

Human rights violations

Militarism is the antithesis of humanism. It disregards human rights, suppresses freedom and mocks liberty. In a militarised state, violation of human rights becomes the order of the day. Nepal today is a prime example of such a process of militarisation.

Between mid-February 1996 and mid-June 2004, nearly 10,000 Nepali people (including around 1500 security personnel) have lost their lives due to the Maoist insurgency and the counter-insurgency unleashed by the state. An analysis of the data available between August 2003 (when a nine-month long ceasefire between the state and the Maoists was broken) and May 2004 shows that eleven people have been killed every day. In addition to the security personnel and the Maoists killed in combat, those killed include political activists, teachers, students, journalists, civil servants and agricultural workers. Cases of torture, disappearance and abduction have reached alarming levels. According to Amnesty International, Nepal heads the list of nations that have abysmal records of disappearances. The INSEC sources suggest that

between 1996 and 2003, a total of 717 people became victims of disappearance. The Maoist abduction of ordinary people, teachers and school children is no less atrocious. As CWIN, a noted child rights organisation, has documented, between January and May 2004 alone, the Maoists abducted more than 3,801 children. In a single day on June 21, "Maoists forcibly took away around 1,000 students and over 30 teachers from 33 schools" in Kailali, as *Kathmandu Post* reported on 22 June.

The Nepali press has also suffered a deadly blow in the conflict, particularly after the imposition of the State of Emergency in November 2001. Between then and April 2004, more than 180 journalists have been arrested, 80 of them were mercilessly tortured and more than 8 killed.

As the conflict intensified, women and children have been made to pay a heavy price. Both sides to the conflict have targeted them as weapons of war. The Maoists have used them for propaganda purposes, as human shields as well as their sentries. The army accuses them of being Maoist sympathisers and supporters and therefore attacks them. By May 2004, more than 1,200 children have become direct victims of the conflict, 317 have been killed, 2,000 orphaned and 8,000 displaced. The case of women is no less appalling. Security forces target them when their husbands or sons are identified as Maoists. Sita Devi Chaudhary of Kailali was widowed when she was 19. The police killed her husband before her eyes and raped her in front of everyone during broad daylight. She was not only widowed, but also psychologically devastated. During the last eight years, security personnel have raped as many as 48 women, killed 600 and around 70 are among the disappeared. In 2003 alone, 17 women suffered rape attempts and sexual harassment by security forces.

Frequent strikes, blockades, travel embargoes and school closures instigated by the Maoists have violated fundamental economic, social and cultural rights of the people on a regular basis. The continued destruction of communication and service delivery has severely disrupted basic infrastructure facilities. The recent announcement made by key donors to suspend development programmes in various districts because of Maoist extortion and intimidation could only worsen these already deteriorated conditions of everyday life.

Protection and promotion of human rights have become increasingly difficult in the face of Nepal's militarised conflict. The organic social network systems that have earlier functioned in society, providing communities social

and human security, are now breaking down. A psychology of fear is felt all around.

Decline in livelihoods

The intensification of conflict has badly affected the national economy. Government spending on development projects has fallen sharply due to the diversion of development funds and the government inability to implement development projects in the countryside. While production has declined, the price of food-items has soared, weighing heavily on the low-income populace.

In the countryside, increasing fear of insecurity has caused the displacement of able-bodied men who live in fear of being caught in the crossfire. This has badly affected rural agriculture, for which manual labour is essential. Even in normal circumstances, food is scarce in most rural districts in the western Nepal. Now, when agricultural production has declined, and inflation moved upwards at an alarming rate, the rural population is becoming increasingly vulnerable to the risk of starvation.

Both the state and Maoists are responsible for this growing crisis in rural Nepali life. On one hand, the state has failed to regulate the declining trends in the economy. On the other hand, Maoist activities have severely undermined the bases of rural livelihoods and rural service delivery infrastructure, such as small hydroelectric projects, post offices, irrigation projects, Village Development Council (VDC) offices, telephone towers and other public infrastructure. It is estimated that more than one-third of VDC offices have so far been destroyed. In the year 2003 alone, the number of VDCs destroyed is 20. The VDCs are the only development and administrative units available locally. In their absence, in addition to the breakdown of development and administrative machinery, local dispute adjudication mechanisms have also ceased to function. The district blockades and embargoes recently placed by Maoists on the movement of the rural populace restricting even the purchase of basic food items, and the seizure of public food stocks by the army, alleging that they would reach Maoist hands, has put rural life in further jeopardy.

The Economic Decline

The performance of Nepal's economy reached an all time low during 2001/02 showing a "negative (-0.6%)" growth record. This was when the

conflict was escalating militarily. There has not been any credible improvement since then, as the situation has turned from bad to worse, ruining the very foundations of the economy. It is estimated that the nation has lost as much as Rs.129,600 million in destroyed infrastructure (power stations, telecommunication stations and VDC buildings). This cost is 26.6 percent higher than the total annual budget of the nation for the running fiscal year.

The External Factor

Like the saga of the Mount Everest, the rise of Maoist conflict keeps Nepal in the centre of world attention, but differently. While the former is linked to exotic adventurism drawing attention from all over the world, the latter has promoted military adventurism involving India, the US, the UK and Belgium in particular.

For India, which is fighting armed rebellions in many fronts at home, the increase in armed activities in the northern neighbourhood comes as an addition to its security burden. India shares porous borders with Nepal in the east, west and south, making it easy for clandestine movement of guerrillas and cross-border transport of weapons. In the official thinking in India, if the Nepali Maoists strengthen their position, it would be an inspiration for Indian Maoist or pro-Maoist groups operating in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. Meanwhile, the Nepali Maoists have reportedly tied up with Maoist groups in India and other South Asian countries. India's threat perception concerning the Maoist insurgents may be seen as credible. The Coordinating Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) has singled out India as "the common enemy of the oppressed nations and people" of South Asia.

Indian observers also claim that Nepali Maoists also maintain links with such Indian insurgent groups as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the Gorkha Liberation Tiger Force (GLTF) in Darjeeling of West Bengal. Indian analysts believe that "militant groups in the subcontinent are coming together not only because of ideological affinity but for mutual benefit" giving the Indian security apparatus an indication of "serious security implications."

This line of reasoning has apparently led India to arm the RNA to increase its capabilities to fight the Maoists. General Nirmal Chandra Vajpayee, the Indian army chief, made it clear last year publicly announcing that Nepal would receive Rs.1,870 million in military assistance. Since then, India and Nepal

have signed an agreement to jointly counter the Maoist insurgency. According to this agreement, India supplies military hardware to Nepal by bearing 70 percent of the total cost. In addition, Nepal recently received, in accordance with the agreement, two Advanced Light Helicopters (ALHs) from India paying only Rs.0.8 million, 30 percent of the total cost.

Some Nepali analysts believe that the Maoists too collect weapons from the Indian markets. Although the arms supply to Maoists is yet to be proven, such a possibility cannot be ignored given the geopolitics of the two countries, the long tradition of people-to-people contact and the increasing influence of underworld arms dealings in the South Asian region as a whole. The Indian factor is therefore ominously crucial in the militarisation of both the Nepali state and society.

Meanwhile, the US-led crusade against the “war on terrorism” has prepared the ground for the ‘coalition of the willing’ to heighten their interest in the Maoist insurgency which draws newspaper headlines at home and abroad. Besides the US, Belgium and the UK are directly involved in Nepali affairs toeing the line of the US that “does not wish to see [the] insurgents prevail”. In 2002, the government of Belgium sold 5,000 Minimi automatic guns to the government of Nepal to fight the Maoists. In August 2002, Prime Minister Tony Blair pushed through a decision in the British parliament to provide military aid to the RNA from the ‘global conflict prevention pool,’ a fund that normally promotes peace in countries at war. The aid amounting to £6 million consisted of Mi-17 support helicopters, explosive ordinance disposal equipment, logistical equipment, communications equipment and equipment in support of the military intelligence. The support helicopters landed in Kathmandu on 21 June 2004. A high-ranking army official confirmed the delivery saying that they would be used for “patrolling and surveillance.” A lot more is in the pipeline as hinted by the interdepartmental mission of the British government: “the military assistance will continue and there will be no decline in the aid next fiscal year.” The mission, led by Stephen Smith, head of the South Asian Department of the British government, was in Kathmandu in February 2004.

The US involvement in Nepal has obvious reasons. First, the US is the main international target of the Maoist struggle in the world, of which Nepali Maoists are a constituent. Already under a series of threats by a number of terrorist groups and organisations such as Al Qaeda and Abu Sayaf, the US is unlikely to tolerate growing anti-US sentiments in Nepal. Secondly, if the

US-backed Nepali army were to succeed containing the Maoists, it would be a great political relief to the US government, which is caught up in a difficult 'war on terrorism' in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thirdly, the US needs a pretext to station its troops in Nepal in order to watch South Asia and China. The Maoist conflict is an opportunity.

As the situation aggravates in Nepal, the US interest appears to be on the rise, as evident in the increase in military aid the US has supplied to Nepal over the years and the promises it has made for future military cooperation. Between 1990 and 2001, the US supplied Nepal a total of US\$2.3 million worth of arms, US\$1.3 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and approximately \$2 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET). After 9/11, the amount increased 10 times of the amount allocated for the entire previous decade, with US\$ 12 million in FMF for the year 2002 alone. The same year, Nepal received nearly US\$0.4 million in IMET, and \$3 million from the Economic Support Fund (ESF). In the fiscal year 2003, Nepal was allocated US\$ 0.5 million in IMET, US\$3 million in FMF and US\$6 million in ESF. For fiscal year 2004, Nepal has been promised US\$0.6 million in IMET, US\$10 million in FMF and US\$6 million in ESF.

"Either you are with us, or ... with the terrorists", said US President George W Bush warning the world some three years ago to toe his line in the 'war on terrorism' that he launched to fight Al-Qaeda and other US-designated terrorists. He was indicating that the world should carry his guns, or else it would be understood that they were carrying the guns of Osama bin Laden. In this logic, there is no room for those who would desist to carry weaponry. In a *bellicist* culture, there is no grey area for peaceful minds to operate. The Nepali government has not dared to risk being 'with the terrorist.' But, Nepal runs another risk, the possibility of becoming a 'failed state,' the security and sovereignty of which would be placed in the hands of the militarily advanced external forces. In that case, Nepal will run the added risk of becoming a 'guinea pig' for the military experiments by regional and global superpowers.

Conclusion

As this chapter demonstrates, the militarisation process in Nepal is integrally linked to the failure of the country's democratic project that was at the political centre stage after the transition from monarchical rule to multi-party democracy in 1990. Since the transition, the popular movement for democracy subsided and the parties and the leadership have failed to

institutionalise democracy in any enduring manner. In that process of democratic failure, the Nepali politics moved in the direction of bipolarity between the monarchy and the Maoist insurgent movement, characterised by continuing civil war and violence. Both the state and counter-state rebellion have produced a culture of unmitigated militarism.

The militarisation of the Nepali state and society, as argued in this chapter, is accompanied by a culture of impunity. Immune to prosecution and punishment, the security apparatus operates without any sense of accountability. Likewise, the Maoists, who claim to be fighting a 'just war,' are not accountable for their unjust acts either. The unchecked activities of war by both sides leading to the killing of civilians, destruction and decimation of economic and administrative infrastructures, blockades of everyday goods and services, and terror and violence has instilled a psychology of fear among the Nepali people. Engaged in a protracted counter-insurgency war, impunity has thus become a defining feature of the behaviour of the Nepali state at present. It has also implanted a culture of violence in Nepali society. *Bellicist* values, values of militarism, have thus become dominant over civilian and humane values since both the state and the Maoists have endorsed the use of violence against those who oppose them. In less than a decade of militarisation, Nepal society has already suffered devastating consequences.

- Civic sense and authority have been replaced by militaristic whims as means of resolving disputes and differences. Loyalty and obedience is sought everywhere in public life, be it in the market place, on the pavement, or at road checkpoints.
- The power to make decisions relating to socio-political affairs of the country have been taken over by the institution of military and monarchy at the expense of democracy which the Nepali people achieved in 1990.
- Resources are being diverted from social services to military financing.
- Criminal actions within security rank and file have been protected from prosecution giving the security apparatus the benefit of the doubt as well as immunity from legal accountability.
- Women have become a systematic target as the state and society get militarised. They have been tortured and terrorised, raped and killed, widowed and traumatised. Meanwhile, able-bodied men have been

driven away from their villages, pushing poor rural families into destitution.

Once militarism permeates into a society, it stays there almost forever, as in neighbouring Afghanistan and Cambodia. It tears apart civilian values, shatters humanitarian precepts, suppresses dissent and differences at gunpoint, and makes obedience to power a social norm. Like termites in the wood, militarism destroys a society from within, breeding hatred and enmity, chasms and paranoia. It instills a culture of violence in the minds of people.

Will Nepal join the cohorts of Cambodia, Afghanistan and Iraq? Not necessarily, if lessons could be learned from the wrongs and failures these countries have undergone, and if the lessons could be learned as much by the regional and international actors as by the national ones. The following points can be suggested as fundamental alternative ways to check the onslaught of militarisation the Nepali State endures at present:

- Create an environment to engage the Maoists in the political mainstream: The Maoist problem is rooted in the political, economic, social and cultural histories of the Nepali state and society. Therefore, it should be addressed politically making 'dialogue' a primary tool to find a negotiated settlement. This, as the first immediate step, calls for withdrawing the 'terrorist tag' put on the Maoists and creating an environment to engage them in dialogue and negotiation. This requires a determined effort on the part of the state to dissociate from the us line of reasoning.
- Create the environment for engaging the unemployed in creative and gainful employment: The denial of basic livelihood opportunities is a major contributing factor in the upsurge of the Maoist insurgency. The democratic change of 1990 brought about significant freedoms in Nepal, but contrary to popular expectations, it could not deliver opportunities, particularly to the youth, of gainful employment. Nor could it guarantee an environment for the free expression of dissent about livelihood and socio-economic grievances. Against this scenario, the Maoist project of 'revolutionary change' attracted the excluded and frustrated. To bring them back to the mainstream, an environment must be created to engage them in gainful employment. The state should not violate fundamental human rights when dissent is expressed peacefully.

- Address the institutional vulnerability of the Nepali state: There should be a visionary reform programme to address the institutional vulnerability of the Nepali state – the caste and class divide, the asymmetry in participation and representation, socio-political deprivation and cultural domination – through broad-based and inclusive democratic processes. It is on the institutional vulnerability that the Maoists have championed their violent political project against the state. Even if the current problem is solved, Nepali society will never get rid of the possibility of violent movements unless the state is reformed.
- Invest resources in the rural people: Nepal is essentially a society of rural communities and therefore the state needs to invest its resources in the rural people to empower and enable them to make decisions about matters affecting their lives, their environment and their present and future generations.
- Establish a culture of peace: This can be realised through education, training, decentralised interaction, media campaigns, public rallies and through intellectual engagement while working in collaboration with ngos, cbos, people's movements, mass organisations and trade unions.
- Bridge the gender gap: Male domination in the socio-political life of Nepal historically is also a contributing factor in the insurgency. Therefore, special gender justice programmes should be launched to empower women and enable them to claim their stake in socio-political affairs of the country.

If experience around the world is any guide, militarism is imposed from above through political decisions. To counter it requires a culture of peace that should be built from *below* by the collective action of civil society actors, human rights NGOs, peace movements, grassroots-based social awareness campaigns, gender justice movements, and other forms of pro-people initiatives. When a culture of peace is established, no *bellicist* whims could make any impact. Let everyone of us civilise our thinking and make sense of it!

NOTES

- 1 The Nepali Congress Party accorded the Constitution an outright welcome; the ULF accepted it with some qualifications and some groups (such as the Nepal Communist Party, 4th Convention and Mashal) rejected it charging that the Constitution could not be secular. None however initiated any action against it giving the impression that it was basically acceptable.
- 2 See, for example, D Kumar, "Consequences of the Militarised Conflict and the Cost of Violence in Nepal," *Contributions to Nepalese Studies* (Kathmandu: CNAS, July 2003). See also, A Karki and B Bhattari, eds. *Whose War? Economic and Socio-Cultural Impacts of Nepal's Maoist-Government Conflict* (Kathmandu: NGO Federation of Nepal, 2003); D Thapa with B Sujapathi, *A Kingdom Under Siege* (Kathmandu: The Printhouse, 2003); and HRW. *Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Civilians Struggle to Survive in Nepal's Civil War*. (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2004). Also available on line from www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nepal1004/.
- 3 H Roka, "Militarization and democratic rule in Nepal," *HIMAL South Asia* (November 2003): 56-61.
- 4 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990 guarantees fundamental human rights ranging from the right to equality between sexes, and among groups of people to the right to religion to culture and education. Naming Hinduism as the only state religion thereby giving sanction to the exclusionist caste system, which forms the bedrock of the Hindu religion, to continue is one of the key contradictions in this 'democratic' constitution.
- 5 In the caste hierarchy, the *brahmin*, *chhetri* and 'other caste groups' mentioned in Table 1 enjoy the upper caste status. The *Newar* and *ethnic communities* enjoy the position immediately next. The *dalits* are the lowest in the caste hierarchy and are demeaned as 'untouchable.'
- 6 NESAC. *Nepal Human Development Report 1998*. (Kathmandu: Nepal South Asian Centre, 1998), 129-130.
- 7 ESP. *Pro-Poor Governance Assessment Nepal*. (Kathmandu: Enabling State Programme, 2001), 13 and 184-185.
- 8 The *Newars*, who constitute around 5 percent of the total population (CBS 2002), have been excluded in this report in its calculation of ethnic demography. In the national discourse on ethnicity, there is some confusion as to whether the *Newars* constitute an ethnic identity as other groups do. See ESP (2001): 180-182.
- 9 NESAC (1998): 100.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 117-118.
- 11 According to Census 2001, the average household size of Nepal is 5.45. See CSRC. *Land Rights in Nepal: Present Realities and Strategies for Future*. (Kathmandu: Community Self Reliance Centre, 2003), 8.
- 12 See, HMG/N. *Budget Speech of the FY 2003/2004 (in Nepali)*. (Kathmandu: Ministry of Finance [2060 BS], 2004): 43.
- 13 In the mysterious royal massacre of June 1 2001, all the members of the ruling King Birendra's family were killed paving the way for the current monarch Gyanendra, the second son of King Mahendra, to accede to the throne which by Nepali tradition is a privilege of the first son of the King.

- 14 Karki's case studies present a fair picture of the way the then Congress government maltreated the opposition with the help of the administration. See A Karki, *The Politics of Poverty and Movement from Below in Nepal*, PhD Thesis submitted to the University of East Anglia, School of Development of Studies, UK (2001).
- 15 The Gurkha soldiers are Nepali youths, predominantly belonging to such ethnic groups as Magars, Rais, Limbus, Gurungs and Tamangs, who are recruited by India and Britain into their armies. The process of recruitment started as early as 1816 by way of a treaty called the Sugauli Treaty entered into between Nepal and the then British India.
- 16 ESP (2001).
- 17 NESAC (1998).
- 18 This proposition, to become the mainspring of Maoism, was made by Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung in 1938 while he was addressing the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. He was responding to 'right opportunism' that propped up the Chinese revolution vis-à-vis the problems of war and strategy. The speech is available online from <http://www.bellum.nu/wp/mtt/mttpowas38>.
- 19 The leaflet, the first of its kind to be publicly circulated by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), dwells on the economic, social, cultural and political problems of the country and, on the background of the analysis, argues for the need for people's war as the panacea for all of them. See A Karki and D Seddon, *The People's War in Nepal: Left Perspectives* (New Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2003): 187-193.

Earlier, on 4 February 1996, the Maoists had submitted a 40-point charter of demands – 9 related to Nationalism, 17 related to the public and its well-being and 14 related to people's livelihoods – before the government led by Nepali Congress leader Sher Bahadur Deuba. February 17th, 1996 was the deadline they had set for the government to respond to their demands warning that the failure to respond would compel them "to launch a movement against the government." Ibid., 183-187.

But, they, in a mysterious move, declared the War 4 days before the expiry of their deadline. Their activities were apparently directed against the Election Commission's denial of their recognition as UPF after the split. As a result, they were deprived of participation in the 1994 local elections.
- 20 Rukum, Rolpa, Jajarkot, Salyan and Gorkha in mid-western and western Nepal and in Sindhuli in the centre-east of Nepal saw the first flare of the People's War.
- 21 Nepal Rastriya Buddhijivi Sangathan Kendriya Samiti. *Nepalma Janayuddha*. (Kathmandu: NRBSKS, 1997), 96-97.
- 22 See A Karki and D Seddon, (2003): chap. 6
- 23 *Kathmandu Post*, 8 November 2003.
- 24 Howard (1986) cited in DP Barash and CP Webel, eds. *Peace and Conflict Studies*, (California, London and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002), 27.
- 25 See "SC orders RNA to obey the court," *Kantipur Online* [home page on-line]; available from www.kantipuronline.com, (22 June 2004).
- 26 See, A Karki and D Seddon, (2003): 3-48 for the condensed history of popular revolts and uprisings against the autocratic rulers of Nepal, calling for social justice and regime change.

- 27 M. Kattel, "Introduction to the People's War and Its Implications," in *The People's War in Nepal: Left Perspectives*, eds. A Karki and D Seddon (New Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2003), 57-61.
- 28 See the news analysis entitled "What The Bills Contain," *Kathmandu Post*, 13 August 2001. One of the two bills replaced an ordinance that established the Armed Police Force.
- 29 In September 2000, Maoists stormed a police post in Dunai, the headquarters of the western mountain district of Dolpa, killing 14 policemen. The Home Minister endeavoured to mobilise the RNA to support the retreating police force. But the army declined prompting the then Home Minister to resign. Similarly, in mid-July 2001, Maoists made another daring attack on Holeri Police Post in Rolpa, killing one police officer, wounding another and abducting over 70. The Prime Minister reportedly called in the army to engage with the Maoists, but the army accepted it only partially, not to attack them but to negotiate the release of the hostages. All this has led many observers, such as H Roka, (2003) and D Kumar, (2003) to believe that the army was not prepared to move under the directives of a civilian government under civilian dispensation.
- 30 See Amnesty International Report. *Nepal, A Spiralling Human Rights Crisis* (2002) and (2003). Also available from www.amnesty.org.
- 31 UNDP. *Human Development Report*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
- 32 For the data on population-physician ratio, see, *Ibid.* (2003).
- 33 D Kumar (2003).
- 34 In 2001-2002, the government slashed budgetary allocations made to nearly 4,000 VDCs by around 50%. It also cut budgets from different development projects. See, A Kumar (2003) footnote 12.
- 35 See "Poll budget diverted to beef up security," *The Kathmandu Post*, 17 March 2004.
- 36 Lintner, (2002) as cited by D Kumar (2003): 184.
- 37 See, "New acquisitions for Palace," *The Kathmandu Post*, 18 January 2004.
- 38 See, "*rajako shasanko biteko ek barasha* ('The past year of the king's rule')," *Rastriya Bimarsha*, 28 May 2004.
- 39 See the king's interview with Time Asia's Alex Perry available online at http://www.time.com/time/asia/2004/nepal_king/nepal_intvu_extended.html.
- 40 Calculation made on the basis of information published by INSEC, which provides trusted information vis-à-vis the human rights situation in Nepal. *INSEC* [home page on-line]; available from <http://www.insec.org.np>.
- 41 See the news commentary covered by Nepali National Daily *Kantipur*, 21 March 2004.
- 42 CWIN shared this information at a discussion programme organized on 9 June 2004 in Kathmandu. For further details, see CWIN [<http://www.cwin.org.np>].
- 43 S. Shrestha, "Press Freedom of Conflict-affected Nepal," *Nepal Samcharpatra*, 3 May 2004.
- 44 See, "Children in Armed Conflict," *CWIN Bulletin* (January-May 2004). Also, see CWIN [home page on-line]; available from <http://www.cwin-nepal.org>.
- 45 FDM. *Cost of War: Economic and Socio Cultural Impacts of the People's War* (Foundation for Development Management: Unpublished Report, 2004): 43.

- 46 INSEC. *Nepal Human Rights Yearbook* (Kathmandu: INSEC, 2004).
- 47 D Thapa with B Sijapathi, (2003). See also, INSEC, (2004).
- 48 NPC (2003): 2.
- 49 See, news analysis entitled "Conflict costing country dearly," *The Kathmandu Post*, 10 June 2004.
- 50 CCOMPOSA was formed in July 2001 to "[b]uild a strong anti-imperialist resistance movement, particularly against US imperialism and Indian expansionism," among others. See, CCOMPOSA Declaration available from http://www.insof.org/160202_decl_ccomposa.
- 51 See, 'Linkages with Northeast Insurgents: Growing Concerns' a commentary by security analyst Sanjaya K Jha available at See, "Linkages with Northeast Insurgents: Growing Concerns," a commentary by security analyst Sanjaya K Jha available from <http://www.ipcs.org/ipcs/countryIndex2>.
- 52 See, news commentary entitled "India to provide 18.7 cr military aid to Nepal" published online at <http://www.rediff.com> (25 April 2003).
- 53 See, "Indian choppers delivered to RNA," *Himalayan Times*, 14 June 2004.
- 54 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Donald A Camp was quoted as making such observation by *Nepalnew.com*, available online from <http://www.nepalnews.com>, 4 March 2003.
- 55 *The Kathmandu Post*, 21 December 2002.
- 56 D Hencke, "Blair 'sneaked aid to Nepal military," *The Guardian*, 5 August 2002.
- 57 *Kantipur Daily*, June 24, 2004.
- 58 As quoted in the *Himalayan Times*, 6 February 2004.
- 59 See, Victoria Garcia, and Rachel Stohl's article available online at See, Victoria Garcia, and Rachel Stohl's article available online from <http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/index.cfm?ProgramID=39&issueid=116>.

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PHILIPPINES

Militarisation, Moro Insurgency and the Challenges for Peace and Democracy

Samira Gutoc

RECENTLY I HAPPENED to emcee a unique event in my hometown, Lanao del Sur. The event is a travelling exhibition of the Philippine Marine Bugle Corps, which according to its battalion commander was the only one of its kind in Asia. He said that it was an effort to reach out to the local Muslim populace and to change the image of the military as being good in battle alone. The times have changed and so have the military, but not the entire military system. The traditional role of the military as the protector of the nation's 'territorial integrity' – which is buttressed by a war policy spearheaded by the hawks in the government's top bureaucracy – reinforces the stereotyping of the military as a violent institution.

There is cause for concern in the expanded role of the military over civilian affairs especially in a third world developing country, where the power relations are clearly drawn, making the poor and the marginalised vulnerable. In the current situation in the Philippines, the following features can be observed with regard to the military:

- Growing support for increasing the defence budget and soliciting US support for modernised methods of warfare;
- Support for US policy on the 'war on terrorism' and for joining the 'Coalition of the Willing';

- Making military appointments to civilian positions in the government administration, resulting to an increase in the military's influence on national policy;
- Subversion of the 'peace policy' in favour of a 'war policy';
- Rising military expenditure at the expense of basic public services;
- Repression of the minorities.

As Michael Randle points out, there are two types relationship between militarism and political repression: the instrumental and structural. At the instrumental level, the military is not only the major arm of repression of the state, but also the source of threats to the liberties of the people, because of the very process of raising and maintaining a highly centralised military. It restricts the freedom of information, discussion and association, as common in many national security states. It also promotes the militarisation of internal security forces and the use of military justice. Instrumental links may also be seen as operating at the international level through the colonial forms of intervention and involvement by major powers in the local conflicts in other countries, and in the spread of military techniques and ideology through international military training programs.

The structural level refers to the influence of militarism on economic and socio-political affairs that tends to make repression more likely. In the Third World, militarism contributes to and perpetuates unjust class structures, reinforcing patterns of dependency within the societies. Militarism as a value system can also encompass racism, sexism, discrimination and homophobia that are embodied in institutions such as the military.

Is there a need to re-assess the role of the military and security forces in the light of changing notions of security and peace processes in a post-conflict phase in the Philippines? How would one address the need for reform from within the military ranks? The controversial Magdalo mutiny in 2002, led by young soldiers, exposing alleged military corruption as well as the army's involvement in the Davao airport bombing, showed severe cracks emerged within the military system. Now, the rebel ranks of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) are prepared to seek civil society participation as part of their consultative strategy to improve the image of the military.

Notwithstanding the signs of military reformism, militarism continues to be the dominant tendency in civil-military relations in the Philippines. This chapter traces the beginnings of the Philippine's militarism, linking the militarisation process to the responses to local conflicts and movements of resistance, specifically among the Muslim (Moro) communities in Mindano. The chapter will also make a case for a new role for the Philippine military with concurrent changes in the policies and attitudes. The proposed new role is framed in terms of a shift from being a traditional defence entity to a progressive protector of human rights.

Global Context: The Philippines in the Developing World

The beginnings of Philippine militarism can be seen in the country's historical involvement in wars and conflicts within and outside the country. The state has been involved in a long war with local secessionists and communists since the late 19th century. In the global scene, the Philippines is the first Asian supporter of the US War on terrorism. Being a predominantly Catholic country and the strongest US ally in Southeast Asia, there was the fear that the Philippines might become the second front of the war against terror in the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is linked to both the Al-Qaeda network and Ramzi Yousef, who was arrested in connection with the bombings of the New York's World Trade Centre.

As a developing country with a strategic maritime area, the Philippines has designed a foreign policy geared towards securing support for its internal and external security. With its porous borders, the Philippine archipelago is threatened with illegal smuggling of drugs, arms and goods, piracy, illegal migration and 'terrorism.' The Philippine's defence is predicated on the condition that it would continue to allow it being used as a platform for intervention to safeguard American regional interests anywhere along the South China Sea and the Southern western Pacific and westward to East Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. As a result, the Macapagal-Arroyo administration has secured military funding from the United States, and even signed a strategic and logistics treaty. Under this treaty, there have been joint US-Filipino military exercises in the Philippines.

The Philippines, as Table 1 shows, is a country with stark poverty, overpopulation being a major challenge in development. A large number of

Table 1: Philippines at a Glance

Poverty and Social Indicators	Philippines	East Asia & Pacific
Population, mid-year 2000 (millions)	75.6	1,853
Average Annual Growth Rate, 1994-2000		
<i>Population (%)</i>	2.1	1.1
<i>Labour Force (%)</i>	2.6	1.4
Most Recent Estimates (1994-2000)		
<i>Poverty (% of pop. below national poverty line)</i>	37	—
<i>Urban population (% of total pop.)</i>	59	35
<i>Life expectancy at birth (years)</i>	69	69
<i>Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births)</i>	31	35
<i>Child malnutrition (% of children under 5)</i>	30	13
<i>Access to improved water source (% of pop.)</i>	87	75

Table 2: Per Capita Expenditure on the Military, Health and Education

Year	Military (US\$)	Public Health (US\$)	Public Education (US\$)
1972	3.8	1.4	5.9
1974	5.8	2.3	7.8
1976	12.6	2.8	5.7
1978	11.0	3.6	11.2
1980	12.9	3.6	11.3

Source: Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures*
(Washington DC: World Priorities, annual, 1974, 1976, 1979, 1981, 1983).

Philippine people live below the poverty line, especially in areas where the communist and Moro insurgencies are active. In all indicators of the human development index, the Muslim areas in the country concentrated in the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) fall below in comparison with all the other regions. In fact, poverty incidence is highest in Mindanao. Its contribution to national poverty is 31 percent. About 1.4 million Mindanao families are not able to meet minimum food requirements for survival. Poverty is most severe in provinces with the largest proportion of Muslim and indigenous people, particularly the ARMM.

An examination of the per capita expenditures on the military, education and health from 1972-1980 in the country (Table 2) demonstrates the shift in priorities that has taken place in the Philippines. In 1972, the government had spent 94 percent more on health and

- Individual and collective insecurity,
- The perception that the government is responsible for their suffering and insecurity, and
- The feeling of hopelessness of their condition under the existing political and economic order in Mindanao.

Sometimes, the Moro problem is also described as one of minoritisation, where the Muslim and indigenous minority has been rendered powerless in relation to the majority in a centre-periphery relationship that dates back to the colonial history. Migration (from Christianised North to the Muslim South) and pacification policies implemented by the Spanish and American colonial rulers had displaced the indigenous minorities in Mindanao.

The continuing conflicts between the state and minority groups had given a rise to a culture of militarism in Mindano. Among the Southern Muslim communities, there is a tradition of procuring and using firearms and it has historical roots because the people there have engaged in armed resistance to colonisers. Massive gunrunning operations have been reported in the Southern Philippines area particularly in Agusan, Misamis, Surigao, Sulu, Basilan, Tawi Tawi and Zamboanga provinces. There are other factors that explain the free flow of arms to Southern Philippines. The geographic configuration of the country with irregular coastlines and isolated islands provide natural covers for gunrunners who use them for landing sites and storage points for their contrabands. Smuggling of arms is a business with prospects for huge profits and ready markets. The connivance between gunrunning syndicates and some corrupt law enforcers provide a nexus for a lucrative arms trade. Powerful political families maintain private armies. It is also difficult to ensure monitoring, maintaining inventories and surveillance activities of establishments that deal with the manufacture, sale, and delivery of firearms.

Armed resistance geared towards the state and the relatively free availability of firearms is a major security problem in Southeast Asia. One of the key findings of a participatory research study on "Armed Violence and Human Insecurity in Southeast Asia" is the need for immediate security reform – particularly the institutions of the army and the police. The ignorance among officials entrusted with policy-making and implementation of the need for reform is not helpful in addressing these

education than it did on the military. Thereafter expenditures increased relatively more in health and education, but the military share reached much higher levels than it has prior to the declaration of martial law in 1972.

Attempts to break the structures that produce and perpetuate poverty have generated violent conflicts in the Philippines. Central to the dynamism of conflict are the programs launched by the Communist and Moro rebels for the re-distribution of land among the landless peasantry. The failure of development is also a source of political instability. Both internal turbulence and external pressures have led many governments to centralise power. Often, the centralisation of state power has weighed against ethnic and religious minorities. In response, the marginalised minority groups have become attracted to the advocacy of faith and culture-based advocacy of self-determination. Across the Southeast Asian region, cultural and religious diversities continue to threaten state unification campaigns. Some rebel fronts have resorted to violent and protracted insurgencies. Thus, armed conflicts have become an enduring feature of the Southeast Asian region resulting to huge costs to human life as well as implications for the security, development and comprehensive well being of the people. According to The International Institute of Strategic Studies' data, the estimated cost of the armed conflicts in the Philippines between 1968 and 1977 has reached the amount of US\$5,100 million.

The Mindanao/Muslim Case Study

Muslims constitute an estimated ten percent of the Philippine's population. They are a significant minority in the Mindanao island. The Filipino Muslims comprise thirteen ethno-linguistic groups and Islamic converts who are spread all over the Philippines in pocket communities as well as in concentrated areas. There is a concentrated Muslim presence in the Southern Philippines, particularly in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

Six major themes are often observed in the discussions of the 'Moro problem.' They are:

- Economic marginalisation and destitution,
- Political marginalisation,
- Preservation of ethnic identity,

challenges. There is little or, no acknowledgement in official circles that when individual and collective rights of the people are regularly violated and the avenues of resistance are blocked or met with state violence, counter-state violence is an inevitable outcome. As Southeast Asia enters into an atmosphere of growing militarisation in which arms are easily available, the spread of armed violence has become unavoidable. One way to minimise the predatory and illegal behaviour of personnel in the security sector is to enforce strict adherence to the practices and obligations enshrined in international law. The relevant statutes are the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials passed by the UN General Assembly and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by the Law Enforcement Officials.

Historical role of the military and the National Security State

The history of the Philippines armed forces is closely linked with the suppression of the Moro insurgency. Having had successfully put down the Northern resistance in 1903, the American and Philippine armed forces joined together to fight the Southern resistance in the Muslim areas of the Moro province. The Americans entrusted the Philippine Constabulary with the task of policing the Moros. In just seven years, there were 124 conflicts between the Philippine constabulary and Moros.

The Philippine military formally took over authority over Moro provinces upon the grant of sovereignty to the Republic of the Philippines in 1945. The Philippine military was originally instituted in 1936 with a constitutional mandate to pursue a three-fold function: external defence, internal security against rebellion, sedition and subversion, and maintaining the law and order through the police and constabulary forces. The armed forces were deemed to be subject to the constitutional doctrine of civilian supremacy. The soldier viewed the military as a source of employment. He also viewed his role as that of a defender of the civilians and the sovereignty of the nation. The soldier was also seen as a potential monster in society because he had the power of gun. The monster must always be caged and the cage should come in the form of institutions.

In the Philippines, there are two schools of thought on the role of the military. The first is the 'interventionist' school which believes that when things do not happen in the way people expect, the military can and should intervene (Gen. de Villa). The other approach is 'constitutionalist' which

advocates that there should be a clear division of roles between the civilians and the military.

During the pre-1972 era, there was a strong division of labour between the military and the civilian government. The civilians engaged in political life while the military defended the nation against internal and external aggression. Military had only short-term loyalties to individuals in power, because none of the presidents were re-elected for another term. The politicisation of Philippine military occurred in a context of political conflicts. Confronted with protracted armed rebellion against the state, civilian politicians called upon the military to maintain the political order. The Martial Law declared by President Ferdinand Marcos in 1972 both confused and complicated the role of the military. Was it to protect the civilian population or civilian politicians? This led to the abuse of the military by the civilians, making the military an instrument in politics. The politicisation of the military eventually resulted in the military's involvement in political affairs, engendering corruption and eventual demoralisation within the military itself.

The declaration of Martial Law suppressed political dissent to ensure regime stability. Under the emergency provisions that suspended the constitutional guarantees for civil and political rights, the Marcos regime effectively blocked the emergence of popular oppositionist movements by incarcerating political opponents and leaders of mass movements. The Marcos regime used the military for the systematic repression of the urban guerrilla movement of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). A specific development that occurred during the Martial law regime of Marcos was the decaying of the military as a public institution. Under the Marcos regime, the loyalty of the military was changed to 'personal' loyalty to Marcos by means of promoting loyal generals.

The toppling of Marcos' martial law administration in 1985 by the People's Power movement was a civilian revolution, but the military played a key role in the last stage of the popular revolt. This provided the context for the subsequent emergence of a reformist movement within the army. Military patronage of the post-Marcos regime added to the resentment expressed by the Rebolusyong Alyansang Makabayan (RAM). Their leaders, – prominent of who was the media savvy young officer, Gringo Honasan (who is now a Senator) – tried to inject nationalism into the army's thinking while trying to make the soldiers identify with the people.

Following the success of the Peoples' Power Movement that effectively toppled the dictatorial rule of the Marcos regime, the reformists campaigned for a changed role for the military, making the assertion that the military must have its own mandate and that it must take on an interventionist role. This idealism of the reform movement was seen as breeding dangerous frustrations. In fact, there have been a number of coup attempts by the reformists during the Aquino regime. But the main beneficiary of these coup attempts has been the military establishment.

Militarisation in Mindanao

During the Marcos regime, the Mindanao problem was deepened by agrarian conflicts precipitated by population movements of mostly Christians from Luzon and Visayas, who occupied traditional Muslim lands and consequently controlled profitable market centres and vast agricultural land areas by the non-Muslim outsiders. These changes had led to social and economic displacement of the indigenous Muslim population.

The social injustice and neglect of the poor that generally characterised the Marcos' rule compounded the plight of the Filipino Muslims, reinforcing Muslim separatist sentiments. The Jabidah Massacre of Moro recruits in Corregidor in 1968 allegedly by the military officers under the orders of Marcos contributed to the creation of the main rebel front, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). To quell the rebellion, the government deployed more than half of its military forces and spent more than 15 million pesos a day, as reported in the journal *Mindanao Focus* in 2002. According to the former Congressman and ex-general Eduardo Ermita, the MNLF-led rebellion has cost some 76 billion pesos during its 26 years of existence from 1970 to the signing of the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) in 1996. In 2000 alone, when the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) attacked the territories controlled by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the government spent no less than 6 billion pesos.

The destruction of *cottas* (camps) maintained by the Muslim rebels and the suppression of revolts have not eliminated the Muslim will to resist and their capacity to continue the armed struggle, however much it has affected their socio-economic life. As the former President Fidel V. Ramos once wrote, "the refusal to recognise Mindanao, not as a mere appendage of Luzon and Visayas but as a land that historically had a thriving civilisation

with distinct political, social and religious structures is the root cause of the ethnic conflict in Mindanao.”

During President Joseph “Erap” Estrada’s (1999-2001) administration an all-out war policy was launched in the South. Popularising the slogan “crush the rebels” in the media, a militarist jingoism was used to provoke pro-war sentiments among the majority of the population. The government deployed its military might with the use of land, air and sea forces against the MILF armed groups entrenched in 50 or so military camps, the most important of which being Camp Abu Bakr. After the fall of Camp Abu Bakr on 9 June 2000, the MILF changed its strategy from semi-conventional warfare to guerrilla tactics. A lean force of mobile MILF troops began to launch sporadic attacks on smaller military encampments and weak military formations. These attacks often led to running gun battles that almost always inconvenienced the civilian population, endangering their safety and security. Although the government recognised that the immediate military objective was destroying the main camps, the MILF forces still continue to be engaged in guerrilla operations spread out in the entire Southern region.

Against this backdrop of the continuing Muslim rebellion, the military expenditure on the government’s counter-insurgency war is increasing at an alarming level, spiralling the overall government budget. The current administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo borrowed massive sums of money, at a rate of 1.086 billion pesos a day, throughout the period of March 2002 to March 2003. This has led to increase in the government debt by 396 billion from 2.5 trillion to 2.897 trillion pesos in the period of 12 months. This led former Senator Wigberto Tanada to comment that the whole process of civilian government is being undermined while there is continuing pressure to further increase the military expenditure.

The US war on ‘terror’ and the Mindanao Problem

Despite current peace negotiations with communists and Moro rebels, the investment in war is being fuelled by the government’s policy of an all-out support for the US-led war on terrorism. The signing of the US-RP Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) which aims to supposedly ‘further the inter-operability, readiness and effectiveness of the RP-US military forces’ seals the Philippines’ rising role as America’s second front following Afghanistan.

The US-led campaign against terrorism reflects a drift toward the militarisation of the response to terrorism and predominance of the military as well as military solutions in addressing not only terrorism but also social rebellions and internal armed conflict. Military response to terrorism and rebellion is not just a dangerous tendency, but also a threat to the peace processes, and to the ways of peace, dialogue, persuasion, inclusion and participation. In the Philippines in particular, it is a threat to the viability of government peace negotiations with various rebel groups such as the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) which is now currently listed in the US as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).

Under the former Philippine-US Military Bases Agreement, US Troops and facilities could only be stationed or installed inside the bases which were limited in scope and area, all in the northern part of the country in the Luzon island. Now, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the proposed MLSA would cover the entire Philippines, including Southern Mindanao, which has a close proximity to Indonesia and Malaysia. While it is true that the MLSA does not specifically designate certain basing areas for use by the US Forces, it offers, like the VFA, the entire Philippines, all its islands, air space and territorial land and water to the US armed forces for use in the same functions for which the bases are being used; training, refuelling, replenishment, re-supply and the repair of US naval vessels. Dr. Rolando Simbulan, a progressive local analyst, comments that the US has begun to “use the Philippines once again as a staging area for US interventionist actions in Asia and other parts of the world” and as the “springboard for unilateral actions of a superpower that is behaving like a mad dog after September 11.”

The Visiting Forces Agreement of 1991 restored US troop activities in the Philippines after the rejection of the bases treaty in 1991. Since then, various small and large-scale military exercises have been undertaken to justify the restoration of US military presence in the Philippines. These exercises include the following:

- Carat – an amphibious exercise between the US Pacific Fleet and Philippine Navy.
- Masur vex – RP-US maritime patrol, surface detection, tracking, reporting and training.
- Palah – joint navy special warfare group.

- Teak piston – air force-to-air force exercise.
- Balance piston – infantry exercise dealing with special operations.

Downgrading the peace process

The Philippine government's collaboration with the global war on terror has negative implications for the peace process at home. The religious labelling of Moro rebels as 'Islamic terrorists' and treating them as 'criminals' is a part of the new policy of favouring a military strategy to deal with internal armed conflicts. With this new strategic shift, the policies of pacification, demobilisation and peace building have been pushed to the background. The new militarist policy is a retreat to the old understanding of the Moro problem, trivialising it as an ordinary law enforcement problem that can be dealt with the capture of the insurgent leaders. The government's refusal to resume formal peace negotiations with the National Democratic Front (NDF) underscores the primacy being given to militarist solutions that have however historically failed to address the socio-economic roots of the long-standing armed conflict in Mindanao. The impact of President Arroyo's *Mindanao Natin* ('Our Mindanao') programme, a sort of Marshall plan that seeks to provide economic assistance to projects addressing the socio-economic needs in Mindanao, remains to be seen.

The military campaigns against Moro rebels have resulted in the commission of the most serious violations of human rights. No precautionary measures were made by the government to spare civilians, especially women and children, from armed violence. There was no distinction between combatants and non-combatants made by the military during armed encounters. But the rebel groups cannot be absolved too. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) found that both sides of the armed conflict have grossly violated International Humanitarian Law. Some of these violations of the Protocol II to the Geneva Convention on the Laws of War include:

- No distinctions were made between combatants and civilians as in the encounter in Pandami, Sulu, in 2002 when military planes and helicopter gun ships swooped down and bombarded civilians purposely to flush out the Abu Sayyaf rebels, killing innocent civilians and damaging properties.

- There were no briefings on military personnel before operations to ensure proper conduct to civilian population.
- No efforts were made with respect to evacuation of children.
- There was desecration of religious buildings and objects as occurred in a Muslim mosque in Barangay (village) Manilop, Indanan, which was looted and damaged.

As a result of the military campaigns against the Abu Sayyaf, about 80,000 civilians were displaced from their place of domicile in Basilan and Sulu. As the war in Central Mindanao raged and the Abu Sayyaf played out to the glare of media publicity (during the all-out war of 2000), some Muslim religious leaders including civilians in Zamboanga peninsula just disappeared. They were abducted or were never seen again, most probably killed, while others were harassed, tortured and detained on the suspicion of being sympathisers or supporters of either the MILF or the Abu Sayyaf group. The government's own human rights watchdog, the National Human Rights Commission has condemned the "blatant human rights violations" by the Armed Forces and recommended the filing of criminal cases against those responsible during the 2001 offensives in Basilan to save the kidnapped Burnhams, an American couple. The setbacks that the peace negotiations in the Philippines have suffered under President Arroyo have actually occurred as a result of a policy battle in which the hawks, who advocate a war policy, have won.

The Moro problem, as recognised in the Tripoli agreement of 2001, is essentially a political-social problem that needs a comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement through negotiations. The return to the principles of that agreement reached during the GRP-MILF talks will provide a credible basis to address the Moro insurgency. The Tripoli agreement of 2001 called for the discussion of three issues – security (ceasefire), rehabilitation and development of conflict-affected areas, and the status of the ancestral domain. The agreement recognised the distinct identity of the Bangsamoro as a people occupying a definite territory, the Bangsamoro homeland, and acknowledged the fundamental right of the Bangsamoro people to determine their future and political status.

Effect of War

According to the World Refugee Survey of the US Committee for Refugees (USCR), the Philippines ranks the third after Burma and Indonesia in Southeast Asia having the most number of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Worldwide, the Philippines ranks 28 in the list of top 41 countries with the most number of displaced populations. Balay, a rehabilitation NGO, has called the attention of the United Nations over the alarming incidence of internal displacement in the Philippines due to military operations against Muslim rebel groups and criminal bands. Balay told the UN representative that the phenomenon of mass exodus of internally displaced persons (IDPs) may intensify because of the involvement of American troops in counter-insurgency operations.

Government records show that the number of IDPs caught in the armed conflict in Mindanao is at least 67,292 – 6.7 percent of the 1,002,855 persons affected. This figure relates to the period in which the conflict escalated as a result of the government's 'total war' policy against Moro rebels and the Abu Sayyaf in March 2000. It still excludes those who sought refuge in Sabah, Malaysia, during the martial law regime. Totally more than one million people have been affected by the armed conflict, nearly as many people globally displaced by natural calamities in 2001.

Post-traumatic stress manifestations are easily noticeable among these displaced communities. They include heightened fear and anxiety on anything related to the military and war; intense anger over their displacement and loss; feelings of disinterest in life; a sense of powerlessness over an uncertain future and; deepened feelings of animosity and mistrust between Muslims and Christians. As Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Health Secretary Lampa Pandi admitted, trauma due to violence is the leading cause of death in the ARMM where hostilities continue to displace thousands of families in the region. Trauma death is defined to include deaths occurred due to gunfire, bombings and other violent incidents such as clashes between military and rebel troops. Out of 100,000 deaths in the ARMM, field reports of BALAY have listed 24,000 as due to trauma. Psychosocial intervention in the form of debriefing, defusing, counselling, and providing trauma therapy to victims has resurged in response to armed hostilities in Mindanao. According to the World Health Organization (WHO) the most basic issue in psychosocial intervention following a disaster is to transform those affected from being

victims to survivors – a victim is passive and dependent; a survivor is not – he is able to take an active role in efforts to help his community and himself recover from the disaster.

Armed clashes between government and the rebels have stunted the country's economic growth and Mindanao has particularly suffered. Quoting the findings of a World Bank study, Paul Dominguez, former Presidential Assistant for Regional Development and the head of Mindanao Economic Development Authority, said that the present value of the economic cost of the conflict would be at least 2 billion over the next ten years. According to Dominguez, this figure is merely the technical cost of the war: "There are hidden costs that are still difficult to quantify. In addition to that, there are costs you cannot measure. This is just the economic cost, not the social cost."

Transforming the Notion of Security

Traditionally, the security discourse has been militarist in nature, and security was viewed as a province of military strategists and defence experts. The official security concept in the Philippines emphasises territorial integrity and external defence. In practice, it is preoccupied with military responses to internal dissent and revolts rather than external threats, much like the other South East Asian states. The concept of human security is gaining official ground only slowly. In her 2001 State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo decried underdevelopment and poverty as the overriding national security issue in which various 'threats' to internal, whether from the CPP-NPA or the various groups in Mindanao, whether MNLF or MILF, are rooted in economic underdevelopment and poverty.

Civil society groups in the Philippines are in the forefront of promoting a more humane approach to the national security framework. Two recent civil society initiatives in this regard are the conferences on 'Medium Term-Development Goals' (MDGs) and 'Waging Peace in Asia and the Philippines' Conference. Advocates for a more humane approach to security have argued that the security of a 'state' must not be prioritised over the security of the state's people. They have also stressed that at a time when the ordinary person's rights are being eroded due to some other country's activities in its own 'war on terror', human rights must remain central to the pursuit of human security in the region.

There is a need for a counter-hegemonic framework for governance and development that would better address rebellion and its root causes. Human rights, human security, peace and development, conflict resolution and peace building, conflict transformation – any of these would provide a better framework for addressing internal armed conflicts. The government's Six Paths Framework for a comprehensive peace process must be defended from the inroads of the national security approach, since it is the government's peace policy formulated after consultations with the people. Similarly, a shift from a culture of war to a culture of peace needs to be made on the understanding that the state should cease to be the sole organiser of security and that civil society has a role in promoting citizen participation in international and national affairs. Such a people-centred concept of security could aim at protecting fundamental freedoms, protecting people from severe and widespread threats, using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations, creating systems (social, economic, political, cultural) that together help people attain survival, livelihood and dignity, integrating peace with security and development, and encompassing freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to have a healthy environment

Such an expanded notion of human security is indeed mandated by international commitments to development. For example, the United Nations has formally endorsed in September 2000 for instance indices to measure developing countries' progress in attaining so-called Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These measures include eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality, reducing child mortality, and improving maternal health and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.

Imperatives of the Peace Process

While a concept of comprehensive human security should be linked to a programme of peace building, a genuine peace process must lead to the goal of democratisation and human rights. As James Boyce points out, medium and long-term adjustment plans toward peace requires new policies towards ensuring a balance in the distribution of income and wealth as well as promoting equitable balance in the distribution of power through democratisation processes. Conventionally, the institutional components of democracy have focused on fair and pluralist elections, the rule of law,

political freedoms and civilian control over the military. In peace building, the agenda of reform should have a broader perspective. Peace building must involve a wide array of initiatives to encourage an atmosphere of confidence not only between conflicting parties but also civil society and the masses, who are usually excluded in formal processes of peace negotiations. Sustainable peace processes also include confidence-building measures such as the cessation of armed guerrilla campaigns or the repeal of repressive emergency legislation as well as programs of economic and political reform. De-commissioning weapons, demobilisation of combatants, disarmament, de-mining and re-integration of the military into civil society and economy are crucial in a meaningful de-militarisation programme. .

Balance of power among conflicting groups, even though this temporarily intensifies a conflict, is necessary to create the political conditions for a peace process to be sustainable. It will ensure win-win outcomes at formal peace negotiations, because negotiations under conditions of power asymmetry are not conducive for a settlement framework acceptable to all conflicting parties.

Conclusions

As argued in this chapter, the programme of de-militarisation in the Philippines is integrally linked to a broader process of democratisation, peace negotiations, peace-building, political and economic reforms and re-building state-society linkages. The following constitute the key components of such an agenda for reform:

- Uphold the peace process, which include a broad range of activities such as negotiations, peace research/education and constituency-building for peace and democracy. Peace and human rights education and interfaith advocacy within the military, media and the educational system must be institutionalised. A sustained programme of peace education must include respect for human rights, democracy and rule of law; recognition and the promotion of cultural diversity and solidarity with others; and promoting inclusion rather than exclusion in ideologies and cultures.
- Re-examine the blanket support for the all out 'war on terror.'
- The National security framework must be challenged and debunked once and for all as a framework of governance. Such a

framework on its face would tend to exclude other ways of life and institutions such as those of the Bangsa Moro nation as well as alternative social systems.

- Considerable efforts must be directed at reforms among the armed forces. New reform initiatives should include improving training in human rights, strengthening the military's democratic accountability to civilian populations and improving their conditions of work.
- Addressing the question of the proliferation of weapons in the region is a necessary component to work towards a meaningful demilitarisation programme. Since there is growing militarisation of states and societies in Southeast Asia, governments must begin to experiment with new ways and means of removing small arms from circulation. One cluster of suggestions in this direction is available in the Arms Trade Treaty, a new international instrument which calls for immediate and strict human rights conditionality on any transfers of arms to governments. It also stipulates a moratorium on further sales to any area where there are ongoing violations of human rights or where a civil war is taking place. The Arms Trade Treaty codifies the principles enshrined in the Nobel Laureates Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers and would protect peace by placing prohibitions on the trade in arms to any nation whose expenditure on military and policing combined exceeds their expenditures on health and education.
- There is the need to expand rehabilitation efforts to cover preventive measures of conflict such as building of peace zones, cooperativism in communities and confidence-building measures. This is in the light of limitations seen among government disaster managers who focus rehabilitation mostly on rebuilding houses rather than consolidating something as basic as family solidarity. They give attention to rebuilding schools but not on restoring the psychological, emotional and social well-being of traumatised children. They provide resettlement for IDPs but hardly consider the healing of community relations and building spaces for peace.

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Militarisation by Other Means

MALAYSIA

National Security, the Police and the Rule by Law: Militarisation by other Means

Francis K W Loh

Introduction

In the midst of ethno-religious conflict and violence that characterise so many Southeast and South Asian countries today, Malaysia stands out as an example of how ethnic relations have been managed rather successfully. More than that, unlike the case in neighbouring countries, the military in Malaysia has remained in the barracks and taken a backseat, politically speaking. Indeed, the literature available on the role of the military or on militarisation in Malaysia is sparse. No comprehensive volume on the political role of the military is available. Early discussion of the military largely focused on its role during the Emergency (1948-60) when an armed struggle led by the Malayan Communist Party was successfully defeated by the armed forces. More recent studies on the military focus on Malaysia's defence and strategic policies, in particular how re-posturing has occurred especially with the end of the Cold War and/or the demise of the Malayan Communist Party. Whenever militarisation is discussed, the theme that is always stressed is how civilian control over the military prevails. Indeed a Westminster system of parliamentary rule dominated by civilians has been maintained since Malaysia's Independence in 1957.

To explain this enigma, liberal theorists have usually resorted to various models such as consociationalism and elite accommodation. These explanations highlight power-sharing arrangements that have been reached

by the political elites of different ethnic groups. Such accommodation, it is argued, is on account of the elites' more moderate, tolerant and altruistic attitudes. In contrast, the masses are awash with parochial and extremist attitudes. Although the assumptions about elite-mass attributes should be questioned, there is no doubt some truth that consociational arrangements have been put in place. For Malaysia has been ruled by the *Barisan Nasional* (BN, and its predecessor the Alliance) coalition, which comprises 14 component parties, since Independence. Although the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) dominates the BN, the other ethnic groups are represented in the coalition via the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), the *Partai Bansa Dayak Sarawak* (PBDS), the Kadazandusun-dominated *Parti Bersatu Sabah* (PBS), and other parties.

After the communal riots of the 13 May 1969, which were largely attributed to persistent Malay poverty, the BN parties reached a consensus to launch the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1971-90). In essence an affirmative action policy, the NEP sought to redistribute wealth to the *bumiputeras* (Malays and other indigenous communities). Through widespread intervention in the economy and society, the BN government sponsored *bumiputera* participation in the modern sectors of the economy. As a result of their apparent discrimination, non-*bumiputeras* in the BN coalition turned frustrated and much squabbling occurred in the course of the NEP, sometimes resulting in policy amendments. However, these squabbles pertained to the implementation of the Policy, not its essence and necessity for which a consensus was maintained.

A second and related factor cited by liberal theorists to explain relative ethnic peace and continued civilian rule is the BN government's successful management of the economy, resulting in Malaysia's emergence as a second-generation newly industrialised country. Through a series of Five-Year Plans, the NEP and economic development generally were vigorously pursued. Malaysia's average real GDP growth was 7.6 percent per annum during 1970-80 and 5 to 6 percent during 1981-85. Due to a recession, the economic growth rate fell during 1986-87 before averaging 8 to 9 percent again from 1988-95. No doubt, this growth was facilitated by the fortuitous discovery of oil (including offshore Liquefied Natural Gas) and high rates of foreign direct investments especially following the Plaza Accords, 1985. On the eve of the 1997 financial crisis, Malaysia had virtually reduced the

index of (absolute) poverty down to about 4 percent while unemployment rates were down to 4 to 5 percent. An estimated one million foreign workers (legal as well as illegal), mostly unskilled and semi-skilled, were further employed in the country. Beginning from the late 1980s, Malaysia had further introduced liberalisation and privatisation policies to adjust its economic policies in line with the needs of the global market economy. These adjustments had also proven successful in maintaining economic growth. It was this economic development generally sustained over almost three decades which allowed for the successful implementation of the NEP, in turn resulting in a dramatic restructuring of the ethnic division of labour inherited from colonialism, wherein a majority of the *bumiputera* had previously been characterised by persistent poverty. In fact, there occurred consolidation of the middle classes from all the ethnic groups as well, which provided further ballast to the BN since they had benefited from its rule.

However, it was not merely consociational arrangements and successful economic management by a developmental state that maintained ethnic peace and kept the military in the barracks. A third factor was the consolidation of a strong state under the BN's rule. Notwithstanding the maintenance of civilian rule, the state penetrated deep into the sinews of civil society. This is a point that the liberal theorists tend to ignore, or fail to elaborate.

Indeed, although elections have been held regularly since Independence in 1957, the electoral process is overwhelmingly dominated by the BN coalition which has won all the general elections that have been held in the country. More important, power has become increasingly centralised in the hands of the federal government in Kuala Lumpur as a result of the constitutional design as well as the political process wherein the BN possesses the most comprehensive party machine. The BN's political machinery facilitates the BN federal government's ability to determine decision-making at the state level even when those state governments are in the hands of the opposition party. This was the case of the North-Eastern peninsular states of Kelantan and Terengganu, as well as of Sabah, in eastern Malaysia during the 1990s. With the abolition of local government elections in the mid-1960s, the BN federal government's reach penetrated even deeper via appointments of its functionaries into district and local level authorities.

Meanwhile, within the federal government itself, that is, at the national level, power has shifted into the hands of the Executive at the expense of the

Legislature, the Judiciary, the mass media, and civil society. However, such concentration of power in the hands of the BN Executive, and the consolidation of the BN state more generally, is not on account of the use of brute force. Instead, it has been achieved by means of coercive laws and the manipulation of state institutions. For instance, the Internal Security Act (ISA) allows for detention without trial while other laws actually curb civil liberties and political rights enshrined in the Constitution. There is also perennial gerrymandering of electoral constituencies with the cooperation of the pliant Elections Commission and abuse of the mass media which is either owned by the government or the ruling parties. In fact, the state resorts to 'coercive legalism' to maintain its power, which is why Malaysians often talk about the 'rule by Law' rather than the 'rule of Law' which connotes a system of constitutional democracy with checks and balances in place. Contrary to the views of the liberal theorists, critics have variously described Malaysia as a 'quasi democracy', a 'semi-democracy', a 'repressive-responsive regime' or even a 'statist democracy.'

It is within the context of these three factors – power sharing via elite accommodation, successful economic growth over three decades, and consolidation of a strong state characterised by coercive legalism or the rule by law – that I wish to discuss the question of militarisation, loosely defined, in Malaysia. Ironically, 'militarisation' has occurred in Malaysia without the armed forces assuming the pre-eminent role in politics or in the society writ large. Instead, militarisation takes place by other means. It is derived from the ideology of national security and the consolidation of a national security state led by civilians who resort to coercive legalism or 'rule by law'. As such, in the Malaysian national security state, it is the Police, acting at the behest of its BN political masters, that plays the critical role.

This chapter comprises four parts. The first part discusses the period of the Emergency and how the British viewed the 'national security' issue, and confronted the communist insurgency in colonial Malaya as a 'law and order' problem. Part two investigates how, following the experience of the Emergency, a plethora of coercive laws, especially the Internal Security Act, was introduced by the Malaysian leaders who inherited the reins of power from the British. In this regard, the Police force was expanded and soon dwarfed the role of the military in national security matters. Part three elaborates on the spill over effects of the powers vested in the Executive and the Police on the judicial process and even the realm of criminal

proceedings, resulting in the increased use of force on the part of the supposed guardians of the law. The last part investigates recent changes in Malaysia's strategic thinking resulting in an expansion and modernisation of the military. Finally I argue that the military is most unlikely to play a greater political role in the foreseeable future.

National Security and Legacy of the Emergency

During the Cold War period, especially following the ascendancy of Communist regimes in China (1949) and North Vietnam (1954), the conservative pro-Western leaders of Asia were led to believe that they faced a dual threat to their national security: an external threat from unfriendly communist countries and an internal subversion by their own communists, often supported by those unfriendly neighbours. This was the logic of the so-called 'Domino Theory' which postulated the fall of other Southeast Asian countries to Communism subsequent to China and North Vietnam.

For reasons of national security, and to avert 'communist subversion' therefore, the conservative Asian leaders entered into alliances with American and other Western powers, and with their help began to expand and modernise their armed forces. Increasing repression and human rights abuses, as well as the dismantling of democratic mechanisms and procedures, characterised this initial phase of militarisation. As a consequence, defence and security spending often escalated, and the military came to play a pre-eminent political role. In South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia the military ultimately assumed power. In other settings like the Philippines and Taiwan, the military provided critical support to the civilian political rulers as they stumbled from crisis-to-crisis. However, in the case of Malaysia (and Singapore), the national security question was interpreted as a problem of 'law and order', and hence posed the need for more policing, rather than increasing military intervention in politics. This difference in approach is a legacy of the Emergency (1948-60), specifically of the way in which the British colonial government confronted the communist insurgency in colonial Malaysia as a law and order problem, and eventually succeeded.

As in other parts of the region, the anti-colonial movement in Malaysia also demanded an end to the colonial rule in the post-Second World War era. Against that backdrop, conflict emerged between the returning British colonial authorities and the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) which

sought self-rule in a socialist republic. The MCP, which had earlier collaborated with the British to fight the Japanese occupiers, was recognized as a legal organisation from 1945 to early 1948. Its legal standing facilitated the MCP to engage in open recruitment and mobilisation of workers, school teachers, farmers, and the former guerrilla fighters of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). Matters came to a head when the colonial government imposed curbs and restrictions on the MCP's activities in 1947. On its part, the MCP hurriedly anticipated the need for an armed struggle in the near future. Following the murder of three European planters in 1948, the colonial government declared a State of Emergency in Malaysia. With this proclamation, the MCP and the various unions and organisations it controlled were proscribed. Many of its leaders were arrested. A new set of laws, the Emergency Regulations, was introduced. Among the new powers given to the colonial authorities were those to arrest and detain without trial, deport 'undesirables', search for and seize arms and other prohibited items, enforce curfew, and impose registration and carrying of identity cards.

The MCP was caught off guard. With its urban-based organisations proscribed, it resorted to the strategy of rural guerrilla warfare. Old links with the rural squatters, established via the MPAJA during the Japanese Occupation, were revived. Reviving these links was necessary, for, in fleeing to the countryside, the MCP became considerably dependent on the Chinese squatters in the rural areas to provide them with recruits, money, information, food, medicine and other supplies. The British authorities had correctly surmised that the squatters had become convenient go-betweens for the communists. Links between the two, therefore, had to be severed.

Security operations were conducted in the squatter areas almost immediately after the Emergency had been declared. However, the repressive measures adopted by the government in these operations – destruction of crops and homes, arrest and detention of suspects, deportation and on several occasions murdering of those who resisted – caused the squatters to turn to the MCP for protection and support, not like during the Japanese occupation. In view of the deteriorating situation, the British and civilian authorities at the highest levels sought an alternative way to deal with the problem. A comprehensive study of the squatter problem involving the various state governments was conducted. The findings were tabled as the *Squatter Committee Report 1949*.

The Report distinguished between the shorter-term and the longer-term aspects of the squatter problem both of which contributed towards a worsening security problem. Firstly, there was a lack of administrative control over the squatter problem after the War. Neither the Police nor the land and district authorities had a presence in the squatter areas. The Report also identified land hunger to be a major problem. Ignored by the authorities, the squatters were easily subjected to pressures by the guerrillas. To surmount these security-related problems, the Squatter Committee recommended the re-establishment of the authority of the government through various administrative measures and the provision of adequate communication, police stations, schools and health facilities. It also recommended the introduction of legal means to provide for the eviction of squatters by summary process and compulsory repatriation of those who refused to be removed on the terms offered by the government. This was the short-term aspect of the security problem posed by the squatters.

Secondly, the Report noted that the squatters farmed to maintain their livelihoods. However, they were cultivating illegally on land which they did not own. Their plight for agricultural land, therefore, had also to be addressed. The land policy which had discriminated in favour of mining and plantation capitalist interests, as well as towards indigenous Malays, had to be amended to provide security of land tenure to these Chinese farmers. To this end, another series of recommendations on the issuance of some semi-permanent form of land tenure was put forth. Taken together, these initiatives were expected to 'win the hearts and minds' of the squatters, and transform them into citizens with a stake in the country. Apart from acknowledging their plight as landless squatters, the recommendations, in effect, also recognized the permanency of Chinese settlement in the peninsula. In the end however, the recommendation to grant the squatters security of tenure was not accepted by the State governments since it encroached upon Malay and other capitalist claims to the land. Resettlement in the 1950s was determined principally by short-term security considerations.

In this pre-Independence period, the security force was relatively small, apparently ten regular infantry battalions, and they were predominantly made up of British soldiers, especially *Gurkha* troops. Some support was also provided by a small contingent of the Royal Malay Regiment (RMR). Anticipating a short-lived communist insurrection, there were initially no

plans to mobilise or recruit more local military personnel. In fact, civilian colonial officers remained in charge in the early stages of the Emergency, and the largely non-Malaysian army was placed under the control of the Police Commissioner, also a British officer.

However, the insurgency turned more serious than expected. Jealousy and friction between the police and the army also developed especially when severe losses were suffered. To solve these problems a military man, Lt. General Harold Briggs, was finally appointed as Director of Operations. In this position he was granted wide powers of coordination over the Police, Army and civilian departments for the prosecution of the Emergency. Briggs' first act was to set up the Federal War Council which brought together the Military, the Police, the administration and other civil services. He established similar War Executive Committees at the state and district levels, resulting in a chain of command which linked his War Council to minor officials throughout the peninsula.

Briggs next focused his attention on the squatters. He identified and contrasted the guerrillas' fighting force, the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), with their support movement, the Min Yuen. To end the Emergency, both the MRLA and the support movement had to be eliminated. Fighting the MRLA was the responsibility of the army with the assistance of the paramilitary Police Field Force which was being rapidly expanded. But fighting the support movement was the task of the civilian authorities with the help of the Police. Briggs further believed that the support movement was based on terrorism and extortion. Thus the people had to be protected. The resettlement of the rural Chinese squatters and the re-grouping of labourers on mines and estates became the cornerstone of his overall plan, the so-called 'Briggs Plan', to defeat the communists. In fact, Briggs interpreted the Emergency as a law and order problem. The War Security Council would decide upon strategic directions, while its equivalent security committees at the state and district levels would co-ordinate operational planning and field activities involving the Army, the Police and the civilian forces. An important innovation was the setting up of the Special Branch of the Police with responsibility for all tactical intelligence and counter-subversion activities. Significantly, military intelligence personnel were emplaced to serve under the direction of the Special Branch chief.

In the event, the resettlement process came to be conducted essentially as a security operation. Entire areas containing squatters to be resettled were

encircled and cordoned off by armed personnel before dawn with no prior warning. Civilian officers including Chinese-speaking administrative officers would then enter the area and inform squatters of the impending relocation within a certain time limit of that same day. The squatters had no choice but to move. That same day their crops and homes were razed to the ground. Areas outside the secured resettlement areas, in effect, became 'free fire zones'. Between 1950 and 1952, more than half a million people were resettled into 480 'New Villages' throughout the peninsula. Another 650,000 persons were regrouped (71 percent on estates, 21 percent on mines, and the remainder around factories, saw mills and timber concerns). A grand total of 1.2 million people, or one-seventh of the entire Malayan population, was ultimately moved. Carried out on such a massive scale and conducted as rapidly as it was, regrouping and resettling no doubt severed the ties between the guerrillas and squatters and helped to resolve the security problem.

To reiterate, Briggs interpreted the insurgency as a 'law and order' problem. In this approach, restoring national security required supplementing military operations with political and administrative initiatives. This included the introduction of the all encompassing Emergency Laws and their strict enforcement. Nowhere had this become more evident than in the New Villages. The squatters were confined behind barbed wire and subjected to security restrictions, curfew, body and house searches, food rationing, etc. A researcher has correctly commented that the 'proscriptive nature of the Emergency Regulations detailed practically all aspects of life for the New Villagers.' Ultimately, the resettled villagers were pacified. This is different from saying that the British 'won their hearts and minds.' For the majority of the villagers maintained a distance between the British on the one hand and the Communists on the other. Consequently, the Communists were forced into a desperate search for recruits, money, information, food and other supplies.

When the Emergency broke out in 1948, there were ten regular infantry battalions and an estimated number of 8,000 police personnel in service. However, due to the Briggs Plan and the emphases given to restoring the law and order, the police force was rapidly expanded. At its peak between 1952 and 1953, the Emergency involved 67,000 police (22,200 regular police and 44,800 special constabulary). The police force also included the paramilitary Police Field Forces, the Federal Reserve Unit (who were trained

to fight urban riots), and the Special Branch in charge of intelligence gathering and psychological warfare. Ordinary Malaysians were also conscripted to serve with the Home Guard totalling 250,000–300,000 between 1952 and 1953. The Guard performed patrols and manned the checkpoints in the vicinity of their homes, as well as in the resettlement areas. Meanwhile, army units increased from 10 to 23 infantry battalions between 1948 and 1953.

By 1953, the guerrillas were clearly on the defensive and more were getting killed. As they withdrew into deeper jungle areas, the number of armed encounters between the guerrillas and British security forces dropped. Peace talks were conducted in Baling in 1955. When these talks failed and with no signs in sight of the Emergency coming to an end, more guerrillas surrendered to avoid being killed. The surrendered enemy personnel were subjected to interrogation by the Special Branch and facilitated the killing or surrendering of other guerrillas. A very successful propaganda war was also launched to entice those who were still holding out. Bit by bit, the peninsula was declared 'white' i.e. cleared of Communist influence. Under these circumstances, the remaining MCP forces withdrew to the Malaysian-Thailand border.

Meanwhile, as part of its law and order approach to security, the British also introduced political reforms leading to self-government. Efforts towards this end included sponsorship of political parties like the MCA, relaxation of citizenship requirement for non-Malays, the formation of a ministerial system of government wherein local leaders were nominated to positions in the Executive, and finally the introduction of elections at the local, and then national, levels. These various political developments dealt a severe ideological blow to the MCP which could no longer claim that it was fighting a war of national liberation.

Political Independence and Coercive Legalism

The introduction of these political reforms led to Independence in 1957. However, independence did not imply the ushering in of democracy. To preserve the existing approach to national security, a variety of measures developed during the Emergency (1948-60) was adapted to the post-colonial constitutional system of government. Firstly, special councils and committees overseeing internal security affairs continued to be maintained at the federal and state levels. As in the Briggs Plan, these committees

brought together civilian and security officials. The National Security Council was presided over by the Minister of Internal Security (previously Home Affairs), usually by the Prime Minister himself, or a trusted aide.

Secondly, under Article 150 of the Federal Constitution, far-reaching powers were made available to the government to rule without recourse to Parliament and elections. Four Emergencies have been proclaimed since the end of the 1948-60 Emergency. Two of these covered the country as a whole, while two others were specific to particular states. The two nation-wide Emergencies were proclaimed in 1964 when *konfrontasi* (literally, 'confrontation') broke out between Indonesia and Malaysia, and in 1969 following racial riots in Kuala Lumpur. On the latter occasion, parliament was suspended until early 1971. In 1966 Emergency rule was also declared in Sarawak to remove the chief minister of the state, while in 1977, the federal government proclaimed an Emergency in Kelantan after the PAS-dominated state government collapsed. Threat of proclaiming Emergency rule on several other occasions have also caused on-going conflicts to be ameliorated, as in Sabah between 1985 and 1986.

Thirdly, a plethora of coercive laws was also enacted as soon as the Emergency was officially declared in 1960. The most draconian of these laws was the Internal Security Act (1960) which allowed for preventive detention. Originally designed to be used against the MCP and those who were believed to advocate the use of violence to overthrow the government, it has subsequently been used to detain political opponents across the whole political spectrum, alleged Communists and Marxists, trade unionists, peasant leaders, student activists, Islamists, church workers, so-called racial chauvinists, opposition party leaders, NGO workers, and other dissidents, not to mention government members of parliament, secret society members, identity card and passport racketeers, counterfeiters, and smugglers of illegal aliens.

Below is an incomplete list of occasions when the ISA was resorted to and used to detain Malaysian citizens since the end of the Emergency:

- November 1960 to February 1961 against some 60 members of the Socialist Front (SF) suspected of ties with the communists;
- March to August 1962 against SF and Labour Party (LP) leaders who opposed the formation of Malaysia;
- 1962 to 1974 against suspected members of the so-called 'clandestine communist organisations' in Sarawak who had

opposed participation in the formation of Malaysia (which was viewed by critics in Sarawak as a 'neo-colonial plot');

- April 1967 against the Asahan and Triang Estate workers led by the Federation of Plantation Workers who went on strike and launched a 'long march' of workers from Negri Sembilan to Kuala Lumpur;
- 1968 against LP and *Parti Rakyat* (PR) leaders and supporters who were accused of belonging to the banned MCP and whose activities were said to 'threaten national security.' This led to a decision by SF leaders to boycott the upcoming 1969 election;
- May 1969 against opposition leaders including Lim Kit Siang
- January 1970 against two PR Pahang Assembly men (Zulkifli Ismail and Siva Subramaniam);
- November 1971 to 1973 against more than 200 people, mainly local workers and residents belonging to the LP and PR in Grik, Chemor and Kroh, and trade union leaders and members in Kedah, Perak, Penang and Selangor;
- 1974 against student activists in various campuses throughout Malaysia who demonstrated in support of urban squatters in Tasik Utara, Johore Bahru, and poor peasants who were apparently starving in Baling, Kedah;
- June 1976 against well-known aides of former premier Tun Razak who were accused of a plot to seize the leadership of UMNO. Apart from these aides, opposition leaders like Syed Husin Ali, Anwar Ibrahim, Razak Ahmad were also detained. (The arrests coincided with an intra-UMNO leadership struggle);
- November 1985 against 36 Muslim villagers in Memali, Baling District, led by Ibrahim Libya who, allegedly was involved in deviant Islamic teachings. (Ibrahim was killed in the November assault);
- 1986 against the nomadic Penans in Sarawak who set up blockades to prevent logging companies from encroaching into their traditional lands;
- October 1987 *Operasi Lalang* ('Operation Lalang') involving the detention of 106 citizens including opposition politicians, NGO

activists, church workers, etc. (These arrests coincided with another round of intra-UMNO leadership struggle);

- January 1991 against four leaders of then opposition *Parti Bersatu Sabah* who were allegedly involved in plans to secede from Malaysia;
- September 1994 against Ashaari Muhammad, the leader of Darul-Arqam, allegedly a 'Muslim deviationist movement' whose success posed a challenge to UMNO. Later in August 1996, another 18 Arqam leaders were arrested;
- 1997 against 10 Shiah Muslims who were accused of threatening security;
- September 1998 against former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, and then other *reformasi* activists who supported him. (These arrests coincided with yet another round of intra-UMNO leadership struggle);
- July 2000 against the al-Ma'unah, a militant Islamic group, who allegedly stole arms from a military camp, and were involved in a stand-off with the military in Sauk, Perak;
- Feb 2001 against the *Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia* which allegedly had ties with the *Jemaah Islamiah*, supposedly al-Qaeda's proxy in the Southeast Asian region; and
- April 2001, arrest of 10 *Parti Keadilan* and *reformasi* activists following UMNO's poor performance in the 1999 election.

The ISA was enacted under Article 149 of the Malaysian Constitution which allowed for a law to be enacted even if it contravened various other constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of the subject under Article 5. Under Section 73 of the ISA, the police may detain anyone for interrogation for 60 days on the suspicion that "he or she acted or is about to act or is likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof." It is well known that the 60 days of preventive detention could be living in a 'chamber of horrors.' From various accounts of former ISA detainees, treatment could vary from actual physical torture to psychological humiliation and disorientation. At the end of the 60 days, further detention of extendable two-year terms have to be authorised by the Minister of Home Affairs, as provided under Section 8 of the ISA. The charges against the detainees, often based on the extracted confessions, are

then specified in a Detention Order (DO). In theory, these charges could be challenged in court through *habeas corpus* proceedings, but such action has become futile following the amendment of the ISA in 1989.

Even if the detainee takes no further legal recourse, he or she comes up for review by an Advisory Board to the Home Minister every six months. But the Board's advice is not binding on the Minister. In practice, the work of the Board has become farcical and the experience of ex-detainees shows a reversing of the legal process whereby a political decision usually determines a release, which is then rubber-stamped by the Board. The Board may also recommend unconditional or conditional release. However, the conditional release makes a mockery of the word 'release,' for the Restricted Order (RO) authorising the release amounts to house arrest. There have been cases when former detainees have been restricted to a particular town which s/he may not leave without the written permission of the police. Monthly reports to the police are invariably required too. But in other cases, the former detainees may also be prevented from leaving the house, or restricted to the house at night. At any rate, all detainees are prevented from speaking publicly, attending any meeting which is political in nature, writing, preparing, printing or distributing articles or cassettes which are political in nature, or to allow their houses to be used for political gatherings.

The ISA has been in existence for more than 40 years and amended several times giving it more bite each time. With the 1989 review, there is no more recourse to judicial review in *habeas corpus* hearings. Henceforth, no judge is allowed to adjudicate on the discretion of the Home Minister to determine whether a political detainee is a security threat or not. Yet this law, it should be understood, is not a piece of emergency legislation. It is important to recognize that it has become permanently entrenched in the statute books and is part of the ordinary law.

The simple truth is that the ISA is a subversive law. For it subverts natural justice which demands that any person accused of a crime should have the right to due process, and to be presumed innocent until convicted in a court of law. Moreover, the ISA also subverts the process by which people may be held legally accountable for their action. Under the ISA, an accusation precedes the investigation. Worst of all, judgment is passed by mere accusation. Moreover, the ISA subverts the checks and balances that are critical to the fair maintenance of the rule of law. Under the ISA, the

Table 1: Legal Restrictions on Human Liberties and Freedoms

Constitutional Provision	Right of Freedom	Legislative Restriction
Article 5	Liberty of the person	Internal Security Act, 1960; Restricted Residence Enactment (CAP.39; Sec. 117 Criminal Procedure Code (CAP.6)
Article 6	Protection against slavery and forced labour	Essential (Self-Reliance) Regulations, 1975; National Service Ordinance
Article 9	Protection against banishment; freedom of movement	ISA 1960; Banishment Act 1948; Immigration Acts, 1959 and 1963
Article 10(1)(a)	Freedom of speech and expression	Sedition Act, 1948 (and Amendments, 1971); Official Secrets Act, 1972 (and Amendments 1986); Printing Presses and Publishing Act, 1948 (amendments 1988); Control of Imported Publications Act, 1959
Article 10(1)(b)	Freedom of peaceful assembly	Public Order (Preservation) Ord, 1958; Police Act, 1967 (and Amendments, 1988)
Article 10(1)(c)	Freedom of association	Trade Unions Act, 1959 (and 1980 and 1989 Amendments); Societies Act 1966 (and 1981 Amendments); University and University Colleges Act, 1971 (and 1975 Amendments) – Discipline of Students Rules and Discipline of Staff Rules
Article 10(1)(c)	Freedom of association and right to industrial action, including strike	Essential (Prohibition of Strikes and Prescribed Industrial Actions) Regulations, 1965; Industrial Relations Act, 1967 (and Amendments, 1971 and 1975)
Article 121	Principle of judicial review	Amendments to Article 121, 1988; Amendments to ISA, 1988; Amendments to ISA, 1989

Minister of Home Affairs and his police make up the arresting officers, the prosecutors, the judges and the executioners, a 'four-in-one' system that they justify under 'national security.' In fact, these features amount to arbitrary executive rule not unlike what one expects in an authoritarian regime and under military rule.

Table 1 presents a list of the coercive laws and how they restrict human liberties and freedoms provided for in the Constitution.

It is clear from the brief survey that the Malaysian state uses coercive laws to curb the rights and liberties of its citizens. These restrictions generally associated with authoritarian and military rule, in fact, have become part of the ordinary law of the land in Malaysia on the grounds of preserving national security. On account of this, these coercive laws have acquired a sense of legitimacy. As a consequence, the ISA and other coercive laws have instilled a culture of fear among the Malaysians to such an extent that even when they agree that they live under conditions akin to authoritarian or military rule, most are too afraid to voice their protest or do something about it.

Police Power and the Judicial Process

The role of the Police continues to be all-encompassing. Article 3(3) of the *Police Act 1967* describes the duties of the police as follows: the maintenance of law and order; the preservation of the peace and security of the Federation; the prevention and detection of crime; the apprehension and prosecution of offenders; and the collection of security intelligence. Apart from the above, the Police Officer's duties range from assisting in the laws relating to revenue, excise, sanitation, quarantine, immigration, regulation to controlling traffic, inspecting vehicles and erecting road barriers, regulating assemblies, meetings and processions; and even regulating the playing of music and other performances in public places; the displaying of flags, banners, placards, etc. In all these, the Police Officers act under the control of the Inspector General of Police, who reports to the Minister of Internal Security.

With so much power vested in the Executive and the Police, invariably, there has been a spill over of such concentration of power onto the judicial process and criminal proceedings as well. This connection between the two branches of government is facilitated via the office of the Attorney-General (AG) who is the chief law officer and legal advisor to the government. By virtue of Article 145(3) of the Constitution, the AG is given sole authority and discretion to institute, conduct or discontinue any criminal proceedings. Acting as the Public Prosecutor, he has control and direction over all criminal prosecutions. In this task, he works closely with the Police who provide him with the necessary information and facts of the cases. In fact, in the Malaysian Magistrates and Sessions Courts, police officers with the rank of Senior Inspector and above often are delegated the authority to

conduct the prosecution of offenders. In turn, the Police, under the Criminal Procedures Code, are given wide powers to question, arrest, search, apprehend and lock up any person. In small towns, it is likely that the police officer who conducts the arrest is also responsible for questioning the detainee, investigating the case to determine the charge, and conducting the prosecution in Court.

Given this overlapping of roles, there is unnecessary opportunity for the Police to abuse their powers. This is especially so because Malaysia's adversarial (instead of an inquisitorial) system of criminal justice eggs on the prosecutor to obtain a confession from the offender/suspect so that the prosecutor will win the case. In this regard, the use of violence against the arrested suspects is not surprising.

Surprisingly, however, there has been an increasing number of complaints about the abuse of power by the Police. It was the Deputy Minister of Internal Security who revealed in Parliament in April 1999 that 635 people had been shot dead by the Police between 1989 and 1999. That revelation had sparked concern by human rights groups and concerned individuals including Raja Aziz Addruse, the former president of the Bar Council, who on behalf of another human rights group Hakam, expressed concern that the police appeared 'trigger-happy.' For that, Raja Aziz was admonished by then Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohammed for undermining the reputation of the police. Yet, it should be recalled that it was during this time, in September 1998, that former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim was assaulted by then IGP, Rahim Noor, while in police custody. Had it not been for the tell-tale signs of a black eye and other bruises, which caused the Court to order an inquiry into the matter when Anwar was presented in court, Anwar's assault would not have come to light at all. For the entire police force had initially denied that assault and battery had taken place.

It was also during this time that the police was accused of using excessive force to quell peaceful street demonstrations opposing Anwar's detention and calling for *reformasi*. This was also the concern of Suhakam, the National Human Rights Commission, after it had completed investigation of several such demonstrations. It was on account of these events and the statistics presented by the Deputy Minister that the reputation of the police suffered a setback.

It appears that the situation has not improved. Suhakam's 342-page *Annual Report 2003* noted that 425 inmates had died during 2002 up till July 2003. It also claimed that another 18 people had died while in police custody in 2002. Meanwhile, Suaram (2003) elaborated on many cases and highlighted in its *Human Right Report 2002* a slight increase in reported deaths of criminal suspects while in police custody: 6 in 2000, 10 in 2001, and 18 in 2002. Many of these victims, Suaram noted, were young and not well aware of their rights. Some were also foreigners, including illegal immigrants.

In fact, in December 2001, Suhakam, concerned with the numbers of deaths of suspects while in police custody, had recommended in its *Rights of the Remand Prisoners Report* certain guidelines to be followed so as to avoid complications and allegations of police brutality. It appears that that Report, just like its Annual Reports submitted to Parliament, has been ignored by the powers-that-be.

More recently Suhakam Commissioner Datuk K C Vohrah, a former judge, has further voiced further concern over the increasing number of 'road show remands' where detainees are moved from one police lock-up to another. He recommends that magistrates carefully scrutinise applications for remand and not merely grant them at the request of the investigating police officer. In this manner, the police would be prevented from circumventing Section 17 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which only allows a maximum remand of 14 days. Vohrah further recommended that "the magistrates should also inquire into the welfare of the detained persons to ensure that no abuse had taken place."

In March 2004, just before the general election, the new Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi set up a Special Commission of Enquiry to investigate the workings of the police force and to examine allegations of their abuse of power. Thus far, however, it does not appear that the setting up of the Commission has allayed the public distrust of the Police. For it has interpreted its role as one of assisting to reform the Police conduct rather than investigating specific cases of assault and deaths.

Meanwhile, following the publicity given to the increased numbers of killings of suspects while in police custody and while being arrested, the Inspector General of Police announced that the police would investigate all deaths in police custody and complete investigations within a month. Public inquests would be held to determine the causes of death. The family of the

deceased could engage in counsel to represent their interests. Detainees would also be told in writing why they are being held and they would also be allowed access to family members and lawyers.

Indeed, in cases involving ordinary citizens, it has virtually been impossible to prove that the assault has actually taken place since no witnesses (and these can only be other police officers present) are forthcoming. The highly centralised Police system in Malaysia might facilitate greater efficiency and co-ordination between units, but it also works against investigation of Police misconduct, corruption, and the illegal use of force. There is nobody in authority responsible for policing the police.

Changes in Strategic Thinking and the Role of MAF: Towards Militarisation?

The discussion so far in this chapter has been on the role of the police and the use of coercive legalism to maintain the BN government's notion of national security. In fact, there has been a shift in Malaysia's strategic policy on two occasions, on account of some internal as well as external political and security developments in recent decades. These changes have led to increased funds for the military to the extent that it is now, for the first time since independence, larger in size than the police force. The implications of this change for the pre-eminent role of the police in matters concerning national security are not yet clear.

Following Independence in 1957, the Anglo-Malaya Agreement on External Defence was put in place. There were also arrangements that required the governments of Britain, Australia and New Zealand to 'make their forces available for Emergency operations.' It was because of the availability of these Commonwealth forces that there was no particular necessity to develop the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) even after Independence. In fact, the same Commonwealth forces played a more important role than the MAF in fighting Indonesia during the *konfrontasi* years in the early 1960s.

An initial change in strategic thinking occurred in the 1970s due to a coincidence of several events. Following the race riots on 13 May 1969 in Kuala Lumpur, which coincided with the British government's decision to withdraw its forces east of Suez, – which further meant that the Anglo-Malayan Agreement would be terminated in 1971 – the MAF embarked on an expansion programme. Due to the fall of the US-backed Saigon regime

in 1975, and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1978, a more comprehensive expansion plan than the one originally anticipated was designed. There was a belief and fear that the Vietnamese communists might turn their attention to the Southeast Asian countries like Thailand and Malaysia. The MCP, it was further believed, would be spurred into action mounting new challenges to the Malaysian government. These fears and concerns led to the launching of PERISTA (*Pembesaran Istimewa Tentera* or Armed Forces Special Expansion Programme).

There were two aspects to PERISTA. Firstly, there was a marked expansion and modernisation of the armed forces. New equipment and weapons were procured and defence spending soared. It appeared that the MAF was preparing itself to fight a conventional war without letting up on its counter-insurgency capabilities.

Secondly, a significant change in the ethnic make-up of the security forces also occurred. The MAF has been dominated by the army whose highest officers came from the Royal Malay Regiment (RMR), which traces its origins back to the experimental corps set up under the patronage of the Malay rulers in 1934. As its name implies, the RMR is completely made up of Malays and has been an important symbol of Malay sovereignty in multi-ethnic Malaysia. Under the expansion exercise, the Malay Regiment expanded rapidly from 10 to 16 battalions in 1969-70, and then grew up to 26 battalions by the mid-1980s. Although there was also a growth of the multi-ethnic Ranger forces from five to ten battalions, nonetheless, it was clear that the purpose of the army's expansion was to back up the government in the event of another communal conflict. In the National Operations Council Report on the 13 May 1969 riots, it was revealed that Malays then comprised 64.5 percent of the MAF officer corps. The Malay Regiment, of course, was entirely Malay. Malays also made up 50 percent of the officers in the multi-ethnic Ranger battalions. In 1981, following the expansion programme, Malays comprised 75 percent of the MAF's entire officer corps. Estimates suggest that the Malay composition has increased even more since then due to the declining numbers of Chinese and Indian recruits. Nowadays, the Malays hold all top ranks as well.

A second change in the strategic thinking occurred in the 1980s, again, due to a combination of several factors. First, due to the economic downturn in 1985, a freeze and review of the expansion programme was conducted. Fortuitously, Perestroika and Glasnost were also underway in the

Soviet Union which meant that Moscow was unlikely to provide material support to Hanoi. Fears of Vietnamese expansionism proved to be unfounded. More than that, in tandem with the impending collapse of Communism, initiatives were also taken to reach a truce with the MCP to cease all hostilities. A truce was actually reached in 1989.

The current Defence Minister, Naguib Tun Razak (1995: 59), considers this peace accord with the MCP a watershed in the development of the MAF. For it has allowed the MAF 'to fully concentrate on developing a full-fledge conventional force without, at the same time, neglecting our expertise on counter-insurgency warfare.' Consequently, the ambitious PERISTA plans were revised. The planned construction of new bases in northern Malaysia was postponed. From a threat focus, there was instead a re-positioning of the military to assume a 'general deterrence posture.'

Still, the Malaysian army has expanded from about 53,000 persons in the early 1970s to more than 100,000 by 1989. By 1997, this figure had further increased to 110,000 regulars plus 40,000 reserves. Although defence spending fell in the second half of the 1980s, the Malaysian government signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Kingdom in 1988 to purchase more military hardware including Tornado fighter bombers and the Rapier anti-aircraft defence system. This was followed by purchases of a computer command and control system, MIG-29s and F/A-18 fighter jets, LEKIU-class frigates and offshore patrol boats.

It was against this expansion and modernisation of the MAF, and its re-posturing in the wake of the collapse of Communism, that the new doctrine of 'comprehensive security' emerged in the 1990s. It is noteworthy that the Malaysian defence policy paper *Malaysian Defence* (1997) identifies the four main threats to the region as (i) overlapping claims and territorial disputes, (ii) pollution and congestion in the Straits of Malacca (iii) piracy; and (iv) illegal immigration. These are non-traditional, or small 's' sources of security concerns, none of which having an overt military dimension

In this regard, it is useful to investigate how 'national security' has been redefined more recently. Then Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad stated: "National security is inseparable from political stability, economic success and social harmony" and that "the first line of defence lies in Malaysia's national resilience." Writing in 1995, the Deputy Chief of the Army stated that National security *inter alia* meant the 'preservation of our way of life and national core values' from external and internal threats. As

such the dimensions of national security includes 'regime maintenance, territorial security, political security, economic security and technological security, as well as security from external military threats.'

In line with this re-definition of national security as 'comprehensive security,' the expansion of the armed forces was to be accompanied by preparing Malaysia for 'total defence' which involves mobilising the military, economic, social and psychological power of the country. Concretely this implied consolidating a core force consisting of the active armed services, a framework force comprising citizens who can be rapidly mobilised in an emergency, a comprehensive industrial and commercial infrastructure oriented towards defence needs, and the ability to call for outside assistance whenever necessary.

Ironically, a conventional process of militarisation has become more evident in Malaysia. For instance, reserve officer training units have been established in all the public universities during the 1990s (Naguib 1995: 6-10). A compulsory national service scheme for all youths was introduced in 2004. Absentees have been threatened with arrest. An arms industry and even an aerospace industry has been systematically developed since the 1990s. 'Defence exhibitions' have been regularly held in Malaysia in the last few years. And whereas in the 1970s until the 1990s, the government systematically recruited Malays into the armed services, they have more recently, encouraged the recruitment of more non-Malays.

This latter change to recruit more non-Malays is probably a response to the latest threat to Malaysia and the region following September 11 and President Bush's declaration of a war on terrorism. There is now concern not only over the growing instability in the region (in Aceh and West Papua in Indonesia, in Southern Philippines, and in Southern Thailand), but also about the apparent growth of Islamic radicalism in Malaysia. Some Islamic activists are allegedly linked to the *Jemaah Islamiyy* (the Al-Qaeda's) proxy in Southeast Asia. For the first time in Malaysia's history, the majority of the detainees held under the ISA are Muslims suspected of having ties with various local or regional radical Muslim groups. Under the circumstances, it makes sense to recruit more non-Malays, who are mostly non-Muslims, into the security forces.

Additionally, Malaysia's Defence Minister, who is also the new Deputy Prime Minister, has called for a nuanced rethinking of Malaysia's Defence Policy. He proposes that the "military should play a larger role in ASEAN

affairs, in concert with other diplomatic proposals.” For him the time has come “for the defence establishment to get together on a regular basis within the ASEAN context, informally to begin with and eventually to take a much more formal surrounding.” His related proposal pertains to the MAF. Noting that the police force is limited in numbers as well as possessing a limited capability and capacity, he claims that the government has given the military “specific roles to guard and monitor remote resorts, as well as to play a much more strategic role.” He further states: “While continuing with our modernisation programme, with the emerging trend towards a low-intensity conflict (LIC), there is a need to re-visit our emphasis... We need to study the full array of the manifestations of LIC, including urban warfare. The threats emanating from LIC must also be carefully studied and perhaps, a dedicated force be structured, and obviously, equipped in order to meet this kind of threat.”

The expansion of the military under PERISTA has placed them ahead of the police for the first time in Malaysia’s history. In 2004, there are an estimated 140,000 personnel in the MAF as compared with 86, 000 in the Police Force. The equipment which the MAF has procured over the past decades following Malaysia’s adoption of a conventional strategic doctrine also put them ahead of their police counterparts. It now appears that the military might be called upon to play additional new roles in the future to combat new regional threats. However, expansion of the MAF does not suggest that they might play an increased role in politics in the future. The UMNO leaders will continue to dominate over the military as they have done in the past. Although the notion of national security has undergone a re-definition, it does not appear that there will be letting up on the part of the police the use of coercive laws to maintain the BN’s grip over Malaysia’s civil society.

Conclusion

The absence of ethno-religious violence in multi-ethnic Malaysia is not simply on account of its consociationalism or some other measures of elite accommodation. Nor does the BN government’s successful management of the economy, which has contributed to Malaysia’s emergence as a second-generation NIC, explain this Malaysian enigma. It is these two factors *plus* the consolidation of the BN’s ‘national security state’ which explains the political stability and relative absence of ethno-religious conflict in the

country. Indeed, several available studies already describe Malaysia as a 'quasi democracy' or a 'semi-democracy.' These studies have also highlighted how the BN state resorts to 'coercive legalism or 'rule by Law' to maintain its power.

The special contribution of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, we related this coercive legalism to the enhanced role of the Police in the Malaysian polity. Secondly, we focused attention on the consolidation of a national security state in Malaysia even when civilian rule has been the norm since 1957. The origins of this national security state were traced to the Emergency when the communist insurrection was viewed first and foremost as a 'law and order' problem, rather than a military one. From that period onwards, the priority was given to establishing the authority of the government over the rural squatters via comprehensive administrative measures, the introduction of legal means to deal harshly with those who resisted, and the offer of some sod to those who obeyed. The resettling and regrouping of more than half a million people via a mixture of these mechanisms facilitated the defeat of the Communists.

Although the Communist insurrection was brought to an end and independence was achieved, democratisation did not really follow. Under the rubric of preserving national security, various restrictions on civil liberties and comprehensive penetration of the state into civil society were embedded into the Malaysian political process in the form of a coercive legalism as epitomised in the Internal Security Act and other restrictive laws. As shown in this chapter, the ISA has been used time and time again to detain not only the alleged Communist subversives, but also critics, dissidents and criminals as well. Thus, to maintain power, the BN has resorted not only to legitimise itself via the delivery of economic goods, but also by means of the use of coercive legalism in which the Police has played an indispensable role, not unlike the role played by the military elsewhere in the region.

The powers vested in the Executive and the Police, invariably, spilled over to the judicial process and even the conduct of criminal proceedings. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Police nowadays has the power to question, arrest, search, apprehend and lock up any person suspected of any wrong-doing. Indeed, in small towns, the Police is also responsible for questioning the detainee, investigating the case to determine the charge, and conducting the prosecution in Court. The end result has been an abuse of

these powers as charged by the detainees, human rights group and the semi-official Human Rights Commission of Malaysia.

Finally, in view of the end of the Cold War and the demise of the MCP, a shift in the Malaysian strategic thinking has occurred; from fighting counter-insurgency to developing a 'general deterrence posture.' For the first time, the military appears to have been given more attention than the Police. Even then, it is inconceivable that the military will intervene in politics unless the UMNO's domination of politics or Malay sovereignty is threatened. At any rate, the military leaders are part of the same Malay ruling elite which dominates the UMNO. Meanwhile, coercive legalism and the extended role of the Police remain adequate for maintaining the UMNO/BN rule. To put it another way, Malaysia will remain in civilian hands, and militarisation by other means will continue in the foreseeable future.

NOTES:

- 1 Robert Rau, "The role of the Armed Forces and Police in Malaysia," in *The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies*, eds. Olsen and Stephen Jurika Jr. (Boulder: Westview Press): 1986; Leonard Sebastian, "Ending an Armed Struggle Without Surrender: The Demise of the Communist Party of Malaya 1979-1989 and the Aftermath," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* vol. 13, no. 3 (1991): 271-298; Derek Da Cunha, "Major Asian Powers and the Development of the Singaporean and Malaysian Armed Forces," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* vol. 13, no. 1 (1991): 57-71; Richard Stubbs, "Malaysian Defence Policy: Strategy versus Structure," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* vol. 13, no. 1 (1991): 44-55; J.N. Mak. *ASEAN Defence Reorientation 1975-1992: The Dynamics of Modernisation and Structural Change*. (Canberra: Australian National University Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1993), especially chap. 10; Md Noor Arshad Che. "The Military Dimensions of National Security," *Strategic Journal of Strategic Studies and International Relations* vol. 3 (1995): 1-8; Abdul Razak Mohamad Najib, "Keynote Address delivered at the Air Power Conference held on October 17, 1994," in *Strategic Journal of Strategic Studies and International Relations*, vol. 3 (1995): 55-62; and Russ Swinerton, "Malaysia's Security Environment and Strategic Responses," in *Malaysian Economics and Politics in the New Century*, eds. C. Barlow and Francis K W, Loh (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003), 75-89.
- 2 Haji Ahmad Zakaria, "Malaysia," in *Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia*, eds. Haji Ahmad Zakaria and Harold Crouch (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), 118-135; and 1985 and Wariya Chamil, "Leadership Change and Security in Malaysia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* vol. 3 (1989): 160-185.
- 3 Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1985).

- 4 Francis K W Loh, *Beyond the Tin Mines* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1998), 68-72.
- 5 W Case, "Semi Democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change," *Pacific Affairs* vol. 66, no. 2 (1993): 183-205; Harold Crouch, *Government and Society in Malaysia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996); James Jesudason, "The Sycretic State and the Structuring of Opposition Politics in Malaysia," in *Political Oppositions in Industrializing Asia*, ed G Rodan (London: Rutledge), 128 – 160; and Haji Ahmad Zakaria, "Malaysia: Quasi Democracy in a Divided Society," in *Democracy in Developing Countries* vol. 3, eds. L Diamond, J Linz and S Lipset (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner): 347-381.
- 6 This section is based on Francis K W, Loh (1988): chap. 3 and 4; and Anthony Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960* (London: Frederick Muller Ltd, 1975): chap. 8 and 9.
- 7 R Renick, "The Emergency Regulations of Malaysia – Its Cause and Effects," *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, vol. 6, no. 2 (1965): 1-39.
- 8 However, the problem of land hunger remained unaddressed. Semi-permanent tenure was only offered for dwelling lots within the new villages and not for agricultural plots outside. New problems associated with a lack of employment opportunities and the inability of the villages to become economically viable emerged in the following decades. See Francis K W, Loh (1988): chap. 5 and 6.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 11.
- 10 It is now clear from the memoirs of Chin Peng, the MCP leader, that the resettlement process was the critical turning point for the communists. See CC Chin and Karl Hack., eds. *Dialogues with Chin Peng: New Light on the Malaysian Communist Party* (Singapore: Singapore University Press), 2004.
- 11 *Ibid.*, 16 and 32.
- 12 P. Ramakrishna, "Abuse of Power under the ISA," *Aliran Monthly* vol. 21, no. 11/12 (2001): 2-9.
- 13 Incomplete list drawn from Soong Kua Kia, *445 Days Under Operation Lalang* (Kuala Lumpur: Oriengroup, 2000) and Yong Koh Swe, *Malaysia: 45 Years Under the ISA* (Petaling Jaya: Strategic Info Research Development, 2004).
- 14 Parts of the following discussion have been extracted from Johan Saravanamuttu et al., "The Pitfalls of Nicdom," *Asian Exchange* vol. 8, no. 1/2 (no date), Kua, (2000) and SUARAM, *Malaysia Human Rights Report*. (Petaling Jaya: Suaram Komunikasi, 2003).
- 15 See Kia Soong Kua, (2000); P. Ramakrishna, (2001): 6-7; and Anil Netto, "No PM, There is Torture in Malaysia," vol. 24, no. 6 (2004) for some examples of how detainees are 'turned over' or 'neutralised' and so-called 'confessions' extracted from them to vindicate the arrests. Such confessions are then televised nationwide.
- 16 This amendment occurred in the wake of several *habeas corpus* hearings undertaken by *Operasi Lalang* detainees in 1987-88. In March 1988, the Ipoh High Court had ordered the release of opposition leader Karpal Singh on the grounds that his detention order contained a grave error, that the Home Minister had shown a 'cavalier attitude' tantamount to *mala fide* or bad faith. In a blatant travesty of justice, the government re-arrested Karpal Singh some eight hours later as he was on his way home. In late July 1988, the Supreme Court upheld the government's appeal against the Ipoh High Court decision in an *ex post facto* justification of Karpal's re-arrest.

- 17 P. Ramakrishna, (2001): 2-9.
- 18 Additional powers had been granted to the Home Minister earlier in 1975 in the form of the Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations (ESCAR) which allows for the removal of certain safeguards contained in the Criminal Procedure Code allowing witnesses to give evidence in camera and in a manner not visible to the accused or counsel, and the Public Prosecutor to authorize the police to intercept mail, articles, telegrams, telexes, and to tap telephones for vital information, in relation to a security offence.
- 19 Johan Saravanamuttu et al., (October 1992): 13-48.
- 20 This section is based on Kandiah Chelliah, "Just, How Just: The Role of the Police, Public Prosecutor and Courts," *INSAF The Journal of Malaysian Bar* vol. 27 no. 4 (1998): 20-52.
- 21 Cited in SUARAM, (2003).
- 22 A case in point is that of 24-year old G Francis Udayapan who disappeared from police custody on April 18 until discovered dead several days later. The police claimed that he escaped from his holding cell, jumped into a river, and drowned. However, his mother believes that he died while in police custody.

A few weeks later, lawyer P Uthayakumar who heads the Police Watch and Human Rights Committee, and was acting on behalf of the mother, was beaten and assaulted at gunpoint. When he asked for 24-hour police protection, his request was denied. On May 20, Uthayakumar, believing that the police were behind his assault, left for the United Kingdom seeking temporary asylum. He did not return until the Prime Minister announced that his safety would be ensured and that the IGP had been put in charge of the Udayapan case.
- 23 In a similar spirit, another Suhakam Commissioner voiced concern on 'whipping demonstrations being conducted in schools to deter students from crime. The Commissioner commented: "It could lead to confusing children that using force on their peers – whether in retaliation or punishment – was legitimate." Indeed, such demonstrations could also "cause unforeseen indirect psychological impact which may cause emotional injury to the students," besides being contrary to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Malaysia acceded to in 1995, as well as other UN Conventions and Covenants. See *The Star*, 28 May 2004.
- 24 See *Asia Times*, 4 June 2004 and Francis K W Loh, "Whither Public Security in Malaysia," *Aliran Monthly* vol. 21, no. 6 (2004): 2-9.
- 25 See *The Star*, 9 June 2004.
- 26 Harold Crouch, (1996): 135.
- 27 Compared to the MAF, the police was then more multi-ethnic in composition. In 1968 it was estimated that Malays made up only 45.1 percent of police officers and some 39 percent of the entire police force. Malay participation increased sharply during the 1970s and 1980s. By 1989, non-Malays made up only 30-40 percent of the officers. Chinese made up only 4.6 percent of the entire force of 76,000. This continued to fall in the 1990s. *Ibid.*, 137.
- 28 Following this truce, the communist guerrillas were resettled in the so-called "peace villages" on the Thai-side of the border.

- 29 The last two items were purchased in keeping with the new deterrence posture which meant that the navy would play an increasing role in defending Malaysia's maritime interests, while combating increased smuggling, piracy and illegal immigration into Malaysia. Significantly, Malaysia has ordered two French submarines which it hopes will be delivered in 2005.
- 30 Md Noor Arshad Che, (1995): 2.
- 31 Ibid., 6.
- 32 Abdul Rajakl Mohamad Najib, (2001): 84.
- 33 Ibid., (2001): 83.
- 34 Ibid., (2001): 84.
- 35 See *The Sun*, 16 June 2004 and *New Straits Times*, 4 July 2004.
- 36 Traditionally, there exists very close ties between UMNO political leaders and the top army officers. For example, General Tunku Osman Jawa, the first Malaysian chief of general staff and then the chief of armed forces staff, was the nephew of Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia's first Prime Minister (PM). The chief of general staff, Major General Abdul Hamid Bidin, was related to Tunku's deputy, Tun Abdul Razak, who became Malaysia's second PM after the 1969 communal riots. Razak's former classmate, General Ungku Nazaruddin Ungku Mohamed, was then promoted as the Chief of General Staff during Razak's tenure as PM in the early 1970s. In 1981, just before he stepped down as Malaysia's third PM, Hussein Onn promoted his brother-in-law, General Ghazali Seth, as Chief of the Armed Forces staff, and his brother, Lt. General Jaafar Onn, as Deputy Chief of Staff of the army. In 1983, Mahathir, Malaysia's fourth PM, replaced Jaafar Onn and appointed Lt. General Hashim Mohamed Ali, his brother-in-law, to the same post. Hashim was also a brother of both the Governor of the Central Bank and the Menteri Besar of the state of Selangor. Mahathir later promoted Hashim to command the army and in 1987 to head the MAF. See Harold Crouch, (1996): 136 and Wariya Chamil, (1989).

The leading UMNO figures and the heads of the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the armed forces and the police hold similar values, orientations, educational backgrounds, and life-styles. Many had their origins in the old Malay upper-class families, while others from less elevated backgrounds had been recruited into the elite after receiving an English-language education, adjusting their outlook and life-styles to suit their new status. In other words, the officer corps was part of a relatively homogeneous Malay elite. See Harold Crouch (1996): 19-20 and 136.

Unless UMNO's domination of politics, and hence Malay sovereignty, is threatened, it is inconceivable that the military will intervene in politics.

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JAPAN

Militarisation of a Pacifist State

Kinhide Mushakoji

Introduction: Post-Defeat Pacifism of Japan and its Erosion

The militarisation of Japan is now developing full speed with the adoption by the Japanese Diet of a series of new laws aimed at militarising the country. Japan, a country which has claimed to be a pacifist nation and is repentant of its past history of military expansion, is also proud of being the only nation to have experienced the 'atom bomb' in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The greater the efforts by the ruling elite to militarise the country, the stronger has been the pacifist conviction of the nation which in 1947, adopted a 'Peace' constitution, to renounce the use of military force for solving international conflicts, and the need for constituting a military force.

Now, after a little more than fifty years, the Japanese government, a majority coalition of the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), and the Komei Party, wants to abrogate the 'Peace' Constitution. Even before doing so, the government, often ignoring due process, has passed a series of laws preparing Japan for becoming a 'normal state,' that is, one which does not renounce the use of military means and the possession of military force. In other words, the government wants Japan, a pacifist state, to be turned into a militarist state. This chapter will examine how the Japanese government, through a combination of different long-term and short-term conditions, has adopted this path with the support of the elite – a path that a large segment of the public views as not only unethical, but also unrealistic.

Since the 1950s, there has been a persistent trend within the Right wing of the LDP towards abrogating the 'Peace' Constitution. However, this faction was not strong enough to question the legitimacy of the 'Peace' Constitution. Nor could it gather the necessary two-thirds majority in the Diet to pass a resolution to abrogate the Constitution. However, in the 1990s, after the end of the cold war, when the rest of the world was demilitarising, Japan took an opposite course towards militarisation. This was because Japan had been accustomed, during the cold war, to take international decisions always in terms of its alliance with the United States. The end of the cold war was not perceived as an end to potential East-West conflagration and the opening of a peaceful age, but rather as the end of bi-polarity, leaving to the Government of Japan's ally, the unipolar hegemon, the task of satisfying Japan's security expectations.

After a brief interregnum of non-LDP coalition governments, when some efforts were made to re-orient Japanese diplomacy away from its dependence on the US-Japan axis, the return of the LDP-led coalition government brought back Japan to its fixation on the US. The abrogation of its Constitution became a target for the Diet which had now secured the necessary two-thirds majority. This change was the result of the adoption of a revised electoral law, based on a limited electoral system allowing for only one representative per constituency. This enabled the LDP to eliminate the opposition representatives who had been, till the end of the 1980s, elected with less votes than the LDP candidates. The defenders of the 'Peace' Constitution although numerous were always outnumbered by the LDP candidates supported by local political bosses who were receiving in return locally profitable projects to improve the infrastructure of the local economy. The 1990s saw a new electoral system, tilting the political balance in favour of support for local interests to the detriment of support for a broader national ideal represented by the pacifism of the Constitution.

The new electoral system influenced the composition of the Japanese Diet, both the Lower and the Upper Houses, and made it possible for those who wanted to de-pacify Japan to go further in their attempt to abrogate the Constitution. This trend was, unfortunately, accompanied by another, which we may call 'constitutional scepticism.' Since the 1950s, the Japanese citizens had been accustomed to seeing Japan militarising itself in real terms, while declaring its faith in the 'Peace' Constitution. Since Japan was not supposed to have any military forces, it created Police Reserve Forces (*Keisatsu Yobi-*

tai). It then formed a 'Self Defence Forces,' the budget of which kept increasing, making Japan one of the most militarised countries in terms of the military budget.

Till the end of the cold war following the fall of the Soviet Empire, Japan retained the dualistic state constitutionalism adopted in the 1950s. Under this constitutional dualism, Japan played the formal role of a 'pacifist state' under the 1947 'Peace' Constitution adopted under Occupation as the first and only victim of the nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki while militarising itself informally under increasing pressure from the United States. Japan could not continue this constitutional dualism in the international environment of the post-cold war age. In East Asia Japan faced the same problem that the United States confronted after the fall of the Soviet Union. Just as the United States needed a new enemy and forged the concept of the 'rogue states,' Japan needed a threat which could replace the old enemy – an eventual Soviet invasion. Thus, the Japanese government and its faithful ally, the Japanese press, invented a new threat, called the DPRK or 'North Korea.' This country, already labelled by the US as one of the rogue states, was believed to engage in developing a new missile system targeted across the Pacific. This Tepodon missile gave Japan an appropriate pretext to continue to rely on the American nuclear umbrella, even after the disappearance of Soviet threat.

Japan soon found another new source of threat. The transnational criminal organisations and the global terrorists – identified first by the United States as a 'new threat' and then by the G7 – also became a major concern of the so far peaceful and unprotected Japan. The globalisation of migrant labour helped create an awareness of 'illegal migrants' and 'bad foreigners,' legitimising an increasing surveillance by immigration and police departments of potential threats from the Koreans and the new migrants. The Mayor of Tokyo invited the Self Defence Forces to participate in earthquake emergency exercises with a view to controlling eventual uprisings by 'bad foreigners' in situations of natural calamity.

As for terrorism, the Japanese public was hypnotised by the 'terrorist' occupation of the Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru in 1996-97. Under these new domestic and international threats, the Japanese government supported by the press, launched a campaign to sensitise the Japanese public, which lacked a sense of 'crisis management' indispensable in this age of 'global terrorism.' The Peace Constitution was criticised for having given Japanese

citizens a false sense of security, disregarding all the threats and insecurities surrounding the island nation.

In the 1990s, Japan began to participate in the UN Peace-Keeping Operations, insisting on not being involved in military conflicts but specialising in logistic supports of a different kind. The erosion of the belief that the 'Peace' Constitution meant what it said was thus based on a 'broad' movement which created a new threat perception among the Japanese public. A review of the ambiguous definition of Article 9 of the Constitution given by the successive LDP Governments till the 1990s thus became unavoidable.

Japanese Governments have been accustomed to responding to such pressures by mentioning the 'constraints' imposed on them by the Constitution, and by submitting to cooperation with the United States, 'within the constraints of the Constitution.' By doing so, successive Japanese Governments gradually eroded the pride and trust of Japanese citizens in their Constitution, and accustomed them to thinking that it did not fit with the emerging realities surrounding Japan. This prepared them for its abrogation. The pacifist state created in the late 1940s during the US Occupation was now gradually replaced by a militarist state, with a new Constitution denouncing the unrealistic principles introduced by the American Occupation Forces. A new militarist Japan has now begun to emerge as a sub-altern militarist state supporting the global military hegemon.

The trend of moving away from a pacifist state towards military participation in global politics has been the subject of a national debate, which produced a great number of articles and studies, both analytical and descriptive. *Saigunbi* or *Remilitarisation* was the label used by both the proponents and the opponents. The terms disappeared around the 1990s, perhaps because Japan had become one of the military powers in terms of its military budget, so that to talk about 're'-militarisation was no longer a relevant term to define what specialists called "militarisation." In the absence of a comparable common language expression to denote 'militarisation,' the term *Saigunbi* had been used in the press and in public discussions on the abrogation of the Constitution.

The *saigunbi* debate began with intellectuals, the great majority of whom were in favour of the 'Peace' Constitution, denouncing the efforts to abrogate it. They appealed to public opinion to oppose the tacit moves by the government to 'remilitarise' Japan. It was only in the 1970s, after the defeat of

two mass demonstrations to oppose the renewal of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in 1960 and 1970, that a vocal opinion supporting remilitarisation emerged, developing a public debate on this key issue. The debate was characterised by the polarisation of opinion in the media for and against remilitarisation. Since the 1950s, intellectuals working with the *Iwanami* Publisher have provided leadership to the intellectual opposition to their campaign for gradual and tacit remilitarisation led by the LDP Government. They were called the 'Iwanami Group.' *Iwanami* was an intellectual magazine of general interest. *Sekai* published by *Iwanami* also carried many articles opposed to remilitarisation. It was only in the 1970s that new magazines dedicated to taking positions against *Sekai*, such as *Shokun*, began to publish pro-remilitarisation articles. The 1970s was also characterised by a key incident in Japanese intellectual history. Ikutaro Shimizu, one of the leading intellectuals of the *Iwanami* Group who played an active role in supporting the *Zengakuren* student movement during the 1960 Anti US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty demonstration, decided to change board and joined the pro re-militarisation intellectuals. His change of position was so extreme that he began to proclaim the right of Japan, as the first victim of the nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to develop its own nuclear weapons.

The remilitarisation debate, however, began to loose interest in the eyes of the general public in the 1980s, when tacit remilitarisation was progressing anyway. The opponents of remilitarisation tried to raise their voice against the mounting tide of militarisation. Tokuma Utsunomiya, a LDP liberal politician, founded an institute on disarmament, the *Utsunomiya Gunshuku Kenkyuu-Shitsu* (Utsunomiya Study Centre on Disarmament Issues) and began in 1980 the publication of a small journal, the *Gunshuku-Mondai Shiryo* or *Documentation on Disarmament Issues*. This monthly review is still one of the few magazines that continue to publish critical articles and documents on the militarisation of Japan. This effort, and those of researchers on nuclear issues such as those in the Nuclear Problem Research Centre called the Peace Depot, have been powerful but isolated voices in the wilderness in the 1980s when Japan was enjoying its 'bubble economy' by strengthening its ties with the United States, which included military cooperation as well. In the 1990s, the debate re-emerged in the post cold-war world under a completely reversed situation.

Whereas remilitarisation was the target of criticism by the leading intellectual media from the 1950s to the 1980s, the majority opinion in the media of the 1990s was supportive of militarisation. On the other hand, opinions critical of militarisation was loosing ground in the media and the think tanks. The argument of the pro-militarisation opinion was crystal clear: Japan had to become a 'normal state.' To this end Japan was now expected to abrogate its 'Peace' Constitution, and to revoke its constitutional commitment to a demilitarised no-war State. This was argued to be indispensable if Japan wanted to play an active role in the global management of conflicts, alongside the United States, now the unipolar hegemon.

New Research Centres began to develop an active advocacy for militarisation (sometimes with restraints and sometimes without any). Among them we can cite the Japan Forum on International Relations as the most influential think tank. The forum now serves the Japanese government and major corporate interests. This Forum is made of leading researchers and practitioners in international relations in the country. The Japan Forum as well as a number of other think tanks, magazines and newspapers began in the 1990s to develop realist policy recommendations for the militarisation of Japan. The Forum is typical in presenting the need for militarisation as a requirement for US-Japan security cooperation. It develops its argumentation in line with American strategic plans. This is why we must now turn to this aspect of the Japanese road to (re)militarisation.

US.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and the (Re)Militarisation of Japan

In order to understand how Japan turned itself into an openly militarist state after a long period of informal and covert militarisation under the cover of an officially pacifist state, it is important to trace this shift in pacifist Japan from the 1950s to the 1990s. Japan had signed both the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Mutual Security Treaty concurrently with the United States. This was a contradictory policy, renouncing in its Constitution the use of any military force and at the same time signing a Treaty which relied on the military force of the United States, whose national strategy in the 'Far East' (which by definition continued to expand, to the extent of including the Indian Ocean and Iraq,) would eventually become the national objective of Japan.

The Mutual Security Treaty was supposed to be a temporary measure until the United Nations, fully exercising its prerogatives, became capable of protecting Japan from outside threats. It defined joint action by the two signatory States as action triggered by the common threat of a military attack on the territory of Japan. It also saw the “contribution to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East” as the reason for Japan allowing the military Forces of the United States to use facilities and areas in the Japanese territory. With Japan, as the frontal state of the ‘Free World’, the Treaty became a means of safeguarding from an attack from the Eastern bloc, either from the Soviet Union or from China.

Then, the issue of the threat from the DPRK gradually emerged. Japan, a country officially opposed to nuclear armaments, was relying on the ‘nuclear umbrella’ of the United States. This apparently contradictory policy of a pacifist state relying on the military support of the world’s largest militarist state had, nevertheless, a two-fold benefit on the development of the pacifist state of Japan. On the one hand, it permitted Japan to economise on military spending and concentrate on developing its economy for the benefit and welfare of its citizens. On the other, it permitted Japan to refuse to participate in the military adventures of the United States. Japan did not send any troops to Korea during the Korean War. Neither did it do so during the Vietnam War. This allowed the Japanese economy to grow through the additional demand generated by the war economies of the two wars. The economic miracle of the Japanese economy and of the East and South-East Asian Tiger economies were accelerated considerably by the pacifism of Japan being combined with the military adventurism of the United States.

The path of Japan as an officially pacifist, but in actual fact, militarising state has been paved with statements of good intentions in keeping the ‘Peace’ Constitution while gradually accepting the American demand for Japan to shoulder its security burden. The renewal, with revision of the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960 was the occasion of a proliferation of Anti-Mutual Security Treaty demonstrations, which forced President Eisenhower to cancel his official visit to Tokyo. The tide of demonstrations, and the similar ones which took place in the 1970s, as part of the worldwide student uprisings, were two occasions when the Japanese public manifested its will to maintain to its ‘Peace’ Constitution and abrogate the Security Treaty with the United States. The official pacifist state of Japan was opposing the rise of the unofficial militarising state.

Social Militarisation: the 1955 Bi-Polar Regime

Japanese politics supporting a combination of official pacifism and unofficial militarisation was developed under the so-called 1955 regime, which continued until the early 1990s. Under this political regime, Japanese politics was bi-polarised and stabilised by a cooperative game between the bureaucrats and the politicians, based on a tacit cooperation between the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Socialist Party, two major parties - one in power and the other in the opposition during the whole period - which had agreed to disagree in the Parliamentary debates and then pass different laws that were good for the economic growth of Japan.

The domestic 'peace' was broken only periodically by people's 'uprisings' that took place at times when the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty was to be renewed. The 1960 and 1970 uprisings were two such occasions. The 1960 struggle succeeded in obstructing Eisenhower's visit to Japan, but it could not prevent the automatic renewal of the Treaty. The Anti-Treaty Struggle of 1970 was launched at the high point of the worldwide student uprisings between 1968 and 1970. The struggle ended in the dramatic defeat of militarised anti-systemic movements, which had been fragmented into mutually antagonistic factions that fought and killed each other.

The anti-systemic movements - all in favour of maintaining the Peace Constitution, and all opposed to the government policy of increasing the Japanese burden sharing in the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty by militarising gradually and unofficially - met with strong police repression, and were unable to organise a common front against this repressive government offensive. The popular movement of 1968-1970 in opposition of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty as well as the Vietnam War was a part of the worldwide movement that originated in the universities. In Japan, it mobilized several hundred thousand demonstrators. The police repression succeeded in dividing this movement, which eventually ended up in militarised and violent infighting among the radical sects. It also created disillusionment among the more pacifist citizens. The ideological fight between the Communist Party and the *Zengakuren* (All Japan Student Federation), and the infighting between the different factions of the *Zengakuren*, developed into social militarisation reproducing violent oppositions between these factions. This had a repercussion on the militarisation of the state of Japan. It depoliticised civil society, which had lost its political will to oppose the anti-Constitutional policies of the

Government. Social de-politisation thus followed the social militarisation of the 1968-70 popular movement.

It was one of the militarised anti-systemic movements, the Red Army of Japan, which decided in 1972 to move out of Japan and fight alongside the Palestinian freedom fighters. This movement introduced the *kamikaze* technique to Palestinian guerrilla tactics and contributed to the militarisation of the anti-systemic movement in West Asia. However, this negative contribution of the Japanese to the international struggle against militarisation and colonialism was a positive example of breaking away from the xenophobic exceptionalism of pacifist Japan.

The return of Fusako Shigenobu, one of the leaders of the Red Army, may be seen as a non-masculinist manifestation of self-criticism by a leader of the militarised movement of 1968-1970. She decided in 2001 to come home to Japan and submit herself to the judicial authorities so that her Palestinian-Japanese daughter could know Japan. She continued to see the importance of international solidarity between the Japanese and the Palestinian peoples, but criticised the violent tactics adopted by her group and by the radical students in their pacifist movement. We must take note of the gender dimension in the movement from the years 1968-1970, but must not forget also its anti-xenophobic dimension. The conviction of Fusako Shigenobu and her comrades that the liberation of the Palestinian people was inseparable from the liberation of the Japanese people was an interesting exception to the exceptionalist pacifism of Japan.

The 1970 movement had, as we have already noted, a negative effect on the capacity of the civil society to oppose government militarisation efforts. It was the militarisation of anti-systemic movements that made the generation of the 1970 anti-militarist movement disillusioned. They decided to remain silent and not take any position judged 'political' by the state or civil society, fearing that Japan might lead itself to social militarisation and bloodshed. This attitude was transmitted to the generations which followed, and caused a general de-politicisation of civil society in the 1970s and 1980s.

Some Exceptions to Exceptionalist Pacifism

The prevailing apathy had some exceptions; one was the Anti-Vietnam War Citizen's Movement founded by non-partisan intellectuals. A new type of non-violent and non-partisan social movement against militarisation emerged in the 1970s and grew in the 1980s. This new trend was represented

by the Be-Hei-Ren, the Alliance for Peace in Vietnam, which decided to act as a citizens' movement independent of the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the trade unions and student movements that have already been fighting against the Japan-US cooperation in the Vietnam war. Their appeal to concerned citizens was not only an effective strategy in the 1970s when the unions and mass movements were forced to keep quiet. It proved also to be useful in preparing for the age of the non-governmental organisations (NGOs), when the mobilisation of concerned 'volunteers' among the NGO participants was becoming crucial for political action.

It was at this point that the people's power intellectuals who continued to exercise their influence in the 1980s and 1990s emerged. One of the leading figures in this non-violent social movement opposing militarisation and promoting constitutional pacifism of Japan was the late Yayori Matsui. Her broad activities were not restricted by the limitations of the exceptionalist pacifism that refused to take up political challenges. She was active in the denunciation of the irresponsibility of the state of Japan in refusing compensation to the victims of the 'Comfort Women' who suffered under military-sexual slavery. She developed a variety of activities in solidarity with Asian women, including victims of Japanese industrial expansion, sex tourism and human trafficking. A number of social movements which recognised gender equality, have taken similar paths, breaking away from exceptionalist pacifism and have linked the search for peace to a critique of Japanese economic expansionism that had been gaining a military dimension. The Pacific Asia Resource Centre (PARC) and the People's Plan 21 are two leading examples of such social movements.

The above discussion shows that in spite of the fact that exceptionalist pacifism characterising the post-occupation state of Japan turned into a mere symbolic reality under the post-1970 de-politisation of civil society, there were still some social movements committed to pacifism combined with a broader world view. They were conscious of the necessity to overcome different xenophobic tendencies hidden in constitutional pacifism. Alongside these trends in Japanese civil society was the emergence of an important people's movement against the presence of US military bases in Okinawa in the early 1970s. Unlike 'mainland' Japan, Okinawa had not experienced a de-politisation of its civil society. Okinawa, where 75 percent of the American bases in Japan are located within a small territory, has been exposed to the insecurity generated by the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty that permitted

the stationing of American military forces. Because of this sense of insecurity, the Okinawa people could not ignore the political realities of the unofficial militarisation progressing under the cover of the official pacifism.

With regard to the development of the anti-militarisation movement in Okinawa, it is necessary to stress the exceptionally important role played by women. The incident of a high school student being raped by three American soldiers occurred in 1995. This happened soon after some leading Japanese women activists returned from the Beijing Women's Conference where they had supported a worldwide resolution to combat violence against women caused by militarisation. Upon their return, some of them organised a protest movement, and sent a peace caravan to the United States. Their call for justice and for the elimination of the military base threat from Okinawa was greeted by a mass mobilisation of the whole of Okinawa's civil society. It also received support from mainland civil society. Thus, a new civil society protest movement led by feminists emerged to counter the gender-based military threats of American bases.

This example shows that in spite of the overall de-politicisation of civil society in Japan and an exceptionalist constitutional pacifism, there were some seeds of a more universalistic pacifism. A political context suitable for this change was provided for with the end of the cold war and the establishment of a uni-polar global hegemony. These global changes compelled the Japanese ruling elite to erase the contradiction between the Peace Constitution and their covert attempts at remilitarisation by abrogating the Constitution and establishing a new global state, which is no longer dedicated to the lofty ideals of peace and demilitarisation. This cause for hope in the dark ages of remilitarising the Japanese pacifist state will be discussed later.

Before discussing the present developments in Japan, it is necessary to see how the Japanese government had developed its informal activities for the remilitarisation of Japan under constitutional pacifism. These remilitarisation efforts were successful because they were supported by the ruling elite, government officials, conservative politicians, and business executives of the transnational corporate sector. From the 1950s onwards, and more specifically in the 1960s, an unofficial militarising state was informally developing itself, especially through the efforts of the Self Defence Forces, and the activities of right wing politicians in and out of the Diet. As early as 1965, the Joint Staff of the Self Defence Forces developed a

clandestine simulation of emergency, called the Operation 'Three Arrows.' The Socialist Party divulged this secret plan, which included the seizure of power by the military forbidding the operation of the Diet and the Executive. This exercise was about emergency situations and legal measures required for the military to operate legally and freely in response to outside threats and battles in Japanese territory. It included a variety of limitations of civilian activities, prefiguring the recent merger between external security and internal security, that is, between military and police activities.

This covert effort to militarise Japan was supported by the big businesses and the corporate community of Japan, especially sectors that could benefit from militarisation. The Japanese heavy industries and high tech industries had to compete with their counterparts in the United States, that were heavily subsidized by the state. This became a serious problem following the explosion of the Japanese 'bubble' economy, which occurred simultaneously with the end of the cold war and the creation of American unipolar hegemony in the early 1990s. The Japanese industries found it natural to insist on the development of a national capacity to provide armaments to the Self Defence Forces. The research and development activities included not only dual use technologies but also military technologies which became the object of Japan-US cooperation in the field of 'security industries.' This trend was formalised in 1997 as the IFSEC, US-Japan Industrial Forum for Security.

However, the corporate sector cannot be held responsible alone for the hidden militarisation progressing behind a screen of official constitutional pacifism. We must recognise the fact that Japanese civil society itself facilitated this trend by the way in which they developed an exceptionalist understanding of the 1947 Constitution. This Constitution declared that the state of Japan was renouncing the use of military force to achieve its national objectives, and that it would not hold any military forces. From the 1950s to the 1990s, this ideology of constitutional pacifism was maintained while the pacifist state was being remilitarised through unofficial, covert means. Since the end of the 20th century, the Japanese ruling elite has wanted to abrogate this Constitution. The reason for abrogation is mainly that it is a Constitution given by the American occupation forces, and that it is unsuitable for the present global age.

This shift of Japan from a pacifist state to a militarised 'normal state' has been interpreted in different ways by those who want Japan to militarise and those who want Japan to remain 'pacifist.' The conservative and right wing

opinion see the official recognition of Japan's already considerable military capacity with satisfaction. It is natural for Japan to renounce its 'unrealistic' pro forma 'pacifism' and join the industrialized countries in exercising their 'international responsibility' to joining in the 'peace-keeping' activities, and performing the 'collective security' measures expected of perform. For those who want Japan to refuse to become a fully-fledged militarised State, this is an unacceptable situation, and therefore they need to insist on keeping the present Constitution. They cannot but be opposed to attempt a last blow to the 'Peace' Constitution abrogating its Article 9 after having ignored it for so long. Yet, they must recognise that to try to maintain the superficial legitimacy of the 'Peace' Constitution alone is not enough to stop the rising tide of militarisation that dominates Japanese politics supported by the national and the international mass media.

The 'Small Japan' Ideology and Its Negation

In order to place the rise of militarism in Japan in a social context, it is necessary to go beyond the denunciation of Anti-Constitutionalism by the ruling elite and review the hidden aspects of failure in social reproduction of pacifist principles adopted by the Japanese people in 1947 after the defeat of the militarist imperial state. In this review, we will not side with either the position of the extreme right which wants Japan to militarise to the extent of building a capacity to develop nuclear armaments, or the fatalistic attitude of conservative opinion that Japan cannot help but militarise itself to fulfil its obligation towards the United States and the international community. Denouncing the opportunism of the elite alone is not adequate to understand why this pacifist state is militarising itself. An appropriate starting point is to examine the three-state theory developed by Kang San-Jung, who defines the present process of militarisation of Japan as a new regime, and the 1999 regime as a manifestation of a new global state of Japan in its stage of gestation. In order to follow Kan Sang-Jung's analysis, we may characterise the present day Japan as a newly emerging global state which is different from the second pacifist state of Japan. The first highly militarised state was created at the time of the Meiji Restoration and it led to expansionist wars in the 1930s and 1940s. The second pacifist state was founded during the occupation following the defeat of the first militarised state. Now, a new global state militarised again as a sub-altern state of the United States is under construction. The recognition of the fact that Japan cannot remain a pacifist

state does not imply that its militarisation needs to be accepted. On the contrary, the question that should be posed is whether Japan can build a new state, re-interpreting its pacifist position in response to global pressure for militarisation from the hegemon and from its own nationalist ruling elite. For Japan to stick to the official pacifism of its Constitution alone is not enough in order to oppose the formalisation of a long trend of hidden militarisation, which is now appearing in the public arena.

It is possible to identify a number of socio-cultural and politico-economic factors that facilitated the re-birth of the Japanese militarist tradition under the pacifist legal cover up. The pacifist state of the post-defeat Japan was in fact not so different from the pre-defeat militarist first state of Japan, and this was why this state was seen as being replaced by a militarist third state fitting the 'global standards' of the American unipolar hegemony. The new Constitution of 1947 kept the patriarchal authority of the Emperor as a 'symbol of national unity.' Patriarchal/cliental human relations continued to play a key role in rebuilding the Japanese economy. While the 'companies' developed into new units of patriarchal allegiance, the patriarchal family system remained strong, obstructing the development of not only gender equality but also individualism and respect for human dignity. The demilitarisation of the state undertaken by the American occupation forces did not succeed in reducing the power of the bureaucrats. Their administrative guidance kept the state authority intact in the eyes of the Japanese citizens whose economic well-being was guaranteed by the rapid growth of the Japanese economy, achieved by cooperation between the government bureaucrats and the business elite of the big corporate sector.

The Constitution of 1947 gave Japanese citizens a guarantee of fundamental rights, but it failed to develop among them an understanding of the universality of human rights. The democratisation of education started by the American occupation authorities, was soon replaced by an education of good citizens, peace loving and dedicated to the welfare of the fellow Japanese. Japan was described as a peace-loving country. Article 9 of its Constitution guaranteed that the Japanese nation would not be involved in international wars. For the Japanese people, Japan was an exceptional country, protected by the United States. They were fortunate not to be sent to fight in Korea during the Korean War, and to Vietnam during the Vietnam War. The economy had profited from these two wars, due to the 'Peace' Constitution.

This exceptionalism characterises the Japanese society of the pacifist state period. It was called sometimes a 'small Japan' ideology, which was better than a 'great Japan' ideology, refusing to be expansionistic militarily, but nonetheless, ego-centric in distinguishing the Japanese from the other peoples of the world. It kept out foreigners from the homogenous patriarchal Japan whose national unity was making itself wealthy. Since the 1970s, the 'small Japan' ideology has been the cause of non-military violations of human rights, especially the racist and sexist treatment of women migrant workers and the victims of human trafficking. It gradually developed into an anti-foreigner feeling, supporting police surveillance and regulation of 'bad' and 'suspect' foreigners, and preparing the ground for joining in the 'war on terrorism.'

Internationally, economic expansion was not forbidden by the Constitution, and this enabled Japan to develop a non-military sphere of influence in East and South East Asia. Since the 1960s, Japan succeeded in playing a sub-altern role to the United States in this region. While the American government was building bilateral military ties with the regional countries belonging to the 'Free World,' Japan developed a multilateral network of economic exchange reinforcing the American military alliance system. This support for the American military efforts in the region was not seen as contradictory to the spirit of the Constitution, in spite of the fact that it stipulated clearly in its Preamble that Japan recognises the rights of all peoples of the world 'to live in peace,' free from fear and want. Paradoxically, the Japanese government's cooperation with the US linked the fear of the people generated by the military threat with wants caused by economic exploitation. It is important to take note of the fact that the Japanese sub-altern role to American hegemony has been gradually transformed from economic to military support. This expansion of the sub-altern role of Japan has been supported by the conservatives as a means of Japan developing its regional hegemony in the Asia Pacific region, and by the extreme right (including the former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone,) as a temporary move in preparing for a future of de-linking with the United States and aiming at a global Japanese hegemony. It is easy to understand that both positions have contributed to the covert trend towards the re-militarisation of Japan.

The Constitutional Pacifism of Japan has another serious limitation in that it is narrowly interpreted not only by the ruling elite, but also by civil

society in general. The 'right to live in peace' has been interpreted to be a provision for Japanese citizens, whereas it was originally a manifestation of remorse by Japan which had infringed on and violated the right of the peoples during its first militarist state period. The 'right to live in peace' was thus called upon by pacifist citizens in court cases where they claimed that the activities of the Self Defence Forces had violated their right to live in peace. Most recently, among a number of court cases about the unconstitutionality of sending the Self Defence Forces to Iraq, the first round of cases defined the cooperation with American occupation in Iraq as a violation of the right of the Japanese troops to live in peace. This claim omitted the violation of the same rights of the people of Iraq, which should have been mentioned in the first place, if the original intention of the Preamble of the Constitution was correctly understood. In this way, Japanese civil society has developed an exceptionalistic pacifism, claiming that Japan and the Japanese were bound by the Constitution to remain unarmed and pacifist.

Japanese pacifism was not just exceptionalistic. It focused the attention of Japanese civil society on 'peace' and war, avoiding any reference to the responsibility of states and peoples in waging wars, committing atrocities, and establishing colonial domination, whether political or economic. The reference to 'Peace' originated during the time of the US Occupation. It was a means for the American occupation forces and the Japanese elite to avoid a public debate on both the American responsibility for its nuclear attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Emperor Showa's responsibility for war in colonising Korea, in attacking China and in invading South East Asian countries.

War is horrendous whosoever is responsible for it. To always refer to peace as opposing war was an easy way of avoiding a discussion of the past and future responsibilities of Japan not to violate the right of the non-Japanese majority of humankind to live in peace. This irresponsible pacifism had both a racist and sexist origin, which is well illustrated by the case of the 'Comfort Women,' which was hidden until the end of the cold war, when the Japanese state refused to compensate the victims.

The above points have to be stressed in understanding the strange combination which has characterised the past half century of a Japanese pacifist state, remilitarising under the official cover of Constitutional Pacifism.

'War on Terror' as the Last Blow to Pacifist Japan

The covert nature of the Japanese state's militarisation, which had continued till the end of the cold war, emerged gradually from under the shadow of the 'New World Order' of George Bush Sr. Japan found it profitable to assert its role in this new world order as a sub-altern militarised state. Indeed, militarising the state now became official. It must be remembered that before the final blow to the formal pacifist state, some last hopes appeared in the form of the Report of the Commission on Defence Issues (*Boei Mondai Kondan-Kai*), established by Prime Minister Hosokawa, during the interregnum when the LDP occupied the benches of the Opposition. The Report proposed that Japan ensures that a multilateral regional security system is developed before Japan officially recognised its militarisation policy so that a remilitarised Japan would not remain a mere sub-altern state of the United States.

With the return of the LDP to power, this alternative militarisation was rejected. Renewed efforts to respond to the US demands led to a series of new laws, prepared for elaborating a new military state as the third state of Japan (reminiscent of the German Third Reich!) after the First (the Meiji Imperial Military State) and the second (the Post US Occupation Pacifist State) state. The trend toward this new militarised state began openly with official pressure from the United States, in response to the Report of the Commission on Defence Issues. Its emphasis on the priority to develop a multilateral regional security system was understood, correctly, by US experts on Japan to mean that Japan may want to operate independently of the US-Japan Mutual Security system. Joseph Nye played a key role in defining the new role of Japan within the context of the US grand strategy in the non-NATO region, which, in the Mutual Security discourse was some strange 'greater Far East.'

The EASR (East Asian Security Report) published in 1995 provided the basis for new negotiations on the Mutual Security Treaty, which was concretised in the Hashimoto-Clinton Joint Declaration of Japan-US Security Cooperation of April 1996. A new guideline for security cooperation between Japan and the United States was agreed upon, identifying an active role for Japan in operations besides logistic operations.

The preparation of a new militarised State through a variety of legislative activities characterised this period. New laws were adopted, often disregarding the opposition of parliamentarians committed to the Peace Constitution. A Law on Cooperation with the Peace-Keeping Activities of the

United Nations had already been passed in 1992 to permit the Self Defence Forces to send troops abroad. Legalisation of a new role beyond 'self defence' for the Self Defence Forces opened the way for Japan's participation in the 'war on terror' under the initiative of Bush Jr. This permitted the state of Japan to move from a burden sharing position with the United States to a military power sharing position.

This trend was started by the new Bush Administration which mobilised experts on Japan like Richard Armitage to design the concrete terms for the new Japan-US security cooperation. The Armitage Report of 2000 defined the Japan-US Alliance as a cornerstone of the US global strategy in Asia. It recommended the strengthening of this Alliance, requiring Japan to remove its constitutional obstacle to 'collective security'. It also demanded that Japan develop emergency legislation, and strengthen intelligence cooperation with the United States. The Koizumi Government passed a series of laws in response to this Report, which included the revision of the Law on Self Defence Forces, the Law on Emergency in Neighbouring Areas, and the Law on Military Attack Emergency.

The first part of the 21st century became the critical divide between the pacifist state and the new global military. The 'war on terror' completed the process that started in the 1990s to sensitise the Japanese public away from its pacifism. The North Korean 'threat' was played up by the return of the kidnapped victims from North Korea. The campaign against criminal foreigners accompanied by a system of cyber-denunciation was launched, and police raids arrested many of the 'illegal' migrants. In 2003, three young pacifists who had distributed leaflets among the families of the Self Defence Forces soldiers to be sent to Iraq were arrested. They became the first ever 'prisoners of conscience' in Japan identified by Amnesty International. It is under this generalised campaign to face a combined effort by the military and the police to associate the Japanese citizens with its threat control that the above-mentioned laws were passed to prepare a revision of the Constitution, which would result in formalising the Global Militarised State of Japan. Indeed, the cooperation of Japan with the war efforts of the United States has not been the monopoly of the government. The Japanese public was in general giving it passive support, with the exception of an active anti-War minority. One sector of the Japanese business world has ensured its active cooperation with the United States. This was the sector involved in the IFSEC mentioned above. A joint statement issued in January 2003 by this

Forum stated unambiguously the need to strengthen Japan-US defence cooperation, to modify the Japanese policy forbidding arms trade, and to develop clear guidelines about the protection of intellectual property rights in the field of military related technologies.

A Possible Alternative Scenario

Is there any way for Japan to avoid the course of becoming a militarised state? There is still a pacifist feeling deeply engrained in the minds of Japanese citizens. The anti-Iraq War movement began to mobilise the young generation. Even in government circles, a new awareness about the danger to go along with the war on terror is increasing. There is another fact which is often forgotten. The Japanese government has adopted at least at the official level a set of principles completely opposed to the logic of the War on Terror as defined in the Report on the Security Strategy of the United States. These principles are expressed in the Report of the UN Commission on Human Security co-chaired by Ms. Sadako Ogata and Dr. Amartya Sen. The Japanese government supported this Commission. This Report calls for the elimination of people's insecurity through the empowerment of the people put in 'insecure' situations by globalisation, instead of resorting to or opting for pre-emptive strikes, similar to that of the United States and its allies on 'terrorists' or 'rogue states.' The Japanese government has recognised 'human security' as a basic principle not only of its development assistance but also of its peace related activities. This explains its present policy of supporting United States war efforts, by contributing to the peaceful reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq, two countries demolished by the United States' pre-emptive strike strategy. To apply the principles of human security in support of the war efforts of the United States generating human insecurity around the world is a serious contradiction.

Will the Japanese public resist this illogical and unrealistic duplicity? This is now becoming a major question in Japan. If there is public resistance, Japan will not become a militarising state, and instead seek to dissociate itself from the unipolar hegemon that spreads human insecurity through its unilateral pre-emptive military and police activities. Japan can play a role, both regionally and globally, in promoting human security alliances in the regions devastated by American military activities. If it fails to do so, Japan will become a sub-altern militarised state, supported by a strong police surveillance system, and promoting militarisation in the service of the

hegemonic 'war on terror.' The present confusion in Iraq shows that no military power can solve any national or international dispute.

In fact, this is the argument presented by the World Peace Committee of Seven in its declaration linking the Iraq debacle to the Peace Constitution of Japan. It calls upon the occupation troops in Iraq to withdraw from the territory, and the United Nations to come to help the people of the country. It further calls upon the United Nations and all the member states to declare the renunciation of the use of armed force as a means to achieve their state policies, and to stop all wars, including internal wars, signing a new Anti-War Convention stipulating the penalisation of all violating parties. It is within this global context that the Committee invited all the member states of the United Nations to recognise the pioneering role of the 'Peace' Constitution of Japan, denying to the state the possession of military force and the right to wage war. This universalistic approach already recognised internationally by the Citizen's Conference on The Hague Peace Appeal may transform the exceptionalist pacifism which has prevailed so far and facilitated the covert remilitarisation process of Japan. To open the Japanese exceptionalist constitutional pacifism and make it a tool to materialise human security by guaranteeing the right to live in peace free of fear and want is a realistic alternative to the neo-realist approach which sees that remilitarisation of Japan is the only way to face the present global hegemony which forces all states to cooperate in its 'war on terror'.

The five young Japanese who have been taken hostage by the Iraqi resistance provides a typical example of the new approach to peace and demilitarisation which goes along the line of the above mentioned Committee of Seven Declaration. Their pacifism is a non-violent version of the Red Army, seeking to establish links of solidarity between the Japanese and the people of Iraq sharing with them their insecurity. Whereas the Red Army wanted to share with the Palestinians their violent resistance, the five hostages wanted to share their fear, wants and insecurity. In their non-violent act of solidarity, security is not assumed to be monopolised by the Japanese, as is the case with the Self Defence Forces stationed in *Samawa*, where their security is protected by various military and political means. By providing water to the unprotected *Samawa* in heavily guarded situations, the young Japanese, unarmed and unprotected, recognised the fact that there is a common fate between them and the Iraqi people, and among all the vulnerable peoples of the world who suffer intense insecurity caused by the

hegemonic forces of militarisation. This non-violent approach to peace based on the solidarity of vulnerable peoples provides a solid foundation for the project of demilitarising all the states of the world. It is hoped that the third state of Japan will not be a remilitarised state, but a state which will contribute to the demilitarisation of all the states of the world.

NOTES:

- 1 On militarisation in Japan, the best book in English is Glen Hook, "Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan," *Nissan Institute Routledge Japanese Studies Series* (London, Routledge, 1996).
- 2 On new threats, see, Peter Andreas and Bicheler Shimson, eds. "From War Fighting to Crime Fighting: Transforming the American National Security State," *International Studies Review* vol. 3, issue 3 (Fall 2001), 31-52. And, also, Kinhide Mushakoji, *Ningen Anzenhoshou Ron Josetsu: Global Fascism ni koushite (Introduction to Human Security Theory: Facing Global Fascism)* (Japan: Kokusai Shoin, 2003), 38-40.
- 3 We apply Gramscian concept "subaltern" to the Japanese State of the 1990s-2000s in the sense that the ruling class of this state wants to participate in the neo-liberal global economy accepting the global standards to be accepted as a subaltern player in the mega-competition. As a subaltern actor, the Japanese elite, which includes not only transnational corporate interests but also the national industrial and commercial interests, are subcontractors of the transnational capital. As all subaltern agents do, they want to gain from their participation in the neo-liberal market, but realise that they are under a constant threat of being eliminated from the global market by transnational players. This is why the subaltern neo-liberal elite of Japan is divided between those who want to play fully the neo-liberal game like Prime Minister Koizumi, while other seeks to preserve national and local control of the economy against neo-liberal pressures to liberalize totally the Japanese economy. This economic subaltern role of Japan reinforces its political subaltern attitude toward the global hegemon, the United States. For a broad analysis of the Japanese ruling elite and its decay, see Harold R. Kerko and John A. McKinstry, eds. *Who Rules Japan: the Inner Circles of Economic and Political Power* (Westport: Praeger, 1995).
- 4 On re-militarisation, see, Hideki Uemura, *Saigunbi to 55-nen-Taiei (The Student Union Zengakuren and the United Front Zenkyoto)* (Tokyo: Mokutaku Sha, 1995).
- 5 On the Constitutional debate, refer to Glenn D. Hook, Gavan McCormack. eds., *Japan's Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2001), also Glenn D. Hook, "Militarisation and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan," *Nissan Institute Routledge Japanese Studies Series* (London: Routledge, 1996)
- 6 The Forum has founded the Center for Preventive Diplomacy which serves as the think tank for the participation of Japan in peace-keeping activities preparing for an active

- international role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces which was traditionally supposed to play only a self-defense role protecting Japan within its territorial boundaries.
- 7 For more detailed information about this historical development, see Hideki Uemura, *Saigunbito 55-nen Taisei* (Remilitarisation and the 1955 regime) (Tokyo: Mokutaku Sha, 1995).
 - 8 Article 10, 1st Para.
 - 9 Article 5, 1st Para.
 - 10 Article 6, 1st Para.
 - 11 The 26 April 2004 Appeal of the Japanese Committee of Seven for World Peace, which is a committee composed by seven Japanese nuclear scientists and other intellectuals, refers to the Japanese Constitution in the following paragraph: "We call upon the United Nations and upon all its member States to declare that they will renounce the use of armed force as a means to achieve their State policies, and to stop all wars, including internal wars, signing a new Anti-War Convention stipulating the penalization of all violating parties.... The Constitution of Japan denies to the State the possession of military force and the right to wage war. Costa Rica forbids itself to maintain a standing army. The pioneering role of these countries in line with the Kellog-Briand Pact must be recognized. We call upon all the States of the world to follow their example, as was declared by the Citizen's Conference on The Hague Peace Appeal."
 - 12 On the 1955 regime, see, Hideki Uemura (1995).
 - 13 For an insider view on the split of the student movement *Zengakuren*, see Masayuki Takagi, *Zengakuren to Zenkyoto* (The Student Union Zengakuren and the United Front Zenkyoto) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1985). On the post-1970 civil society intellectual climate, a dialogue between intellectuals from different generations, pre and post-1970s is of interest. See, Kiyoshi Kazai and Hironori Kazuma, *Doubutsu-ka suru Sekai no Nakade: zenkyoutou ikou no nihonn, Post-Modern ikou no Hiyou* (Animalization of Society: The Post-United Front Japan and a Post Modern Critique) (Tokyo: Shuei-Sha, 2003).
 - 14 About Shigenobu and her daughter, Mei Shigenobu, the auto-biography of Mei Shigenobu (2002) gives a good insight in their dedication to the cause of the Palestinians. See, Mei Shigenobu, *Palestine kara Sakura no Kuni he, Haha to Watakushi no 28 Nen* (The Secret: From Palestine to the Country of Cherry Blossoms, My Mother's and My 28 Years Journey) (Japan: Kodan Sha, 2002).
 - 15 Vera Mackie *Feminism in Modern Japan: Citizenship, Embodiment and Sexuality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 217-219.
 - 16 On the clientelist nature of the Japanese society, see, S.N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger, *Japanese Civilization: A Comparative View* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996).
 - 17 On the Comfort women military sexual slavery, see Yoshiaki Yoshimi, *Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II* (Columbia, Columbia University Press, 2000). Also, Rita May Kelly, Jane H. Bayes, Mary Hawkersworth, Brigitte Young, eds. *Gender, Globalization and Democratization* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 205-222.
 - 18 See the documents in Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack, *Japan's Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis* (London: Routledge, 1996)
 - 19 See Note 11. The text cited there is preceded by the following paragraph on the Iraq situation. "The present confusion in Iraq shows that no military power can solve any

dispute, international and national. We call upon all foreign occupation troops in Iraq to withdraw from the territory and upon the United Nations to come to help the people of the country."

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SOUTH KOREA

Social Militarisation and Gender

Insook Kwon

Introduction

South Korea has been one of the most militaristically tensed areas since the Korean War (1950-1953). The division of Korea into two states and the hostile relationship between North Korea and South Korea has resulted in unlimited military competition and extreme enmity. Meanwhile, in its geopolitical strategies vis a vis the Soviet Union and China, the United States used South Korea during 1953-1959 as an important military outpost. Even after the cold war, the US, sensitive to the increasing power of China and the constant military threat from North Korea, has been cultivating special militaristic interests in South Korea in the name of peace in East Asia. In response to the presence of heavy armament and militaristic tension, public concern about national defence and anti-communism in South Korea is deeply grounded and has been growing. These two concerns over national defence and anti-communism can also be seen as determining and controlling the everyday life of South Korean peoples since the Korean War. At the same time, the long presence of military regimes has contributed to reinforcing and even distorting these concerns.

In order to examine the nature of militarisation in South Korea, the most interesting period for investigation is the 1960s and 1970s. During these years, South Korea was under Park Chunghee, who came from the military. He led a military coup in 1961 and ruled South Korea for 18 years

until 1979. Throughout his rule, especially after 1968, Park Chunghee mobilised the whole society for self-reliant national defence and economic development, with the objective of competing with North Korea. However, the nature of this phase of militarisation was not just about heavy military build up and oppressive rule. It was grounded on an urgent need resulting in a deep consensus among citizens for national security and national defence. Militarisation was the most distinct code that overwhelmed and defined other issues and other concerns. It included mass mobilisation on a wide scale promoting voluntary self-sacrifice for economic development and national prosperity, constructing a paramilitary system through militaristic education imparted to citizens in their early years, propagating an ideology of anti-communism and intensively cultivating a strong sense of enmity against North Korea.

In this chapter, I will try to show how strongly the South Korean nation has been militarised through the deployment of such popular as well as culturally embedded ideologies such as nationalism, patriarchy, national defence, anti-Communism and gendered morality. In addition, I will demonstrate by examining the South Korean experience of militarisation in the 1960s and 1970s, how militarisation can actually occur even during the so-called 'peacetimes' or even pre and post-war times.

To understand South Korea of the 1970s, I use the concept of 'social militarisation.' Militarism refers to a complex belief system, not just to an ideology that legitimises the existence and empowerment of a military system. Indeed, militarism holds a wider set of beliefs firmly based on the presumed necessity of vindicating hierarchy and discipline, effectively constructing a strong masculinity, and legitimising the use of group violence as a solution to conflict in the name of interests of groups, nations or allies. As such, militarism is a belief system, which complements or strengthens (but are not merely synonymous with) those characteristics embedded in patriarchy and nationalism. That is, militarism exists not only in the form of common sense values and beliefs, but also in the form of submerged and habitual consent, which is typical in situations of hegemonic infiltration.

Militarisation is a key concept which explains how social-cultural processes shape the outlook of individuals, institutions, social movements and even entire societies, both in war and non-war periods. Scholars have used the concept 'militarisation' to focus attention on the influence of

militarism in societies in non-war situations. Meanwhile, feminist analysts have particularly wanted to see the gendered influence of militarism. Enloe, for example, sees militarisation as a very gendered process that can happen any time, in any form and to any person. It proceeds in a diversity of forms and contents in people's ideologies and practices of everyday life. Thus, as Enloe argues, militarisation is often invisible. Therefore, it is even more difficult to recognise its gendered nature.

The Historical Process of Militarisation

Under Japanese colonialism that began in 1910 and especially when the Japanese colonial military government waged war in the 1930s to the 1940s a priority, the outlook of the South Korean people began to be shaped by a continuing, intense and multi-stranded process of militarisation. In 1945, with its liberation from Japan after almost four decades of severe colonisation, Korea was divided into two entities: North Korea, ruled by the Soviet Union's military and South Korea, ruled by the US military. By 1948, a socialist government in North Korea and a capitalistic government in South Korea had been inaugurated under the patronage of the two big powers. In 1950, the Korean War commenced. The war was devastating. Lasting three years, it totally destroyed in both Koreas the agriculture, the economic infrastructure and the cities in their entirety. The war killed more than 5 million Koreans. However, in South Korea, it was not, and still is not, war alone that has deepened social militarisation in the lives of women and men. Although repeated and vengeful ideological conflicts have caused severe damage in people's minds in both North Korea and South Korea, each emergent state also entrenched its own domination by manipulating collective memories of the people. Each cold war state served its own ruling group's interests by encouraging popular enmity towards its counterpart. In South Korea, the state effort had been successful until very recently in making most South Korean people believe for almost fifty years in the possibility of another war as a real threat. Consequently, for South Korean citizens, national defence became a persistent theme of concern and undeniable priority, not just politically but also personally.

Immediately after the coup, Park's first pledge was to promote anti-communism and national security. The emphasis on these two goals increased steadily, and never let up. The military conflict between South Korea and North Korea started escalating to a full-scale conflict after South

Korea dispatched troops to Vietnam in 1965. North Korea changed its military policy more bellicosely. In the meeting of representatives of the North Korean Labour Party held in October 1966, the North Korean leaders decided on a three-year extension of the seven-year economic development plan, which was to end in 1967, in the name of strengthening national defence. From 1961 to 1965, military defence comprised 4.18 percent of North Korea's national budget. However, this percentage skyrocketed to 31 percent from 1966 to 1971. Against the backdrop of this change in policy, thirty-three heavily armed North Korean commandos attempted to attack the Blue House and the Presidential residence to assassinate Park Chunghee. This attack took place on 21 January 1968. The South Korean army managed to repel the attack within 800m (0.5 mile) of the location of the Blue House. The so-called 'Blue House Raid' was a shocking incident that shook the entire South Korean nation. On 23 January 1968, North Korea captured an American spy ship, called Pueblo. Three months later, in April, North Korea shot down the American Navy plane EC 121 saying it was in violation of the country's territorial sky. Towards the end of 1968, a group of armed North Korean guerrillas numbering 120 infiltrated the east coast areas of South Korea. Their official aims were 'the revolutionisation of remote mountain areas' and 'revitalisation of the underground cells.' This series of North Korean provocations caused the greatest degree of tension between the North and the South since the Korean War ended. It also legitimised anti-communism and national defence as sacred doctrines in South Korea. In response to the military actions of North Korea, the Homeland Reserve Force (*hyangto yebigun*), mobilising 2.5 million former male conscripts, was founded in 1968. In remote coastal areas, even women joined the Homeland Reserve Force, and were trained in military drills. On 19 April 1968, Park's government decided to implement military drill education for male students in universities. Also, Park started to agitate the Korean people with the slogan *Ssaumyonso Konsolhacha!* (Let's construct while we are fighting!). Throughout his rule, this slogan encapsulated most succinctly how the South Korean society had been militaristically organized.

As the militaristic tension between South Korea and North Korea heightened, on 24 July 1969, the US President Richard Nixon presented his new Asian military policy. Through this policy, also known as the Nixon doctrine, the US sought to "reduce its military involvement in Asia and

encourage the 'Asianisation' of conflicts on that continent." The gradual withdrawal of American troops stationed in South Korea meant more than a mere reduction in numbers.

In the 1970s, establishing self-reliant defence was the main goal of Park's regime, with the overwhelming consent of large sections of the Korean population. One crucial excuse for the transition from light industry to heavy industry in the early 1970s was to ground the self-reliant national defence. The Park administration increased its defence budget and developed its own military equipment and research. By 1976, South Korea started to produce patrol boats, tanks and M-16 rifles. By 1978, South Korea's first surface-to-surface missiles were successfully tested.

Anti-Communism: A Major Tool for Militarisation

When Park Chunghee carried out the military coup in 1961, the first pledge he made was to strengthen the policy of anti-communism. Park arrested 930 people, charged with being potentially pro-Communist. They were members of political parties or of civil society organisations. Some of them were teachers, students and journalists. Two months after the coup, the temporary military regime promulgated *Pankongpob* (Anti-communism Law). This was in addition to the already existing National Security Law. Under the anti-communism law, any kind of connection, meeting or communication with North Korea, which was defined as an anti-state institution, was illegal. Similarly, any kind of activity that might work in the interests of North Korea was illegal. Thus, both in theory and in reality, any kind of anti-government activity was a direct violation of the anti-communism law, because harming the South Korean government meant support for North Korea.

In 1980, Chun's regime brought the content of the anti-communism law under the National Security Law, since the anti-communism law had been highly criticised by pro-democracy dissidents for its draconian nature and arbitrary implementation. However, until now, the main content of the anti-communism law remains unchanged. Currently, Roh Muhyun's government is making attempts in the National Assembly to change the National Security Law.

While it is an irrational and draconian piece of legislation, enacting it just two months after the Coup and sustaining it until now could not have been possible without wide public support and consent. In other words, the

law was not simply an outcome of the military regimes' autocracy. The Korean Politics Research Team, which has analysed South Korea's policy of anti-communism, observes: "In fact, the anti-communism-national defence ideology was established in the minds of the Korean people not as systemic discourses. Rather, they were common sense beliefs for the masses in that the ideology was based on historical common experiences of the Korean War. Thus, its reproduction was taken for granted, and was not challenged. So, it was a 'magical' power and an indulgence of its survival under Machismo-like political ground, "structured through the Korean War."

The reason for creating and maintaining the emotional and very antagonistic anti-communism in modern South Korea comes from anti-communism's relationship with its identical twin, national defence. As already noted, the relationship between anti-communism and national defence was shaped by the experience of the Korean War and its collective memory. The Korean War was a civil war for nation building between revolutionaries and anti-revolutionaries, a nationalist war against colonial collaborators and American neo-colonial rule, and an international war between the capitalist and socialist camps. It was started by North Korean Communists in the name of saving oppressed people from anti-revolutionaries, building a new independent nation against American neo-colonial rule, and expanding the socialist camp by defeating capitalists. However, it proceeded as a total war for the Koreans. In air raids and vengeful and repetitious killings between Communists and anti-Communists, millions of civilians died and most Koreans suffered damages estimated at three billion dollars. South Koreans and North Koreans were left with a total destruction and poverty on both sides during and after the war. Regardless of the main reason for the war, the war in South Korea was memorialised as a war between North Korean Communists who intruded South Korea causing immense destruction and killing South Korean anti-Communists who defended the nation.

The Korean War had a tremendous impact on all segments of the South Korean population. It was a cluster of harsh experiences that cemented, in the minds of the majority of South Koreans for several generations, the national defence's bond with anti-communism. H.K Lee elaborates:

The most important of these [impacts] is that it provided state elites with almost unlimited sources with which to legitimate the use of coercive measures against any political opposition. Since fear and

aversion of communism was deeply rooted in people's personal and immediate experiences of the tragic war, the ideological indoctrination of 'national security' became much easier and more efficient.

However, anti-communism in South Korea has not been a fixed entity or a text usable whenever state elites or presidents wanted. Education, media, drama, movies, even slogans attached to utility poles and signboards were all used to maintain and strengthen anti-communism feelings. One area on which scholars of education, sociology and political science agree is that the core of the educational policy in South Korea after the founding of the South Korean government (1948) was anti-Communism. Kyuhwan Yi sums up the three human types the South Korean state has idealised: anti-Communists, patriots, and moralists. According to Yi, being an anti-Communist is premised on being a patriot and a moralist. Thus, the ideological human type the state has wanted to construct through education has been an anti-Communist patriot or anti-Communist moralist.

After the Korean War (1950-1953), the prioritised position that the ideology of anti-communism enjoyed in educational policy in modern South Korea was never altered. Particularly after Park Chunghee took power in 1961 anti-communism became an all-encompassing ideology. With strong top-down control of power, Park's regime strengthened and detailed anti-communism education. Immediately after the coup, the goal of the first practical education guideline was smashing the second-hand intrusion (mainly an ideological intrusion) of North Korea. This meant having students thoroughly absorb strong anti-communism and national defence ideologies, by denouncing pro-communism and ideological neutralism, prohibiting students' political activities and strengthening military education. The emphasis of anti-communism education was at its height after *Yushin* (the Revitalising Reforms) was introduced. According to Ross Harold Cole's analysis, lessons with anti-Communist themes in textbooks in elementary social studies, in the national language and in the morality curriculum in 1957 increased from 9.8 percent to 14.5 percent in 1965, and then to 21.5 percent in 1974. Scholars of education agree that the 1970s was the prime time for anti-Communist education in terms of intensity and amount. Kyuhwan Yi confirms that moral education in the 1970s continued to the 1980s without any significant change.

One crucial characteristic of anti-communism education throughout modern South Korean history is that it is driven by negative hate propaganda against Communists. Yonglin Mun draws attention to the 'deformed adaptation' of anti-communism. Any effort to understand the content and nature of communism has been treated as a violation of anti-communism. Demonising North Korea has been an integral element of this state ideology of anti-communism. Jaech'ol Yun, in his analysis of anti-communism morality education, shows that textbooks have contained unrealistic and overly exaggerated content to portray the 'horror' and 'cruelty' of North Korean Communists while describing the lives of North Korean people as being worse than slavery.

In movies in the 1960s and 1970s, the anti-communism drive of the Park administration was carried out through censorship. The government censored scenarios and even interfered in re-making films to suit the anti-communist ideology. For instance, the government prohibited *Opaltan* ('Missing Bullet Shot'), directed by Hyonmok Yu, from running, saying it contained pro-Communist content. Park's government indicted Manhi Yi, director of *7 Inui Yoporo* ('Seven Female War Prisoners'), on the charge that the film was pro-Communist. In the 1970s, after the *Yushin* system, Park's government strengthened censorship and imposed government-made rules on movie production. Through the *Yushin* policy on films, the government used the medium of cinema to accomplish the anti-communist ideology and to establish national defence preparedness. The Ministry of Culture and Public Information (*Munhwa Kongpobu*) put limitations on the number of Korean movies that could be produced and had movie companies produce movies by the order of the government. Some of these orders were allocated to movies for national defence. A number of anti-communism and pro-*Yushin* movies came out in this era.

In radio and TV broadcasting, the control and manipulation by the Park regime went much further than it did with films. Especially after *Yushin*, broadcasting became a loyal institution which propagated the *Yushin* ideology, anti-communism and national defence. During a period of one-month from 17 October to 21 of November 1972, following the proclamation of *Yushin*, each broadcasting network covered *Yushin* ideology 218 times in mono-commentary, 398 times in panel discussions, 1,268 times in spot drama and 58 times in special programmes. In fact,

promoting *Yushin* ideology was the public goal of most broadcasting networks.

With these measures for ideological mobilisation, brutal oppression became an inevitable response to violations of anti-communism as well as to perceived threats to national security. The so-called *kongan sakon* ('public security incidents'), which describes activities and organisations that violated anti-communism and national security, was the main term that the government used to categorise every anti-government activity and organisation. The incidents involving the People's Revolutionary Party in 1964 and 1974, the Unification Revolutionary Party in 1968, the National Democracy Youths and Students Federation in 1974, and the South Korean National Liberation Front in 1979 represent large-scale public security related episodes. Generally, these incidents occurred as a result of political manipulation and the reports about them were both distorted and exaggerated. At court proceedings against the accused of these incidents, there was often insufficient proof. Convictions mainly depended on the national fear of anti-communism, confessions obtained through ruthless torture, and the servile cooperation of the Judiciary. Charged with being pro-Communist and connected with North Korea, sometimes hundreds of people were arrested, tortured and sentenced to heavy penalties, such as death or life imprisonment. Many leaders, for instance, eight people in the case of 'the Second People's Revolutionary Party Incident,' were executed. In addition to these large-scale organised incidents, numerous spy incidents surfaced whenever some political crisis or necessity emerged. Almost every student movement demonstration and anti-government activity in the 1980s was accused (and propagated) of being leftist and committing pro-Communist violations.

Anti-communism rhetoric has been used repeatedly for more than 50 years after the Korean War to oppress dissidents. This may have resulted in the erosion of the legitimacy of the government's repressive policy of anti-communism. In addition, the strong anti-government and pro-democracy movement that survived amidst repression had also undermined the sacred position accorded to the state policy of anti-communism. At present, the popular response to a pro-Communist incident would not be the same as it was under Park Chunghee's regime. Yet, it is not clear whether the bulwark of anti-communism has been effectively broken in South Korea. Even now, there is an enormous fear of being charged of being pro-

Communist. Physical oppression and surveillance still exists in daily life. This is clearly related to the hidden fear of being Communist. *Palkaengi*, the degrading term for Communists that applies to any left-wing idea, irrespective of the wide spectrum of differences that exist among leftists. Anti-capitalist ideas continue to be illegal under South Korea's anti-communism law. In South Korean society, they are also morally unacceptable in a popular sense.

Nationalism and Militarisation

The main reason for the survival of anti-communism was its tight association with national defence and the never changing reality in relation to the North Korean regime and its people. While North Korea was portrayed as the incarnation of evil, the people in North Korea were looked down upon as mere brainwashed puppets. This means that there has emerged an all-pervasive, deeply rooted and emotionalised hegemonic consent to ensure the maintenance and multi-functional use of the twin ideology of anti-communism and national defence. Although Park Chunghee relied on and utilised this hegemonic ideology, the experience of the Korean War was not the only factor that contributed to the militaristic dynamics. Without a strong nationalism that Park Chunghee had also strongly cultivated, these dynamics could not have effectively functioned in the way they did.

In a very broad sense, Korean nationalism has enjoyed a positive, powerful and culturally embedded privileged position in South Korea's political culture. It indeed extends beyond the geographical distinction of the North and the South as well as the obvious class and gender distinctions. The common experience of all Koreans during thirty five years of Japanese occupation (1910-1945), and of the post-1945 division of the Korean peninsula have helped elevate cultural/political nationalism to the status of a religious ideology. It is even embraced across sharp social and ideological divisions. Furthermore, the existence of US military bases on South Korean soil for almost fifty years has strengthened this tendency to see nationalism as a necessary protection from any political activism, especially amongst progressive intellectuals and students who have been two of South Korea's most influential political actors. Thus, one finds a curious situation today that can confuse the casual observer. On the one hand, nationalism has been instrumental in justifying the ruling class oppression of the working and

peasant classes in the name of developing South Korea's national economy and national prosperity. Yet, at the same time nationalism has also been an essential ideology for the politics of resistance among many South Korean intellectuals and students in their mobilisation against the military regimes' anti-unification policy in the 1960s through to the 1980s. Nationalism has also helped them to mobilise large sections of students and citizens to protest against the US intervention in Korea's internal affairs. Thus, for both the conservative ruling class and resisting groups, nationalism has been an irrefutable basic ideology used to convey their respective agendas, even though the goals and contents of these two rival nationalisms have been different from one another.

Despite the powerful position occupied by Korean nationalism, the legitimacy of national defence is not without its weakness. Korean nationalism's potency has been derived from its experience during Japanese colonial occupation (1910-1945). As a result of living through this colonial experience and hearing stories of it from earlier generations, both political elites and ordinary citizens have a strong desire for national survival, which, in turn, has persuaded most of the necessity of cultivating national, political, militaristic and economic forms of power. Both state and popular discourses fostering and perpetuating Korean nationalism stress the relative weakness of South Korea, and underscore its geographic vulnerability, as it is surrounded by China, Japan and Russia. Today's nationalists of the right and the left portray each of these countries as politically powerful and culturally militaristic.

Park Chunghee efficiently utilised nationalism for the project of economic development, applying the concept of 'patriotic warrior.' One of his main propaganda efforts throughout the 1970s was the idea that industrial soldiers (*sanop chonsa*) would save the nation from poverty by building a self-reliant defence. In a speech to South Korean workers in January 1970, President Park said:

The most basic factor in our pursuit of a self-reliant defence and the foundation for reunification is the power of a completely self-reliant economy, and the most important factor for achieving a self-reliant economy, is the expansion of exports. In order to increase our export volume, we have to produce good quality goods at lower prices than goods produced by other countries and this is impossible if wages are high. What will happen to us if export volume decreases because of high wages and high prices for goods? I want you to understand that

both improvements in workers' lives and the growth of corporations depend on our national development, so I ask for your cooperation to take pride and responsibility for the establishment of the nation. I can assure you that the rapid growth of the economy due to the continuing expansion of exports will provide a prosperous future for our three million workers.

To elevate this 'fighting soldier' image for the nation, a poster issued by the Office of Labour Affairs in 1970 portrayed smiling women wearing hard hats that looked like soldier's helmets, although in fact women workers in light industry do not wear hard hats. This image of the fighting soldier, used to promote economic development, was linked to the propagation of many development miracles. The Kyongpu (Seoul-Pusan) expressway has been evaluated as one of Park's miraculous accomplishments. The 428-kilometer Kyongpu expressway, which was constructed over two years and five months (from 1967 to 1970), crossed South Korea vertically from Seoul to Pusan. Described as combat fields rather than construction fields, nine million people per year participated in these construction projects, and 77 workers died at work. According to Myongpak Yi, the former president of Hyundai Construction, workers sometimes worked 20 hours a day. As he recalled: "It was rather like a war. Workers did not just work as workers. They had responsibilities as industrial soldiers, and they fought to save the nation."

Coercive Militarisation

However, social militarisation did not happen only through euphemisms or mass mobilisation. Coercive assimilation and severe penalty for nonconformity were other grounds for establishing national consent. Thus, fear of the state became an everyday habit, deeply rooted in the consciousness of the people. The Kim Daejung case illustrates this process quite well. In 1971, Park Chunghee was running for his third presidential term. Compared to Park's easy victory over Poson Yun in 1967, the challenge mounted by Kim Daejung, the opposition candidate of the *Sinmintang* (the New Democratic Party), in 1971 was a formidable one. By this time there has been labour unrest developing in the industrial sector. In 1970, Chon Taeil, a cloth-cutter, burnt himself to death to protest against the extremely harsh working conditions of factory workers and their low wage standards. His death sparked off social attention on labour issues and

opened up a new phase in the labour movement. College students were always critical of Park Chunghee's ruling style and policies. However, given the advantage of incumbency as well as the financial power, combined with the support of the rural population, Park was re-elected, winning 53.2 percent of the votes compared to Kim's 45.3 percent.

After his re-election, Park amended the constitution in 1972 and named it *Yushin* (revitalising) constitution. Under the *Yushin* constitution, Park drove South Korea to be more authoritarian, characterized by almost no political freedom, using the most extensive version of national defence propaganda. The *Yushin* constitution was initiated in 1972 with the declaration of martial law on the 17 October, 1972. In the name of the construction of Korean-style democracy, ensuring security and national defence and promoting national economic modernisation, Park Chunghee elevated the office of the President to the position of an absolute monarch, with powers to control the Congress, the judiciary and the administrative system. This move guaranteed him safety of his position as the President. One characteristic of *Yushin* was its zero tolerance of criticism. Clifford describes the nature of Park's rule as follows: "Park's constitution was a notoriously repressive document, one that prohibited any sort of criticism—even of the constitution itself. 'Groundless rumours' were a crime and unexplained absences from school theoretically could be punished with the death penalty."

The brutality reached its height through continuously issued Emergency Measure Laws 1 and 2 (8 January 1974), Emergency Measure Law 4 (3 April 1974) and Emergency Measure Law 9 (13 May 1975). These laws were in operation until his own right hand man, Jackyu Kim, head of KCIA, assassinated him on 26 October 1979. Park's Emergency Measure Law 1 promulgated the following: (i) prohibition of any action of denying, opposing, and criticising the *Yushin* constitution; (ii) prohibition of assertion, proposal, suggestion and petition for reforming and repealing the *Yushin* constitution; (iii) prohibition of spreading groundless rumours; (iv) prohibition of reporting in relation to actions of the above prohibited three; (v) arrest of violators of the law without a warrant and their imprisonment for a period up to 15 years; and (vi) subjection of violators to trial under martial law. Through Emergency Measure Law 4, Park wanted to prevent student activists of the pro-democracy movement from taking any action against him. This law included the following measures: (i) prohibition of

any activity of National Federation for Democratic Youths and Students; (ii) prohibition of meetings, demonstrations, denunciations and sit-in struggles inside and outside campuses; (iii) sentencing of the leader of a demonstration to a maximum punishment of death and abolishing schools that violated the Emergency measures; (iv) deployment of armed forces to provinces to maintain security, on the request of local ministers; and (v) non-prosecution of persons related to National Federation for Democratic Youths and Students if they surrender voluntarily. Emergency Measure 9 further elaborated the Emergency Measure Law 1. It prohibited any activity of denying, opposing, distorting, defaming, insisting on the reformation and repeal, and propagandising against the *Yushin* constitution. It permitted violators to be arrested without warrant.

Invisible Militarisation: The Gendered Process

Among the processes that are not categorised as social militarisation, gendered social militarisation is the one that is the most difficult to notice. Gendering as a process is never just about women nor is it just about ideas of femininity. Within the context of a patriarchal dimension in a given society, international politics sometimes militarises military prostitutes. Sometimes, gender-divided economic structures militarise women workers, using their nationalistic and Confucian morality. Sometimes, pro-democracy student movements militarise women activists, using the 'efficiency' of hierarchy and privileging masculinity in prioritising violent struggles. How and through what process do these women accept certain roles and feminine characteristics is, therefore, difficult to analyse due to the complex and interwoven nature of militarisation. Even the somewhat direct relationship with the military of the wives of military personnel (the 'military wives') is hidden as a result of their role acceptance as wives under patriarchy. Moreover, women's low representation of their interests and experiences, coupled with the absence of their own language and discourse, enhances the invisibility of the gendering process of social militarisation. Without special attention to both gender and militarism, these processes are not easy to unravel. However, if we do not explore these processes, we cannot come to a clearer understanding of the multiple interwoven dimensions of women's oppression. Neither can we plan and pursue demilitarisation without an understanding of women's perspectives.

In the presentation of national defence and national prosperity programmemes, men were portrayed as the real players who would save the nation. Each South Korean man was to see himself as responsible for becoming a soldier under a male-only universal conscription, while simultaneously he was to serve the nation as an industrial soldier working to build the country's heavy industry. Park Chunghee actively pursued the creation of Korean steel, ship-building, machinery and automobile industries in the name of constructing what he envisioned as an effective military self-defence. Feminist anthropologist Eunsil Kim explains that gendered dynamics by noting that the "intentional direction of Korean modernisation was production and development representing masculinised images." According to Kim, women represented rather a dangerous and cautious aspect of modernization exemplified by consumerism and loosened morality. As Sangin Kim slapped her sisters for their consumerism, in the 1970s, the state built social censorship that did not allow any kind of individualistic desire and consumerism in which women are supposed to be primarily engaged. However, women were invited to be involved in this state project as workers and an active participant of population control. Seung-kyung Kim explains that 'dutiful daughters' were the chief image the Korean government used in mobilising young women workers. She writes: "The government's stress on loyalty and obedience as the chief virtues of workers frequently utilised a traditional image of young women as dutiful daughters willingly sacrificing themselves for the good of the nation." This statement implies on the one hand that women were supposed to break with Korea's traditional home-oriented feminised sphere through participating in the public job market and doing manual work for the state. On the other hand, however, the Park industrialising scheme to fend off the communist threat from the North relied on sustaining the traditional image of the sacrificing daughter, thus ensuring that Korean women stayed firmly within the rigid script of national patriarchy. Also, at the time, the state considered that overpopulation was a major obstacle to overcoming poverty and achieving economic development. The state-sponsored family planning programme invited women's body to the public arena and created a discourse of the connection between economic development for national prosperity and women's reproductive activities.

Another example was the *Saemaul Undong* which Park Chunghee launched in 1970 to create a spiritual reformation movement in the name

of inculcating the values of diligence, self-help and cooperation. The importance of *Saemaul Undong* is that it invited the rural women to the public sphere and constructed a directed relationship between them and the state. The *Saemaul Undong* was also the pillar of mass propaganda that earnestly provoked people's participation in the state militarised project. Many women peasants in rural areas became leaders of the *Saemaul* movement, as women workers were the driving force in the 1970s fast economic growth initiative. Following Park's direction, rural women voluntarily participated in several campaigns, such as the campaigns for saving rice, building roads and bridges, renovating houses and increasing incomes. Women peasants actively participated in the *Saemaul Undong* as wives with voluntary enthusiasm while simultaneously facing the criticism of men that they were violating the 'proper' gender boundaries. Women were able to be more assertive, strong, proud and communal by taking part in these government launched campaigns, yet their roles were limited by the campaign's institutionalised expectation that they remained true to the patriarchal ideal of Korean femininity. This traditional ideal of women was in fact reinforced by the still strong traditional and conservative gendered culture as well as by the Park regime's promulgation of a political culture which demanded devotion and loyalty to the nation and the state.

However, the most militarised group of women were military prostitutes. Katharine Moon observes how military prostitutes became a main target and actor in a campaign to persuade the US to maintain its military presence after the Nixon doctrine was implemented in South Korea. Under a direct order from Park Chunghee, the Clean up Campaign was launched to solve the racial conflict between local residents and US black servicemen, improve the camp town environment, and control venereal disease in a systematic manner. To enhance the relationship between South Korea and the US, the South Korean government enthusiastically implemented this campaign. Local residents and bar owners were taught to refrain from racial discrimination, especially against black servicemen, even though they had acquired such racial attitudes from the racial discrimination practiced within the US military and by the way in which the black people were represented in the media. However, the main target of the US military's campaign and the local Korean authorities were camp town prostitutes, seen as the source of social problems, unrest, racial violence and health problems such as venereal disease. As a result, this

campaign was practiced mainly through surveillance and control of the bodies and attitudes of women prostitutes. As Katharine Moon observes:

What began as a joint USFK-ROK (United States Forces in Korea-Republic of Korea) venture to improve the discipline, welfare, and morals among US troops in Korea turned Korean camp town prostitutes into instruments of foreign policy. Through the pursuit of the ROK government's 'people-to-people diplomacy' toward the United States, the women became 'personal ambassadors' who would be responsible for improving US-ROK civil-military relations. During the Clean up Campaign, the prostitutes bore the burden of reconciling the difference between two races (blacks and whites) and two governments. Joint US-ROK control over their bodies and behaviour, through VD examinations and supervision of their interactions with GI customers, became an indicator of the status of base-community relations and the willingness of the ROKG to accommodate US interests.

The Clean up Campaign, however, was not an isolated incident in relation to military control over prostitutes. Cynthia Enloe, in her groundbreaking book, *Does Khaki Become You?* analyses the lives of camp followers, prostitutes, military wives, nurses, women soldiers, women in liberation armies and women in defence industries to introduce the concept of the militarisation of women's lives. In Enloe's analyses, the militarisation of women's lives means that their lives have been related to, used or exploited for the existence or sustenance, and direct or indirect needs, of the military.

However, with the exception of Katharine Moon's research on the US military and Korean local authority policy on military prostitutes in camp towns, there is no research regarding the military's policy on prostitutes in South Korea, although prostitution is a crucial part of the life of South Korean soldiers. Songsuk Cho in her in depth interviews with former conscripts finds that prostitution is a significant part of the conscripts' leisure culture and a main medium for building a common sexual concept inside and outside the military.

Songsuk Cho points out the daily repetitious share of exaggerated, even violent sexual experiences, the commercialisation of the woman's body, and the normalisation of sex with prostitutes among conscripted men. According to Songsuk Cho's research, some Korean armies distribute condoms to soldiers who are going on vacation or going out at night, in

order to prevent the spread of venereal disease. This practice shows that basic military policy accepts prostitution as a part of a soldiers' experience. However, in contrast to the US based camp towns constructed for US soldiers, similar camp towns do not seem to exist for the Korean armies. It may be because there is no need to construct them, since prostitution is easily available anywhere and anytime in South Korea. It is known that one million women are engaged in the entertainment industry for locals around the country. Particularly in the province of Kwangwon, where most of the military bases are located, while there are formal brothels, prostitution is available in other entertainment services. For example, teahouses around local areas have a ticket system. Waitresses of teahouses serve teas and also sell their bodies. Men who wish to take the waitresses out need to buy tickets, and are charged by the hour. Because prostitutes are so easily accessible, there is no need for the military to intervene and exert control over prostitutes, with the exception of preventing the spread of venereal disease.

Military wives are another clear example of the hidden gendered social militarisation that exists in Korean society. The exact number of military wives in South Korea is not known. Since there are 159,000 professional military men and women, it may be assumed that there are, at least, one hundred thousand military wives. However, the social visibility of military wives is practically non-existent, with the exception of rumoured scandals around wives of Generals, represented by the two first ladies of former Presidents Doohwan Chun and Taewoo Roh, and their greedy profiteering, investments in real estate, and extravagant life styles. However, in the research literature on military wives, the issue of gender is not directly addressed. Cynthia Enloe views the military wives not just as soldiers' wives, but as a distinct group of women who deserve special attention. Enloe says: "She [the military wife] is defined by society not only by her relationship to a particular man, but by her membership in a powerful institution; she is seen not just as a particular soldier's wife, but as a military wife." As the title of their book, *No Life Like It*, clearly shows, Deborah Harrison and Lucie Laliberte also insist on the special distinction between military wives and civilian wives in the Canadian case:

Everything would change if you were to swap places with a military wife. You might suddenly find yourself living on a military base in a house whose size depended on your husband's rank. Your husband

would go to work in a uniform. He would spend a lot of time away on exercises, leaving you alone to run the household. He would drink with his work mates and march in parades. He would be more likely than other men to be an alcoholic or a batterer. To make sure he progressed in his career, you would be expected to do volunteer work on the base and/or entertain his workplace, and your social identity would revolve around his rank. You and your children would be uprooted every three years to move to a different city or country and adjust to a new neighbourhood, school, set of friends, and low-paying job. You would be unlikely to accumulate much of a pension, and if your marriage broke up, you might spend your retirement years living on welfare.

Similar to the experience of Canadian military wives, the Korean military families have their own peculiarities. Doo-Seung Hong describes them as follows: (i) frequent movement from one location to another; (ii) the ever present possibility of working in isolated regions, and therefore the likelihood of living isolated from families and relatives; (iii) the frequent experience of the father and husband being absent; (iv) the unclear separation between military life and family life; and (v) economic destitution and the deprivation of social opportunities. There are many Korean women who are required to move frequently when their husbands change postings.

However, the main distinction that exists for military wives is that they have an inescapable belonging to the military community, and the military depends on their voluntary non-paid work, expecting them to take care of every detail of their husbands' lives, both at work and at home. Without the volunteer work of military wives, it would be impossible for military men to manage their personal and their military lives. Moreover, the communities of military wives directly belong to the military. One military wife said: "If an emergency happens, wives are quicker to respond than men. We help our husbands get to the base quickly. Also, we are looking for things we can do to help military men other than our husbands. ...Our military families go and give comfort to the men at the bases quite often. We feel rewarded when we see that military men are happy when we bring food to the base."

South Korean military wives say that it is difficult to adjust during the first five years of marriage, but they soon become military persons 'spiritually' and loyal supporters with no regrets of marrying a soldier.

Researchers have noted the presence even during unusual circumstances, a deep sense of sacrifice, patience, and patriotism that the military wives are supposed to possess, even under very difficult circumstances. However, the basic framework of the life of a military wife is an idealized expectation of a wife's role. To be a 'good wife' while accepting a secondary role in the family is perhaps not possible without the social imposition of the sexual division of labour, the sexually divided spheres, and the social construction of masculinity and femininity. Partly due to this patriarchal basis, the military wives accept most military realities as normal.

However, the role acceptance of military wives and the effort of the military to control and exploit women's support and work are not the same in all countries. It is not easy to compare the lives of military women across states because of the circumstantial differences that exist within each society and the unavailability of adequate comparative research. Moreover, it is not easy to find the policies or events within the military that relate to military wives. However, in South Korea, the social visibility of military wives as a group is extremely low, and there have not been reports of group resistance against the state or the military, as in the case of the Organisation of Spouses of Military Members (OSOMM) in Canada. The OSOMM sued Canada's Department of National Defence. In their lawsuit, the OSOMM claimed that the wives' inability to make decisions on issues that affected their daily lives amounted to discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status. As Harrison and Laliberte report, this incident received "considerable notoriety in Parliament and the national media" while generating "negative public attention on the military's attitude toward wives". This degree of awareness and activity is still unimaginable in South Korea due to several factors. There is not still much feminist attention or activity on the military. The existence of strongly Confucian patriarchal values and the high degree of social acceptance that national defence matters should receive highest priority has also contributed to the absence of resistance by military wives. In short, the militarisation of military wives in South Korea has not been publicly acknowledged.

Conclusion

A study of South Korea of the 1960s and 1970s reveals how deeply a society can be militarised. By examining dominant ideologies, policies, propaganda, political culture and education, I described in this chapter how a South

Korean version of militarisation has come into existence. I also demonstrated how a pervasive culture of militarism has developed in South Korea as a diffuse belief system as well as an influential ideology. I have termed this process as 'social militarisation.' In this chapter, I have provided an account of how in the 1970s, a process of social militarisation had been closely associated with the twin project of anti-communism and economic development, which the state encouraged as necessitated by the urgency of national security. In summary, what is the end result of 30 years of military rule, which also maintained the hegemonic dominance of an ideology of urgency of national defence for national survival, a carefully cultivated sense of nationalism, and a policy of anti-communism grounded in hostility towards North Korea? The answer is that these three powerful ideologies penetrated all sectors of the Korean life – the economy, the media, educational system and the family. They in turn produce a militarised national and gendered culture.

NOTES:

- 1 Cynthia Enloe, *The Morning After* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1993). Also, Cynthia Cockburn, "The Gendered Dynamics of Armed Conflict and Political Violence," in *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors?*, eds. C. O. N. Moser & F. C. Clark (London and New York: Zed Books, 2001).
- 2 Jacklyn Cock, *Women and War in South Africa* (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 1993).
- 3 Cynthia Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You* (London, Winchester, North Sydney and Wellington: Pandora, 1983). Also, SeungSook Moon, "Gender, Militarization, and Universal Male Conscription in South Korea," in *The Women and War Reader*, ed. Lois Ann Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin (New York and London: New York University Press, 1998). And, Anuradha M. Chenoy, "Militarisation, Conflicts and Women in South Asia 1998," in *The Women and War Reader*, ed. Lois Ann Lorentzen and Jennifer Turpin (New York and London: New York University Press, 1998).
- 4 2.92 million North Koreans and 2.3 million South Koreans were killed during the Korean War (1950-1953). See, <http://www.kr.encycl.yahoo.com/enc/info.html?key=1690450>.
- 5 Dongch'on Kim, *War and Society: What Have Korean War Meant To US?* (Seoul: Tolpege, 2000).
- 6 Katharine Moon, *Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S. – Korean Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

- 7 Sekil Pak insists that North Korea made up those incidents after the dispatch of South Korean troops to Vietnam that took place to obstruct more dispatches of South Korean troops. However, the real intention of North Korea was not clear. The South Korean government that wanted to engage in a military attack and revenge angered the US, because the US did not want to get involved in another war other than in Vietnam. In response, the South Korean government refused to send more troops to Vietnam. See Sekil Pak, *Rewriting Modern History of Korea I, II and III* (Seoul: Tolpege, 1988, 1989 and 1992).
- 8 Katharine Moon, (1997): 58.
- 9 John Kie-Chiang Oh, *Korean Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999).
- 10 Katharine Moon, (1997).
- 11 Park's six pledges were, 1) strengthening anti-communism policy; 2) abiding by the United Nations Charter; 3) sweeping away corruption; 4) establishing a self-reliant economy; 5) putting effort into the unification; 6) being ready to go back to South Korea's obligation to the military whenever handing over the reins of government to new and conscientious politicians.
- 12 Sekil Pak, (1989).
- 13 Translated by the author. See, Korea Politics Research Association, Political History Team. *Modern Korea History, Story Pocket, 2 and 3* (Seoul: Nokdu, 1993), 24.
- 14 Hyuk Koo Lee, *The Politics of Nationalism in Korea: Nation, Class and the State*, PhD Dissertation at University of Texas, Austin (1990, 203-204).
- 15 However, before the Korean War, anti-communism was not prioritised as much as it was after the Korean War. See, Kanghwan Cho, "The Series of Biographies of Successive Ministers of Education," *Sindonga*, September 1983.
- 16 Inhwoe Kim, *The History and Problem of Education in South Korea* (Seoul: Munamsa, 1994).
- 17 Kanghwan Cho, (1983).
- 18 Park Chnnghee announced the beginning of the *Yushin* system in 17 October 1972. He declared Martial Law, dissolved the National Assembly, prohibited any kind of political activities and ordered the previous censorship of speech, publication and broadcasting, and closure of universities.
- 19 Ross Harold Cole, *The Koreanization of Elementary Citizenship Education in South Korea: 1948-1974*, Doctoral Dissertation at Arizona State University (1975).
- 20 Inhwoe Kim, (1994). Also, Kyuhwan Yi, *Hankuk Kyokuk Ui PiPanJok Ihe (Critical Understanding on Education of Korea)* (Seoul: Hanwul Academy, 1993).
- 21 Inhwoe Kim, (1994):186. There have been five full-scale revisions of educational curricular from elementary to high school levels in 1955, 1963, 1973, 1981 and 1992.
- 22 Kyuhwan Yi, (1993).
- 23 Yonglin Mun, "We do not need an Anti-Communism Education but Unification Education?," *Sindonga* (April, 1989).
- 24 Minhwan Kim, *The History of Korean Mass Media* (Seoul: Sahoe Pipyongsa, 1996).
- 25 Ibid.

- 26 It is not an exaggeration to say that those large-scale 'public security' related incidents had been manufactured by brutal torture of those arrested. By the torture practiced by the KCIA (Park's era) and National Security Planning Agency (Chun's era), an insignificant link with North Korea was made into a huge 'national subversive incident' involving many people. During torture, Ulho Yi of the 'Second People's Revolutionary Party Incident' went mad while Chaemun Yi, the leader of South Korean National Liberation Front, died in custody.
- 27 This does not mean that there has been a unified emphasis on issues of unification and the US intervention among South Korean intellectuals and students active in resistance movements. From the middle of the 1980s, they have been divided into two groups, one emphasising nationalistic, anti-imperialistic (anti-American) unification issues and another focusing on class and socialistic democracy issues.
- 28 Seung-kyung Kim, *Class Struggle of Family Struggle? The Lives of Women Factory Workers in South Korea* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4.
- 29 Seung-kyung Kim, (1997).
- 30 On Air, Munhwa Broadcasting Company, 14 August 1998.
- 31 Mark Clifford, *Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats and Generals in South Korea* (Armonk, New York, London and England: M.E. Shape, 1994), 77.
- 32 Ch'ongsa Editorial Team. *Annals in the 1970s South Korea* (Seoul: Ch'ongsa, 1984).
- 33 Katharine Moon, (1997). Also, John Kie-Chang Oh insists that one crucial excuse for the transition from light industry to heavy industry in the early 1970s was to ground the self-reliant national defence. John Kie-Chang Oh, *Korean Politics* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999). The Park administration increased its defense budget and developed its own military equipment and research. By 1976, South Korea started to produce patrol boats, tanks and M-16 rifles. By 1978, South Korea's first surface-to-surface missiles were successfully tested.
- 34 Eunsil Kim, "Cultural Discourse of Korean Modernizing Project and Its Patriarchal Nature," *Contemporary Criticism* vol. 8 (1999): 89.
- 35 Seung-kyung Kim, (1997): 5.
- 36 Eunsil Kim, (1999), and Eunsil Kim, *Women's Body and Cultrual Politics of Body* (Seoul: T'tohanaui Munhwa, 2001).
- 37 Home Ministry, 1980.
- 38 Pyongju Hwang, "State and People of the Park Chunghee Regime", *Contemporary Criticism* vol. 12 (2000): 46-68.
- 39 *Wolgan Chosun*, a monthly political magazine, claims that women leaders of *Saemaul Undong* were the main force in modern South Korean history, because they led the economic success of the 1970s. See, *Wolgan Chosun*, December 1999.
- 40 Jeong-mi Yoo, "An Analysis on the Experience of Women Who Participated in State-led Development", *MA Thesis at Ewha Womans University* (2002).
- 41 Ibid. Also, see Joo-sook Kim, *Rural Family and Rural Woman* (Seoul: Hanul Press, 1994).
- 42 Moon, (1997): 84.
- 43 Enloe, (1989).
- 44 Cho, (1997).

- 45 A women's newspaper reported that women comprise two percent of the South Korean military. Also, women officers (if one excludes nurses) are 0.01 percent of the whole military office. See *Yosong Sinmun*, 11 September 1998.
- 46 Both the master thesis of Seho O, *Research on Marriage Adjustment of Military Family in South Korea*, A Master Thesis of Korea University (1984) and an article by sociologist Dooseung Hong, *The Sociology of the Korean Armed Forces* (Seoul, Nanam Press, 1996) deal with military families, but do not address the issue of gender. In my research, I was only able to find two articles in two South Korean monthly political magazines about military wives, in *Wolgan Chosun* and *Sindonga*, from 1980 onward. One is the anonymous personal statement of one military wife. See, Kyongsuk Kim, "Being a Wife of a Military Officer in South Korea," *Sidonga* (June 1993). The other article is a collection of materials based on group interviews and a collection of essays written by military wives. Even though these two articles were published ten years apart, the description of the lives of military wives is almost identical. Actually, the descriptions of military wives are very similar to that of *Does Khaki Become You?*, which talks mostly about US and British cases and in *No Life Like It*, which talks about Canadian cases. For the latter, refer to Deborah Harrison and Lucie Laliberte, *No Life Like It: Military Wives in Canada* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Publishers, 1994).
- 47 Enloe, (1988):46.
- 48 Harrison and Laliberte, (1994): 1-2.
- 49 Hong, (1996): 227.
- 50 Dongson Kim, "Military Wives," *Wolgan Chosun* (September 1984): 284.
- 51 Enloe, (1988). Also, Harrison and Laliberte, (1994).
- 52 Harrison and Laliberte, (1994): 79.

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Militarism as National Ideology

INDONESIA

The Failure of *Reformasi* and Remilitarisation

Hilmar Farid

Introduction

The biggest problem impeding democratisation in Indonesia at present is the immense military power that dominates all aspects of life. It is as if the abstract and dubious reform agenda which was formulated towards the fall of Suharto in 1998 has gone nowhere. To date, demands to abolish the army's territorial command structure and bring to trial the military officials involved in an array of human rights abuses have not been realised. In fact the opposite has occurred. The civil and military emergencies in Maluku and Aceh have been followed by the creation of new regional military commands (*kodam*) in both provinces. Instead, the trials related to human rights abuses by the Indonesian military in Timor Leste in 1999 have been used as a 'stage' by the military elite to strengthen support and arouse nationalist feelings in order to oppose what they refer to as 'foreign intervention.'

It is true that on one hand, Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) did make a series of changes under pressure from the international community, in particular the US government that generously provided Suharto's New Order regime for 32 years with arms as well as financial and political support. The most important and visible change was the separation of the police force (*Polri*) from the armed forces. Although this was not accompanied with a change in the militaristic nature of the police force which had been 'guided' by the military for decades, the split did create a clearer division in

their roles, whereby the military was expected to take charge of defence and the police, of internal security. Another step was the reduction in the number of military personnel in the parliament, which will be completed with the abolition of the TNI/Polri Faction in 2009, as well as the prohibition of active military officers holding positions in the government bureaucracy, which was greatly encouraged during the New Order.

But on the other hand, the TNI has openly opposed demands for reform which aim to place the military under civilian control and leadership. Regions hit by conflict, such as Aceh, Papua, Maluku and Central Sulawesi, have also become places for struggles between military officials and local governments who support reform. Military officials who are openly against change oppose and sabotage policies of the central government and criticise civilian leaders whom they claim 'know nothing about the situation on the ground.' In Maluku, there is a strong belief that a number of officers deliberately created instability in order to make the civil government, which was at that time under Abdurrahman Wahid, look incapable of tackling such conflict. Even in Aceh there were reports concerning TNI troops provoking armed contact, which was then used as an excuse to reject the peace talks between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

The outcome of TNI's rebelliousness and its sabotage of national policies is clear – it is a return to using military power to resolve uprisings in the regions. The declaration of a state of emergency and the launching of a military operation in Aceh in May 2004, which is the largest military operation since the invasion of Timor Leste in 1975, is a sign of the return of military power in Indonesia. These two steps set precedence for mobilising military strength to deal with future political problems or disputes without much resistance from the civilian governments or parliament. Whereas during Abdurrahman Wahid's period of leadership, there were debates between civil governments, military officials and parliament concerning how to resolve separatism, now these three groups together support military actions which to date has resulted in at least 500 people from both sides being killed.

This chapter attempts to clarify the re-militarisation process in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto in May 1998. Militarisation is not something new in Indonesian history. In fact, military presence within commerce and politics, reliance upon military strength to resolve social conflict and political tension, and the rise of militaristic nationalism have been present since the professional army was formed towards the end of the 1940s. Therefore, in the analysis of

the militarisation which is taking place in Indonesia now, it is useful to look at its roots in the past, particularly when the New Order was formed along with the slaughter of an estimated half a million people in the 1965-1966 military takeover that violently overthrew the Sukarno regime. Militarisation is not a rarity, rather the norm in capitalist systems hit by violent crises. I argue that the products of militarisation, such as the formation of armed militias which have mushroomed in Indonesia over the past five years stemming from relations between the military and youth groups at the time of the 1965-66 massacre, are related to attempts by the elite to find a solution to the overwhelming crisis. This chapter will then examine the social consequences of militarisation, focusing on its victims. Finally, this chapter will explore the international dimension, or more correctly, external support for militarisation since the New Order, which has been extremely important for the expansion of military power across the board.

Origins and Development of a Military Regime

The New Order regime was the result of a political conflict between the military and a portion of the ruling class on the one hand, and the Communist Party and other left-wing organisations on the other, the latter being banned after the attempted coup occurred on 1st October 1965. More than half a million members and supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and other mass organisations were murdered, arrested or exiled by military rulers, who used anti-communist hysteria to launch a 'slow coup' in order to topple President Sukarno. The mass homicide also became a base for the New Order's authoritarian state which placed the military as the most important supporting pillar. The military, through intelligence units and the territorial command structure, mobilised the army and provided support to anti-communist youth organisations in order to initiate the murders. It was those involved in the carnage that became an important part of the Command for the Restoration of Security and Public Order (*Kopkamtib*), which was formed in October 1965, and became the most important institution during the New Order period. The role and authority of this institution was formulated in accordance with the practices of officials to 'regain security and order,' which included arresting and detaining civilians without a time limit, censoring the press, restricting the flow of people across borders, and supervising vital economic activities. The legal regulations and laws which allowed for these actions were usually used in response to criticism

or complaints which were rarely heard, and thus in its early days there were no legal restraints at all over this institution.

The carnage of 1965-66 also changed the social image and national identity of Indonesians. The idea that the nation was born by a resistance against colonialism and that it respected social equality was squashed and systematically removed from the education system as well as from politics. Military rulers then mobilised experts from several fields and dominated various forms of media in order to create a new identity which spread blind faith in the nation's military ideals and opposed attempts to fight for social equality as well as attitudes that criticised those in power as 'communist poison.' By manipulating facts about the murder of six generals which provided an excuse for the military to eliminate the communists, the New Order regime spread fear amongst the people – especially women – who were politically active, and emphasised the importance of the military as the nation's saviour. The results of the campaign which continued for decades are visible from the 'longing,' particularly within the middle class even today, for military strength which can bring security and stability such as that during the Suharto era.

The extermination of communists in 1965-1966 was the largest military operation ever conducted in TNI's history, and paved the way for military domination in all parts of life. The Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (or *Kopkamtib*) that was formed in October 1965 to lead the operation had almost unrestricted powers and resembled permanent martial law which was "intermittent and uneven in application, but constant in doctrine and potential." Another way was to appoint active military officers as Ministers, Members of Parliament and other officials within the civil bureaucracy. This militarisation process began soon after the 1965-66 extermination which was carried out in order to 'cleanse the country of communist elements.' At the height of the New Order regime, almost half of the officials at the ministerial level, two thirds of governors and more than half of *bupati* (local governors) were military officers. In 1980, there were more than 8,000 military officers holding civil posts in a variety of fields, both in the central parliament and regional parliaments. To ensure that the civil bureaucracy always stayed in line with military interests, a co-ordinating structure called Regional Leaders Assembly (*Muspida*) was also created, which involved local military commands, the head of police, the head of the civil bureaucracy such as the governor or the *bupati* (local governor), the attorney

general and the courts. This 'co-ordinating' structure had a large influence in determining the policies of the civil bureaucracy and the performance of the judicature.

The military's penetration into non-military affairs was justified by the *Dwifungsi* (dual function) doctrine, which stated that the TNI was a military power as well as a socio-political power. This doctrine was put forward in the early 1950s to warrant military intervention in politics and it then became the most important element of the New Order's military ideology. There was an important assumption within this doctrine that TNI soldiers were basically more superior than other Indonesians and, because of this, were given the authority to become involved in determining issues outside their field. On the other hand, civilian leaders had been proven incapable of leading, as the nation had been continually threatened by disintegration, foreign subversion and separatist movements. Because of such convictions, TNI appointed itself as the principal component in maintaining national security. In practice, TNI developed special units which were charged with the task of preventing the development of opposition movements that were always referred to as 'threats to national security and stability.' For 32 years, thousands of people were sent to prison, sometimes for tens of years, simply because they had been accused of threatening 'national security' through their writing and speeches, or sometimes merely for just being present in discussions which criticised the government.

TNI began consolidating its territory in a repressive manner at the end of the 1960s. This had previously been prevented by regional rebellions and separatist movements. The first target was Papua which until 1963 remained under the control of the Dutch. Previously it had been Sukarno who had began the political integration process by sending TNI to seize the region from the Dutch. Through negotiations with the United Nations, it was finally agreed that the region's political status would be determined through a referendum. After taking control, Suharto sent more soldiers to launch a military operation which caused hundreds of people to die and tens of thousands to be displaced from their homes. In 1969, during this terror campaign the New Order organised a referendum where all of the remaining leaders in Papua stated their desire to become integrated with Indonesia. In December 1975, TNI invaded Timor Leste, a former Portuguese colony which was going through the decolonisation process. Defying criticism from the international community, the TNI killed tens of thousands of people within

the first years of the invasion, and it has been estimated that throughout the 24 years of Indonesian occupation two thirds of the nation's population died due to military attacks, intelligence operations or starvation and suffering. For decades, these two regions and Aceh were declared as military operation zones and completely controlled by the military.

The presence of military operation zones became a reason for TNI to justify the 'security approach' used in confronting opposition against the central government. For the same reason, this approach was also used to confront student demonstrations, farmer actions against land occupation as well as labour strikes. Since the beginning of the New Order, the military determined its role in guarding stability as a condition for development. In line with the strengthening of relations between the military and the business world, the capitalist ideology within the military ideology also gained strength. In the 1980s, opposition to development projects was crushed using military repression and people who opposed development were accused as being communists. In all disputes the business enterprises had with workers and farmers, it was certain that the military troops involved would defend the businesses' interests. From maintaining stability in general, the military gradually placed itself as a protector of capital accumulation by openly becoming assistants for large enterprises, particularly those engaged in extracting natural resources.

During the New Order, and in reality to date, TNI has not been too interested in developing military technology or weaponry, as is done in many other nations. The military budget is generally low, around 2 percent of the GDP and 10 percent of the government's expenditure, which according to military officials has never been enough. Indonesia is not very active in security pacts or cooperation and even bilateral cooperation is very much limited to border security problems and cross-border criminality. In terms of technological aspects, the military has not undergone significant improvements. The New Order government never developed nuclear, biological or chemical weapons during its period of reign. On the contrary, the government of this era ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and proposed the declaration of Southeast Asia as a nuclear weapons free zone that was later adopted as an ASEAN policy. During this period, Indonesia was noted as one nation that signed the Biological Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons.

The lack of interest in technology, weaponry and external defence in general reflects TNI's character as a political organisation rather than one that is military. This factor was compounded in 1965 when TNI leaders, as a part of the ruling class and with international support, in particular the United States, took over. It was these officers who controlled the 'nation within the nation' that placed TNI within the political system with its own commercial and political interests. Capacity building was more often carried out for overcoming problems within the country, such as developing political intelligence networks to keep watch on pro-democracy groups, religious groups or ex-political prisoners, as well as creating counter-insurgency units to crush guerrillas in Timor Leste, Aceh and Papua. Even in carrying out internal security tasks, the military often used paramilitary groups such as the Banser Youth and Democratic Youth, which were involved in the massacre of 1965-66 and the pro-Jakarta militia in Timor Leste.

Crisis, Reform and Re-Militarisation

The 1997-98 crisis was a serious threat to the regime's stability. In a short period, what initially looked like a financial problem developed into intense economic and political crises. The New Order regime, which claimed to be the saviour of the nation, could not actually do anything to protect its people from the economic devastation that swept the country so abruptly. Widespread restlessness developed into powerful protests. When more than a million people took to the streets in several cities in May 1998, it was clear that the regime was not going to be able to maintain its power. Although successful in killing a large number of people and creating havoc, the TNI was unable to pressure the public into requesting the military to restore order as some of its leaders had hoped. In the middle of this chaos, the New Order elite began to distance themselves from the rulers and returned to ethnic, family and religious networks to build up their own small kingdoms. It was these new groups who had an important role in a variety of communal conflicts that began to appear towards the end of the New Order's regime.

Pressure on TNI increased further because of its involvement in several cases of violence, in particular the murder of student activists soon after General Suharto stepped down as President. In an internal meeting in September 1998, TNI formulated a new policy paradigm which was hoped to improve TNI's image in post-Suharto Indonesia. This paradigm covered several programmes such as the separation of the police force and the military,

discarding of the military's social-political functions, termination of the military's involvement in day-to-day politics, confirmation of a neutral attitude towards the forthcoming general elections, and a revision of TNI's doctrine. In the last six years a few of the above points have been reached successfully, for example the separation of the police force and the army as well as the withdrawal of 2,000 military officers from government institutions at all levels and another 3,000 officers from the civil bureaucracy. Furthermore, several other officers have been brought to court to explain their involvement in cases of violence in several regions, including Timor Leste and Aceh.

The collapse of the New Order system caused many opportunities for change to take place. However, the absence of a solid reform agenda and competition between civilian leaders resulted in the loss of this opportunity for reform. The military, which was cornered at one point because of human rights violations, corruption and other acts of misconduct, only needed a very brief space to straighten itself out and improve its image. In November 1998, or less than a year after the fall of Suharto, TNI had returned to attacking civilians, including shooting dead several student activists in Jakarta, without seeing the need to provide any justification. On the contrary, TNI General Wiranto, who was a presidential candidate in the 2004 election, stated that the students ought to have been shot because student actions were a threat to national stability.

Whereas repressive action such as this invited criticism in Jakarta, the military launched similar actions in the regions without any obstructions. In order to restore security and order, TNI launched military operations which killed military and civilian leaders from the opposition movements in Aceh and Papua. Criticism from human rights groups and foreign governments regarding violence in these regions were quickly cast off as foreign intervention which deliberately sought to destroy Indonesia's unity in the name of human rights. Even suggestions to seek resolutions peacefully through negotiations owing to the bad experience in Timor Leste, where the attempt at a peaceful resolution ended with the region claiming independence, and the tendency for such negotiations to provide greater freedom for opposition movements. Another reason is, of course, that peaceful negotiations reduce TNI's role as the guard of national stability. This attitude was clearly apparent when Abdurrahman Wahid's government, which took the initiative to enter into negotiations with the Free Aceh Movement

(*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, GAM), reached a cessation of hostilities agreement. TNI then broke the agreement and attacked a village, an incident which eventually triggered GAM to retaliate, and thus negotiations broke down. The intelligence agency also mobilised villagers to protest against the executive and supervisory boards that had been created through the peace negotiations. A similar campaign was conducted during peace negotiations in Maluku and Central Sulawesi, where TNI troops and intelligence officers distributed automatic weapons and ammunition amongst warring groups and dispersed snipers who shot villagers from warehouse roofs in order to trigger violence.

When peaceful negotiations failed, partly due to such provocation, TNI leaders urged the civil bureaucracy to give them larger authority in order to 'maintain security and order.' The central government called a state of emergency in Maluku in 2000 which did not achieve anything except increasing the number of military personnel in the region and forming new regional military commands (*kodam*). In May 2003, the government called a state of emergency in Aceh and launched its largest military operation since the invasion of Timor Leste in 1975. After killing over 2,000 people accused as separatist guerrillas – including elderly people and children under five years – TNI stated that the military's presence in the region was still very much required.

The increased tendency to use military strength to overcome social and political problems such as the above situation could end in the return of authoritarian power, although not in the form of a dictatorship such as the New Order. In Aceh, Papua and other regions hit by conflict, reform lasted only several months after the fall of Suharto. Within a short period, all reforms that had been implemented, such as the freedom to the expression of an opinion, to form groups and to form unions, were lost. Even rights such as these were enjoyed only by a section of the middle class and the more established political organisations which were considered to be part of the system, whereas workers' organisations still had to face brutal actions. As during the New Order, industrial disputes are more often resolved using a 'security approach', that is by sending the military or thugs to stop strikes from occurring, or to arrest and torture workers involved in the movement. Even in land cases, the company involved in the dispute often requests assistance from the local military command or police in return for a mutually agreed payment.

Militarisation as occurred in recent years can also be seen in the increasing number of military personnel and their coercive abilities. In December 2003, the airforce created 10 Raider Battalions, a 10,000 strong group with an airborne capacity. Soon after completing the training programme and following their inauguration, these battalions were given a trial run in Aceh to overcome opposition from local residents. In mid-2004, TNI made an agreement with Malaysia to establish joint training to confront terrorist threats in the Malacca Straits. It is unknown how effective this series of training sessions will be in preventing terrorism. Indonesia's delegate to the negotiations with Malaysia was Major General Adam Damiri (an officer who was far more competent in accelerating terror than preventing it) who had only a few months before being sentenced to five years jail by a court in connection with human rights crimes in Timor Leste in 1999. Overall, there has been no substantial increase in the number of TNI personnel compared with previous years, but it is clear that there has been an increase in its combat, territorial, and intelligence capacities due to support from new facilities provided by the central and regional governments, as well as through foreign support.

The increase in territorial commands was perhaps TNI's most obvious step to strengthen and further its influence. Since 1999, General Wiranto, who at that time was the Minister for Defence and a TNI commander, proposed to increase the number of territorial commands from 10 to 17 similar to during the New Order era. In Maluku, the proposal was rejected by local communities and human rights groups who realised that the spread of military power in the area would not assist in resolving problems. However, when conflict in the region became more widespread, due to the involvement of TNI who provided weapons and support to one of the armed groups, the Pattimura Military Command, its status was raised to a *kodam* (regional military command). Using as an excuse the increasing capabilities of this apparatus for defence, military officials proposed to form a number of other *kodam* in regions hit by unrest in border areas including Papua, Timor Leste and Kalimantan. According to the plan, each *kodam* would be supported by an 'organic battalion,' a battalion which would have its barracks in the region in question and be under the orders of the local commander. In Aceh, it was planned that there would be six organic battalions, whereas in Kalimantan there would be two special organic battalions to guard the border by 2003. In addition to strengthening the political position of the military, the increase

in the number of *kodam* also benefited TNI commercially as the structure of the territorial commands provides the backbone of the military's business activities, both in the legal/formal and informal areas.

During Megawati Sukarnoputri's government (2001-2004), the intelligence agency has also grown rapidly. The presidential decree in 2002 on combating terrorism gave the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) the authority to build an organisational structure parallel to the civil bureaucracy. In addition to forming an intelligence office down to the sub-district level, BIN also recruited and used civil officers to carry out tasks as intelligence agents. Although the Indonesian parliament (DPR) only agreed upon the \$24.5 million budget proposed by BIN in 2004, the formation of intelligence offices in the regions had already been going on for a year. At the end of January 2003, the West Java regional head decided to reconstitute the Regional Intelligence Co-ordinating Board (*Bakorinda*), an *ad hoc* institution providing a meeting place for high-ranking officers to exchange information and intelligence data. During the New Order era, *Bakorinda* meetings held an important role in organising plans for intelligence operations which often resulted in human rights violations such as illegal abduction, torture and murder. In South Sulawesi, BIN has already begun to recruit civil servants as intelligence officers.

The intelligence agency's authority has now become even wider than during previous years, and exceeds its basic function as an agency which collects information. Under the new system, BIN has several new powers such as investigating the distribution of counterfeit money and the printing of important documents from drivers' licenses to school certificates and credit cards. It is feared that such far-reaching powers could provide avenues for business and corruption amounting to millions of dollars. But the more serious matter is the BIN's power to restrict the civil rights of a person thought to be involved in terrorism or transnational crime without any proof except for intelligence reports. In a proposal presented to the President several weeks after the bomb explosion in Bali in October 2002, intelligence officials requested the authority to form secret units and detain people without charge. Another manifestation is the intelligence agency's involvement in politics. BIN accused organisations and individuals of "not wanting the presidential elections to run smoothly or safely" in 'top-secret' reports, which were interestingly enough spread to DPR members and leaked to the press. In a meeting with the DPR, the head of BIN obtained support to prevent such

groups by arresting their leaders who were considered to be 'possible security threats.' Commenting on the accusation that such an authority meant a return to the repressive style of the past, Head of BIN Lieutenant General Hendropriyono said: "If we had used the old style, the NGOs that deceived the nation and sold their own country to the point that Timor Leste was lost, would have been sentenced to death."

Ideologically, there has not been any meaningful change with regard to militarisation. Although forced to drop the *Dwifungsi* doctrine, at least formally, TNI has remained a narrow militaristic fort of nationalism. An important discourse in the reform era is the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). Within this concept, Indonesia is seen as the final product of the developments within Indonesian society, a gift from God which must be defended by each and every patriot. Military leaders consider efforts to defend NKRI from various threats as a noble task and within this framework they can do anything, including killing people thought to be disrupting the unity of NKRI. This concept gradually became a part of the official rhetoric during Habibie's government, or more precisely after the announcement that the government had agreed to a referendum in Timor Leste in late January 1999. Several observers noted that the function of this concept was similar to the *dwifungsi* doctrine. It justifies the military as a territorial structure that guards the nation's unity. The broadening of this territorial structure was carried out at the same time as, if not before, the regional divisions that the local elite had fought for incessantly since the ratification of the Law on Regional Autonomy in 1999 were established.

With this doctrine of guarding the unity of NKRI, the military has always justified its involvement in, and occasional domination over, policy formulation. Throughout the New Order, the military was considered, and it considered itself, an organisation made up of 'the best men in Indonesia' and thus it was befitting for the military to control central as well regional governments. The legacy of this 'best men' ideology can be seen in the comments of military officials regarding the reasons for their involvement in the formulation of a variety of laws, especially those concerning security and defence. In the formulation of the Law on Eradicating Terrorism and the calling of a state of emergency in Aceh, military officers openly attacked civil officials who they thought did not understand defence issues and made the wrong decisions which ultimately threatened the unity of the Republic, such as in the case of Timor Leste. In early 2003, military leaders pushed for

TNI laws among others to give TNI commanders the power to mobilise the army to 'save the nation from danger' without permission from the president or the DPR, or, in other words, allowing the military to stage a 'constitutional coup d'état.'

Military's Formal Return to Politics

During 2004, there were two important events which marked the military's formal return to politics. First, there was the enactment of the Law on TNI, which received criticism and attention from many groups. Although it did include several important points for reform, such as the removal of the military command structure and the prohibition of soldiers from engaging in business and political activities, it did not remove the controversial section that allowed the military to seize state power whenever the commander-in-chief decides that the state was in danger. Many observers saw this law as providing the military the legal apparatus which it could use to defend its political strength. The sections of the new law that received much attention were those relating to the appointment of TNI commanders to positions equal to those of the ministers. This enables the senior military officers to become cabinet members who can also determine government policies. In effect, the new reform, contrary to the rhetoric of the 'New Paradigm,' allows military officers to hold civilian posts and continue to defend the territorial command structure thus providing a 'gateway' for the military to become involved in socio-political affairs.

The Law on TNI was significant not just from the perspective of the debated contents, but also in terms of the formulation of the draft and its enactment by the parliament. According to the law, the draft discussed in the DPR should have come from the Ministry of Defence, but what was actually used is a draft discussed at a meeting with the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, involving high-ranking military officials. The somewhat bitter debate in parliament over a number of sections of the draft law actually proves that the draft was still full of problems and required more time for its finalisation. However, due to a push from the government, particularly the military, the Parliament eventually ratified the draft. This entire process indicates that ultimately military officials still hold enough power to control the formulation of laws and the path of the government, as they did during the New Order.

The second event was the presidential election which ended September this year. In the first round, two of the five candidates came from the military. They were General (ret.) Wiranto, who has recently been accused by a court in Timor Leste for crimes against humanity in the region in 1999, and General (ret.) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who faced prosecution for his involvement as a senior military officer in the attack on the Indonesian Democratic Party headquarters in July 1996, which at that time was led by Megawati Sukarnoputri. Another general, Lieutenant General (ret.) Agum Gumelar, who was an intelligence officer for a lengthy period and involved in several military operations, nominated himself for vice-presidency. On one hand, these nominations indicated the military's regained confidence after a shaky period due to the criticism regarding their long record of human rights violations as well as excessive extortion and corruption. On the other hand, it also indicates the failure of civilian leaders to carry out the reform agenda which included restricting the military from taking on issues of governance.

The campaign against presidential candidates from the military, launched by pro-democracy activists, has not been successful. In the first round, the two military candidates, Wiranto and Yudhoyono, together obtained more than half the votes, whereas the other civilian politicians got less. Yudhoyono finally won the elections after he beat Megawati Sukarnoputri by a large margin, despite being supported by a somewhat insignificant party in parliament. Yudhoyono's victory is the military's first step in returning to the domain of politics, particularly to improve TNI's image, which was damaged by adverse criticism over the last few years. Yudhoyono so far has been known as a moderate figure in the military, involved in the formulation and implementation of the New Paradigm announced by the TNI. In his cabinet, which is referred to as the United Indonesia Cabinet, there are only four retired military officers which to date have not been too prominent in politics. From this perspective, it could be said that Yudhoyono consciously wants to avoid a militaristic impression which many people had initially worried about. Looking into its policies and programmes, however, it is clear that Yudhoyono's government has the same militaristic tendencies as the New Order.

In the *Vision, Mission and Programme* distributed to the public by supporters of Yudhoyono and his vice-president, Jusuf Kalla, during the election campaign, as well as in their public statements, there were no clear indications and commitments to continue with TNI reform or

demilitarisation. Instead, several points in their programme actually affirmed their position as the heirs of the New Order's repressive policies, including 'conflict resolution' in several areas, especially Aceh, Poso, Maluku and Papua. It is fairly clear that conflict resolution here only emphasises the security and stability aspects. The final objective in their programme refers to "the increasingly strong Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on the Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and Unity in Diversity," which singularly excludes the possibility of alternative resolutions, such as political negotiations or referenda in conflict regions. Not long after Yudhoyono was declared the winner, military officials explained that they would not be withdrawing TNI troops from Aceh or Papua. Looking at his career path and political attitudes to date, there is a very small chance for Yudhoyono to change his policies in these regions. Another proposal that the new President Yudhoyono has proposed in his programme is the increase in the nation's ability to confront terrorist threats. Several steps taken while he was the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security clearly show that Yudhoyono will not take any drastic steps outside the 'war on terrorism' framework of the US. As with other high-ranking military officials, he supports a general expansion in the authority of intelligence agencies and the military in order to safeguard against terrorism.

In the provincial regions, the military has already made a formal return to politics. Many military officers have begun to be appointed as regional government officers. This measure in fact runs counter to the principles in the New Paradigm as well as regulations drawn up in 1999. In the backdrop of the state of emergency in Aceh, TNI and police officers have replaced as many as 36 sub-district heads. Even the co-operation between the civil bureaucracy and the military has begun to increase. At present, many regional governments have purchased equipment for TNI, including motor vehicles and boats.

Many territorial commands at the district level (*kodim*), which should be funded by the central government are now beginning to request budgetary 'assistance' from local governments. This practice not only violates defence regulations, but also leads, as critics have pointed out, to developing civil-military affiliations at the local level. Such civil-military cooperation at the local level has a particular history in Indonesia. For example, during the 1950s it led to anti-government violence and agitation for an uprising against the central government. Militarisation of the civil bureaucracy in the regions

is very likely to happen, particularly because of the educational background of officials. Almost all of the present district and sub-district leaders in Indonesia are graduates of the Home Affairs Higher Education Institute (STPDN), which is well known for its military style education. In early September 2003, this particular university caught the media's attention when a new student died after being mutilated by senior students during an 'initiation ritual.'

Militarisation and Social Control

Another way to strengthen the military's grip has been the burgeoning of security organisations, such as the political party task forces (a euphemism for security forces) after 1998, which resemble private armies more than youth wings of a political organisation. Their organisational structure has been formed to resemble that of the military, complete with territorial commands, intelligence units, operations and logistics, as well as other military paraphernalia such as camouflage uniforms, steel-cap boots and sharp weapons. In Timor Leste and Maluku, militias were and are being formed and trained by the military, as well as being equipped with automatic weapons and ammunition like a regular battalion. Although their roots can be traced back to relations between the military and anti-communist youth groups in the mid 1960s, the presence of paramilitary groups and thugs has become more prominent since the fall of Suharto. Their main role as an extended arm is to do the 'dirty work' for a political party, a military leader or a government official. In Maluku and Central Sulawesi, these groups have an important role in increasing conflict between religious groups. Aside from the relations with the military, the presence and growth of armed civilian groups have clearly had an influence on the militarisation of social relations. In Maluku, for example, kinship relations have been replaced by loyalty to an armed civilian group, as the use of weapons is the best form of self-defence during periods of conflict. Civil governments and other non-military organisations are considered more obscure because they do not have any coercive power. In schools, teenagers involved with armed groups have become a major problem because they tend to ignore rules and regulations and resolve problems by resorting to violence.

The tendency to spread intelligence officials out in communities and recruit members of communities as intelligence agents is another form of militarisation. Towards the 2004 general elections, the police force in West

Java recruited around 80,000 motorcycle taxi drivers as intelligence agents. They were assigned to collect information on passengers and also residents from the surrounding area, and to report anything suspicious to intelligence agents. A similar approach was adopted by BIN with the regional governments, particularly the civil service police and civil defence units that became an extended arm of the military during the New Order. There is a real possibility that policies such as these will revive the 'intelligence culture' which was so strong during the New Order era. It is a 'culture' that compelled the citizens to keep watch of their fellow neighbours and citizens, reporting each other, even implicating falsely, if they observed any thing 'unusual.' Previously, it was proven that such practices resulted in many persons being wrongly arrested. It also promoted discrimination against certain ethnic and religious groups. This process of militarisation therefore heightened violence especially when combined with political hatred that was widespread amongst the elite.

Militarisation and Its Victims

Militarisation and violence causes extreme suffering for people in the regions struck by conflict. Since 1999, around 1.5 million people have lost their homes and fled their homelands to new areas. A national survey conducted by the World Food Programme in early 2002 indicated that internal refugees who have spread throughout several provinces have formed an under-class that lives with very high unemployment and poverty rates and very poor health standards. More than half of the refugee families live below the poverty line and have an unemployment rate of 54 percent. In several areas such as Aceh, the percentage of households living below the poverty line reaches 90 percent whereas the unemployment rate is 100 percent. From a financial perspective, the vacant land left behind by refugees and the increase in internal refugees in camps that are willing to do any type of work in order to survive is an ideal condition for extreme exploitation. Since 2001, the government has worked together with several plantation and mining companies to relocate refugees who have sufficient skills to work as contract labourers in new regions. A number of others are 'placed' on land that is yet to be cleared to survive as farmers or fishermen. Many of these groups then become involved in disputes with local residents because they are considered to be squatting on someone else's land, or with regional governments because they are considered to have stolen state land.

Women and children are generally the victims in such situations. Militarisation basically strengthens male domination in relation to values, institutions and everyday practices and increases gender inequality and discrimination. In conditions of militarisation and conflict, the government, opposition groups and communities put pressure on men to take the responsibility of defending the community. The call for people, including anti-government guerrillas, to pick up weapons indirectly emphasises a gender stereotype, where men with their weapons become 'defenders' whereas women are the defended. These different roles are apparent in refugee camps or communities affected by conflict, where women generally carry out the policies and plans formed by a group of respected men, such as religious leaders and traditional figures. The role of women in caring for communities devastated by conflict is actually immense. Whereas men take on the 'important' role of guarding security points – which is usually done whilst playing cards and drinking – or become involved in fruitless meetings with the government, women provide food, take care of children, do the cleaning and frequently obtain an additional income by working in other areas. Research has shown that many families in refugee camps are supported by women and girls rather than men. Despite this, the roles women play in decision making regarding the community's future is usually very minimal, generally because of the gender stereotyping reinforced through militarisation.

Another serious problem in armed conflict is sexual violence towards women. Sexual violence does not occur randomly; it has a clear objective and target, specifically to embarrass the victims, their families and communities. In these situations, the female body becomes the place of conflict between those wishing to destroy, and those guarding the community's respect. Revenge or punishment of an enemy often takes the form of sexual violence. Violence, particularly rape and harassment, also occur (and are ignored by leaders) as a 'payment' for soldiers who have risked their lives in conflict. The ending of armed conflicts or military operations does not automatically end violence against women. After years of living under military occupation, communities tend to resolve everyday problems, even domestic disputes, through violence. In Timor Leste, the level of domestic violence is very high, and in December 2000 the bodies of four women were found in separate places after their own husbands or brothers had murdered them using a machete. In the same year, 169 cases of violence against women were recorded, and domestic violence was the most common type of violence,

reaching 40 percent high of all cases. The commercial sex trade also tends to increase in conflict regions, particularly to serve the regular troops who have been placed in an area by the government or international organisations. This factor among others, proves that peaceful situations do not automatically provide security for women, because it is actually the balance between gender relations and the system which protects them.

Militarisation and its International Dimension

International support, particularly from the US and its allies, was a very important factor for the New Order regime to maintain power. Since the late 1950s, airforce generals have received support from the US government and military for being 'a reliable anti-communist force' and as well, being leading agents for modernisation through capital expansion. Towards the end of the 1950s, the US even supported a number of rebellious military officers by sending weapons and assisting in an air strike in Indonesia. The rebellion failed but co-operation between Indonesian officers and the US diplomatic and intelligence communities continued. When Sukarno's government continued to attack US and British imperialism opting to strengthen relations with socialist countries instead, a co-operation between Indonesian military officers and the US was developed in planning to confront any situation should Sukarno no longer be the President. The abduction of the six airforce generals on 1st October 1965, which was subsequently portrayed as an attempted coup, provided the pretext for the military to carry out their plans. The US quickly moved to support General Suharto, an officer who was relatively unknown. With full support from the US and its allies, a coalition between the ruling elite and the military moved faster than the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) which was accused of having carried out the coup. Many communists were murdered quickly and the US intelligence assisted the Indonesian military by providing a list of around 5,000 PKI leaders and supporters to be targeted. Outside the country, the US played an important role in ensuring that the mass murder of around half a million people was not publicly discussed.

In the early years, the New Order relied greatly upon the support of the US and its allies for needs ranging from food aid, assistance, to the formulation of the country's economic policies. From a military perspective, the US was the most important source of weapons and military supplies while the United Kingdom and France followed. The US also trained TNI troops and officers

systematically in a broad range of lethal tactics and military strategies, including psychological operations. The military later used the methods and tactics learned from the US to abduct pro-democracy activists in 1997-98 and shot student demonstrators just before the fall of Suharto. However, out of all forms of US support, the most important was the political support for everything the New Order implemented while in power. When Indonesia was about to invade Timor Leste, General Suharto asked for assistance from US President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger who were visiting Jakarta a day before the invasion. For the first four years, TNI carried out a massive land, sea and air attack in Timor using weapons and military equipment provided by the US. The US played an important role within the UN by blocking the Security Council from following up two resolutions which explicitly asked Indonesia to stop the invasion and respect the rights of the people of Timor Leste to determine their own political fate.

Towards the fall of Suharto, a large number of New Order supporters within the country and overseas began to reconsider, if not withdraw, their support to the regime altogether. The US was among the last group to ask Suharto to step down and support the reform process in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the US military maintained its good relations with TNI and, breaking an embargo set by the US Congress, provided military training for TNI troops. Later it supported military violence that occurred after the referendum in Timor Leste in 1999. The US support for the Indonesian military continued even when the TNI was facing pressure to bring the officers involved in the violence in the region to justice. Moreover, the demand to create an international court to try the TNI officers became weaker with the US, along with other strong nations in the UN, playing a key role in blocking such demand.

Relations with the business world, particularly vital international projects, have become a supporting pillar for militarisation. During the economic crisis of 1997, the government ordered TNI to guard 'vital' industries, such as oil refineries and mines owned by ExxonMobil, Caltex, Unocal and Freeport. The designation of this task simply legalised what had been a common practice for a long time. Freeport, for example, spent \$5.6 million in 2002 to pay for TNI troops to guard its giant mine in Papua, whereas it is estimated that ExxonMobil spends \$500,000 per year on similar matters in Aceh. Smaller enterprises often put the members of elite forces such as *Kopassus* or battalions on duty around their grounds for security reasons.

They are also used as a coercive force in negotiations, and even as thugs in the case of disputes. There is apprehension about such hiring out of troops by sometimes, the ex-military personnel or those who receive military pension, because this practice could lead to the privatisation of security, a problem that is quite serious in some African countries.

After 11 September 2001, support for the TNI underwent a great change. The US government quickly disregarded Congress policies and withdrew a number of embargoes on loans and military assistance to Indonesia, and thus became one of the main allies in the 'war on terrorism' in Southeast Asia. Amidst the anti-terrorist hysteria, the Bush administration did not just normalise relations with Indonesia, but also was directly involved in forming special forces to overcome the terrorist threat. Several months ago, the US Congress agreed to a military aid package to the value at \$16 million. For Indonesia, this assistance does not mean much in terms of increasing the TNI's capacity to confront the terrorist threat. This is evident from the lack of significant results from military investigations on terrorist networks compared to that of the police force. Despite this, assistance was significant in raising the TNI's morale, because they now openly receive support from their old allies, after a long period of being treated as an 'international pariah' due to human rights violations and extensive corruption. The ups and downs of this relationship continue as is evident through the US Congress's criticism of the use of US weapons in the war in Aceh. Previously, the US House of Representatives decided to end the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme in Indonesia because of the attacks on ten US nationals in Timika near the Freeport mine on August 31, 2002. This programme will not be continued until the Indonesian government investigates the attacks and drags those who were responsible for the attacks to court.

Support from other countries in Southeast Asia is generally not too important a factor because of the ASEAN's policy of non-intervention in each other's internal affairs. For 32 years, the New Order enjoyed ASEAN's 'silence,' yet did not receive any support to maintain power when Indonesia was hit by the severe economic crisis of 1997. In November 2001, Indonesia became active in formulating a framework for co-operation to fight terrorism and transnational crime. The contents of a series of discussions held in this regard were summarised in a co-operation agreement signed by the delegates at the ASEAN Regional Forum in June 2003. A year before, Indonesia had

also signed an agreement with the Philippines and Malaysia to initiate joint training for anti-terrorist operations, and information sharing to guard against terrorist infiltration as well as security problems along the border. This year, Indonesia has proposed the formation of an ASEAN Security Community which would handle problems concerning terrorism, separatism and transnational crime.

Conclusion

Militarism is a legacy of authoritarianism which is rooted in the power structures and culture in Indonesia. The processes and means of changing the existing regimes often determine the character of the new regime as well as the success or failure of the demilitarisation, or even the remilitarisation project. President Suharto's fall was not as dramatic as that of Marcos of the Philippines or Mobutu Sese Seko in Congo who were overthrown by the military. Although the military received a direct blow when Suharto stepped down, and was soon hit by critical attacks from all directions, it has successfully re-gathered and re-consolidated its power, made several attempts to adapt to the new situation and finally returned to the political stage. Political instability resulting from violence, turmoil and economic difficulties, in conjunction with the absence of any serious commitment on the part of the civilian elite circles to build democracy, made militarism and militarisation inevitable and possible. This has been visible from the welcome received by President Yudhoyono, an ex-General, who is considered capable of taking Indonesia to a 'normal period,' free of tumultuous political competition and social conflict.

Reform in military bodies has occurred only on the surface, such as the withdrawal of the military from civil bureaucracy as well as representative institutions. In reality, many important political decisions are made by the military without even feeling the need to consult the parliament or other governmental agencies. The separation of TNI and the National Police Force, for example, has not automatically made the police independent. Similarly, the prohibition of active military officers engaging in business and politics has not in reality stopped any of these practices. In any case, the failure to reform the TNI cannot be fully explained by the reluctance of politicians to change alone. The inability of the political-civilian elite to formulate and carry out a coherent reform agenda is also largely responsible for this reform failure. In fact, many in the civilian elite have encouraged the military's return

by forming political partnerships with the military as well, paramilitary groups at the local, provincial and national levels.

Against this backdrop, a process of remilitarisation has also occurred in several areas. Civilian riots and violence provide a reason for the military to bring about peace through repressive measures. Meanwhile, the war on terror led by the US received a warm welcome from the Indonesian military, which in order to return to power in politics required support from the US. From a legal perspective, the military benefited from the enactment of the Law on TNI, last October. The election of General Yudhoyono as President completed the necessary formalities for the military to return to politics. In the provincial regions, remilitarisation has occurred quickly, particularly in areas of conflict and violence that often involves the TNI. Remilitarisation on a national scale and in the region is significant as it is to a certain extent supported by the public, despite of the military's loss of legitimacy after the fall of Suharto. It is now even more difficult to expect the military to take responsibility for crimes against humanity and corruption in the past, and therefore, there is a greater possibility for a repeat of these incidents in the future. The failure of reform in this context is not merely a valuable lesson, but also a damaging legacy for democratisation efforts in the future.

NOTES:

- 1 In 1988, this institution was replaced by the Agency for Coordination of Assistance for the Consolidation of National Security (Bakorstanas), whose role was not as large as its predecessors. See, Richard Tanter, *Intelligence Agencies and Third World Militarization: A Case Study of Indonesia, 1966 – 1989*, PhD Thesis, Department of Politics, Monash University, (1991, 264).
- 2 In the New Order's version of the events of 1 October 1965, it was said that members of Gerwani, a women's left-wing mass organisation, tortured the generals, slashed their bodies and cut off their genitals with razors before killing them. This accusation has been proven incorrect, but to date is still used as a reason to prevent the involvement of women – especially women from the lower class – in politics. For an explanation of the murders, the accusations relating to Gerwani and their importance for the New Order's constructions, see, Saskia Wieringa, "The Birth of the New State Order in Indonesia: Sexual Politics and Nationalism," *Journal of Women's History* vol. 15, no. 1 (2003): 70–91.
- 3 In order to carry out its tasks and operations, this institution used territorial commands which held around 70% of the army's soldiers. This structure began to be formed at the end of the 1940s and was strengthened at the beginning of the 1960s in order to match

the power of the Communist Party and the left-wing movement in general. See, Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces in Indonesia* (St. Leonards NSW: Allen and Unwin, 1996).

- 4 Richard Tanter, (1991): 265.
- 5 This doctrine rested on the conviction that TNI played an important role in fighting for independence, which actually had no basis. During political negotiations which ended with the transfer of power to the republic's leader in 1949, regular TNI soldiers were cornered. Even during what is referred to as the 'war for independence,' guerilla fighters that had spread to a variety of regions and received wide support from the people had a much greater role compared to the TNI army. After the fall of Suharto, many people, including those within TNI, questioned this doctrine. Within the 'new paradigm' which was formulated in September 1998, it was stated that the *Dwifungsi* doctrine was no longer relevant in the reform era, but that the institutions – such as territorial commands – could not just be abolished. See, Rizal Sukma and Eddy Prasetyono, eds. Working paper No. 9, Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 'Clingendael.' *Security sector reform in Indonesia: the military and the police*. The Netherlands, 2003.
- 6 The referendum in Timor Leste in August 1999, which ended with the majority of the population choosing independence, actually proves that such an approach cannot be maintained and in fact threatens 'national integration' which it hoped to protect. But whereas the experts understand this mistake, military leaders have in fact made Timor Leste into a case of a lack of firmness on the behalf of civilian leaders in facing up to the separatist problem. The absence of any trials involving the generals responsible for the human rights violations in the region – two of whom were candidates for the 2003 presidential elections, that is General (ret.) Wiranto and Lieutenant General (ret.) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – has in fact strengthened militaristic nationalist sentiments.
- 7 Jun, Honna, "Military Ideology in Response to Democratic Pressure During the Late Suharto Era: Political and Institutional Contexts," *Indonesia* no. 67 (1999): 79.
- 8 On the other hand, this lack of funds has become a reason for TNI to remain involved in business activities through either military organisations managing companies or selling their services to protect legal, illegal and even criminal business activities. See, Lesley, McCulloch, "Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business," Paper presented at the conference, *Soldiers In Business: Military as an Economic Actor*, Jakarta, 17-19 October 2000.
- 9 Robert Lowry, (1996): 33-35.
- 10 Rizal Sukma and Eddy Prasetyono, (2003): 23.
- 11 Kusnanto Anggoro, "Perish the False Hope of Real Military Reform," *Jakarta Post* (15 June 2004).
- 12 For examples, see George Aditjondro 2000, "Guns, Pamphlets and Handie-Talkies," Paper presented at the conference, *Conflicts and Violence in Indonesia*, Institute of Southeast Studies, Humboldt University in Berlin, 3-5 July 2000.
- 13 An observer compared the situation in Indonesia to Turkey, where the military acts as a watchdog that intervenes and even launches soft coups or intervenes in the process of changing the head of state without changing the government. See, Soei Liem, "It's the Military Stupid!" Paper presented at the *International Workshop Violence in Indonesia: Its Historical Roots and Its Contemporary Manifestations*, Universiteit Leiden, 13-15 December 2000.

- 14 See, "Indonesia: Violence and the Integration Program," in *Violence in Indonesia*, eds. Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer (Hamburg: Abera, 2001), 17-24.
- 15 On 11 November 2001, members of the Kopsassus killed Theys Eluay, a leader in the Papuan Presidium Council, a political organisation which is fighting for the rights of the Papuan people to determine their own fate. The victim was murdered after an invitation to dinner at a Kopsassus post. Several officers from this special force were also thought to be involved in the death of a Freeport employee from the US, and were thus arrested and tried. Upon the sentence being handed down, the Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Ryamizard Ryacudu stated that he was proud of what these Kopsassus members had done and that he considered them heroes because they had saved NKRI. See, *Kompas*, 24 April 2003.
- 16 In reality, TNI did not feel they needed legitimacy in taking such action. In late December 2003, the Army Chief of Staff said in front of around 10,000 Raiders that TNI would interfere should there be blood shed in the 2004 general election.
- 17 Available from <http://www.sby-oke.com/pic/visi-misi.pdf>; Internet; accessed 20 August 2004.
- 18 Similar practices were carried out in East Timor during the first years of the occupations and for a lengthy period in Papua. See, *Kompas*, 28 May 2004.
- 19 See, Kees van Dijk, "The Privatization of the Public Order: Relying of the *Satgas*," in *Violence in Indonesia*, eds. Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer (Hamburg: Abera, 2001). Also, Togi Simanjuntak, ed., *Premanisme Politik* (Jakarta, Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 2000).
- 20 Several groups managed to get international attention because they were thought to be a part of the Al-Qaeda international terrorism network. See a report on a *mujahidin* training camp outside of Poso in *Time*, 18 March 2002. The paramilitary Christian group *Legiun Christum* in the same area which has also been mobilised to oppose efforts to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state is rarely referred to. It is known that these two groups have strong relations with a number of active and retired military officers.
- 21 In reality this division of labour is not absolute. In East Timor and Aceh for example, a large number of women joined or are joining the armed groups to fight against TNI. But in any case, this does not automatically wipe out the strong division between defenders and those who are defended.
- 22 The World Food Programme has recently conducted an extensive survey on the plight of internally displaced persons (IDP's) in Indonesia. See, World Food Program. *Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Indonesia Livelihood Survey*, 2002.
- 23 In addition, there were also cases of violence by UN civilian police and members of the UN peace forces from Jordan. See, *The Guardian*, 15 January 2001.
- 24 Many academics even believe that these officers had been prepared to overthrow Sukarno and take over the government with the support of the US. See, Peter dale Scott, "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno," *Pacific Affairs* vol. 58, no. 2 (1985).
- 25 Training covered techniques for psychological operations which were then put into practice when abducting pro-democracy activists who to date have not re-appeared, and sniper techniques which were used to shoot student activists in Jakarta in May and November. See, Allan Nairn. "Indonesia's Killers." *The Nation*, 30 March 1998. Also, Allan Nairn. "Indonesia's Killers." *The Nation*, 27 September, 1999).

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THAILAND

Hidden Dimensions of 'Thainess': Violence and Militarism in the Culture and Politics

Pravit Rojanaphruk

Introduction

In this chapter the central argument I develop is that the Thai society, contrary to its portrayal in the official discourse of 'Thainess' (*kwam pen Thai*) as gentle and peace-loving, is highly militarised. I will also make the point that the state through its control of historical memory of the people by means of an official ideology of glorifying state violence is instrumental in making the majority of the Thai people ignorant of the militarised nature of their society.

Thai society is blind to its own militarised aspects. It is a society that believes its own tourism image of being the Land of Buddhism and the Land of Smile. Yet it resorts to violence in handling personal, social and political conflicts. The Thai state has often deployed violence in dealing with conflicts. From the brutal suppression of the pro-democracy student movement in October 1976 to the Kru Se Mosque massacre of 87 Muslim protestors in April 2004, the Thai state has met dissent with unmitigated violence. The countless stories of gory incidents of murder that parade on the front pages of the daily tabloid press indicate how Thai society is indeed prone to violence.

Thai people seem to be unaware that their culture harbours a militarised way of thinking that is deeply rooted in a culture of autocracy and feudalism. Although the absolute monarchy in Thailand ended in 1932,

the culture of feudalism continues. Even at present, the king is the supreme head of a patronage system under which military and civilian leaders have ruled Thailand with an iron fist. In its inclination towards autocracy and resorting to violence with impunity, the present administration of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is no exception.

Challenges of Militarism

Thailand ended direct military rule in 1992 when the military dictatorship was over-thrown by a popular revolt. However, the culture of militarism, autocracy, and violence persists due to three factors.

Firstly, notwithstanding the belief that there prevails much social harmony in Thailand, the Thai people in general are incapable of engaging in genuine dialogue and debate when they are met with disagreement. When challenged with dissent, they resort to mud slinging, cursing, and even violence.

Secondly, Thailand's nation building process has been shaped by violent events and dictatorial ethos, which are all not open for public debate. For instance, the massacre of more than forty people who were branded as 'communists' and 'anti-monarchists' on 6 October 1976 at the Thammasat University in Bangkok, was an incident erased from public memory. Similarly many violent and militarised aspects of the past, such as the military invasions of neighbouring kingdoms or the taking of captive labour, are often glorified. Those who disagree with the official history are subjected to 'official' harassment. They also face condemnation by the elite and the public.

Thirdly, there is a highly problematic construction of Thai identity through the official notion of 'Thainess.' It projects the Thais as being essentially a peace-loving people, ignoring that enormous violence that persists and exists at different levels of society. This has made the Thai people themselves blind to the militarised and dictatorial dimensions of their own culture. Against this backdrop, I argue that militarism runs deep in Thai society, beyond the issues of war, arms build up, and conceptions of national security. Indeed, it exists in the domain of everyday Thai culture.

Working Definition

A culture can be described as militarised when it rests on the belief that the mighty are right as is often evident in the privileged use of violent force by

the state and the powerful. In a militarised culture, violence is used as the means to resolve conflict and differences. In such a public culture of militarism, those with differing views are often treated as enemies – often enemies of the nation as well as the state. It does not tolerate differences and dissent.

A militarised culture is also about submitting oneself to autocratic rule and control which often disguises itself as discipline, law and order, and being considerate about the common good. It encourages the obedience to the order and power exercised by the powerful. Similarly, the blind acceptance of the official version of history that allows no space for the contestation from the periphery of the Thai nation is a critical aspect of this culture of obedience and conformity.

Absence of Dialogue Leading to Violence

One easily visible cultural trait of the Thai people is the avoidance, at least at the superficial level, of confrontation and conflict. However, beneath this surface of calmness is conflict waiting to surface in other forms.

Of late, the point has been often made at intellectual seminars on Thailand's social and political issues that the Thai society lacks the spirit of genuine debate and dialogue. The complaint, which is repeatedly raised, points out that instead of engaging in debate and dialogue, the Thai people resort to cursing and other forms of verbal abuse in interactions with people who hold different views. "Some called me a water buffalo, some called me gay," complained Wasant Panich, the National Human Rights Commissioner, referring to numerous abusive responses he received on the internet following his visit to the predominantly Malay-Muslim province of Pattani where on 28 April 2004, dozens of Thai-Malay Muslim separatist rebels were killed by government troops.

A similar complaint was made at another seminar held at the Thammasat University on the controversy about public signs forbidding women entering certain 'sacred' parts of temples in northern Thailand. The complainant, a well-known feminist, pointed out that those who supported the continuation of such prohibitive practices merely wanted to hurl abuse at their opponents rather than debating over the issue. She added that these abuses came from people who called themselves devout Buddhists.

On the day when the national human rights report was released, one of the speakers at the event, Krittiya Archawanitkul of Mahidol University,

proposed that the human rights report by the National Human Rights Commission should contain more 'points of views.' He said: "We must respect and learn from differing views, especially those that are reasonable."

The case of the well-known historian Sujit Wongthes is yet another example. Wongthes often holds views of Thai history quite different from the officially endorsed ones. He recently claimed that Pattani, Southern Muslim city, site of the more recent ethnic violence and clashes, was a very old state, perhaps even older to the Sukhothai kingdom. One web surfer discounted Sujit's view on a popular chat site, not by debating the merits or demerits of Sujit's thesis, but emphasising that the historian's Sujit's family name, Wongthes, literally meant someone from a foreign family lineage. His suggestion was as that Sujith Wongthes was 'un-Thai' and therefore his historical judgement should not be trusted.

In such a culture where people only love to hear their own version of the truth, there is very little room available to move around when it comes to politics or criticism of the state and the government leaders. Government leaders particularly think that they are above criticism. It must have surprised Thirayuth Boonmee, a scholar at Thammasat University and a high-profile critic of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, to have received a very calm response from the Prime Minister when he severely criticised the latter's rule, exposing the growing collusion between political and business interests.

Shinawatra's silence should not be mistaken for tolerating criticism or taking criticism seriously. It is an indication that the Prime Minister feels so secure about his power that he now thinks he could simply ignore Thirayuth's criticism. When the Prime Minister thinks that he is beyond criticism, it is a dangerous sign in itself. It is not mere personal arrogance, but a symptom of the lack of a culture of debate, criticism and dialogue in Thai society.

People in Thailand maintain a facade of civility. It lasts only until patience runs out, exploding into verbal as well as physical violence. In many military coups in Thailand, coup leaders have been seen with their smiling faces, standing in front of the very prime ministers whom they were plotting to overthrow. For the Thai people, belief rather than understanding appear to be more important. A 12-year absence of direct military dictatorship has not yet been able to produce a culture of dialogue, debate, meaningful engagements and exchanges. During the decades of dictatorial

era, people learnt not to listen to, but to obey, not to argue but to follow. When listening and obeying became too much, the only way they could handle it was resorting to violence and counter-violence. This appears to be what is happening in the Muslim conflict in the Southern Thailand.

In social relations, people use verbal abuse to destroy the 'other', the enemy, through non-physical means. Indeed, the roots of dictatorship and militarised culture run deeper than many appear to think. Such militarism in the public culture can be countered only through conscious efforts to cultivate a public culture of democracy which values genuine dialogue, debate, and listening whether at home, in the family, in the neighbourhood, in schools and beyond.

Militarist Culture in Thai Society

There are many examples that manifest the militarised culture and ways of thinking that is widely prevalent in Thai society.

- Belief in the supremacy of power and the powerful. On the top of the pinnacle of power lays the 'revered' power of the king in which his good name is protected by the constitution from any criticism. Any criticism is considered 'unpatriotic' and being 'disloyal' to the king. (Sulak Sivaraksa, a pro-monarchist social critic, insists that even loyalty demands dissent!).
- The persistent acceptance of the use of force by parents against children, husbands against wives, teachers against students, the state against citizens. On the Children's Day, most military compounds are open for the children to come and play with the guns and tanks. Official Thai history taught in school places special importance on the role of the kings and the military in defending the kingdom. Siamese attacks on its neighbours are praised in school textbooks. The lynching and massacre of students who were accused of being communist and anti-monarchist at Thammasat University in October 1976 is still viewed by many Thais as 'appropriate.' The public continue to support the violent dispersal of mostly peaceful demonstrators branding them 'trouble makers,' as repeated at the anti-Thai-Malaysia gas pipeline protest in 2002. The 'war on drugs' in 2003 that led to 2,500 deaths mostly by extra-judicial means enjoys similar public support.

- The stress on following the orders and acceptance of the chain of command without questioning authority exists not only within the military, but also in the business world. The Thais stand still to show respect to the national anthem when it is aired by the radio every day at 8 a.m and 6 p.m. This is a remnant of Thailand's ultra-nationalist past and many Thais adhere to it without raising any questions about its relevance to the conditions today. The same can be said of the continuation of compulsory military service and pre-military training for young men.
- There is a near sacred status accorded to the concept of patriotism. Any threat to the indivisibility of Thailand's territorial integrity is not tolerated. This became evident in the popular support extended to the recent killing of Thai-Malay Muslim rebels in Pattani province in April 2004. The death of 85 civilian protesters in Tak Bai district of Narathiwat province in October 1978 also received similar expression of public support.
- The mainstream Thai culture does not tolerate criticism. In the absence of a culture of criticism, gossip has become a widespread form of social violence. Gossip is popular. It is often heard from the taxi drivers who are fond of indirect criticism. This intolerance of criticism manifests itself in government's frequent interference with press freedom, the employers' hostility towards unionisation, and union busting within the 'free press' of the corporate media industry. Criticism of the monarchy is prohibited. Thus, when a culture of criticism is non-existent and the conflict is avoided, the ultimate and inevitable outlet of social anger is violence.
- The public acceptance of coercive authority is embedded in the culture of everyday life. This is often expressed in proverbs and popular sayings that justify the obedience to authority and subjection of oneself to punishment. Examples are abound in everyday conversation: "The cow should be tied on its neck if one loves it, just like a child deserves to be hit by the loving parents"; or "The military is the protective fence of the nation."
- There is now a proliferation of privatised security services. They provide 'private security' to workplaces and exclusive residential areas. Many ex-military and police personnel have entered into this

fast-growing industry for employment. Some of them are even hired as hit men or assassins.

- The Village Scouts Movement, which is the largest 'quasi-fascist, right wing mass movement in Thai history, continues to spread militarist values among the young. According to Bowie, an anthropologist who studied this movement, five millions or one fifth of Thailand's adult population became its members in the late 1970s. The movement which came under Royal Patronage in 1972 served to intimidate anyone critical of the government into silence. The scouts participated in the bloody and gruesome attack at Thammasat University on October 6, 1976.

'Thainess' and History

The identity of 'Thainess' reflects the militarised culture against which it was officially constructed. This has been a process intimately linked to Thailand's nation-building project which began in earnest after the 1932 revolt that brought the absolute monarchy to an end. In general, 'Thainess' is defined as being Buddhist and able to speak Thai. This narrowly constructed identity makes it difficult for ethnic Malay Muslims in the deep South, who speak a variant of Malay, to feel Thai. A recent government survey revealed that about 30,000 people in the deep South could not speak Thai. The Malay Muslims are not Buddhist by religion. In some towns, they constitute the majority of the population. The spate of violence that began in January 2004, sometimes associated with separatist sentiments, reveals the inadequacy of the officially sanctioned 'Thainess' to accommodate the diverse identities that exist within the country.

This restrictive construction of 'Thainess' is widely accepted by the Thai people despite the fact that many different ethnic and linguistic groups have contributed to the Thai culture. Among them are the Mon and a dozen other hill tribes, with the Khmer, Lao and Malay communities. The dominant conception of 'Thainess' is based on the myth of national homogeneity – as opposed to the plurality and diversity in society. The concept of a homogenous Thai nation was constructed seven decades ago to create a sense of community among the people. As Professor Benedict Anderson suggested to the Thai media early this year (2004), the Thai nation-state is not willing to recognise the Muslims in the deep South as Malay Muslims. It calls them 'Thai Muslims,' thereby denying these people

their own cultural roots. It is a policy motivated by the fear that Malaysians would become involved with the conflict in the Southern Thai territory.

The story of how the Chinese migrants and their offspring became Thai is not very different. Over the past 70 years, the government has pushed them to suppress and even abandon some of their traditional identity markers – their names, their language, costumes etc., – and adopt characteristics of the homogenous Thai identity prescribed by the government. This homogenisation of national identity was carried out in the name of social harmony and national unity. In this process, to be Thai meant the acceptance of, and assimilation into, the state-sanctioned conception of ‘Thainess,’ discarding the cultures and autonomous identities of minority communities.

There is however a major difference between the Malay and Chinese communities in Thailand. The Chinese are a migrant minority whereas the Malay-speaking Muslim people of Pattani and nearby areas are not migrants. Their indigenous status is the source of the conflict as well as their identity crisis.

The identity crisis of the Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand has been made acute and more complex by the new trend towards the purification of Islamic belief through the removal of indigenous pre-Muslim Hindu and animistic beliefs. This seeks to re-align local Muslims with the larger Islamic world. It is a process that can be described as ‘Arabisation.’ Local mosques that once reflected Malay-style vernacular architecture have now fallen out of favour. The high-Islamic style of the Middle East, with prominent domes, has come to dominate the Muslim architecture in Southern Thailand.

The recently created Ministry of Culture tries to play the role of gatekeeper for the official Thai identity. It polices the notion of Thainess by telling the public what is appropriate to be Thai and what is not. For example, the Ministry recently attempted to ban gays from television. It also tried to impose dress codes for young women during the Songkran festival. Among the Ministry’s other activities of cultural policing is banning the scantily clad fashion models on catwalk.

Meanwhile, the official manipulation of ‘Thainess’ is now being challenged by the private sector which uses the identity question in commercial advertising. A TV commercial for a local brand of beer, Beer Chang, asks the viewers, “Are you Thai or not?” The commercial suggests that ‘Thainess’ can be maintained by consuming the right brand of beer.

When the identity is multi-faceted, it tends to transcend national borders and be subject to re-imagination, revival and fluidity, thereby challenging the exclusive and hegemonic notion of 'Thainess.' For example, among some Thais, being Chinese is now something to be celebrated, because China is emerging as an economic, political and cultural power at the global level. As the notion of multiple identities is now becoming accepted and tolerated in Thai society, it remains to be seen how the Malay-Muslims will be treated by the Thai state.

'Thainess' and Nation-State as a Modern Project and Its Limitations

The discourse of 'Thainess' and nationalism as a modern project shares many characteristics with other modern projects such as architecture and history. Modernity rests on a certain grand narrative. In architecture it is the 'international style' which, came to dominate the modern architectural design throughout the world in the 1960s and the 1970s. Modernity's stress on standardisation erases diversity and privileges the centre. For example, in the 'modern' history in Thailand, history as seen from the point of view of Bangkok, the capital city, is dominant. It does not allow competing histories from the periphery to co-exist.

History in a modern sense is a-historical in that it projects the present of the nation-state to the past and ignores the history-making role played by the peripheries. It is this kind of modern understanding of Thai history that has caused dissent and dissatisfaction in the predominantly Malay-Muslim areas in Pattani and in the surrounding provinces of Yala and Narathiwat. This shows that a national history, like in Thailand, that ignores the perspectives of the periphery does not understand nor comprehend fully the realities of the periphery. As it is now increasingly becoming evident in Thailand, a nationalist ideology designed at the centre for the entire country can hardly hold the nation together.

A small, yet vocal, group of scholars and historians have questioned this ultra-nationalistic history. By doing so they have also gotten themselves into trouble, by evoking the wrath of the state. Among these scholars are Srisakala Wallibhotama, Sujit Wongtej, Charnvit Kasetsiri, Somsak Chiamtirasakul, and Thongchai Winichakul. Meanwhile, the recent violent events in the Malay-Muslim areas of Southern Thailand have produced some unanticipated outcomes. New books are now being written about the

history of the conflict and the history of Pattani itself, from the point of view of the periphery, effectively challenging the centre's representation of history.

In a recent book on militant Islamic movements in South East Asia, an attempt is made to discover the missing Pattani link of Thai history. It argues that after the kingdom of Pattani was annexed to the kingdom of Thailand, the Malay Muslims in Pattani were forced to assimilate into Thai identity through education, economic activities and political loyalty. In the 1930s under Prime Minister Pibul Songkram's rule, the Malay-Muslims in the Southern border provinces were not allowed to wear their traditional clothing or to speak the Malay language. They were also forced to abandon their Muslim family names. Against such a process of creating a homogenous Thai identity, there was resistance by the Malay Muslims that even dates back in the early twentieth century.

About the historical process of constructing a modern Thai nation, Thongchai points out that there has not been a consistent definition of 'Thainess' at the official level. Defining 'Thainess' has been an unending process. According to Thongchai, authorities have defined 'Thainess' from the perspective of their own ideological camps. Prince Damrong Rajanubhap once suggested that the three moral pillars of the Thai people were love for national independence, tolerance, and compromise or assimilation. The Pibun government during World War II (1938-1945) initiated many attempts to civilise the Thai culture. Many commissions were established to stipulate what the Thai culture should be and to supervise its dissemination. Thongchai notes an interesting irony in this modernising project of the Thai identity: "Traditional clothing and the traditional practice of chewing the betel nut were prohibited, while trousers, skirts, and kissing before going out to work in the morning were prescribed."

'Preservation and promotion of the national culture' has been a major official concern in defining 'Thainess.' As Thongchai points out, a government body has always existed for this purpose. The Commission for National Identity, which has had to define Thainess in order to clarify its tasks for planning, coordination, and consultation on the security of the institutions of the nation, religion and monarchy. The commission concluded that the nation is composed of eight elements: territory, population, independence and sovereignty, government and administration, religion, monarchy, culture, and dignity. As Thongchai suggests, there is an

ambiguity even about this official understanding of Thainess. The Commission expressed its concern that the meaning of the term 'national identity' was "quite broad, covering all aspects of the nation to the extent that it may cause some confusion and unclear understanding. Even the eight elements as defined are not agreed upon by everyone." We may conclude with Thongchai that "[s]ince the definition of Thainess has never been (and never will be) clear, the domain of what is Thai and the power relations arising from it constitute an arena over which different interpretations from various positions struggle to gain hegemony."

The officially sanctioned 'Thainess' is also counter posed in the public imagination with notions of 'un-Thainess.' The smear of being 'un-Thai' has become a convenient rationale in dismissing and attacking fellow Thais. A recent instance that dramatically demonstrated a particular construction of un-Thainess is the incident involving the pop diva, Tata Young, who has had a high-profile relationship with the tennis superstar and national icon, Paradorn Srichaphan. Young boasted about it at a press conference and later on television. After weeks of pressure from the fans and his parents, Srichaphan abandoned his 'un-Thai' girlfriend. Indeed in Thailand, branding someone 'un-Thai' is one of the most convenient and dangerous ways of vilifying a Thai person. It is dangerous because, the 'un-Thai' measuring stick has long been used as an easy means/gauge of social control by the state.

In the final analysis, it is this narrow and restrictive history and interpretation of Thainess that has given rise to the competing nationalism for an independent Pattani. Pattani nationalism as a modern project is also narrowly imagined. In their inability to identify and share a common identity under the greater Thai project of nation building, the Malay-Muslims of Pattani have also invented an exclusivist identity.

Conclusion

I argued in this essay that despite the official construction of a Thai identity as that of a peaceful people in harmony, the Thai society is a militarised one in which beneath the facade of civility and smile is a culture of violence. The end of the Monarchy in 1932 or the end of the military dictatorship in 1992 have not severed the Thai society's deep rooted links with other dimensions of militarist culture – obedience to authority, lack of debate and dissent, intolerance of difference and the blind acceptance of the will of the

state. Neither has the state given up its practices of dealing with political dissent and conflict by military means, as recently became evident in the bloody repression of Malay-Muslims in Southern Thailand.

I further pointed out that in the militarised culture of Thailand, there is no social space for a public culture of criticism and dissent. The official construction of the discourse of Thainess as the identity of a peace-loving people has left very little room for introspection and critical ability among the Thai people to acknowledge the violent nature of their own society. While this official discourse may have positive consequences, it is necessary to look beyond this veneer of peace, harmony in order to see the actual nature of the contemporary society. The historical amnesia about the violent past and the lack of any condemnation of past violence, or even coming to terms with the violent past, has made it easier for violent history to repeat itself.

Against this backdrop, there exists a need for a conscious effort to democratise the Thai culture, despite the adoption of parliamentary democracy seven decades ago. Thailand's militarised culture is so deep rooted that most Thai people are even not aware of its existence. Without reflexivity and conscious attempt to explicate it, people are likely to continue to accept militarism as a normal.

NOTES:

- 1 Sivaraksa wrote on this issue: "Indeed we were told, nay, we were ordered, to salute the national flag, accompanied by the comical and chauvinistic national anthem twice every day at 8 a.m. and 6 p. m. This is still going on today. I feel that if the country is ruled democratically, with sensitivity to various nationalities and ethnicities, especially the Malays in the South and the hill peoples in the North as well as the Khmers in the Northeast, we would have done away with the name Thailand and the national anthem, not to mention the military custom of forcing everyone to salute the flag daily." See, Sulak Sivaraksa, *National Identity and its Defenders* (Chiangmai: Silkworm Books, 1993), 47-48.
- 2 At the Thammasat violence, the Scouts "enthusiastically assisted in the beating and killing of scores of university students; some were shot, others garrotted, and yet others doused with gasoline and set ablaze. The day ended with the dissolution of Parliament and the return of military rule." See, A.K. Bowie, *Rituals of National Loyalty: An*

Anthropology of the State and the Village Scout Movement in Thailand (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 3. Bowie, who was the only foreigner who observed the scouts five-day initiation rite, adds: "While the instructors at the initiation revealed their activities with pride, film clips of Nazi Germany flashed through my mind, a macabre déjà vu of fascism." Ibid., 4. Bowie credited the Thai state for inventing a ritual of village scouts to use as a weapon in its struggle against communism at that time.

- 3 See, S. Yuanto et al, 2003.
- 4 See, W. Thongchai, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of Siam* (Chiangmai: Silkworm Books, 1998), 4.
- 5 Ibid., 5.
- 6 Ibid., 9.

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Jayadeva Uyangoda is Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science and Public Policy in the University of Colombo who is noted for the significant contributions he has made to the critical understanding of conflicts and conflict resolution in Sri Lanka and the subcontinent. He is Founder Co

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Kinhide Mushakoji is a reputed Japanese authority on international affairs and a lifelong peace advocate. Mushakoji has been on the Board of several organisations, among them, the Japanese Peace Studies Association and the International Peace Research Association. He is the Director of the Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership (CAPP), Osaka University on Economic and Law. He is also Vice Chair of the International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR).

Formerly the Vice-Rector of the Regional and Global Studies Division of the United Nations University for 13 years, Mushakoji is also former Director of the Institute of International Relations which he founded in 1969 at the Sophia University in Tokyo, and was also President of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) between 1986 and 1988.

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Kwon Insook is a former labour activist who is now teaching on women's studies at the Myongji University in South Korea. Central to Insook's study for many years are on the issues of women and militarism. She is a PhD graduate on Women's Studies from the Calrk University and her dissertation in 2000 is entitled *Militarism in My Heart: Women's Militarised Consciousness and Culture in South Korea*. Insook was an Assistant Professor on Women's Studies in South Florida until 2003.

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Pravit Rojanaphruk is a Senior Reporter of *The Nation* who has been working with the Thai daily since 1991. Pravit is a core member of the Bangkok Forum, a civic group aimed at rejuvenating Bangkok community life, a board member of the Arom Pongphangarn Foundation (Labour Rights Promoting Foundation), a contributor to the *Pacaryasara Magazine*, an alternative magazine led by social critic Sulak Sivaraksa and is columnist-cum-contributor of the leading Korean News Magazine, *Hankyore 21*.

His special areas of interest are in media reform (with the promotion of transparency, democracy and public accountability), democratic culture, cultural globalisation and its repercussions and history. Pravit is also currently covering the day to day developments in Southern Thailand following the outbreak of violence in March 2004 that now threatens to blow into a full – scale conflict.

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Samira Ali-Gutoc is a former correspondent for the leading Philippine daily, *The Inquirer*, based in Marawi City who is now working for the Minda News and calls herself a ‘peace journalist’. She is a journalist and member of the Media Committee of the Young Moro Professionals Network who writes extensively on the subject of building a peaceful democratic society in countering the negative imagery of Muslims as portrayed by popular media.

Samira is a founding member of the Asian Peace Alliance.

The Asian Regional Exchange for New Alternatives (ARENA) is a regional network of concerned Asian scholars and activists which aims to contribute to processes of meaningful and people-oriented social change. Noting the new global climate of insecurity that has been ushered in by the escalation of war and militarism, ARENA has embarked on a new multi-pronged peace programme that seeks to :

- change the conception of security from national security towards a more people-friendly paradigm in protection of people's rights, livelihoods and security;
- show how militarised notions of security contribute to and influence security arising from peoples and states; and
- introduce alternative approaches arising from people's perspectives.

ARENA believes that the current crisis of 'security' has given rise to a political moment which calls for an alternative vision and agenda for peace. In this spirit, ARENA hopes to articulate a 'social critique' that inspires new visions and political imagination.